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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The impact of British rule over India has received 
considerable attention at the hands of the historian. But 
there remain important gaps in our knowledge of this impact. 
These gaps are a result of the historian’s failure to 
discern a causal relationship between the values and objec­
tives of British administrators in India, and the changes 
stemming from the policies they pursued. In focussing 
attention on the principles which inspired British adminis­
trators, the historian has thrown a flood of light on the 
premises of British policy. But despite the insight he has 
gained into the intellectual motivations of British policy, 
his task remains unaccomplished until he dwells upon the con­
sequences of British rule, and relates these consequences to 
the social ideals and political objectives which inspired 
British administrators. Consider an obvious example. The 
decay of the village communities under British rule is often 
looked upon as a process independent of the values of British 
administrators. But the moment it is realised that a consum­
ing belief in individualism and rationalism encouraged 
British administrators to promote progress and prosperity 
through destroying the cohesion of rural society, the decay
of the village communities stands revealed as a piece of cal­
culated social engineering rather than an accidental conse­
quence of British rule over India,
Before the British concern for progress and prosperity 
can be related to the atomisation of rural society, it is 
necessary to comprehend the institutions and the organisation 
of society prior to the British conquest. The complexity of 
Hindu society, and the diversity of conditions in different 
parts of India, prevent the historian from focussing atten­
tion on the country as a whole, and oblige him to embark upon 
a regional investigation. I have chosen Maharashtra as my 
field of study. This choice was determined by several 
factors. Maharashtra comprises a distinct geographical 
region, and it possesses an historical tradition and a cultur­
al identity peculiarly its own. It was also the birthplace 
of a religious movement which transmitted the great tradition 
of Hinduism to the masses, and formed the basis of a polity 
that successfully challenged the domination of Islam, and 
constituted the hub of an imperial system which virtually em­
braced the entire subcontinent before its defeat and dissolu­
tion at British hands. Finally, because the polity of 
Maharashtra was based upon resurgent Hinduism, the institu­
tions of Hindu society flourished there in a fullness of life
which was absent in these institutions in parts of the 
country subject to Muslim rule.
The vitality of Hindu institutions in Maharashtra was 
reinforced by a Brahmin ruling family, which buttressed its 
power through the creation of a landowning aristocracy from 
amongst its caste-fellows, and through recruiting the bureau­
cracy from members of its caste. The exercise of political 
authority by a Brahmin dynasty created a unique situation in 
Maharashtra. While the values of Hinduism assured the 
Brahmin caste of a superior status throughout the country, 
the combination of social status with political power enabled 
the Brahmins of Maharashtra to enjoy a predominance without 
parallel in India. This predominance was reflected in the 
vigour of caste organisations which defined social sanctions 
and enforced social order. It was also expressed in the 
moral life of the community and the cohesion which held 
castes and classes together, despite chronic political insta­
bility, and despite the existence of an administration which 
was not subject to legal or rational restraints.
Both the values and institutions of Hindu society were 
related to a social order in which prescription and stability 
rather than progress and mobility formed the concern of the 
statesman and the administrator. The economic organisation 
of society was of a piece with these values and institutions.
The idea of economic growth was unknown; and the conduct of 
economic relations between the State and the individual, and 
between different sections of the community, through collec­
tive bodies like the village community or the caste guild 
stimulated co-operation as opposed to competition, and 
reduced inequalities in wealth to a minimum. The community 
was influenced by values which put a premium on order and 
stability; and its economic life revolved around institutions 
which stood in the way of economic growth. These values and 
institutions interacted with and reinforced one another, and 
they formed the basis of a society which achieved order 
through acquiescence in a rigid scheme of social stratifica­
tion, and attained stability at the cost of economic stagna­
tion.
It is necessary to focus attention on the obstacles to 
progress in traditional Maharashtra in order to understand 
the changes which transformed the region in the nineteenth 
century. These changes stemmed from the gulf in political 
and economic values between British administrators and their 
Maratha predecessors. To emphasize this gulf does not imply 
that all British administrators shared a common outlook, or 
that they were agreed upon the policies that were to be pur­
sued in Maharashtra. But despite differences in their social 
visions, the new rulers of Maharashtra were committed to the
promotion of progress and prosperity, and this commitment 
distinguished them from the administrators of the old order. 
For instance, Mountstuart Elphinstone, the first governor of 
the conquered territories, was a conservative in the 
Burkean tradition. Yet Elphinstone yielded to none in his 
determination to replace the traditional polity of Maharashtra 
by a liberal polity; and he was as anxious as the advocates 
of reform to put Maharashtra on the path of progress and 
prosperity.
Where the Utilitarian advocates of reform within the 
British Government differed from the conservative administra­
tors was in their doctrinaire belief in individualism and 
rationalism; and in their refusal to take any account of the 
traditional values and institutions of Maharashtra. These 
differences found their clearest expression in economic 
policy, and it was in economic policy that the Utilitarians 
achieved their most signal triumph over the conservatives. 
Elphinstonefs concern for continuity in the midst of change 
enabled him to formulate a sophisticated policy of reform in 
the systems of education and administration. But his refusal 
to make a clean break with the past prevented him from coming 
to grips with the economic problems which afflicted rural 
society. Tradition and prescription did not at all concern 
the Utilitarians. Believing that in the laws of political
economy they possessed an objective insight into social 
reality, and convinced that progress was dependent upon an 
individualistic as opposed to a collective organisation of 
society, the Utilitarians set aside the policies pursued 
under the Marathas, and prepared the ground for a new order 
in rural society. This new order rested on the ryotwari 
system of land-revenue, which established a direct contrac­
tual relationship between the peasant and the State, and fixed 
his dues on the basis of the Ricardian law of rent. Through 
undermining the cohesion of the village community, and through 
fixing the land-tax on the basis of the laws of political 
economy, the Utilitarians hoped to stimulate agricultural 
production and to raise the level of rural prosperity. They 
also believed that the growth of individualism and a competi­
tive social environment would result in the emergence of a 
class of rich peasants whose prosperity and dominance would 
form a stable base for British rule over India.
The ryotwari system of land-revenue proved to be a dis­
astrous social experiment. The advocates of reform were all 
too successful in undermining the cohesion of the village 
community, and in transforming the social climate of village 
society. They were also able to promote the growth of a 
small class of rich peasants. But the rise of this class was 
overshadowed by the growing power of the moneylenders, whose
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role in the rural economy acquired a new significance under 
the ryotwari system, and whose dominance was reinforced by 
the legal system created by the British Government. The 
rise of the moneylenders and the decline of the cultivators 
found expression in the transfer of holdings in land from the 
latter to the former. This transfer would have been a fruit­
ful change if the moneylenders had taken over the role of 
capitalist farmers, since they not only possessed substantial 
holdings in land, but they also commanded the capital re­
sources and the intelligence necessary to exploit rational 
techniques of agriculture. But their caste values prevented 
them from becoming capitalist farmers. Instead, they pre­
ferred to lease fields to their former owners, and continued 
to pursue the business of moneylending.
The conflict between the cultivators and the moneylenders 
led to the agrarian disturbances of 1875> which compelled 
British administrators to modify their policies and to amend 
the system of administration they had instituted to promote 
prosperity in rural society. Behind the abandonment of 
Utilitarian policies lay a growing belief that the advocates 
of reform had made a fatal mistake in disregarding the level 
of social development which prevailed in Maharashtra; and 
that reform could be creative only if it took into considera­
tion the values and institutions which flourished in a
community. By remoulding the legal system in favour of the 
cultivator, and by stimulating the flow of rural credit 
through co-operative credit societies, the British Government 
sought to undermine the dominance of the moneylenders, and 
to promote the prosperity of the cultivators. But while these 
measures curbed the power of the moneylenders, they did not 
raise the prosperity of the cultivating community as a whole. 
Instead, the small class of rich peasants created by the 
ryotwari system exploited these measures to the exclusion of 
other cultivators, and they were able to establish their 
dominance over the villages of Maharashtra,
The rise of the rich peasants by the opening decades of 
the twentieth century held serious political implications for 
Maharashtra. The Brahmins of Maharashtra, who had dominated 
the region before the British conquest, maintained their 
hegemony throughout the nineteenth century, despite the emerg­
ence of a group of new Brahmins who subscribed to progress and 
rationality, and who were opposed to the values of caste and 
the institutions of orthodox Hinduism. So long as the 
peasants lived at a level of subsistence, they acquiesced in 
Brahmanical supremacy. But the moment a rich class arose 
within the peasantry, it challenged the Brahmin community, and 
sought for itself a status appropriate to its economic power. 
The rich peasants1 quest for dominance was expressed in a
political movement which first challenged the position of the 
Brahmins, and then proceeded to attack the British Government. 
Because of their numerical strength and their economic power 
the rich peasants had no trouble in undermining the position 
of the Brahmins, and the transfer of political authority in 
1947 signified their triumph over the British Government.
Yet the bonds which linked the peasants and Brahmins to a 
common corpus of religious values prevented the anfci-Brahmin 
movement in Maharashtra from assuming the disruptive 
characteristics it acquired in States like Tamiland, where 
popular and elite values stemmed from conflicting schools of 
religious philosophy. Because of the existence of an intel­
lectual consensus, once the rich peasants of Maharashtra had 
captured political power, they were able to forge a creative 
alliance with the Brahmins, and this alliance underlies the 
stability of politics in contemporary Maharashtra.
PREFACE
This thesis deals with the transformation of 
Maharashtra from a traditional to a modern society. It 
sets out the transition of a relatively static society into 
one in which progress and change were pursued as desirable 
social objectives. Such a transition is of deep interest to 
the historian, both for the light it throws on the society 
with which he is concerned, and the insights it reveals into 
the nature of social change. Assuming this to be so, a study 
of Maharashtra acquires a heightened interest, since it was 
conquered from its traditional rulers in 1818 by a State 
which immediately set it on the path to modernisation.
Because of the transfer of political authority into the hands 
of the British Government, the modernisation of Maharashtra 
can be studied in a sharpness of definition which does not 
obtain for societies where this change took place spontan­
eously.
I am indebted to the Australian National University for 
awarding me a scholarship which made this study possible, and 
for financing a field trip to India. I am also extremely 
grateful to my supervisor Dr D.A, Low, who opened a new 
intellectual horizon before me through encouraging me to
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CHAPTER I
INTEGRATION AND CLEAVAGE IN  MAHARASHTRA -  1818
M a h a ra s h tra  ( l i t ,  th e  g r e a t  c o u n t r y )  l i e s  i n  c e n t r a l  
and w e s te rn  I n d i a ,  I t  i s  in h a b it e d  b y  a p e o p le  who s p e a k  th e  
t fa r a t h i  la n g u a g e , and who p o s s e s s  a d i s t i n c t  c u l t u r a l  and  
l i s t o r i c a l  t r a d i t i o n ,  w h ic h  s e t s  them  a p a r t  from  th e  r e s t  o f  
the c o u n t r y .  M a h a ra s h tra  c o v e r s  an a r e a  w h ic h  i s  bounded by  
the A r a b ia n  S e a  on t h e  w e s t ,  th e  r i v e r s  N arbada and T a p t i  on 
the n o r t h ,  and th e  M a lap ra b h a  on th e  s o u t h ,  w h i le  i t s  
e a s t e r n  b o u n d ary  i s  d e f in e d  by g e o p h y s ic a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
v h ic h  d e m a rca te  t h e  l i n e  o f  c le a v a g e  b etw een  th e  M a r a th i and  
T e lu g u  s p e a k in g  p e o p le .  A p a r t  from  th e  n a rro w  Concon c o a s t ,  
v h ic h  l i e s  b etw een  th e  A r a b ia n  S ea  and th e  G h a t s ,  M a h a ra s h tra  
c o m p rise s  a p la t e a u  w h ic h  s lo p e s  g r a d u a l ly  to  th e  e a s t ,  b u t  
ie s c e n d s  p r e c i p i t o u s l y  w e stw a rd s  to  th e  c o a s t a l  p l a i n  and th e  
I r a b ia n  S e a , From th e  G h a t s ,  w h ic h  s t r e t c h  ro u g h ly  n o r t h  t o  
s o u th , lo n g  to n g u e s  o f  h ig h e r  g ro u n d  ru n  e a s t  and d iv id e  th e  
p la t e a u  in t o  co m p artm en ts l i k e  th e  p l a i n s  o f  B e r a r  and
1
2N a g p u r, t h e  b a s in  o f  th e  u p p e r G o d a v r i ,  and th e  Bhim a  
b e tw e e n  Poona and Sholapur-*-.
Th e  p h y s i c a l  s e t t i n g  o f  M a h a ra sh tra  h a s  c o n f e r r e d  
c e r t a i n  a d v a n ta g e s  upon h e r  p e o p le  w h ic h  a r e  r e f l e c t e d  i n  
t h e i r  h i s t o r y  and i n  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  t r a d i t i o n s *  The  
N arb ad a  and T a p t i ,  w h ic h  form  th e  n o r t h e r n  b o u n d ary  o f  
M a h a r a s h t r a ,  w e re  in s u rm o u n ta b le  b a r r i e r s  i n  th e  p a th  o f  any  
in v a d e r  who p ro ce e d e d  to  th e  D e ccan  a f t e r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  h i s  
a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  th e  b a s in s  o f  th e  In d u s  and G a n g e s . E v e n  
when t h e s e  b a r r i e r s  had b een  o v e rco m e , th e  t e r r a i n  o f  
M a h a ra s h tra  o f f e r e d  i d e a l  c o n d it io n s  f o r  s u s t a in e d  r e s i s t a n c e  
a g a in s t  an a l i e n  arm y o f  o c c u p a t io n «  B o th  th e  G h a t s ,  w h ic h  
ru n  p a r a l l e l  to  th e  c o a s t l i n e ,  and th e  to n g u e s o f  h ig h e r  
g ro u n d , w h ic h  b ra n c h  o f f  e a s tw a rd s  from  th e  G h a t s ,  a re  
f la n k e d  by r i c h  v a l l e y s  and p l a i n s  t h a t  a r e  d o tte d  by  
num erous tow ns and v i l l a g e s *  The u p la n d s  o f  M a h a ra sh tra  
t h e r e f o r e  o f f e r  an i d e a l  s e t t i n g  f o r  m i l i t a r y  r e s i s t a n c e  
a g a in s t  an a l i e n  a u t h o r i t y ,  w it h  ab u n d an t s o u r c e s  o f  s u p p ly ,  
and w it h  num erous s i t e s  f o r  m i l i t a r y  s t r o n g h o ld s ,  w here  pow er 
ca n  be o r g a n is e d ,  b o th  f o r  a g g r e s s io n  and f o r  d e fe n c e *  The
1
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3e n t i r e  r e g io n  i s  re g a rd e d  b y  m i l i t a r y  s t r a t e g i s t s  t o  be one 
o f  th e  m ost e a s i l y  d e f e n s ib le  p a r t s  o f  In d ia ^ .
B e c a u se  o f  th e  g e o g r a p h ic a l  s e t t i n g  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a , and  
t h e  c u l t u r a l  and p o l i t i c a l  i d e n t i t y  o f  h e r  p e o p le ,  th e  
r e g io n  p o s s e s s e s  a d i s t i n c t  p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  i t s  own. The  
e th o s  o f  M a h a ra s h tra  im p r e s s e s  i t s e l f  f o r c i b l y  upon th e  
s c h o la r  who s t u d ie s  th e  h i s t o r y  and c u l t u r e  o f  th e  r e g io n .  
R e f e r r in g  t o  th e  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a , S p a te  h as  
summed up th e  la n d  and i t s  p e o p le  w it h  re m a rk a b le  acumen and  
p e r c e p t io n .  f The e n t i r e  r e g io n 1 , he p o in t s  o u t ,  1 b e a r s  th e  
im p r in t  o f  th e  M a r a t h a s : a to u g h , h a rd w o rk in g , and c h e e r f u l  
p e a s a n t r y ,  a b ly  s e r v e d  b y  an a d r o i t  B rah m in  e l i t e  w h ic h  m ain ­
t a in e d  c lo s e  to u c h  w it h  th e  p e o p le 1 3 . The u n iq u e n e s s  o f  th e  
M a h a r a s h t r ia n  s t y l e  o f  l i f e  was j u s t  a s  a p p a re n t  to  S i r  
R ic h a r d  T e m p le , th e  G o v e rn o r  o f  Bombay i n  th e  1 8 7 0 s . S p e a k ­
in g  o f  th e  e x t e n t  to  w h ic h  th e  g r e a t  t r a d i t i o n  o f  H in d u ism  
had in f lu e n c e d  M a h a r a s h t r a , S i r  R ic h a r d  o b s e r v e d : f B u t  
d e s p i t e  ( t h e  c u l t u r a l  v a lu e s  w h ic h  th e y  s h a r e  w it h  th e  r e s t  
o f  I n d i a )  th e  M a h ra tta s  h a ve  a lw a y s  form ed a s e p a r a t e  p e o p le
2
R . T e m p le , f The M a ra th a  N a t i o n a l i t y 1 i n  S h iv a . i i  And The 
R is e  O f The M a r a t h a s . ( C a l c u t t a ,  1953)>  p p . 6 - 7 .
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o r  n a t i o n ,  a n d  s t i l l  r e g a r d  t h e m s e l v e s  a s  s u c h * 4 # W h a t  w a s  
o b v i o u s  t o  T e m p l e  i n  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  a n d  s t r u c k  
S p a t e  i n  t h e  t w e n t i e t h ,  c o u l d  h a r d l y  h a v e  f a i l e d  t o  m a k e  a n  
i m p r e s s i o n  o n  t h e  s o n s  o f  t h e  s o i l ,  a n d  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  
M a h a r a s h t r a  i s  a  t h e m e  w h i c h  h a s  e x c i t e d  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  
M a h a r a s h t r i a n  s c h o l a r  f r o m  t h e  t i m e s  o f  R a n a d e  t o  c o n t e m p o r ­
a r y  i n t e l l e c t u a l  f i g u r e s  l i k e  P h a t a k  a n d  K a r v e  a n d  G a r d e .
T h e  H i s t o r i c a l  T r a d i t i o n  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a
B e h i n d  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a  l i e s  a n  h i s t o r i c a l  
t r a d i t i o n  s t r e t c h i n g  i n t o  t h e  b e g i n n i n g s  o f  t h e  C h r i s t i a n  e r a .  
D u r i n g  t h e  t h r e e  c e n t u r i e s  w h i c h  f o l l o w e d  t h e  b i r t h  o f  C h r i s t  
M a h a r a s h t r a  w a s  r u l e d  b y  a  S a t v a h a n a  d y n a s t y  f r o m  t h e  c a p i t a l  
c i t y  o f  P a i t h a n  o n  t h e  G o d a v r i .  P a i t h a n  u n d e r  t h e  S a t v a h a n a s  
w a s  a  w e l l  k n o w n  c e n t r e  o f  c u l t u r a l  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  a c t i v i t y ,  
a n d  t h e  a r c h i t e c t u r a l  r e m a i n s  o f  t h e  p e r i o d  s p e a k  o f  a  
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  a n d  p r o s p e r o u s  c o m m u n i t y .  F o r  a  c o u p l e  o f  
c e n t u r i e s  a f t e r  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  t h e  S a t v a h a n a s  c h a o s  r e i g n e d  
s u p r e m e  o v e r  M a h a r a s h t r a .  B u t  t h e  C h a l u k y a s ,  w h o  c a m e  t o  
p o w e r  i n  t h e  s i x t h  c e n t u r y ,  a n d  r u l e d  o v e r  t h e  l a n d  f o r  t h e  
n e x t  c e n t u r y  a n d  a  h a l f ,  w e r e  p o w e r f u l  e n o u g h  t o  k e e p  a t  b a y  
t h e  E m p e r o r  H a r s h a  o f  K a n a u j ,  w h o  h a d  e s t a b l i s h e d  h i s  s w a y
4
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5o v e r  th e  w h o le  o f  I n d ia  n o r t h  o f  th e  N a rb a d a . The C h a lu k y a s  
w e re  e c l i p s e d  i n  A .D . 780 by t h e  R a s h t r a k u t a s , who d o m in ated  
M a h a ra s h tra  t i l l  th e  end o f  th e  t e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  and w ere  th e  
m o st p o w e r fu l r u l i n g  f a m i ly  to  e s t a b l i s h  t h e m s e lv e s  i n  th e  
r e g io n .  The R a s h t r a k u t a s  w ere  i n  t u r n  o v e rth ro w n  b y  a c a d e t  
l i n e  o f  th e  C h a lu k y a s ,  b u t  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  r e g io n  
p a s s e d  in t o  th e  han d s o f  a Y ad ava  c l a n ,  w h ic h  w as d e s t in e d  
to  be o verw helm ed  by th e  I s l a m i c  d e lu g e  t h a t  sw e p t th ro u g h  
th e  la n d  i n  th e  c l o s i n g  y e a r s  o f  th e  t h i r t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .  
Though t h e  Y a d a v a s  w ere  v a n q u is h e d  by th e  M u slim  
in v a d e r s  fro m  th e  n o r t h ,  M a ra th a  pow er was w eakened  r a t h e r  
th a n  c o m p le t e ly  d e s t ro y e d  by th e  I s l a m i c  i n v a s i o n ,  and b a s in g  
t h e m s e lv e s  on t h e i r  i n a c c e s s i b l e  m o u n ta in  s t r o n g h o ld s ,  th e  
la n d e d  c h i e f s  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a ,  w hose o t h e r  s o u r c e s  o f  pow er 
we s h a l l  p r e s e n t ly  d i s c u s s ,  w ere  a b le  to  m a in t a in  a p o s i t io n  
o f  s e m i- in d e p e n d e n c e  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  M u slim  k in g s  o f  th e  
D e c c a n , B u t w h i le  i t  c lu n g  p r e c a r i o u s l y  to  i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  
p r e r o g a t i v e s ,  th e  la n d e d  a r i s t o c r a c y  o f  M a h a ra s h tra  was 
u n a b le  t o  p r e s e n t  any s e r i o u s  c h a l le n g e  to  th e  M u slim  r u l e r s ,  
and i t  c o u ld  n o t  c o n c e r t  an y  o r g a n is e d  o p p o s it io n  to  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  dom inance o f  I s la n r * .
5
V id e  The H is t o r y  And C u l t u r e  O f The In d ia n  P e o p le , e d , by  
R .C .  M azum dar, V o l .  I I  (T h e  Age o f  Im p e r ia l  U n i t y ) ,  C h a p te r  
X I I I  and V o l*  I I I  (T h e  Age o f  Im p e r ia l  K a n a u j) C h a p t e r  I .
6S h i v a j i ,  th e  g r e a t  h e ro  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a ,  who i n i t i a t e d  a 
1 n a t i o n a l 1 movement a g a in s t  th e  M u slim  k i n g s ,  was o f  
r e l a t i v e l y  p le b ia n  o r i g i n .  He saw  h i s  o p p o r t u n it y  when th e  
M ughal Em p e ro rs  o f  th e  n o r t h  co n q u e re d  th e  M u slim  k ingdo m s  
o f  th e  D e c c a n , and he e x p lo i t e d  th e  p o l i t i c a l  vacuum  th e y  had  
c r e a t e d  to  s e t  up an in d e p e n d e n t  S t a t e  on t h e  t w in  p i l l a r s  o f  
r e s u r g e n t  H in d u ism  and M a ra th a  dom inance« S h i v a j i  and h i s  
s o l d i e r s  w e re  M a ra th a s  o f  lo w ly  c a s t e ,  b u t  h i s  m i n i s t e r s  and  
a d m in i s t r a t o r s  w ere  B ra h m in s  who c o m p rise d  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  
a r i s t o c r a c y .  S h i v a j i f s  a c h ie v e m e n ts  w ere  m any: he in c u l c a t e d  
s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e  in  h i s  p e o p le ;  he d r i l l e d  them  i n t o  a 
co m p e te n t m i l i t a r y  p o w e r; and he l a i d  th e  f o u n d a t io n s  o f  an  
e n d u r in g  p o l i t i c a l  co m m u n ity . The p o l i t y  w h ic h  he fo u n d ed  
was v i s i t e d  by v a r io u s  v i c i s s i t u d e s  a f t e r  h i s  d e a t h .  B u t  
o n ce  he had  a ro u se d  th e  s p i r i t  o f  in d e p e n d e n c e  among th e  
M a r a th a s , i t  was n e v e r  e x t in g u is h e d ,  and th e  M ughal E m p ire  
b le d  i t s e l f  to  d e a th  i n  a v a in  b id  to  v a n q u is h  a S t a t e  t h a t  
was s e c u r e l y  b a se d  on th e  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  common p e o p le  and  
th e  a r i s t o c r a c y  o f  th e  r e g io n ^ .
Once th e  M a ra th a s  had  c o n s o l id a t e d  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  i n  
th e  D e c c a n , t h e  M ughal Em p e ro rs  w ere  f o r c e d  to  a c q u ie s c e  i n  
t h e i r  in d e p e n d e n c e , and to  g r a n t  them  fo rm a l r e c o g n i t io n .
6
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7The in s t r u m e n t  o f  r e c o g n i t io n  was n e g o t ia t e d  on b e h a l f  o f  a 
d e s c e n d a n t  o f  S h i v a j i  b y  h i s  B rah m in  m i n i s t e r ,  whose o f f i c i a l  
d e s ig n a t io n  was th e  P e sh w a . The o f f i c e  o f  th e  Peshw a grew  in  
im p o rta n c e  a s  th e  M a rath a  kingdom  g a in e d  i n  s t r e n g t h ,  and  
e v e n t u a l l y  becam e h e r e d i t a r y ,  w h i le  th e  k in g  sa n k  in t o  a 
p o s i t i o n  o f  i n s i g n i f a n c e .  In  c o u r s e  o f  t im e  th e  M a ra th a  
pow er becam e d o m in an t th ro u g h o u t  M a h a r a s h t r a ,  w it h  th e  
B rah m in  Peshw a c o n t r o l l i n g  a u t h o r i t y  fro m  h i s  s e a t  a t  P o o n a , 
w h i le  t h e  t i t u l a r  k in g s  c lu n g  to  th e  shadow  o f  pow er a t  th e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  o f  S a t a r a .
A t  t h e  sam e t im e  a s  th e  Peshw a e s t a b l i s h e d  h i s  
a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  M a h a r a s h t r a ,  some o f  h i s  s u b o r d in a t e  c h i e f s  
w ere  b u sy  c a r v in g  o u t  in d e p e n d e n t  p r i n c i p a l i t i e s  fro m  th e  
r u in s  o f  th e  M ughal E m p ire . P ro m in e n t  among t h e s e  c h i e f s  w ere  
th e  B h o n s le s  who e s t a b l i s h e d  th e m s e lv e s  i n  N ag p u r, th e  
S c in d h ia s  who g a in e d  c o n t r o l  o f  G w a l io r ,  and th e  H o lk a r s  who 
s e i z e d  h o ld  o f  In d o r e .  The r e l a t i o n  b etw een  th e  Peshw a and  
t h e s e  M a ra th a  c h i e f s  was a te n u o u s  o n e . The c h i e f s  w ere  
in d e p e n d e n t . Y e t  th e y  r e c o g n is e d  th e  Peshw a a s  th e  head  o f  
th e  M a ra th a  p o l i t y .  B u t w h i le  th e  c h i e f s  a c c e p te d  th e  
fo rm a l s u z e r a i n t y  o f  th e  P e sh w a , th e  Peshw a r e f r a in e d  from  
im p o s in g  an y  r e s t r i c t i o n  on t h e i r  freed o m  o f  a c t i o n .  A 
C o n fe d e r a c y  th u s  came in t o  e x i s t e n c e  o f  w h ic h  th e  B rah m in  
P e sh w a , o r  h e a d , r u le d  o v e r  Poona and th e  M a ra th i s p e a k in g
8( sw a ra .jy a  o r  in d e p e n d e n t)  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  w h i le  th e  s u b o r d in a t e  
M a rath a  c h i e f s  c o n t r o l l e d  e x t e n s iv e  t r a c t s  o f  c e n t r a l  and  
u p p e r I n d i a .  S u ch  was th e  im p e r ia l  s y s te m  w h ic h  s u p p la n t e d  
th e  M u g h a ls , and w h ic h  a t t a in e d  th e  h e ig h t  o f  i t s  g lo r y  i n  
th e  m id d le  o f  th e  e ig h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y
E v e n  b e f o r e  th e  M a rath a  C o n fe d e ra c y  came in t o  c o n f l i c t  
w it h  th e  B r i t i s h  who w ere  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e m s e lv e s  a ro u n d  
Bom bay, M a d ra s . and C a l c u t t a ,  a m i l i t a r y  r e v e r s e  a t  P a n ip a t  
i n  1761 a t  th e  hand s o f  th e  A fg h a n s  had sh a k e n  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
e d i f i c e  head ed  by Poona to  i t s  v e r y  f o u n d a t io n s .  B u t w h i le  
th e  M a ra th a s  w ere a b le  to  r e c o v e r  fro m  th e  d e f e a t  a t  P a n ip a t ,  
and a p p l ie d  th e m s e lv e s  w it h  ren ew ed  v ig o u r  to  t h e  f u l f i l m e n t  
o f  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  a m b it io n s ,  th e y  m et t h e i r  N em esis i n  th e  
B r i t i s h  G o vern m en t. The f i r s t  A n g lo -M a ra th a  W ar, w h ic h  was 
fo u g h t  i n  th e  1 7 8 0 s , p ro v e d  i n c o n c l u s i v e .  B u t i n t e r n a l  
d is s e n s io n s  i n  1803 s p l i t  th e  C o n fe d e ra c y  w id e  o p e n , and  
o b l ig e d  th e  Peshw a to  s e e k  B r i t i s h  p r o t e c t io n ,  w h i le  B r i t i s h  
a rm ie s  i n f l i c t e d  a s e r i e s  o f  d e f e a t s  on h i s  o v e r -m ig h ty  
v a s s a l s .  As a r e s u l t  t h e  M a rath a  c h i e f s  w ere  f o r c e d  to  
n e g o t ia t e  p e a ce  w it h  th e  B r i t i s h  G o v ern m en t, w h ereb y  th e y  
ce d e d  l a r g e  p ie c e s  o f  t e r r i t o r y ,  and a c c e p te d  B r i t i s h  
p o l i t i c a l  su p re m a c y .
7 “
C #A . K in c a id  and D .B .  P a r a s n i s ,  A H is t o r y  o f  th e  M a ra th a  
P e o p le . (M a n g a lo re , 1 9 2 2 ) ,  V o l .  I I ,  C h a p te r s  X XXV I to  X X X IX , 
p a s s im .
9Though th e  w ar o f  1803 s h a t t e r e d  th e  M a ra th a  C o n fe d e ra c y  
b y  p la c in g  th e  Peshw a and th e  M a ra th a  c h i e f s  u n d e r B r i t i s h  
t u t e la g e ,  b o th  th e  Peshw a and h i s  v a s s a l s  r e f u s e d  to  a c c e p t  
th e  v e r d i c t  o f  t h e i r  se c o n d  e n c o u n te r  w it h  th e  B r i t i s h  a s  
d e c i s i v e .  The i n i t i a t i v e  f o r  th e  t h i r d  and f i n a l  
A n g lo -M a ra th a  w ar came from  th e  P e sh w a , d e s p i t e  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  i n  1803 he had p la c e d  h im s e l f  v o l u n t a r i l y  u n d e r B r i t i s h  
p r o t e c t io n .  S p u rre d  by m em ories o f  p a s t  g l o r y ,  i n  1816 he  
p la c e d  h im s e l f  a t  th e  head  o f  a M a ra th a  c o m b in a t io n  w h ic h  
s o u g h t  to  r i d  th e  c o u n t r y  o f  B r i t i s h  c o n t r o l .  H o w ever, h i s  
a tte m p t to  a s s e r t  h i s  in d e p e n d e n c e  ended  i n  m i l i t a r y  d i s a s t e r  
a t  K i r k i  n e a r  Poona i n  1 8 1 8 . U nder t h e  te rm s o f  th e  p e a ce  
s e t t le m e n t ,  th e  Peshw a r e t i r e d  a s  a s t a t e  p r i s o n e r  to  B i t h u r  
n e a r  B e n e r a s ,  w h i le  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  u n d e r  h i s  c o n t r o l  w ere  
ta k e n  o v e r  by th e  B r i t i s h  G overnm ent® .
The B h a k t i  U p su rg e  and S o c i a l  C o n se n su s  in  M a h a ra s h tra
The f a c t o r s  o f  g e o g rap h y  and e n v iro n m e n t w h ic h  e n a b le d  
M a h a ra s h tra  to  o f f e r  e f f e c t i v e  o p p o s it io n  to  I s la m ,  and  
f a s h io n e d  h e r  in t o  th e  b a s e  o f  r e s u r g e n t  H in d u ism , and th e  
hub o f  a p o l i t y  w h ic h  a t  one s t a g e  v i r t u a l l y  c o n t r o l l e d  th e  
e n t i r e  s u b c o n t in e n t ,  h ave  r e c e iv e d  c o n s id e r a b le  e m p h a s is  a t
s--------
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th e  hands o f  th e  h i s t o r i a n s  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a . I t  w o u ld  be  
w rong to  deny t h a t  to  an e x t e n t  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  m oulded th e  
p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a , and t h a t  th e y  h e lp e d  h e r  to  h o ld  
o u t a g a in s t  and to  v a n q u is h  I s la m .  B u t i t  w ould  be e q u a l ly  
i n c o r r e c t  to  m a in t a in  t h a t  h e r  p h y s i c a l  e n v iro n m e n t a lo n e  
e x p la in s  th e  r e s i s t a n c e  w h ic h  M a h a ra s h tra  was a b le  to  o f f e r  
to  th e  s p re a d  o f  I s la m .  The k e y  to  th e  v ig o u r  o f  M a h a ra s h tra  
l i e s  i n  th e  s e c u l a r  and s p i r i t u a l  v a lu e s  w h ich  i n s p i r e d  th e  
M a h a r a s h t r ia n s ,  and w h ic h  stemmed fro m  a r e l i g i o u s  u p su rg e  
t h a t  c o in c id e d  w it h  t h e  a d v e n t  o f  I s la m  i n  th e  D e c c a n . T h is  
r e l i g i o u s  u p su rg e  im posed  a s o c i a l  c o n s e n s u s  upon M a h a ra s h tra  
th ro u g h  a f f i l i a t i n g  t h e  e l i t e  c a s t e s ,  l i k e  th e  B ra h m in s , and  
th e  lo w e r  and m id d le  c a s t e s ,  l i k e  th e  m ahars and k u n b is ,  to  
a common c o rp u s  o f  s p i r i t u a l  v a l u e s .  By r e s o lv in g  t h e  t e n s io n  
b etw een  th e  e l i t e  c a s t e s  and th e  r e s t  o f  t h e  co m m u n ity , 
M a h a ra s h tra  was a b le  to  b r id g e  a g u l f  w h ic h  b e d e v i l l e d  H in d u  
s o c i e t y  e ls e w h e r e ,  and p re v e n te d  i t  fro m  o f f e r in g  e f f e c t i v e  
r e s i s t a n c e  to  I s la m .  The r e s o l u t i o n  o f  c a s t e  t e n s io n s  
r e le a s e d  a f lo o d  o f  c r e a t i v e  e n e rg y  w h ic h  e x p re s s e d  i t s e l f  
i n  th e  p o l i t i c a l  d e s ig n s  o f  S h i v a j i ,  and th e  im p e r ia l  v i s i o n  
o f  th e  P e sh w a s .
The s e m in a l  i n t e l l e c t u a l  in f lu e n c e  on th e  B rah m in  
c a s t e s  o f  M a h a ra s h tra  was th e  a d v a i t a  p h ilo s o p h y  o f  S a n k a r » ,
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who l i v e d  i n  th e  e ig h t h  c e n t u r y ^ . S a n k a r a ’ s  a d v a it a v a d a  
w as th e  m ost d o m in an t s c h o o l  o f  o rth o d o x  H in d u ism , and i t s  
v i t a l i t y  l a y  p a r t l y  i n  i t s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n ,  and  
p a r t l y  i n  th e  m o n a s t ic  o r d e r  o r g a n is e d  b y  i t s  fo u n d e r  to  
p r o v id e  a f ir m  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b a s i s  f o r  h i s  i d e a s .  H o w ever, 
th e  c o n c e p ts  a d v an ce d  by S a n k a ra  w e re  n o t  d i r e c t e d  to w a rd s  
s o c i a l  g ro u p s  o u t s id e  th e  B ra h m a n ic a l p a le ,  s o  t h a t  th e  v a lu e s  
o f  H in d u  o rth o d o x y  d id  n o t  i n  th e  f i r s t  in s t a n c e  in f lu e n c e  
th e  lo w e r  and m id d le  c a s t e s *  As a r e s u l t  o f  S a n k a r a ’ s  
p r o s e l y t i s i n g  a c t i v i t y  th e  com m unity was d iv id e d  in t o  a s m a l l  
B rah m in  e l i t e ,  w hose v a lu e s  w ere  f i r m l y  a n c h o re d  to  a d v a i t a * 
and a h o s t  o f  l e s s e r  c a s t e s ,  w h ic h  w ere  o n ly  m a r g in a l ly  
in f lu e n c e d  by th e  h ig h  c u l t u r e  o f  H in d u ism * The i n t e g r a t io n  
o f  th e  lo w e r  c a s t e s  w it h  th e  B rah m in  e l i t e  was a t a s k  to  w h ic h  
a re m a rk a b le  c o t e r i e  o f  r e l i g i o u s  l e a d e r s ,  th e  s o - c a l l e d  
S a i n t s  and P ro p h e ts  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a , a d d re s s e d  th e m s e lv e s  i n  
th e  c e n t u r ie s  f o l lo w in g  th e  s p r e a d  o f  S a n k a r a ’ s  id e a s  among 
th e  B ra h m in s . The e a r l i e s t  f ig u r e s  i n  t h i s  movement w ere  
Jn a n e sh w a r  and M u k u n d ra j, who l i v e d  i n  th e  t w e l f t h  and
9
S*N * D a s g u p ta , A H is t o r y  o f  In d ia n  P h i lo s o p h y . (C a m b rid g e , 
1 9 5 1 ) 9  V o l .  I ,  pp* 7 3 -4 *  A ls o  s e e  F .  W ard en , ’ On th e  Custom s  
o f  th e  G o s a v e e s ’ , A p p e n d ix  B , pp* 6 7 -7 1 *  i n  A* S t e e l e ’ s  
Summary o f  th e  Laws and C ustom s o f  H indoo  C a s t e s  W it h in  th e  
Dekhun P r o v in c e s  S u b .ie c t  to  th e  Bombay P r o v i n c e s . (Bom bay. 
1 8 2 7 ) .  T h is "  i s  h e n c e f o r t h  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  S t e e l e ’ s  Summary o f  
th e  Law s and C ustom s o f  th e  H indoo C a s t e s .
t h i r t e e n t h  c e n t u r ie s ^ ® . M ukundraj w as a B rah m in  b y  c a s t e ,  
a d e v o te e  o f  S h iv a ,  and he w ro te  a num ber o f  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  
w o rk s i n  w h ic h  he e x p r e s s e d  i n  s im p le  M a r a t h i p o e t r y  th e  
a d v a i t a  p h ilo s o p h y  o f  S a n k a r a .  I n  d e l i b e r a t e l y  c h o o s in g  
M a r a t h i ,  th e  la n g u a g e  o f  th e  common p e o p le ,  in s t e a d  o f  
S a n s k r i t ,  t h e  la n g u a g e  o f  th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  a r i s t o c r a c y ,  f o r  
h i s  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  w r i t i n g s ,  M ukund raj s e t  a fo o t  a movement 
w h ic h  a im ed a t  i n f lu e n c in g  s o c i a l  g ro u p s  b e lo w  th e  B rah m in  
e l i t e .  J n a n e s h w a r , who was a l s o  a B ra h m in , was e v e n  m ore  
s u c c e s s f u l  th a n  M ukundraj i n  s p r e a d in g  t h e  g r e a t  t r a d i t i o n  o f  
H in d u ism  among t h e  lo w e r  and m id d le  c a s t e s  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a .
The m ost im p o r ta n t  l i t e r a r y  w o rk  o f  Jn a n e sh w a r  was a comment­
a r y  on th e  Bhagawada G i t a  c a l l e d  th e  J n a n e s h w a r i .  I n  
e x p o u n d in g  th e  G i t a  f o r  th e  common m an, Jn a n e sh w a r  to o k  a s  
h i s  p r i n c i p a l  them e th e  v a lu e  o f  b h a k t i  o r  d e v o t io n  t o  God, 
and he i s  t h e r e f o r e  re g a rd e d  a s  th e  fo u n d e r  o f  th e  b h a k t i  
s c h o o l  o f  M a r a th i p o e t r y .  He i s  i n  f a c t  th e  c o ry p h a e u s  o f  
th e  d e v o t io n a l  m ovem ent, w h ic h  h o n o u red  S h iv a  a s  w e l l  a s  
V is h n u , th e  two p r i n c i p a l  Gods o f  th e  H in d u  p a n th e o n , and  
f o l lo w e d  S a n k a ra  i n  i t s  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  a p p ro a c h . S in c e  
Jn a n e sh w a r  s t a r t e d  h i s  s p i r i t u a l  c a r e e r  a s  a d e v o te e  o f
1 0
S e e  S .M . E d w a rd ’ s  in t r o d u c t io n  t o  J .  G r a n t - D u f f ,  A H is t o r y  
o f  th e  M a r a t h a s . (O x f o r d , 1 9 2 1 ) ,  V o l .  I ,  p .  l x i .
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S h iv a ,  and he was d e e p ly  in f lu e n c e d  by th e  a d v a i t a  d o c t r in e  
o f  S a n k a r a ,  h i s  a d v o c a c y  o f  th e  e s s e n t i a l l y  V a is h n a v a  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  d e v o t io n  a s  a means to  s a l v a t i o n  was p r o b a b ly  
due to  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  R a m a n u ja , a V a is h n a v a  p h i lo s o p h e r  o f  
t h e  e le v e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  who i s  b e l ie v e d  to  be th e  le a d in g  
o p p o n en t o f  th e  v ie w s  o f  S a n k a r a , I t  i s  c o n c e iv a b le  t h a t  
Jn a n e sh w a r  b e lo n g e d  to  th e  B hagaw ata  c u l t ,  w h ic h  r e c o g n is e d  
th e  w o rs h ip  o f  S h iv a  and V is h n u  a s  e q u a l  and o n e , and t h a t  
t h e  w h o le  d e v o t io n a l  movement o f  M a h a ra s h tra  i s  d e r iv e d  fro m  
t h i s  s o u rc e * ^  •
Though i t  was i n i t i a t e d  b y  B ra h m in s  o f  h ig h  c a s t e ,  fche 
b h a k t i  movement so o n  p a s s e d  in t o  th e  h an d s o f  lo w ly  b o rn  
i n d i v i d u a l s  l i k e  N am adeva, a c o n te m p o ra ry  o f  J n a n e s h w a r , who 
was a man o f  th e  p e o p le ,  and who e x p r e s s e d  r e l i g i o u s  and  
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  id e a s  th ro u g h  a s im p le  and m oving  d e v o t io n a l  
p o e t r y  w h ic h  e x e r c i s e d  a trem en d o u s in f lu e n c e  on th e  
u n s o p h is t i c a t e d  p e a s a n t s  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a ,  The e n t i r e  m ovem ent, 
and th e  p o e t i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e  w h ic h  i t  i n s p i r e d ,  was s u f f u s e d  
w it h  a ro m a n t ic  g l o r i f i c a t i o n  o f  d e v o t io n  t o  G od. B e s id e s  
p r e a c h in g  th e  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  d e v o t io n a l  a s  opposed to  i n t e l ­
l e c t u a l  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  G od , th e  b h a k t i  s a i n t s  t r i e d  t o  c u t
1 1
B .N .K ,  S h a rm a , ’ The V a is h n a v a  S a i n t s  o f  K a r n a t a k a ’ , i n  The  
C u l t u r a l  H e r it a g e  o f  I n d i a , ( C a l c u t t a ,  1 9 5 0 ) ,  V o l .  I V ,  p p . 
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a c r o s s  th e  o b s t a c le s  w h ic h  s to o d  i n  th e  way o f  co m m u n ica tio n  
b etw een  t h e  B rah m in s and th e  lo w e r  c a s t e s ,  and to  d e m o lis h  
th e  b a r r i e r s  w h ic h  d e b a rre d  th e  l a t t e r  from  a c c e s s  to  
s p i r i t u a l  s a lv a t i o n *  B u t a lth o u g h  t h e y  a d v o c a te d  th e  
r e v o lu t io n a r y  d o c t r in e  o f  th e  s p i r i t u a l  e q u a l i t y  o f  th e  
d i f f e r e n t  c a s t e s ,  th e  b h a k t i  s a i n t s  d e s i s t e d  fro m  a t t a c k in g  
s e c u l a r  d i s t i n c t i o n s  o f  c a s t e ,  p a r t l y  i n  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
s o c i a l  ha rm o n y , and p a r t l y  o u t o f  in d i f f e r e n c e  to  th e  
m a t e r ia l  w o r ld . T h e i r  a t t i t u d e  f in d s  e lo q u e n t  r e f l e c t i o n  
i n  th e  p o e t r y  o f  N am adeva, who w ro te  w it h  s u c h  c o m p a ss io n  
and f e e l i n g  t h a t  he i n s p i r e d  a w h o le  g ro u p  o f  m in o r p o e ts  
from  th e  p le b ia n  c a s t e s ,  o f  whom Sam vatya  th e  g a r d e n e r ,  
N a rh a r id  th e  g o ld s m it h ,  Goa th e  p o t t e r ,  and C ho kam ela  th e  
m ahar d e s e r v e  s p e c i a l  m e n t io n . I n  t h e i r  a tte m p t to  e s t a b l i s h  
a s p i r i t u a l  d e m o cra c y , th e  b h a k t i  s a i n t s  r e j e c t e d  th e  
e l i t i s t  a s s u m p tio n s  o f  o rth o d o x  H in d u ism , and th e y  b o ld ly  
a d v o c a te d  th e  id e a  o f  s a l v a t i o n  f o r  e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l ,  w h at­
e v e r  m ig h t be h i s  s t a t i o n  i n  th e  s c a l e  o f  c a s t e ,  and  
h o w so e ver hum ble m ig h t be h i s  s t a t u s  i n  l i f e :
One and a l l  h ave  a r i g h t  to  b e n e f i t  from  my 
t e a c h in g s  [w ro te  one o f  th e  b h a k t i  p o e ts  1 • • • T h e re  
i s  no r e s t r i c t i o n  h e r e .  A l l  th e  v a r n a s  ( c a s t e s )  
ca n  b e n e f i t  from  i t .  B ra h m in s , S h u d r a s ,
V a i s h y a s ,  K s h t r iy a s  and e v e n  C h a n d a la s  h a ve  an 
e q u a l r i g h t  h e r e .  V a is h n a v a s  f e e l  t h a t  a l l  d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  and d i s c r im in a t io n  i s  a d e lu s io n ,  i . e .  
i n a u s p i c i o u s .  One who d e s c r ib e s  th e  c a s t e  o f  th e  
V a is h n a v a s  w i l l  f a l l  i n  th e  w o r s t  o f  h a i l s . . .H e
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i s  no B rah m in  to  whom God’ s  name i s  n o t  d e a r ,  n o r  
th e  d a n c in g  o f  th e  V a is h n a v a s . . .O ne who s t r a i g h t ­
away on u t t e r i n g  t h e  name o f  R a m a -K r ish n a  h a s  
b e f o r e  him  h i s  im a g e , th o u g h  b o rn  an u n t o u c h a b le ,  
i s  a B rah m in  in d e e d .• .1 2
T h ro u g h  t h e i r  d o c t r in e  o f  s p i r i t u a l  e g a l i t a r i a n i s m  th e  S a i n t s  
and P ro p h e ts  o f  M a h a ra s h tra  w ere  a b le  to  s p r e a d  th e  h ig h  
c u l t u r e  o f  H in d u ism  among s o c i a l  g ro u p s  o u t s id e  th e  Brahm an-  
i c a l  p a le ,  and a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e i r  t e a c h in g s  t h e  B rah m in  and  
n o n -B ra h m in  c a s t e s  came to  be in f lu e n c e d  by a common c o rp u s  
o f  r e l i g i o u s  v a l u e s , and w ere  draw n c lo s e  to  e a c h  o t h e r  
th ro u g h  th e  p u r s u i t  o f  common s p i r i t u a l  and s e c u l a r  o b je c t ­
iv e s  •
The f i r s t  p h a se  o f  th e  b h a k t i  movement ended  w it h  
Namadeva and h i s  im m e d ia te  a s s o c i a t e s .  D u r in g  th e  p e r io d  
w h ic h  f o llo w e d  no o u t s t a n d in g  l i t e r a r y  w ork was p ro d u c e d , and  
th e  c r e a t i v e  le g a c y  o f  th e  t im e  i s  n e g l i g i b l e .  The r e a s o n  
f o r  t h i s  d e c l in e  i n  c r e a t i v i t y  i s  fo re sh a d o w e d  i n  th e  hymns 
o f  N am adeva, w h ic h  c o n t a in  r e f e r e n c e s  to  a f o r e ig n  i n v a s i o n ,  
and to  a P ad sh ah  o r  M u slim  r u l e r .  The M u slim  in v a s io n  o f  
th e  D e ccan  had com m enced, d i s t u r b in g  th e  t e n o r  o f  l i f e  in  
M a h a r a s h t r a , and c r e a t in g  s o c i a l  ch a o s  and p o l i t i c a l  d i s o r d e r .
1 2
Q u o ta t io n  ta k e n  from  D .K . G a rd e ’ s  u n p u b lis h e d  d o c t o r a l  
d i s s e r t a t i o n  on ’ S o c i a l  and P o l i t i c a l  Thoug ht o f  th e  S a i n t s  
o f  M a h a r a s h t r a ’ , A lla h a b a d  U n i v e r s i t y ,  1 9 5 6 .
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The c o h e s io n  g e n e ra te d  w i t h in  H in d u  s o c i e t y  by th e  b h a k t i  
movement h e lp e d  i t  i n  w it h s t a n d in g  t h e  im p a c t  o f  I s la m ,  B u t  
s i n c e  th e  t e a c h in g s  o f  Namadeva and h i s  a s s o c i a t e s  w ere o f  a 
p a s s iv e  q u a l i t y ,  and more c o n c e rn e d  w it h  th e  s p i r i t u a l  th a n  
w it h  th e  s e c u l a r  w o r ld , no a c t i v e  re s p o n s e  to  I s la m  was 
im m e d ia te ly  fo r th c o m in g . T h ro u g h o u t th e  t h r e e  c e n t u r ie s  o f  
I s l a m i c  p re d o m in an ce  o v e r  M a h a r a s h t r a ,  th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  
com m unity was f o r c e d  to  a c q u ie s c e  i n  th e  p o l i t i c a l  su p re m a cy  
o f  I s la m ,  and i t s  e n e r g ie s  w ere  w h o l ly  a b so rb e d  i n  m a in t a in ­
in g  i t s  r e l i g i o u s  and c u l t u r a l  i d e n t i t y .  H o w ev er, th e  
p o l i t i c a l  a p a th y  o f  th e  m a jo r i t y  was n o t  s h a r e d  b y  some 
e n t h u s i a s t i c  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  w hose a n c e s t o r s  had b e q u e a th e d  t o  
them  t r a d i t i o n s  o f  d a r in g  and a d v e n t u r e . S u ch  i n d i v i d u a l s  
r e a l i s e d  t h a t  t h e  n a rro w  s o c i a l  b a s e  o f  M u slim  r u l e ,  and th e  
c o h e s io n  o f  th e  H in d u  co m m u n ity , c o u ld  be e x p lo i t e d  to  
e s t a b l i s h  a p o l i t y  b a se d  on r e s u r g e n t  H in d u ism . T h e i r  ho p es  
w ere  r e in f o r c e d  by th e  a n ta g o n ism  a ro u s e d  in  th e  H in d u  commun­
i t y  b y  th e  b ig o t r y  and in t o le r a n c e  o f  th e  M u slim  r u l e r s ,  
w h ic h  in d u c e d  them to  l i s t e n  e a g e r ly  to  r e l i g i o u s  le a d e r s  who 
c o u ld  expound th e  c l a s s i c a l  t a l e s  o f  H in d u  c h i v a l r y ,  and  
n a r r a t e  a c c o u n ts  o f  d iv in e  in t e r v e n t io n  on b e h a l f  o f  o p p re s s e d  
H in d u s  who had re m a in e d  f a i t h f u l  to  t h e i r  r e l i g i o n .  Once th e  
I s l a m i c  im p u ls e  had  s p e n t  i t s  v ig o u r ,  M a h a ra s h tra  was re a d y  
f o r  a r e l i g i o u s  u p su rg e  t h a t  w o u ld  r e c a l l  th e  p a s t  g l o r i e s  o f
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H in d u is m , and th ro u g h  in v o k in g  th e  t r a d i t o n s  o f  an h e r o ic  
a g e , fa n  th e  em bers o f  h e r  m a r t i a l  a r d o u r .  In  r e s p o n s e  to  
t h i s  n eed  t h e r e  a p p e a re d  a r e l i g i o u s  r e v i v a l  w h ich  e x p r e s s e d  
t h e  s e n t im e n t s  f i r s t  v o ic e d  b y  Jn a n e sh w a r  and Namadeva w it h  
a m i l i t a n c y ,  and a c o n c e rn  f o r  s e c u l a r  v a l u e s ,  t h a t  w e re  co n ­
s p ic u o u s  b y  t h e i r  a b se n c e  i n  th e  f i r s t  p h a se  o f  th e  b h a k t i  
m ovem ent. The o u t s t a n d in g  le a d e r  o f  m i l i t a n t  b h a k t is m  was 
R am ad asa , who r e p la c e d  th e  cy m b a ls  b y  th e  sw o rd  a s  th e  
emblem o f  th e  m ovem ent, and w hose t e a c h in g s  a tte m p te d  to  
i n s p i r e  a p o l i t y  b a se d  on r e s u r g e n t  H in d u ism -^ .
Ram adasa t ra n s fo rm e d  th e  b h a k t i  movement in t o  a 
r e l i g i o u s  f o r c e  a p p r o p r ia t e  to  th e  a ssu m p tio n  o f  an o f f e n s iv e  
a g a in s t  I s la m .  What M a h a ra s h tra  n e x t  r e q u ir e d  was a s e c u l a r  
l e a d e r  who com bined  i n  h i s  p e rs o n  m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  
q u a l i t i e s  o f  g e n iu s .
I t  found  s u c h  an i n d i v i d u a l  i n  S h iv a j i^ ^ .
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R .D .  R a n a d e , P athw ay to  God i n  M a r a th i L i t e r a t u r e . (Bom bay, 
1 9 6 1 ) ,  p p .  284- 3 3 3 .
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M .G . R a n a d e , ’ The S a i n t s  and P ro p h e ts  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a 1 , i n  
R is e  O f The M a ra th a  P o w e r« (Bom bay, 1 9 0 1 , r e p .  1 9 6 1 ) ,  p . 6 4 . 
My i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  b h a k t i  movement a s  th e  c o n s e n s u s  
f a c t o r  in  M a h a ra s h tra  a r i s e s  p a r t l y  o u t o f  a p e r u s a l  o f  th e  
e x t e n s iv e  l i t e r a t u r e  a v a i l a b l e  on th e  s u b j e c t ,  and p a r t l y  
o u t o f  d i s c u s s io n s  w it h  I r a w a t i  K a r v e , S . V .  D a n d e k a r , D .K .  
G ard e  and N .R . P a t h a k ; r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  s h o rtc o m in g s  
o f  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  r e s t s  s o l e l y  on me. I r a w a t i  K a r v e ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  c la im e d  t h a t  ’ b e c a u s e  o f  th e  im p a ct o f . th e
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The p o l i t y  e r e c t e d  b y  S h i v a j i  on th e  fo u n d a t io n s  l a i d  
b y  th e  S a i n t s  and P ro p h e ts  o f  M a h a ra s h tra  was c h a r a c t e r i s e d  
by s e v e r a l  i n t e r e s t i n g  f e a t u r e s .  The t a s k  c o n f r o n t in g  th e  
i d e o l o g i c a l  fo u n d e rs  o f  M a h a r a s h t r ia n  u n i t y  c o n s i s t e d  in  
b r id g in g  th e  g u l f  b etw een  th e  v a lu e s  o f  e l i t e  c a s t e s  and th e  
lo w e r  and m id d le  c a s t e s .  I t  was a c c o m p lis h e d  s u c c e s s f u l l y  by  
th e  b h a k t i  s a i n t s ,  who p o p u la r i s e d  th e  h ig h  c u l t u r e  o f  
H in d u ism  th ro u g h  a p o e t i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e  d i r e c t e d  a t  th e  
u n s o p h is t i c a t e d  s e c t i o n s  o f  th e  co m m u n ity . B u t d e s p i t e  th e  
s o c i a l  c o n s e n s u s  c r e a t e d  b y  th e  b h a k t i  m ovem ent, w h ic h  
e n v e lo p e d  th e  p e a s a n t  and th e  B ra h m in  i n  th e  f a b r i c  o f  common 
v a l u e s ,  i t  r e q u ir e d  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h ip  o f  an u n u s u a l ly  h ig h  
q u a l i t y  to  k n i t  th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  e le m e n ts  o f  M a h a ra s h tra  in t o  
a c o h e s iv e  p o l i t y .
Long b e f o r e  th e  M u slim  c o n q u e s t  o f  th e  D e c c a n , t h e r e  
f lo u r i s h e d  u n d e r  th e  H in d u  r u l e r s  o f  M a h a ra s h tra  a c l a s s  o f  
t e r r i t o r i a l  c h i e f s  c a l l e d  deshm ukhs who e x e r c i s e d  j u d i c i a l  and  
e x e c u t iv e  p ow ers o v e r  th e  d i s t r i c t s  u n d e r  t h e i r  c o n t r o l - ^ .
b h a k t i  s a i n t s  one c o u ld  g e t  a b e t t e r  e x p o s i t io n  o f  S a n k a r a ’ s  
a d v a i t a  from  an i l l i t e r a t e  p e a s a n t  woman i n  M a h a ra s h tra  th a n  
fro m  an a c a d e m ic  p h i lo s o p h e r ’ .
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P a p e rs  From The R e c o rd s  o f  th e  E a s t  I n d i a  House R e la t in g  to  
th e  R e v e n u e , P o l i c e  and C i v i l  and C r im in a l  J u s t i c e .  U nder th e  
Com pany’ s  G overnm ent i n  I n d i a . V o l .  I V .  (L o n d o n , 1 8 2 6 ) .  S ee
The S t r u c t u r e  o f  the M aratha  S t a t e
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W h e th er th e y  w ere  p e t t y  r u l e r s  w hose d e c l in e  had r e s u l t e d  i n  
th e  e s t a b l is h m e n t  o f  t h e  f i r s t  r e g io n a l  k ingdo m s i n  
M a h a r a s h t r a ,  o r  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  o f  a c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  
who had  g r a d u a l ly  u su rp e d  h e r e d i t a r y  s t a t u s ,  i s  o f t e n  d i f f i ­
c u l t  to  s a y .  B u t w h a te v e r  may h a v e  b een  t h e i r  o r i g i n ,  when 
th e  M u slim s f i r s t  in v a d e d  th e  D e cca n  i n  th e  t h i r t e e n t h  
c e n t u r y ,  th e y  fo u n d  th e  deshm ukhs f i r m l y  e n t r e n c h e d  i n  th e  
c o u n t r y s id e ,  and th e  l e g i t im a c y  o f  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  fo u n d  
w id e s p re a d  a c c e p ta n c e  i n  th e  r u r a l  a r e a s .  So  s t r o n g  was th e  
deshm ukhs * h o ld  o v e r  th e  p e a s a n t s ,  t h a t  when th e  M u slim  
r u l e r s  t r i e d  to  c o n s o l id a t e  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  b y  a p p o in t in g  
a g e n ts  f o r  th e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  th e  la n d - t a x  who w e re  r e s p o n s ­
i b l e  s o l e l y  to  them , th e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e s e  a g e n ts  was n o t  
a c c e p te d  by r u r a l  s o c i e t y ,  w h ic h  r a l l i e d  ro u n d  i t s  t r a d i t i o n ­
a l  l e a d e r s ,  th e  d esh m u kh s* The M u slim  r u l e r s  w e re  t h e r e f o r e  
o b lig e d  to  p u rc h a s e  th e  l o y a l t y ,  and th e  c o - o p e r a t io n ,  o f  th e  
deshm ukhs b y  g r a n t in g  them  a p r o p o r t io n  o f  th e  l a n d - t a x  a s  
th e  re w a rd s  o f  t h e i r  o f f i c e ,  and o n ly  th e n  c o u ld  th e y  im p o se  
t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  on th e  r u r a l  c o m m u n it ie s*  A s a r e s u l t  o f  
t h i s  a rra n g e m e n t th e  deshm ukhs l o s t  some o f  t h e i r  p r e r o g a ­
t i v e s  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  a s e c u r e  p o s i t i o n .  Y e t  t h e y  re m a in e d  a
Memoranda b y  J .  B r ig g s  and H . P o t t in g e r  e n c lo s e d  i n  W. 
C h a p l in ’ s  R e p o rt  d a te d  20 A u g u st 1 8 2 2 . T h e se  p a p e rs  a re  
h e n c e f o r t h  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  EA ST IN D IA  PAPERS*
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p o w e r fu l c l a s s ,  n o t  o n ly  u n d e r th e  M u slim  r u l e r s  o f  th e  
D e c c a n , b u t a l s o  u n d e r S h i v a j i  and th e  P e sh w a s . T h a t  t h e  
deshm ukhs w ere  an im p o rta n t  s o c i a l  g ro u p  i n  M a h a ra s h tra  b o th  
u n d e r  th e  M u slim  r u l e r s ,  and u n d e r t h e i r  H in d u  s u c c e s s o r s ,  i s  
p ro v e d  by th e  s o l i c i t u d e  w it h  w h ic h  th e  B r i t i s h  G overnm ent  
h a n d le d  t h e s e  o ld  la n d e d  f a m i l i e s  a f t e r  1818^-^.
Th e  c o n f l i c t  b etw een  th e  S t a t e ,  a s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  
re v e n u e  c o l l e c t i n g  b u r e a u c r a c y ,  and th e  la n d e d  a r i s t o c r a c y ,  
becam e th e  p r i n c i p a l  f e a t u r e  o f  th e  p o l i t y  a f t e r  th e  M u slim  
c o n q u e s t ,  and th e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  r e s t e d  on 
th e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  a p r e c a r io u s  b a la n c e  b etw een  t h e s e  two 
c o u n t e r p o is e d  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  So  lo n g  a s  a u t h o r i t y  a t  th e  
c e n t r e  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s y s te m  was v e s t e d  i n  an e f f i c i e n t  
r u l e r ,  th e  deshm ukhs w ere  k e p t  i n  c o n t r o l ;  b u t  th e  moment th e  
c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  w eaken ed , th e y  becam e f r e e  o f  a l l  r e s t r a i n t ,  
and r e a s s e r t e d  t h e i r  in d e p e n d e n c e . The. i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  
deshm ukhs c o n f l i c t e d  w it h  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  any e x i s t i n g  o r  
p o t e n t i a l  c e n t r a l i s i n g  a u t h o r i t y ,  and made them r e s i s t  any  
a tte m p t  a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  r e g io n ,  w h e th e r  
i t  was made by an a l i e n  e le m e n t l i k e  th e  M u s lim s , o r  by a 
s t a n d a r d  b e a r e r  o f  r e s u r g e n t  H in d u ism  l i k e  S h i v a j i .
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EA ST IN D IA  P A P ER S . V o l .  I V ,  R e p o rt  on th e  M a h ra tta  S t a t e s  
b y M r. E lp h in s t o n e  d a te d  25 O c to b e r  1819*
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The d i f f i c u l t i e s  fa c e d  b y  S h i v a j i  i n  u n i f y in g  
M a h a ra s h tra  b e a r  w it n e s s  to  th e  d esh m u kh sT d e s i r e  f o r  an  
in d e p e n d e n t  s t a t u s ,  f o r  b e fo r e  he came i n  c o n f l i c t  w it h  th e  
M u slim  r u l e r s  o f  th e  D e c c a n , th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  la n d e d  f a m i l i e s  
o f  th e  r e g io n  o f f e r e d  th e  m ost b i t t e r  o p p o s it io n  to  h i s  
d e sig n ^ -? . B e ca u se  o f  th e  r e s i s t a n c e  o f f e r e d  by th e  d e sh m u k h s, 
S h i v a j i  r e a l i s e d  how im p o rta n t  i t  was f o r  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  t o  be 
b u t t r e s s e d  by a c l a s s  o f  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  a g e n ts  who owed t h e i r  
p o s i t io n  to  h i s  p o w er. As th e  a re a  u n d e r  h i s  c o n t r o l  
w id e n e d , he i n s t a l l e d  in  p o s i t io n s  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  and a s  
a c o u n t e r p o is e  to  th e  o ld  la n d e d  a r i s t o c r a c y ,  D e s h a s th  
B rah m in s t r a in e d  i n  th e  b u s in e s s  o f  a d m in is t r a t io n  by h i s  
a s t u t e  B rah m in  m i n i s t e r ,  Dada Kondev* The v i t a l  r o l e  p la y e d  
by th e  b u r e a u c r a c y  in  k e e p in g  th e  deshm ukhs u n d e r c o n t r o l  was 
e q u a l ly  a p p a re n t  t o  th e  P e sh w a s , and when th e y  assum ed  
c o n t r o l  o f  th e  S t a t e ,  th e y  d i s p la c e d  th e  D e s h a s th  B ra h m in s  i n  
th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  by C h itp a v a n  B ra h m in s , who b e lo n g e d  t o  th e  
same c a s t e  a s  B a l a j i  V is h w a n a th , th e  f i r s t  P e sh w a , and c o u ld  
t h e r e f o r e  be e x p e c te d  to  s e r v e  th e  new r u l i n g  f a m i ly  w it h  
u n f l in c h in g  l o y a l t y ^ .
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(Bom bay, 1 9 4 9 ) ,  p p . 7 4 - 7 .
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To p la c e  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  on a f i r m  b a s i s ,  th e  r u l i n g  
f a m i l i e s  o f  M a h a ra s h tra  n o t  o n ly  r e c r u i t e d  th e  b u r e a u c r a c y  
from  s o c i a l  g ro u p s  on whose l o y a l t y  th e y  c o u ld  depend  
i m p l i c i t l y ,  b u t  th e y  a l s o  c r e a t e d  new t e r r i t o r i a l  lo r d s  who 
owed t h e i r  p o s i t io n  w h o lly  to  t h e i r  g e n e r o s i t y .  As a r e s u l t ,  
by th e  t im e  th e  B r i t i s h  co n q u e re d  th e  D e ccan  i n  1 8 1 8 , two 
g ro u p s  o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  lo r d s  had b een  su p e r im p o se d  upon th e  
o ld  deshm ukh f a m i l i e s  whom S h i v a j i  had sub d ued  i n  th e  f i r s t  
i n s t a n c e ;  n a m e ly , th o se  who h e ld  g r a n t s  from  S h i v a j i ,  o r  
fro m  th e  S a t a r a  R a j a s ,  i s s u e d  d u r in g  th e  t im e  o f  t r o u b le s  
when th e  M arath a  S t a t e  was engaged i n  a w ar o f  s u r v i v a l  w it h  
th e  M u slim  r u l e r s ,  and th o s e  whom th e  Peshw as had  r a i s e d  to  
th e  s t a t u s  o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  c h i e f s  in  a b id  to  c o n s o l id a t e  
t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y .  To th e  f i r s t  g ro u p  b e lo n g e d  c h i e f s  l i k e  th e  
N a ik s  o f  Sunda-*-^, w h i le  th e  se c o n d  c o m p rise d  la n d lo r d s  l i k e  
th e  p a rv e n u  P a tw a rd h a n s  who h a d , b y  1 8 1 8 , r i s e n  fro m  com par­
a t i v e  o b s c u r i t y  to  th e  o w n e rsh ip  o f  th e  l a r g e s t  la n d e d  
e s t a t e s  i n  M a h a ra sh tra  in  th e  b r i e f  s p a c e  o f  f i f t y  y e a rs^ ® .
W h ile  th e y  p r e s e n t e d  a p e r p e t u a l  t h r e a t  to  th e  i n t e g r i t y  
o f  th e  S t a t e ,  th e  deshm ukhs a l s o  p e rfo rm e d  a u s e f u l  s o c i a l
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f u n c t io n ,  f o r  w it h  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  t i e s  w it h  th e  v i l l a g e s  
o f  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s ,  and th e  in f lu e n c e  th e y  e x e r c i s e d  a t  th e  
Poona C o u r t ,  th e y  w ere  a b le  to  p r e v e n t  th e  e x c e s s e s  l i k e l y  to  
be p e r p e t r a t e d  by an a d m in is t r a t io n  t h a t  was n o t  s u b j e c t  to  
an y  l e g a l  and r a t i o n a l  r e s t r a i n t s .  Long r e s id e n c e  i n  a 
d i s t r i c t  f a m i l i a r i s e d  th e  deshm ukhs w it h  th e  s e n t im e n t s  o f  
th e  r u r a l  m a s s e s , and w it h  t h e i r  c o n d it io n s  o f  e x i s t e n c e ,  so  
t h a t  th e y  a c te d  a s  l i s t e n i n g  p o s t s  th ro u g h  w h ic h  Poona c o u ld  
a c q u a in t  i t s e l f  w it h  th e  tem p er o f  th e  p e a s a n t r y  and gauge  
i t s  r e a c t io n s  to  i t s  re v e n u e  p o l i c y .  As a g a in s t  t h e s e  
’ n a t u r a l 1 le a d e r s  o f  r u r a l  s o c i e t y ,  th e  b u r e a u c r a c y  c r e a t e d  
by th e  P eshw as f o r  c o n t r o l l i n g  th e  s w a ra .jy a  t e r r i t o r i e s  was 
sdim ple i n  c o n c e p t io n .  The S t a t e  was d iv id e d  in t o  re v e n u e  
d i v i s i o n s ,  e a ch  one o f  w h ic h  was p la c e d  u n d e r an o f f i c e r  
c a l l e d  th e  m a m la td a r , who a l s o  e x e r c i s e d  j u d i c i a l  and  
m a g is t e r i a l  a u t h o r i t y .  The a p p o in tm e n t o f  th e  m a m latd a r  
r e s t e d  w it h  th e  Poona a u t h o r i t i e s ,  tho u gh  th e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  
th e  s u b o r d in a t e  o f f i c e r s  u n d e r h i s  c h a rg e  was o f t e n  l e f t  to  
h i s  d i s c r e t i o n .  In  th e  p e r ip h e r a l  d i s t r i c t s  an o f f i c e r  
c a l l e d  th e  S ir s o o b e d a r  s to o d  b etw een  Poona and th e  m a m la td a rs . 
The S i r s o o b e d a r ’ s  f u n c t io n s  w ere i l l - d e f i n e d ,  and h i s  p r e ­
r o g a t iv e s  and d u t ie s  v a r i e d .  In  th e  C a r n a t i c  he p o s s e s s e d  
g u b e r n a t o r ia l  a u t h o r i t y ,  a p p o in t in g  h i s  own m a m la td a rs . and  
b e a r in g  p e r s o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  r e v e n u e .
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In  th e  K a n d e sh , on th e  o t h e r  h a n d , he e x e r c i s e d  g e n e r a l  
s u p e r in t e n d e n c e ,  a lth o u g h  th e  m a m la td a rs  c o n d u c te d  t h e i r
b u s in e s s  u n d e r th e  d i r e c t  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  Poona a u t h o r i t i e s  • 
The m am latd ar was th e  ly n c h - p in  o f  th e  b u r e a u c r a c y ,  and  
he was c o n s e q u e n t ly  c h o se n  from  f a m i l i e s  whose a n te c e d e n t s
w ere  e i t h e r  known to  th e  P e sh w a , o r  to  a p ro m in e n t member o f
2 2h i s  c o u r t  . When a p p o in te d  to  a new d i s t r i c t ,  h i s  f i r s t  
c o n c e r n  was to  a c q u a in t  h im s e l f  w it h  th e  prom im ent i n d i v i d ­
u a ls  o f  th e  a r e a ,  in c lu d in g  t h e  deshm ukhs and h e r e d i t a r y  
o f f i c e r s ,  whose in t im a t e  kn o w led g e  o f  th e  r e g io n  su p p le m e n te d  
th e  in f o r m a t io n  c o n c e r n in g  re v e n u e  p ro b le m s w it h  w h ich  he 
e q u ip p e d  h im s e lf  from  th e  Poona s e c r e t a r i a t  b e f o r e  d e p a r t in g  
f o r  h i s  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  c h a r g e .  When t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  l e v y in g  
a la n d - t a x  on th e  r u r a l  a r e a s  a r o s e ,  th e  m a m la td a r1s  n e g o t ia ­
t io n s  w it h  th e  P a t e l s  o r  th e  headmen o f  v i l l a g e s  w ere  a lw a y s  
c o n d u c te d  th ro u g h  th e  d esh m u kh s, w hose t r a d i t i o n a l  t i e s  w it h  
r u r a l  s o c i e t y  f a c i l i t a t e d  th e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  an e q u it a b le  
a s s e s s m e n t . On th e  one h a n d , th e  m a m la td a r  m anoeuvred  to  
p r o c u re  th e  maximum r e t u r n  from  th e  p e a s a n t r y  by way o f  th e
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l a n d - t a x ,  w h i le  on th e  o t h e r ,  th e  headmen o f  v i l l a g e s  d id  
t h e i r  b e s t  to  deny th e  S t a t e  o f  a s  much o f  i t s  l e g i t im a t e  
d u es a s  th e y  c o u ld .  In  th e  c o n f l i c t  b etw een  th e  m a m la td a rs  
and th e  v i l l a g e  headm en, s i n c e  th e  fo rm e r w ere s u p p o rte d  by  
th e  s u p e r io r  pow er o f  th e  S t a t e ,  and b e c a u se  th e y  w e re  n o t  
s u b j e c t  to  an y  l e g a l  and r a t i o n a l  r e s t r a i n t s ,  i t  i s  c o n c e iv ­
a b le  t h a t  th e  d i r e c t  im p o s it io n  o f  th e  m a m latd a r on th e  
p e a s a n t s  w o u ld  h a ve  le d  to  o p p r e s s iv e  t a x a t i o n ,  r u in o u s  a l i k e  
f o r  th e  p r o s p e r i t y  o f  th e  S t a t e  and th e  co m m u n ity . B u t th e  
i n t e r p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  d eshm ukh, who r e c e iv e d  a f ix e d  s h a r e  o f  
th e  re v e n u e  c o l l e c t e d  by th e  S t a t e ,  y e t  had s t r o n g  t r a d i t i o n ­
a l  t i e s  w it h  th e  r u r a l  c o m m u n it ie s , n o r m a lly  e n s u re d  an  
e q u i t a b le  s e t t le m e n t  o f  th e  l a n d - t a x .  N e v e r t h e le s s ,  i f  th e  
m a m la td a rs  i n s i s t e d  upon a re v e n u e  demand w h ic h  was e x c e s s i v e ,  
i t  was open to  th e  v i l l a g e  co m m u n itie s  to  a p p e a l to  Poona 
th ro u g h  th e  d esh m u kh s« whom th e y  re g a rd e d  a s  t h e i r  p a t r o n s .
The e x i s t e n c e  o f  an a l t e r n a t i v e  c h a n n e l o f  co m m u n ica tio n  
b etw een  th e  r u r a l  co m m u n it ie s  and Poona e x e r c i s e d  a s a l u t a r y  
e f f e c t  on th e  m a m la td a rs . and p re v e n te d  them fro m  o p p r e s s in g  
th e  p e a s a n t r y .
W h ile  th e  b a la n c e  o f  a u t h o r i t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
b etw een  th e  b u r e a u c r a c y  and th e  la n d e d  a r i s t o c r a c y  e n s u re d  
th e  sm ooth f u n c t io n in g  o f  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  u n d e r a c a p a b le  
r u l e r ,  th e  t e n s io n s  l a t e n t  w i t h in  i t  e ru p te d  in t o  th e  open
26
th e  moment a w e ak e n in g  o f  th e  c o n t r o l l i n g  hand a t  Poona  
u n d erm in ed  th e  pow er o f  th e  m a m la td a rs . W henever t h i s  
h ap p e n e d , i t  was a t  th e  p e r ip h e r ie s  o f  th e  s w a r a jy a  t e r r i t o r ­
i e s  r a t h e r  th a n  i n  th e  d i s t r i c t s  s u r r o u n d in g  Poona t h a t  th e  
w o rs t  sym ptom s o f  d i s e q u i l ib r iu m  m a n ife s te d  t h e m s e lv e s .  In  
one s u c h  d i s t r i c t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  B r i t i s h  a d m in i s t r a t o r s  d i s ­
c o v e re d  t h a t  th e  p e a s a n t r y  was b e in g  f o r c e d  to  p ay  f o u r  p e r  
c e n t  o v e r  and above th e  n o rm a l re v e n u e  b y  way o f  e x t r a  c e s s e s  
and i l l i c i t  t a x e s ^ 3 . The g r e a t e r  num ber o f  t h e s e  t a x e s  o r i g ­
in a t e d  i n  th e  t im e  o f  t r o u b le s  f o l lo w in g  th e  f a t e f u l  d e f e a t  
a t  P a n ip a t  and th e  d e a th  o f  th e  t h i r d  P e sh w a , B a l a j i  B a j i  
R ao . He was s u c c e e d e d  i n  1761 by Madhav R a o , who was a m in o r  
and w hose m i n i s t e r s  l e f t  a f f a i r s  o f  s t a t e  i n  th e  han d s o f  
l o c a l  o f f i c e r s ,  who th o u g h t i t  e x p e d ie n t  to  l e t  o u t v i l l a g e s  
to  te m p o ra ry  t a x - f a r m e r s  who m ig h t g iv e  r e n t  f o r  them . The  
l a t t e r  i n  t u r n  in d e m n if ie d  th e m s e lv e s  by t a x in g  th e  p e a s a n t r y  
o v e r  and above th e  e s t a b l i s h e d  r a t e s ,  to  w h ic h  th e y  added th e  
l e v y  o f  c o m p u lso ry  f e u d a l  s e r v i c e .  The t a x - f a r m e r s  e x e r c i s e d  
c o n s id e r a b le  in g e n u it y  i n  d e v is in g  means to  e x t r a c t  th e  
maximum fro m  th e  p e a s a n t .  Thus i t  was l e g i t im a t e  f o r  them  to
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co m p e n sate  th e m se lv e s  f o r  f lu c t u a t i o n s  i n  th e  m a rk e t  p r i c e s  
o f  c r o p s  by f i x i n g  a r a t e  a t  w h ic h  th e  co m m u tatio n  o f  th e  
a s s e s s e d  g r a in  w ould be l e v i e d ,  and i f  i n  a y e a r  o f  s c a r c i t y  
th e  m a rk e t  p r i c e  r o s e  c o n s id e r a b ly  above th e  f ix e d  p r i c e ,  th e  
t a x - f a r m e r  demanded an a d d i t io n a l  c e s s  ( k u s s e r ) to  s e c u r e  f o r  
h im s e l f  an e q u it a b le  s h a r e  o f  th e  p r o f i t s .  In  p r i n c i p l e  k u s s e r  
was u n o b je c t io n a b le ;  b u t  once l e v i e d  i t  c o n t in u e d  e v e r  a f t e r ­
w ard s a s  a p a r t  o f  th e  c u l t i v a t o r f s  n o rm a l b u rd e n . O f a 
s i m i l a r  n a tu r e  was th e  p u t t e e  t a x  th ro u g h  w h ic h  th e  
t a x - f a r m e r  i n  some d u b io u s  f a s h io n  s a d d le d  th e  e x p e n s e s  o f  
a d m in is t e r in g  th e  v i l l a g e  on th e  p e a s a n t r y .  L a s t  came a 
s p e c i e s  o f  f e u d a l  v i l l e i n a g e  c a l l e d  v e t . w h ic h  in v o lv e d  th e  
r i g h t  to  demand f r e e  s e r v i c e s  on v a r io u s  o c c a s io n s :
T h e re  i s  [o b s e rv e d  a B r i t i s h  c i v i l i a n ]  so m e th in g  r e ­
c i p r o c a l  i n  f e u d a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w h ic h , c o n v e y in g  as  
t h e y  do a s e n s e  o f  s e r v i t u d e  and d e g ra d a t io n  i n  th e  
lo w e r  o r d e r s ,  n e v e r t h e le s s  g iv e s  one th e  id e a  o f  
p r o t e c t io n  a f f o r d e d  i n  l i e u  o f  p e r s o n a l  s e r v i c e ;  and  
one i s  th e  l e s s  a p t  to  d is p a r a g e  th e  s y s te m  when i t  
i s  c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  a r e c i p r o c i t y  o f  a id  and p r o t e c ­
t io n  was a l l  t h a t  bound s o c i e t y  i n  th o se  d a rk  a g e s .
" V e t ” , h o w e v e r, p a r t a k e s  o f  n o th in g  o f  t h i s  c h a r a c t ­
e r .  I t  c o n s i s t s  o f  la b o r io u s  s e r v i c e ,  r e n d e re d  a t  
th e  w i l l  o f  one w ho, f a r  from  p o s s e s s in g  th e  r ig h t  
to  p r o t e c t  from  o u tw ard  i n v a s i o n ,  comes among them  
a s  t h e i r  ackn o w led g ed  t a s k - m a s t e r . . .T h e r e  i s  som e­
t h in g  r e p u l s iv e  i n  th e  id e a  to  s u c h  a p e rs o n  b e in g  
a llo w e d  to  im pose a c a p i t a t i o n  t a x . . . i n  l i e u  o f  a 
s e r v i c e  w h ich  he n e v e r  had b e t t e r  r i g h t  to  demand 
th a n  t h a t  e x p re s s e d  by t y r a n t s 2 4 .
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The d ep en d en ce  o f  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  o r d e r  upon a p r e c a r io u s  
b a la n c e  b etw een  th e  b u r e a u c r a c y  and th e  la n d e d  a r i s t o c r a c y  
was a b a s ic  w e ak n e ss  o f  th e  M arath a  p o l i t y ,  s i n c e  th e  
s l i g h t e s t  p o l i t i c a l  u p s e t  a t  Poona c o u ld  th ro w  th e  w h o le  
s y s te m  in t o  c o n f u s io n  and t r a n s f o r m  th e  deshm ukhs from  th e  
p a tr o n s  o f  r u r a l  s o c i e t y  in t o  t h e  o p p r e s s o r s  o f  th e  p e a s a n t r y .
R u r a l  S o c i a l  O r g a n is a t io n
The i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  s y s te m  o f  th e  
M a ra th a s  w o u ld  s u g g e s t  t h a t  th e  v i l l a g e s  o f  th e  D e cca n  w ere  
s u b je c t  to  f r e q u e n t  f lu c t u a t i o n s  i n  f o r t u n e  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  
ch a n g e s i n  th e  b a la n c e  o f  pow er in  P o o n a . B u t l i f e  i n  r u r a l  
s o c i e t y  was n o t  s e r i o u s l y  a f f e c t e d  by p o l i t i c a l  t r a n s f o r m a ­
t io n s  i n  P o o n a , b e c a u s e  o f  th e  l i m i t e d  r o l e  p la y e d  by th e  ad­
m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  s h a p in g  th e  c l im a t e  o f  th e  c o u n t r y s id e ,  and  
b e c a u s e  o f  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i t h in  th e  v i l l a g e s  
w h ic h  co n d u c te d  t h e i r  a f f a i r s  w it h  s k i l l  and c o m p e te n ce , and  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  r e s i s t e d  th e  a tte m p ts  o f  th e  S t a t e  t o  i n t e r f e r e  
i n  th e  a f f a i r s  o f  th e  com m u n ity .
E v e n  th e  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  a M a h a r a s h t r ia n  v i l l a g e  s e t  i t  
a p a r t  a s  a m in ia t u r e  w o r ld ,  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  i n  i t s e l f ,  and  
g e a re d  to  a s t y l e  o f  l i f e  c a l l i n g  f o r  a minimum o f  c o n t a c t
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w it h  th e  o u t s id e  w o rld ^ 5 . I t  was lo c a t e d  on a sm o o th ly  
r o l l i n g  mound i n  c l o s e  p r o x im it y  to  a s t r e a m , and su rro u n d e d  
by th e  f i e l d s  w h ic h  th e  v i l l a g e r s  c u l t i v a t e d .  From  a 
d is t a n c e  i t  had th e  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  a m ass o f  c r u m b lin g  g re y  
w a l l s ,  w it h  a few  s t u n t e d  t r e e s  g ro w in g  o u t am ongst them , and  
h e re  and t h e r e  a s t r u c t u r e  s t a n d in g  o u t m ore c o n s p ic u o u s ly  
th a n  th e  r e s t .  A l l  t h i s  was e n c lo s e d  by a mud w a l l  o f  
i r r e g u l a r  s h a p e , and p ie r c e d  by ru d e  g a t e s  o f  wood a t  two o r  
more p o i n t s • On e n t e r in g  s u c h  a v i l l a g e  t h in g s  a p p e a re d  no  
more p r e p o s s e s s in g  th a n  from  th e  o u t s id e .  T h e re  was a l a c k  
o f  o r d e r  i n  l a y o u t .  The c ru m b lin g  w a l l s  w ould  t u r n  o u t t o  be  
th e  h o u se s  o f  th e  v i l l a g e r s ,  w h ic h  w ere  made o f  c a lc a r e o u s  
e a r t h  w it h  t e r r a c e d  to p s  o f  th e  same m a t e r ia l *  T h e s e  d w e l l ­
in g s  w ere  c o n s t r u c t e d  w it h o u t  an y  a tte m p t a t  r e g u l a r i t y .
They had n a rro w  and c ro o k e d  la n e s  w in d in g  am ongst them and  
d iv id in g  them  in t o  g ro u p s o f  t h r e e  o r  f o u r .  W h ile  co n fo rm in g  
t o  a b a s i c  s t r u c t u r a l  p a t t e r n ,  th e  homes o f  th e  r i c h e r  c u l t i v ­
a t o r s  w ould  be s l i g h t l y  l a r g e r  i n  s i z e  and d i f f e r e n t  i n  o u t ­
w ard  a p p e a ra n c e  from  th o s e  o f  th e  p o o re r  c u l t i v a t o r s .  B u t  
th e  m ost c o n s p ic u o u s  s t r u c t u r e s  i n  th e  v i l l a g e  w ere  th e
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c h o w r ie . o r  th e  r a u n ic ip le  h a l l ,  w here  th e  p u b l i c  a f f a i r s  o f  
th e  v i l l a g e  w ere d e b a te d ; and th e  te m p le , b u i l t  e i t h e r  by a 
r i c h  and r e p e n t e n t  P a t e l ,  o r  b y  a p h i la n t h r o p ic  deshm ukh , i n  
th e  hope o f  com m uting t h e i r  e a r t h ly  s i n s .  C o n s p ic u o u s , t o o ,  
w e re  th e  d w e l l in g s  o f  th e  u n to u c h a b le  c a s t e s  l i k e  th e  M ahars  
and th e  M angs, who w ere  p re v e n te d  b y  s o c i a l  ta b o o s  from  com­
in g  in t o  p h y s i c a l  c o n t a c t  w it h  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  v i l l a g e r s ,  and  
who c o n s e q u e n t ly  r e s id e d  i n  l i t t l e  h a m le ts  o u t s id e  th e  w a l l s  
o f  th e  v i l l a g e .
The b u lk  o f  th e  v i l l a g e  com m unity c o m p rise d  c u l t i v a t o r s  
b e lo n g in g  to  th e  k u n b i c a s t e ,  who w ere  s u b d iv id e d  in t o  
t h u lw a h e e k s » o r  h e r e d i t a r y  c u l t i v a t o r s ,  and u p r e e s . o r  c u l ­
t i v a t o r s  w ith o u t  any p r e s c r i p t i v e  r i g h t s  in  th e  s o i l *  The  
th u lw a h e e k s  w ere  d e s c e n d e n ts  o f  th e  f i r s t  s e t t l e r s  o f  th e  
v i l l a g e ,  who had i n  p e r io d s  o f  rem o te  a n t i q u i t y  moved o v e r  i n  
.i a t  h a s , o r  f a m i ly  g r o u p s , to  new s i t e s ,  and had a p p o r t io n e d  
th e  a v a i l a b l e  a r a b le  la n d  b etw een  t h e m s e lv e s ,  th e  h o ld in g s  o f  
e a c h  .ia th a  r e c e i v i n g  t h e  f a m i ly  name to  d i s t i n g u i s h  i t  fro m  
o t h e r  f i e l d s .  The o r i g i n a l  ia t h a  e s t a t e s  w ere  h e ld  j o i n t l y  
by th e  f a m i l y ,  w h ic h  was r e s p o n s ib le  a s  a body f o r  th e  p a y ­
m ent o f  th e  l a n d - t a x .  I f  th e  ow ners o f  one o f  th e  s h a r e s  i n  
a j o i n t  e s t a t e  l e t  h i s  la n d  f a l l  w a s t e ,  th e  f a m i ly  assum ed  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  h i s  s h a r e  o f  th e  S t a t e f s  d u e s , and th e  
f i e l d s  b e lo n g in g  t o  him  w ere  ta k e n  o v e r  f o r  c u l t i v a t i o n *
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S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  th e  member o f  a .ia th a  d ie d  w ith o u t  an h e i r ,  h i s  
p o r t io n  was d iv id e d  among th e  s u r v i v i n g  r e l a t i o n s .  He was  
a g a in  f r e e  to  d is p o s e  o f  h i s  p a t r o n o m ic , b u t  th e  s h a r e  was  
n o t  p e r m it te d  to  p a s s  o u t o f  th e  f a m i ly  i f  a c o - s h a r e r  was 
w i l l i n g  to  buy i t .  O n ly  i n  c a s e s  w here  no one i n  th e  f a m i ly  
w an ted  to  p u rc h a s e  th e  f i e l d  d id  i t  p a s s  on to  an o u t s i d e r ,  
who now e n t e r e d  th e  .ia th a  on th e  sam e te rm s as th e  o r i g i n a l  
in c u m b e n t , b u t was r e f e r r e d  to  a s  a b i r a d e r  b haus o r  l e g a l  
b r o t h e r ,  in s t e a d  o f  g h a r  b h au s o r  h o u se  b r o t h e r .  The i n s t i ­
t u t io n  o f  . ja th a s  f a c i l i t a t e d  re v e n u e  a rra n g e m e n ts  b etw een  th e  
v i l l a g e  and the p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  F o r  a r e p r e s e n t a t iv e  
o f  th e  e l d e s t  b ra n c h  i n  e a c h  ia t h a  lo o k e d  a f t e r  th e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  th e  e n t i r e  f a m i ly  and c o l l e c t e d  th e  d u es from  th e  y o u n g e r  
b r a n c h e s ,  w h i le  th e  s e n i o r  b ra n c h  o f  th e  s e n io r m o s t  .ia th a  
f u r n is h e d  th e  i n d iv i d u a l  who f u n c t io n e d  a s  th e  headman o f  th e  
v i l l a g e ^ .
By th e  t im e  th e  Peshw a B a j i  Rao I I  s u r r e n d e r e d  th e  Poona  
t e r r i t o r i e s  to  th e  B r i t i s h  G overnm ent i n  1 8 1 8 , th e  ia t h a  
sy s te m  had l o s t  some o f  i t s  c o h e s io n ,  p a r t l y  th ro u g h  i n b u i l t  
t e n s io n s ,  b u t  p a r t l y  a l s o  th ro u g h  th e  a tte m p ts  o f  th e  Poona  
a u t h o r i t i e s  to  u n d erm in e  th e  autonom y o f  th e  .ja th a s  in  th e
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managem ent o f  re v e n u e  a f f a i r s *  S u ch  a tte m p ts  w ere  in s p i r e d  
e i t h e r  by th e  d e s i r e  to  e n h an ce  th e  re v e n u e s  o f  th e  S t a t e ,  o r  
to  e n s u r e  t h a t  a f a i r  s h a r e  o f  th e  v i l l a g e  p ro d u ce  w ent to  
i t s  c o f f e r s .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  s u r m is e  how f a r  th e  b u re a u ­
c r a c y  o f  th e  e a r l i e r  P eshw as had  a t  a l l  s u c c e e d e d  i n  d i s r u p t ­
in g  t h e  c o h e s io n  o f  th e  r u r a l  c o m m u n it ie s , b u t  th e  f a i l u r e  o f  
th e  Poona G overnm ent to  u n d e rm in e  th e  autonom y o f  th e  . ja th a s  
i s  e lo q u e n t ly  r e f l e c t e d  in  th e  f a t e  o f  th e  kam al s u r v e y  o f  
th e  1 7 6 0 s in t r o d u c e d  u n d e r th e  Peshw a Madhav R a o . D e s p it e  
th e  c a r e  w it h  w h ic h  t h i s  s u r v e y  was c o n d u c te d , th e  r e n t a l s  
b a se d  upon i t  w e re  n e v e r  a p p l ie d ,  b e c a u s e  i n  t h e i r  p la c e  th e  
r u r a l  co m m u n itie s  s u b s t i t u t e d  th e  r i v a . j , o r  c u s to m a ry  r a t e s ,  
w h ic h  d i f f e r e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  fro m  th e  kam al f i n d i n g s .  T h is  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  i s  open to  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  th e  kam al 
s u r v e y  o n ly  a im ed a t  p r o v id in g  th e  m a m la td a rs  w it h  an  id e a  o f  
th e  p r o d u c t iv e  c a p a c i t y  o f  h o ld in g s  i n  th e  v i l l a g e s  o f  th e  
D e c c a n ; b u t s u c h  an h y p o t h e s is  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  m a in t a in  s i n c e  
th e  kam al s u r v e y  show ed th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  sy s te m  to  be s h o t  
th ro u g h  and th ro u g h  w it h  g l a r i n g  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s .  A l l  t h i s  
ca n  be i l l u s t r a t e d  by a c o m p a r iso n  o f  th e  kam al and r i v a . j  
s u r v e y s  o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  v i l l a g e .  In  th e  v i l l a g e  o f  O sw aree  
K huro  i n  Poona d i s t r i c t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  th e  f i e l d s  P a n d ru  and 
W u rso la  c o n t a in e d  a ch o w ar o f  la n d  e a c h ,  and w ere  t h e r e f o r e  
ta x e d  an e q u a l amount b y  th e  r i v a . j  s u r v e y ,  a lth o u g h  th e y  w ere
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found to  p o s s e s s  d i f f e r e n t  p r o d u c t iv e  c a p a c i t i e s  by th e  kam al 
s u r v e y ,  w h ic h  to o k  b o th  th e  q u a n t i t y  and th e  q u a l i t y  o f  th e  
s o i l  in t o  c o n s id e r a t io n .  A co m p a riso n  o f  th e  f i e l d s  D h u l jo t e  
and A m berket in  O sw aree K hu ro  show s th e  r iv a . j  s u r v e y  i n  a 
w o rse  l i g h t ,  w it h  th e  d is c r e p a n c y  b etw een  th e  a c t u a l  and  
assum ed p r o d u c t iv e  c a p a c i t i e s  b e in g  even  g r e a t e r ^ ? .
D e s p it e  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  . ja th a s  to  r e s i s t  th e  a tte m p t  o f  
th e  M arath a  b u r e a u c r a c y  to  r e g u la t e  th e  i n t e r n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  th e  la n d - t a x  i n  th e  v i l l a g e ,  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  no lo n g e r  fu n c ­
t io n e d  in  f u l l  v ig o u r  a t  th e  t im e  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  c o n q u e s t .
S u ch  m em ories a s  th e  v i l l a g e r s  had o f  th e  . ja th a s  fo u n d  e x p r e s ­
s io n  in  th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  e n t r u s t in g  th e  s e n io r m o s t  f a m i ly  i n  th e  
v i l l a g e  w it h  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  c o l l e c t i n g  th e  l a n d - t a x  from  
th e  c u l t i v a t o r s ,  even  tho ugh j o i n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  p a y ­
ment o f  th e  t a x  was no lo n g e r  r i g i d l y  e n f o r c e d .  The members o f  
th e  f a m i ly  c h o se n  to  r e p r e s e n t  th e  v i l l a g e  w ere  s t y l e d  P a t e l s , 
and th e  s e n io r m o s t  among them was c a l l e d  th e  c h i e f  o r  mukkadam  
P a t e l . Long a f t e r  th e  fo u n d in g  o f  th e  v i l l a g e ,  th u lw a h e e k s  
d e sce n d e d  from  th e  P a t e l  f a m i ly  c o n s id e r e d  th e m s e lv e s  h ig h e r  i n  
s t a t u s  th a n  o th e r  th u lw a h e e k s , tho ugh t h e i r  c la im s  w ere n o t  
b u t t r e s s e d  by an y  o th e r  s o c i a l  o r  eco n o m ic  p r i v i l e g e s .  The  
c r u c i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  w i t h in  th e  c u l t i v a t i n g  com m unity l a y
27
BA. R .K .  P r in g le  to  H .R .D . R o b e rts o n  d a te d  20  Novem ber 1 8 2 3 :  
R .D . V o l .  10 /94  o f  1 82 3 .
34
b etw een  th e  th u lw a h e e k s  and th e  u p r e e s . The fo rm e r  had an  
i n d is p u t a b le  r i g h t  o f  c u l t i v a t i n g  t h e i r  h o ld in g s  s o  lo n g  a s  
th e y  p a id  th e  l a n d - t a x ;  th e y  c o u ld  a l s o  s e l l  o r  m o rtg ag e  
t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  w it h  t h e  c o n c u r re n c e  o f  th e  o t h e r  m em bers o f  
th e  f a m i ly *  By c o n t r a s t ,  th e  u p r e e * s  c o n n e c t io n  w it h  t h e  
v i l l a g e  was te n u o u s*  He le a s e d  th e  d e s e r t e d  h o ld in g s  o r  th e  
a r a b le  w a s te  o f  th e  v i l l a g e ,  e i t h e r  on an a n n u a l b a s i s ,  o r  on 
a l e a s e  r u n n in g  c o n c u r r e n t ly  f o r  a num ber o f  y e a r s *
The s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  b etw een  th e  th u lw a h e e k s  and  
th e  u p re e s  w ere  e x p r e s s e d  in  s o c i a l  r a t h e r  th a n  i n  e co n o m ic  
d i s t i n c t i o n s .  T h ey  w e re  r e l a t e d  to  c o n t r a s t in g  s t y l e s  o f  
l i f e  r a t h e r  th a n  to  s h a r p  eco n o m ic d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  In  th e  
v i l l a g e  o f  A m b o la , f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  th e  h o ld in g s  o f  u p re e s  l i k e  
S u n t 0 0 3 e e  S c in d ia h  and K u n d o je e  com pared  v e r y  f a v o u r a b ly  in  
a r e a  and p r o d u c t iv e  c a p a c i t y  w it h  th e  h o ld in g s  o f  th e  
th u lw a h e e k s  o f  th e  c o m m u n ity ^ . B e s id e s ,  th u lw a h e e k s  l i k e  
B e e r je e  S c in d ia  and A m bajee S c in d ia h ,  whose f i e l d s  p o s s e s s e d  
th e  same p r o d u c t iv e  c a p a c i t y  a s  th e  h o ld in g s  o f  th e  a f o r e ­
m e n tio n e d  u p r e e s . p a id  a h e a v ie r  l a n d - t a x  a s  t h e i r  s h a r e  o f  
th e  t o t a l  v i l l a g e  r e n t .  Why th e y  d id  s o  i s  e a s y  to  u n d e rs ta n d
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o n ce  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  o b t a in in g  u p re e s  f o r  em ploym ent on 
d e s e r t e d  h o ld in g s  i s  a p p r e c ia t e d .  As opposed to  t h e  u p r e e s » 
who w an d ered  from  one v i l l a g e  t o  a n o th e r  in  s e a r c h  o f  b e t t e r  
l e a s e s ,  th e  th u lw a h e e k s  w ere  d e e p ly  a t t a c h e d  to  t h e i r  f i e l d s ,  
and r e f u s e d  to  m ig ra te  to  a new v i l l a g e  s o  lo n g  a s  th e y  c o u ld  
make a b a re  s u b s i s t e n c e  in  one p la c e .  T h e i r  a tta c h m e n t  to  
t h e i r  h o ld in g s  d id  n o t stem  s o l e l y  from  an a c q u i s i t i v e  
i n s t i n c t ;  i t  a l s o  f lo w e d  from  a d e s i r e  f o r  th e  s o c i a l  p r i v ­
i l e g e s  w h ic h  th e  th u lw a h e e k s  e n jo y e d  in  th e  r u r a l  co m m u n ity , 
and t h e  p r e s t ig e  w h ic h  th e  p o s s e s s io n  o f  a w a ta n  ( r i g h t  in  
la n d )  b e sto w e d  on i t s  ow ner i n  an a g r a r ia n  s o c i e t y .  The  
th u lw a h e e k  was a member o f  th e  v i l l a g e  c o u n c i l ,  and had an  
a c t i v e  v o ic e  i n  i t s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s ;  he had a r i g h t  o f  p a s t u r e  
i n  th e  v i l l a g e  common; he d id  n o t  pay  any h o u s e - t a x  s o  lo n g  
a s  he p o s s e s s e d  o n ly  one d w e l l in g  i n  th e  v i l l a g e ;  he was 
exem pted fro m  a t a x  p a id  by o t h e r  c a s t e s  on m a r r ia g e ,  a s  w e l l  
a s  from  a d is p e n s a t io n  fe e  f o r  m a rry in g  a w if e  who had b een  
r e p u d ia t e d ,  o r  was a w idow ; a n d , m ost im p o r ta n t  o f  a l l ,  he 
and h i s  w if e  w ere  e n t i t l e d  to  p re c e d e n c e  o v e r  th e  u p re e  a t  
m a r r ia g e s  and upon o t h e r  c e r e m o n ia l  o c c a s io n s  i n  th e  v i l l a g e .
The l a c k  o f  s h a r p  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  in co m e s i n  th e  v i l l a g e  
im posed  a t r a n q u i l l i t y  upon r u r a l  s o c i e t y  w h ic h  e x e r c i s e d  a 
d e c i s i v e  i n f lu e n c e  on th e  s o c i a l  b e h a v io u r  o f  th e  c u l t i v a t ­
o r s .  The k u n b is  w ere  m ild  and u n o b t r u s iv e ,  and th e y  a b h o rre d
a w ant o f  g e n t le n e s s  in  o t h e r s .  Y e t  f o r  a l l  t h e i r  g e n t le n e s s  
t h e y  had a l a t e n t  warm th o f  te m p e r , and i f  o p p re sse d  beyond a 
c e r t a i n  p o in t  th e y  c o u ld  tu r n  f i e r c e l y  upon t h e i r  t o r m e n t o r s .  
The k u n b is  w ere  n o t o u t s t a n d in g ly  a s t u t e ,  b u t n e i t h e r  w ere  
th e y  w a n t in g  i n  i n t e l l i g e n c e .  A s y m p a t h e t ic  o b s e r v e r  w ould  
h ave  fo u n d  them w e l l  in fo rm e d  ab o u t m a t te r s  r e l a t i n g  to  th e  
b u s in e s s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  and th e  c o n c e rn s  o f  th e  l i t t l e  com­
m u n ity  o f  th e  v i l l a g e  w ould  im m e d ia te ly  h o ld  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t .  
f 0n th e  w h o le 1 , a B r i t i s h  c i v i l i a n  o b s e r v e d , 1 th e y  a r e  f a r  
b e t t e r  in fo rm e d  th a n  th e  lo w e r  c l a s s e s  o f  o u r p o p u la t io n ,  and  
c e r t a i n l y  f a r  s u r p a s s  them i n  p r o p r ie t y  and o r d e r l i n e s s  o f  
dem ean o u r1^ .  T h a t  s u c h  p o r t r a y a l s  o f  r u r a l  harm ony a r e  n o t  
o v e r-d ra w n  i s  c l e a r  from  th e  s t a t i s t i c a l  a c c o u n t  we h a ve  o f  
th e  v i l l a g e  o f  A m b o la ^ . O f th e  c u l t i v a t i n g  f a m i l i e s  i n  th e  
v i l l a g e ,  6 0  p e r  c e n t  had f i e l d s  r a n g in g  from  1 5  to  3 0  
b e e g h a s . H o ld in g s  o f  t h i s  s i z e  made f o r  a r e a s o n a b le  l i v i n g  
by th e  s t a n d a r d s  o f  th e  t im e , a lt h o u g h , a s  we s h a l l  p r e s e n t ly  
s e e ,  th e y  p r o v id e d  no in s u r a n c e  a g a in s t  in v o lv e m e n t  i n  d e b t .  
The t h r e e  s u b s t a n t i a l  c u l t i v a t o r s  i n  th e  v i l l a g e  w ere  th e  
P a t e l ,  Baboo Rao S c in d ia h ,  and M a ro je e  S c in d ia h  and B a p u je e
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S c in d ia h ,  e a c h  o f  whom had a h o ld in g  t h a t  was 60 b ee g a h s i n  
e x t e n t  and t h r i c e  a s  l a r g e  a s  t h a t  owned by th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  
th e  p e a s a n t s .  A t th e  o p p o s it e  end o f  th e  s o c i a l  s c a l e  
s to o d  k u n b is  l i k e  Am ruta S c in d ia h  and H ykunt S c in d ia h ,  who 
found i t  v i r t u a l l y  im p o s s ib le  to  k eep  body and s o u l  t o g e t h e r  
on th e  p r o f i t s  d e r iv e d  from  t h e i r  f i e l d s .  By and l a r g e ,  
h o w e v e r, r u r a l  M a h a ra s h tra  p r e s e n t e d  a p i c t u r e  d o m in ated  by 
a g re y  and anonym ous m ass o f  k u n b is  who h e ld  th e  b a la n c e  
b etw een  a few  s u b s t a n t i a l  c u l t i v a t o r s  on th e  one h a n d , and 
a f r in g e  o f  im p o v e r is h e d  p e a s a n t s  on th e  o t h e r .
F o r  a l l  t h a t  th e  eco n o m ic c o n d it io n  o f  th e  g r e a t  body o f  
c u l t i v a t o r s  was f a r  from  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  A s t r a n g e r  to  th e  
r u r a l  s c e n e  w ould  h ave  em erged w it h  an u n d u ly  p e s s i m i s t i c  
n o t io n  o f  th e  a c t u a l  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s ,  s i n c e  th e  c u l t i v a t o r s  
w ere  q u ic k  to  s u s p e c t  i n  any e n q u ir y  c o n c e r n in g  t h e i r  a s s e t s  
a p o t e n t ia l  enhancem ent o f  th e  t a x  b u rd e n , and t h e r e f o r e  
p r e s e n te d  an o v e r-d ra w n  p i c t u r e  o f  t h e i r  f i s c a l  o b l i g a t i o n s .  
B u t th e  k u n b is  w ere by no s t r e t c h  o f  im a g in a t io n  r o l l i n g  in  
w e a l t h ^ .  We g e t  an a c c u r a t e  id e a  o f  th e  c o n d it io n  o f  th e  
c o u n t r y  d i s t r i c t s  from  a c lo s e  lo o k  in t o  L o n y , a l a r g i s h  
v i l l a g e  a t y p i c a l  o n ly  b e c a u se  i t  s to o d  c lo s e  to  P o o n a . Of
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th e  8 4  c u l t i v a t i n g  f a m i le s  r e s i d i n g  i n  L o n y , a s  many a s  79 
w ere  in d e b te d  to  th e  f o u r  J a in  and two M a rw a ri v a n i s ,  o r  
m o n e y - le n d e rs  o f  th e  v i l l a g e .  W h ile  th e  t o t a l  d e b t ,  a sum o f  
R s . 1 4 * 5 3 2 , was a v e r y  f o r m id ib le  sum , i t  was s p l i t  up in t o  
s m a l l  lo a n s  ra n g in g  from  R s .5 0  to  R s .2 0 0 .  T h i s ,  h o w e v e r, 
d o es n o t  ta k e  a c c o u n t  o f  d e b ts  o f  R s .2 ,0 0 0  and upw ards co n ­
t r a c t e d  by th e  two o r  t h r e e  v e r y  s u b s t a n t i a l  la n d e d  f a m i l i e s  
w h ic h  r e s id e d  i n  L o n y 3 2 . T h e se  d e b ts  had g e n e r a l l y  b een  co n ­
t r a c t e d  t o  d e f r a y  th e  e x p e n se s  o f  m a r r ia g e ,  o r  to  p u rc h a s e  
s e e d ,  fo o d  and s t o c k .  E a c h  k u n b i k e p t  a ru n n in g  a c c o u n t  w it h  
h i s  v a n i . t a k in g  a r e c e i p t  f o r  s u c h  sum s a s  he p a id  from  tim e  
to  t im e . By a w id e ly  a c c e p te d  c o n v e n t io n  i n t e r e s t  accum u­
l a t e d  o n ly  t i l l  i t  e q u a l le d  th e  p r i n c i p l e .  R e la t io n s  b etw een  
th e  p e a s a n t s  and t h e i r  c r e d i t o r s  th u s  a p p e a r  to  h a ve  been  
c o n d u c te d  on an e q u i t a b le  b a s i s ,  b u t  i t  w o u ld  be l e g i t im a t e  
to  h a v e  r e s e r v a t io n s  ab o u t how th e  s y s te m  w orked  i n  p r a c t i c e .  
F o r  d e s p i t e  a n a t u r a l  l i v e l i n e s s  o f  th e  m in d , th e  k u n b is  w ere  
n o t  v e r y  sh rew d  i n  m anaging t h e i r  f i s c a l  a f f a i r s .  The  
c o n t e s t  b etw een  them and th e  v a n is  was a l l  th e  more u n e q u a l 
s i n c e  th e y  w ere  p i t t e d  a g a in s t  i n d iv i d u a l s  whose c a s t e  
v a lu e s  made them g r a s p in g ,  and who s p e c i a l i s e d  i n  m o n e y le n d -  
i n g .  H o w ever, th e  p o r t r a y a l  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b etw een  th e
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c u l t i v a t o r s  and th e  v a n is  a s  one o f  t e n s io n  and c o n f l i c t  w o u ld  
be u n t ru e  to  th e  s o c i a l  tem per o f  th e  t im e . F o r  th e  b u s in e s s  
o f  a g r i c u l t u r e  in v o lv e d  in t im a t e  c o - o p e r a t io n  b etw een  two  
g r o u p s : th e  k u n b is ,  who p ro v id e d  la n d  and la b o u r ,  and th e  
m o n e y le n d e rs , who a s s i s t e d  w it h  s e e d  and c a p i t a l .  As a 
r e s u l t  o f  s u c h  a p a r t n e r s h ip  th e  p ro d u c e  o f  th e  c u l t i v a t o r  
was m o rtg ag ed  e v e n  b e f o r e  i t  was re a p e d  to  s a t i s f y  th e  
v a r io u s  demands he had to  m e e t. B u t s i n c e  t h i s  p r o c e s s  had  
w o rked  o u t i t s  own r a t i o n a l e ,  and th e  v a n i  had n e i t h e r  th e  
i n c l i n a t i o n  n o r  th e  m eans to  a p p r o p r ia t e  th e  h o ld in g s  o f  th e  
k u n b i , th e  l a t t e r f s  d ep en d en ce  upon h im  f o r  c a p i t a l  was n o t  
as t r a g i c  a f e a t u r e  o f  th e  r u r a l  econom y a s  i t  becam e s u b s e ­
q u e n t ly .
The k u n b i*s  r e a l  s t r e n g t h  l a y  i n  t h a t  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  s o c i a l  pow er w i t h in  th e  v i l l a g e  s e r v e d  to  r e d r e s s  th e  im­
b a la n c e  b etw een  th e  c u l t i v a t o r s  and th e  v a n i s . O f th e  i n s t i ­
t u t io n s  w h ich  w ie ld e d  in f lu e n c e  and c o n t r o l l e d  a u t h o r i t y  i n  
th e  v i l l a g e ,  th e  m ost s i g n i f i c a n t  w ere  th e  p a t e l s h i p  and th e  
p a n c h a y a t . The P a t e l ,  a s  a lr e a d y  i n d i c a t e d ,  was a r e p r e s e n t a ­
t i v e  o f  a s e n io r  .ja th a  w hose p o s i t io n  a s  th e  head  o f  th e  
v i l l a g e  had b een  e n d o rse d  by th e  S t a t e .  He t h e r e f o r e  com­
b in e d  i n  h i s  p e rs o n  l e g a l  and t r a d i t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  w h ic h  
made him  th e  m ost im p o r ta n t  i n d iv i d u a l  i n  th e  v i l l a g e ,  and
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in v e s t e d  him  w it h  sw e e p in g  pow ers o f  i n i t i a t i v e 3 3 . L ik e  
Baboo Rao S c in d ia  o f  A m b o la , m ost P a t e l s  w ere  among th e  s u b ­
s t a n t i a l  la n d h o ld e r s  in  t h e i r  c o m m u n it ie s , o v e r  and above  
w h ic h  th e y  e n jo y e d  a q u a n t i t y  o f  f r e e - h o ld  la n d  a s  re m u n era­
t io n  f o r  t h e i r  d u t i e s .  So im p o r ta n t  w as th e  P a t e l ’ s  o f f i c e ,  
and s o  o n e ro u s  th e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  i t s  s t y l e ,  t h a t  many an 
in cu m b e n t who had f a l l e n  upon e v i l  d a y s  was re d u c e d  to  s e l l ­
in g  an o f f i c e  he c o u ld  n o t o ccu p y  w it h  d i g n i t y .  Y e t  th e  
p r o p e r t y  and p r e r o g a t iv e s  a t t a c h e d  to  th e  p a t e l s h i p  w ere  
c o n s id e r e d  s o  u n a l i e n a b le ,  t h a t  v e r y  o f t e n  o n ly  a p a r t  o f  th e  
r i g h t s  o f  h i s  o f f i c e  w ere  s o l d .  S u ch  a c o n v e n t io n  g ave  r i s e  
to  th e  e x i s t a n c e  o f  two o r e ven  m ore P a t e l s  i n  a v i l l a g e ,  
w it h  th e  s e n io r m o s t  among them r e t a i n i n g  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  
p r e c e d e n c e .
T h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  p l a y e d  b y  t h e  P a t e l  w a s  t o  
r e p r e s e n t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  c u l t i v a t i n g  c o m m u n i t y  i n  t h e  
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  m a m l a t d a r  a n d  t h e  d e s h m u k h  w h i c h  
l e d  t o  t h e  f i x i n g  o f  a n  a n n u a l  r e v e n u e  d e m a n d  o n  t h e  v i l l a g e .  
B u t  i n  h i s  d u a l  c a p a c i t y  a s  a  t r a d i t i o n a l  l e a d e r  o f  v i l l a g e  
s o c i e t y  a n d  t h e  o f f i c i a l  h e a d m a n  o f  t h e  v i l l a g e ,  t h e  P a t e l
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was a l s o  e n t r u s t e d  w it h  th e  t a s k  o f  e x te n d in g  th e  c u l t i v a t e d  
a r e a  by e n c o u ra g in g  u p re e s  to  s e t t l e  i n  th e  v i l l a g e .  He d id  
t h i s  by o f f e r in g  p o t e n t i a l  t e n a n t s  a t t r a c t i v e  t e r m s :  e i t h e r  
on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  co w l t e n u r e ,  w hereb y th e  u p re e  p a id  a 
f r a c t i o n  o f  th e  r e n t  in  th e  f i r s t  y e a r  w it h  a n n u a l i n c r e a s e s  
le a d in g  to  th e  f u l l  r e n t  in  th e  s i x t h ,  o r  th ro u g h  th e  m u ckta  
t e n u r e ,  w h ereb y  t e n a n t s  w ere  e n co u ra g e d  to  c l e a r  t h e  a r a b le  
w a s te  on paym ent o f  a v e r y  n o m in a l r e n t .  More s i g n i f i c a n t  
s t i l l  was th e  P a t e l ’ s  p r e r o g a t iv e  to  g r a n t  th u lw a h e e k  s t a t u s  
to  th o se  who w an ted  to  p u rc h a s e  and n o t  j u s t  r e n t  la n d  i n  th e  
v i l l a g e .  In  b e s to w in g  s u c h  r i g h t s ,  h o w e v e r, he had to  co n ­
s u l t  a l l  th o s e  who had a perm an en t s t a k e  i n  th e  co m m u n ity .
S u ch  r e q u e s t s  w ere  t h e r e f o r e  d e b a te d  in  th e  c h o w r ie  b y  th e  
P a t e l  and th e  th u lw a h e e k s  o f  th e  v i l l a g e .  A g r a n t  s i g n i f y i n g  
th e  a d m is s io n  o f  a p e a s a n t  c a l l e d  K o s a je e  in t o  t h e i r  r a n k s  by  
th e  P a t e l  and t h e  th u lw a h e e k s  o f  th e  v i l l a g e  o f  M u lta n  v i v i d l y  
e v o k e s  th e  tem p er o f  s u c h  d e l i b e r a t i o n s :
We [ t h e  P a t e l s  and th e  th u lw a h e e k s  o f  th e  v i l l a g e ]  
b e in g  p r e s e n t ,  you  K o s a je e  so n  o f  K o s a je e  P a t e l  
T a ru h  o f  Sowkee came and p re s e n te d , a p e t i t i o n  i f  
a l e t t e r  o f  i n h e r i t a n c e  (m eeras p u t t a h )  w ere  
g ra n te d  f o r  la n d s  in  th e  above v i l l a g e  t h a t  yo u  
w ould  la b o u r  and s e c u r e  t h e i r  p r o s p e r i t y .  H a v in g  
ap p ro ved  o f  y o u r  p e t i t i o n  we g iv e  y o u . . . t h e  f i e l d  
c a l l e d  S a n . . *
We th e  v i l l a g e  a u t h o r i t i e s  h ave  g ra n te d  yo u  t h i s  
from  o u r f r e e  w i l l  and p l e a s u r e . . .Y o u  and y o u r
f
c h i l d r e n ’ s  c h i ld r e n  a r e  to  en .jo y  t h i s  r i g h t . • .3 4
(E m p h a s is  add ed )
In  a d m it t in g  K o s a je e  to  th e  m em bersh ip  o f  th e  com m unity  
th e  P a t e l  o f  M u lta n  i s  th u s  r e v e a le d  a s  t a k in g  a d e c i s io n  
b a ck e d  by p o p u la r  s e n t im e n t  i n  th e  v i l l a g e .  S in c e  th e  
P a t e l ’ s  p r e r o g a t iv e s  f lo w e d  in  a l a r g e  m e a su re  from  th e  
a c c e p ta n c e  o f  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  and h i s  le a d e r s h ip  by th e  c u l t i v ­
a t o r s ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  s i m i l a r  c o n s u l t a t io n s  l a y  b e h in d  
e v e r y  im p o rta n t  d e c i s io n  ta k e n  by th e  v i l l a g e ,  w h e th e r  i t  was 
a q u e s t io n  o f  a d m it t in g  a new member to  th e  com m u n ity , o r  th e  
e r e c t io n  o f  a new c h o w r ie ,  o r  th e  a d o p t io n  o f  an e x t r a  l e v y  
to  m eet a c a l l  f o r  a d d i t io n a l  t a x a t io n  by th e  m a m latd ar in  an  
e m e rg e n cy . H a rk in g  b a c k  o nce a g a in  to  A m b ola , i t  f o l lo w s  
from  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  h o ld in g s  i n  t h i s  v i l l a g e  t h a t  P a t e l  
Baboo Rao S c in d ia h  w o u ld  h a ve  p ro v e d  c o m p le te ly  i n e f f e c t i v e  
i n  th e  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  h i s  d u t ie s  i f ,  even  i n  th e  m ost t r i v i a l  
o f  i s s u e s  a f f e c t i n g  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  com m u n ity , he had  
n o t  ta k e n  in t o  c o n f id e n c e  i n d iv i d u a l s  l i k e  M adjee S c in d ia h  
and R a ja  Rao S c in d ia h ,  whose h o ld in g s  in  la n d  w ere  j u s t  a s  
e x t e n s iv e  as  h i s ,  and whose v o ic e  i n  th e  v i l l a g e  c o u n c i l s
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c o n s e q u e n t ly  c a r r i e d  g r e a t  w e ig h t3 5 . T h is  i s  n o t  to  deny th e  
s p e c i a l  p r i v i l e g e s  w h ic h  th e  P a t e l  e n jo y e d  by v i r t u e  o f  h i s  
p o s i t i o n .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  even  tho u g h  th e  d e c i s io n  to  a c c e p t  a 
new member in  th e  v i l l a g e  was a c o l l e c t i v e  o n e , i t s  fo rm a l  
s a n c t io n  depended upon th e  paym ent o f  a s p e c i a l  c e s s  c a l l e d  
th e  m eeras p u t t a h  by th e  new in cu m b en t to  th e  P a t e l ^ .  B u t  
i t  i s  to  be b o rn e  i n  m ind t h a t  th e  P a t e l  was n o t  a la w  i n  
h im s e l f ,  and t h a t  he was g u id e d  and in f lu e n c e d  i n  h i s  
d e c i s io n s  by th e  s e n t im e n t s  o f  a l l  th o s e  c u l t i v a t o r s  who had  
a p erm anent s t a k e  i n  th e  v i l l a g e .
I n d i c a t i v e  to o  o f  th e  m anner i n  w h ic h  th e  c o l l e c t i v e  
v o ic e  o f  th e  c u l t i v a t o r s  i n  th e  v i l l a g e  was b ro u g h t  to  b e a r  
on th e  t a s k s  o f  v i l l a g e  a d m in is t r a t io n  was th e  w o rk in g  o f  
th e  p a n c h a y a t  ( l i t .  c o u n c i l  o f  f i v e ) ,  o r  th e  j u d i c i a l  i n s t i ­
t u t io n  aro u n d  w h ich  th e  l i f e  o f  th e  r u r a l  co m m u n itie s  
r e v o lv e d .  B e in g  th e  m ost im p o rta n t  p e rs o n  in  th e  v i l l a g e ,  
th e  P a t e l  was i n v a r i a b l y  a p p ro a ch e d  by th e  i n d i v i d u a l s  co n ­
c e rn e d  when a d is p u t e  a ro s e  o v e r  any o f  th e  w h o le  ra n g e  o f  
i s s u e s  w h ich  ca n  p la g u e  a r u r a l  s o c i e t y ^ .  The P a t e l  in  th e
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B u t i f  he f a i l e d ,  th e  d i s p u t in g  p a r t i e s  w ere  r e f e r r e d  to  a 
p a n c h a y a t  o r  ad hoc c o u n c i l  o f  th e  m ost i n t e l l i g e n t  and  
i n f l u e n t i a l  k u n b is  o f  th e  v i l l a g e *  The p a n c h a y a t  was ru n  
a lo n g  s im p le  l i n e s .  The members g a th e re d  i n  th e  c h o w r ie  o r  
i n  th e  open to  h e a r  th e  d i s p u t in g  p a r t i e s  a rg u e  t h e i r  c a s e s ,  
and to  exam in e  s u c h  w it n e s s e s  a s  c h o se  to  a p p e a r . Once a l l  
t h i s  was o v e r ,  th e  p a n c h a y a t , a f t e r  d e b a t in g  th e  w h o le  i s s u e ,  
drew  up an aw ard w h ic h  was com m unicated  to  th e  P a t e l  f o r  
e x e c u t io n .  The p a n c h a y a t f s  a d v a n ta g e  o v e r  fo rm a l j u d i c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  l a y  i n  th e  i d e n t i t y  o f  f e e l i n g  and s e n t im e n t  
b etw een  th e  a b r i t r a t o r s  and th e  d i s p u t a n t s .  S in c e  i t s  
aw ard s w ere  sh a p e d  by v a lu e s  w h ic h  w ere  s h a r e d  b y  a l l  
members o f  th e  c u l t i v a t i n g  co m m u n ity , th e y  w e re  r e a d i l y  
a c c e p te d  by th e  k u n b is . H o w ever, th e  p a n c h a y a t  was by no 
means an i d e a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  s o l v i n g  d is p u t e s  w i t h in  th e  
v i l l a g e .  F o r  a p a r t  from  th e  d i l a t o r i n e s s  in h e r e n t  i n  i t s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  i t  d id  n o t p o s s e s s  th e  m eans to  e x e c u t e  i t s  
a w a rd s , and was in  t h i s  r e s p e c t  c o m p le te ly  d e p e n d e n t upon th e  
P a t e l .  B e s id e s ,  i t  was n o t d e s ig n e d  to  r e s o lv e  c o m p lic a t e d  
c a s e s ,  and o f t e n  p e r m it t e d  m a t t e r s  to  d r i f t  u n t i l  some c ir c u m ­
s t a n c e  p re v e n te d  th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  com ing to  a d e c is io n ^ ® .
3*
EA ST IN D IA  P A P ER S , I V ,  B o r r a i d a le ’ s  N ote on P u n c h a y a ts  
d a te d  n i l .
first instance attempted to settle the dispute by himself*
45
S in c e  th e  p a n c h a y a t  was th e  o n ly  j u d i c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  
i n  r u r a l  s o c i e t y ,  and b e c a u se  i t  was c o m p le te ly  d o m in ated  by  
th e  c u l t i v a t i n g  co m m u n ity , th e  v a n is  i n  th e  v i l l a g e s  o f  th e  
D e cca n  w e re  u n a b le  to  e x p l o i t  th e  k u n b is  d e s p i t e  th e  c o n t r o l  
th e y  e x e r c i s e d  o v e r  th e  r u r a l  econom y. The v a n is  c o u ld  
a lw a y s  r e f e r  a r e c a l c i t r a n t  d e b to r  to  a p a n c h a y a t » But 
s i n c e  th e  members o f  th e  p a n c h a y a t  w e re  c h o se n  from  am ongst 
th e  k u n b is , th e y  c o u ld  be t r u s t e d  to  g iv e  d e c i s io n s  w h ich  
show ed f a r  more th a n  l e g i t im a t e  c o n c e rn  f o r  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
th e  c u l t i v a t o r s .  A l l  t h i s  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  firu e  i n  d e b t  
c a s e s  in v o lv in g  a P a t e l  o r  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p e a s a n t .  B u t even  
o t h e r w is e  th e  v a n i  had no ch a n ce  o f  r e c o v in g  a d e b t u n le s s  he  
s e c u r e d  th e  a s s i s t a n c e  o f  some p o w e rfu l la n d e d  c h i e f  who 
c o u ld  i n f lu e n c e  h i s  d e b t o r .  More f r e q u e n t ly ,  he to o k  to  
in c e s s a n t  im p o r t u n it y ,  and by l i t e r a l l y  th ro w in g  h im s e l f  on 
th e  t h r e s h o ld  o f  h i s  d e b to r  and r e f u s in g  to  budge t i l l  th e
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d e b t was r e p a y e d , he so m e tim es s u c c e e d e d  i n  h i s  o b je c t iv e ^  . 
The V a lu e s  o f  V i l l a g e  S o c ie t y
B e s id e s  th e  c u l t i v a t o r s  who t i l l e d  th e  s o i l ,  and th e  
v a n i s  who p la y e d  an im p o r ta n t  r o l e  in  th e  econom y, e a c h
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v i l l a g e  i n  t h e  D e c c a n  c o n t a i n e d  a  n u m b e r  o f  B r a h m i n  f a m i l i e s  
w h i c h  m a d e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e  
c o m m u n i t y .  B o t h  i n  t h e i r  p h y s i c a l  a p p e a r a n c e  a n d  i n  t h e i r  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n ,  t h e  B r a h m i n s  s t o o d  a s  a  g r o u p  
a p a r t  i n  t h e  v i l l a g e ,  m a r k e d  o u t  f r o m  t h e  k u n b i s  a n d  o t h e r  
c a s t e s  i n  ’ b e i n g  f a i r e r ,  b e t t e r  d r e s s e d ,  a n d  m o r e  v i r t u o u s  
i n  t h e i r  m a n n e r s 14 ® .  T h e  t w o  h e r e d i t a r y  o f f i c e s  w h i c h  t h e y  
m o n o p o l i s e d  i n  e v e r y  v i l l a g e  w e r e  t h o s e  o f  t h e  j o s h i  o r  t h e  
v i l l a g e  p r i e s t ,  a n d  t h e  k u l k a r n i  o r  t h e  a c c o u n t a n t .  T h e s e  
o f f i c e s  a d m i r a b l y  s u i t e d  t h e  s t y l e  o f  l i f e  o f  t h e  B r a h m i n s ,  
a n d  c o n f e r r e d  o n  t h e m  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p o w e r  a n d  i n f l u e n c e .
N e x t  t o  t h e  P a t e l ,  t h e  k u l k a r n i  w a s  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  
i n d i v i d u a l  i n  t h e  v i l l a g e ,  s i n c e  h e  k e p t  a  r e c o r d  o f  t h e  
d i m e n s i o n s  o f  t h e  h o l d i n g s  o f  t h e  c u l t i v a t o r s ,  t h e  r e n t s  
t h e y  p a i d  t o  t h e  S t a t e ,  a n d  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o n  w h i c h  t h e  l a n d  
w a s  h e l d .  T h e  n a t u r e  o f  h i s  o f f i c e ,  c o u p l e d  w i t h  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  h e  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  f e w  e d u c a t e d  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  t h e  
v i l l a g e ,  i n v e s t e d  t h e  k u l k a r n i  w i t h  a n  i m p o r t a n c e  f a r  e x c e e d ­
i n g  h i s  f o r m a l  s t a t u s .  T o  e n h a n c e  h i s  i n f l u e n c e ,  t h e  
k u l k a r n i  w o u l d  o f t e n  e n g i n e e r  a  s p l i t  b e t w e e n  t h e  n u m b e r s  o f  
t h e  c u l t i v a t i n g  c o m m u n i t y ,  a n d  l e a d  a  g r o u p  o f  k u n b  i s  i n  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  P a t e l  o f  t h e  v i l l a g e .  T h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e
V i d e  C o a t s ’  A c c o u n t  o f  L o n y
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B rah m in  f a m i l i e s  a l s o  stemmed from  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  i o s h i , 
who lo o k e d  a f t e r  th e  te m p le  t h a t  was th e  p r id e  o f  any  
r e s p e c t a b le  v i l l a g e ,  and a tte n d e d  to  th e  d a y - t o - d a y  r i t u a l ­
i s t i c  n eed s o f  th e  v i l l a g e r s ,  p ro v id e d  th e  o n ly  l i n k  b etw een  
th e  k u n b i and th e  g r e a t  t r a d i t i o n  o f  H in d u ism . A d m it t e d ly ,  
th e  . io s h i  d id  n o t  r e p r e s e n t  th e  b e s t  i n  B ra h m a n ic a l s o p h i s t i ­
c a t i o n ,  and h i s  n a iv e t y  and n a rro w  v i s i o n  c o u ld  d i s i l l u s i o n  
B r i t i s h  c i v i l i a n s  who had b een  b ro u g h t  up upon s t o r i e s  o f  
B ra h m a n ic a l s u b t l e t y  and p e r c e p t io n .  B u t th ro u g h  g iv in g  
l o c a l  e x p r e s s io n  to  th e  h ig h  c u l t u r e  o f  H in d u ism  in  th e  i d o l s  
o f  th e  M a r u t is  and th e  M ahadevs and th e  B h a ir a v s  w h ich  
ad o rn e d  th e  v i l l a g e  te m p le , he s e r v e d  to  a n c h o r  th e  l o y a l t y  
o f  th e  k u n b i to  th e  o n ly  t a n g ib le  em bodim ent o f  H in d u ism  
w h ic h  th e  l a t t e r  saw  a ro u n d  h im . S u ch  bonds w ere  r e in f o r c e d  
on o c c a s io n s  o f  b i r t h s ,  d e a t h s ,  and m a r r ia g e s ,  and th e  m y r ia d  
r e l i g i o u s  c e re m o n ie s  w h ich  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  r u r a l  l i f e ,  when th e  
i o s h i  p r e s id e d  o v e r  th e  p r a y e r s  o f f e r e d  to  th e  G o d s, and  
in v o k e d  them to  a c c e p t  t h e  o f f e r in g s  o f  t h e  l e s s e r  c a s t e s  n o t  
w h o l ly  o u t s id e  th e  p a l e ^ .
Y e t  th e  i o s h i  d id  n o t  ra n k  a s  h ig h  i n  th e  r u r a l  com m unity  
a s  h i s  c a s t e  s t a t u s  and h i s  fo rm a l p o s i t io n  w o u ld ^ le a d  one to  
a ssu m e . T h is  was s o  b e c a u s e  h i s  d ep en d en ce  upon h i s  c a s t e
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s t a t u s  f o r  a  l i v e l i h o o d  l o w e r e d  h i m  i n  t h e  e y e s  o f  t h e  c o m ­
m u n i t y .  B u t  t h e  i n s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  . i o s h i  c a n  a l s o  b e  
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  s o m e  o t h e r  i n f l u e n c e s .  S i n c e  t h e  h i g h  c u l t u r e  
o f  H i n d u i s m  e x p r e s s e d  i t s e l f  i n  a  l a n g u a g e  ( S a n s k r i t )  w h i c h  
t h e  b u l k  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  c o u l d  n o t  f o l l o w ,  a n d  s i n c e  i t  
d e a l t  i n  c o n c e p t s  w h i c h  w e r e  n o t  m e a n t  f o r  m a s s  c o n s u m p t i o n ,  
t h e  k u n b i * s  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  c u l t u r e  w a s  p u r e l y  m e c h a n i s t i c .
- i o s h i ,  t h r o u g h  w h o m  t h i s  i n t e r e s t  w a s  k e p t  a l i v e ,  w a s  
m e r e l y  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  f u n c t i o n a l  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  v i l l a g e ,  w h o  
p r e s i d e d  o v e r  m a r r i a g e  c e r e m o n i e s  a n d  o b s e q u i e s  i n s t e a d  o f  
f a b r i c a t i n g  p o t s  a n d  p a n s ,  a n d  h i s  r a n k i n g  a s  a n  a r t i s a n  o r  
b u l l o t e d a r  ( o f  w h i c h  m o r e  l a t e r )  o f  t h e  t h i r d  a n d  l o w e s t  
c a t e g o r y  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  s t a t u s  h e  h e l d  i n  t h e  v i l l a g e  
c o m m u n i t y .
T h e  s p i r i t u a l  l i f e  o f  t h e  k u n b i s  w a s  m o u l d e d  n e i t h e r  b y  
B r a h m a n i c a l  v a l u e s ,  n o r  b y  t h e  i o s h i s  w h o  c l a i m e d  t o  r e p r e ­
s e n t  t h e s e  v a l u e s  i n  t h e  v i l l a g e s  o f  t h e  D e c c a n .  T h e  s p i r i t ­
u a l  w a n t s  o f  t h e  k u n b i s  w e r e  s a t i s f i e d  b y  t h e  J n a n e s h w a r i ,  
a n d  b y  t h e  a b h a n g a s  o f  T u k a r a m a  a n d  N a m a d e v a ,  w h o s e  s i m p l i c ­
i t y  a n d  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  i n s i g h t s  c o m b i n e d  t o  e x e r c i s e  a  g r e a t  
i n f l u e n c e  o n  t h e  p e a s a n t s .  W h a t  l i n k e d  t h e  k u n b i s  t o  t h e
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g r e a t  t r a d i t i o n  o f  H in d u ism  was th e  l i t e r a t u r e  o f  th e  
b h a k t i  m ovem ent, w h ic h  had re m a in e d  a l i v e  in  f o l k  memory 
th ro u g h  co m m u n ica tio n  by th e  sp o k e n  word from  one g e n e r a t io n  
to  a n o t h e r ;  w hat em bodied f o r  them th e  h ig h  c u l t u r e  o f  
M a h a ra s h tra  w ere th e  s h r in e s  o f  b h a k t i  gods l i k e  th e  tem p le  
o f  V i t h a l a  o f  P a n d h a rp u r , to  w h ic h  th o u sa n d s  f lo c k e d  e v e ry  
y e a r  to  e s t a b l i s h  communion w it h  th e  o b je c t  o f  t h e i r  
d e v o t io n .  The a n n u a l p i lg r im a g e  to  P a n d h a rp u r b ro u g h t  
to g e t h e r  h ig h  and low  c a s t e s ,  and p e a s a n t s  from  rem o te  
v i l l a g e s ,  and i t  s e r v e d  a s  an i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  th e  t r a n s m is ­
s io n  o f  r e l i g i o u s  v a l u e s ,  and th e  s p r e a d  o f  s o c i a l  c o h e s io n .  
On th e  ro ad  to  P a n d h a rp u r  th e  c h a s t e  B rah m in  fro m  W ai ru b b ed  
s h o u ld e r s  w it h  th e  k u n b i from  th e  N ag ar t e r r i t o r i e s ,  w h i le  
a s u b s t a n t i a l  P a t e l  t r i e d ,  n o t v e r y  h a rd  f o r  th e  n o n c e , to  
a v o id  p o l lu t in g  c o n t a c t  w it h  an u n to u c h a b le  h u r r y in g  to  th e  
te m p le  o f  V i t h a l a .  B u t w h e th e r  B rah m in  o r  M ah ar, o r  k u n b i o r  
v a n i ,  on th e  ro a d  to  P a n d h a rp u r e v e ry o n e  r e c i t e d  th e  same 
ab han gas in  th e  p r a i s e  o f  th e  b h a k t i  G o d s :
So I  was g e t t in g  to  know my M a h a ra s h tra  anew e v e r y  
day [ w r i t e s  a M a h a r a s h t r ia n  s o c i o l o g i s t  o f  th e  
P a n d h a rp u r p i lg r im a g e ] .  I  found  a new d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  M a h a r a s h t r a : th e  la n d  whose p e o p le  go to  
P a n d h a rp u r f o r  p i lg r im a g e .  When th e  p i lg r im a g e  
s t a r t e d  from  P o o n a , t h e r e  w ere  p e o p le  from  P o o n a ,
J u n n a r ,  S a t a r  e t c .  E v e ry d a y  p e o p le  w ere  j o i n i n g  
th e  p i lg r im a g e  from  K a n d e sh , S h o la p u r ,  N a s ik ,
B e r a r .  A l l  w e re  M a ra th i s p e a k in g  p e o p le  -  com ing
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from  d i f f e r e n t  c a s t e s ,  b u t  s in g in g  th e  sam e s o n g s ,  
t h e  same v e r s e s  o f  th e  V a r k a r i  c u l t . ,.43
H o w ever, i t  was n o t  n e c e s s a r y  to  go t o  P a n d h a rp u r to
g a in  i n i t i a t i o n  in t o  th e  b h a k t i  c u l t .  F o r  a l l  o v e r  th e
c o u n t r y s id e  t h e r e  f lo u r i s h e d  l a y  g ro u p s  o f  d e v o t e e s ,  h e ld
t o g e t h e r  by a g u ru  o r  s p i r i t u a l  l e a d e r ,  w h ic h  m et i n  th e
v i l l a g e  c h o w rie  to  r e c i t e  t h e i r  f a v o u r i t e  ab h an g as and
p o n d er o v e r  th e  m ean ing  o f  e a r t h ly  e x is t e n c e  and th e  f a t e
t h a t  l a y  b eyo n d . O f t e n ,  t o o , a w a n d e r in g  m e n d ic a n t  who had
d e d ic a t e d  h i s  l i f e  to  th e  s e r v i c e  o f  th e  Gods o f  P an d h arp u r
w o u ld  v i s i t  th e  v i l l a g e ,  and h o ld  a k i r t a n  o r  r e l i g i o u s
a sse m b ly  to  w h ic h  a l l  th e  v i l l a g e r s  w ould  f l o c k ,  f o r
V i t h a l a  made no d i s t i n c t i o n  b etw een  B rah m in  and S h u d ra  and
r i c h  and p o o r , b u t w elcom ed a l l  to  h i s  f o l d .  T h u s a d v a it a
becam e a h o u se h o ld  c o n c e p t  in  M a h a r a s h t r a , and l in k e d  th e
M a ra th i s p e a k in g  w o rld  in  a c^lose t e x t u r e  o f  v a lu e s  w h ich
t ra n s c e n d e d  th e  t e n s io n  b etw een  c a s t e s  and r e g io n s  and
form ed th e  b a s i s  o f  a p o p u la r  c u l t u r e  f lo w in g  o u t  o f  th e
g r e a t  t r a d i t i o n  o f  H in d u ism 4 4 .
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In f o r m a t io n  r e g a r d in g  th e  o r g a n is a t io n  o f  th e  V a r k a r i  
s e c t  was o b ta in e d  fro m  S .V .  D an d e k a r i n  an in t e r v ie w  d a te d
22 D ecem ber 1 9 6 2 . P r o f e s s o r  D a n d e k a r , a p h i lo s o p h e r ,  i s  a 
w e ll-k n o w n  f ig u r e  in  th e  V a r k a r i  m ovem ent.
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W h ile  th e  i n t e g r a t i v e  in f lu e n c e s  c o n v e rg in g  from  th e  
v i l l a g e s  o f  th e  D e ccan  to  P a n d h a rp u r , th e  s p i r i t u a l  c a p i t a l  
o f  M a h a r a s h t r a , l in k e d  th e  r u r a l  co m m u n it ie s  to  a common 
c o r p u s  o f  r e l i g i o u s  v a l u e s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w it h in  th e  v i l l a g e s  
c u t  a c r o s s  t h e s e  in f lu e n c e s  to  p r e s e r v e  th e  d i s t i n c t i v e  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  th e  v i l l a g e  com m unity , and to  s e t  i t  a p a r t  a s  
a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  u n i t .  The m ost im p o r ta n t  o f  s u c h  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s  w ere  th e  b u l l o t e d a r s . The b u l lo t e d a r s  w ere  a r t i s a n s  
h a i l i n g  from  d i f f e r e n t  c a s te s  who p o s s e s s e d  h e r e d i t a r y  r i g h t s  
o f  s e r v i c e  in  th e  v i l l a g e , a n d  who w ere  co m p en sated  by th e  
v i l l a g e  com m unity a c c o r d in g  to  w e l l  r e c o g n is e d  s c a l e s  o f  
re m u n e ra t io n  f o r  th e  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  t h e s e  s e r v i c e s ^ , The  
m o st im p o r ta n t  b u l lo t e d a r s  w ere  th o s e  who c o n t r ib u t e d  
d i r e c t l y  to  th e  b u s in e s s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  and s e r v e d  th e  
k u n b i : th e  s o o t a r , who f a b r i c a t e d  th e  wooden im p lem e n ts o f  
t h e  c u l t i v a t o r ,  and k e p t  them i n  a s t a t e  o f  good r e p a i r ;  th e  
l o h a r ,  who f a s h io n e d  and r e p a ir e d  th e  iro n w o rk  a s s o c ia t e d  
w it h  t h e s e  im p le m e n ts , b u t  c o u ld  a l s o  p r e s s  h i s  s k i l l s  to  th e  
t i r i n g  o f  a c a r t  o r  th e  s h o e in g  o f  a h o r s e ;  and th e  c h a m a r , 
who made th e  l e a t h e r  h o ld e r s ,  w h ip s ,  ro p e s  and bands r e q u ir e d  
by t h e  p e a s a n t s .  A ls o  ra n k e d  a s  b u l l o t e d a r s . tho u g h  t h e y  w ere
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not a r t is a n s , were the Marhars or the untouchable watchmen 
of the v i l l a g e . There were at le a st  a dozen Mahar fa m ilies  
in  a normal v i l l a g e , and despite  their  low so c ia l  ran k in g , 
they possessed great w eight in  the rural w orld , s in c e  on them 
rested  the important task of preventing  encroachments on the 
boundaries of v i l l a g e s , of which they had an accurate know­
ledge handed down to them by t r a d it io n . The Mahars also  
served  as the ears and eyes of the community, always on the 
a le r t  for any unusual occurrence which might s p e ll  danger for 
the v i l l a g e ^ .
Though this  account does not exhaust a ll  the catego ries  
w ith in  the b u l lo t e d a r s , of which every v il la g e  in  the abstract 
possessed tw elv e , enough has been sa id  to in d icate  how the 
techn ica l s k i l l s  required  for ag ricu ltu re  were found w ith in  
the v i l l a g e , making i t  a self- contained  community. But what 
was the ranking  of the d if fe r e n t  b u llo t e d a r s ? and how were 
they remunerated for the serv ices  they performed? A c o n sid ­
eratio n  of these questions throws in te re st in g  l ig h t  on the 
corporate sentim ent that p rev ailed  in  the v i l l a g e , and the g u lf  
between the formal statu s  of an occupation on the b a s is  of 
c aste , and the monetary rewards asso ciated  w ith  that p a r t ic u ­
lar  s k i l l .  The b u llo ted ars  were not paid  in d iv id u a lly  by the
See G o o d in efs Report on Deccan Com m unities.
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v i l l a g e r s  f o r  th e  s e r v i c e s  th e y  p e r fo rm e d ; i n s t e a d ,  th e y  
w e re  a l l o c a t e d  a p p ro x im a te ly  o n e - e ig h th  o f  th e  g r o s s  a n n u a l  
p ro d u c e  o f  th e  v i l l a g e .  The f r a c t i o n  o f  t h i s  sum r e c e iv e d  
b y  i n d iv i d u a l  a r t i s a n s  was d e te rm in e d  by th e  p r a c t i c a l  
u t i l i t y  o f  th e  s e r v i c e s  th e y  p e r fo rm e d , and b o re  no r e l a t i o n  
to  t h e i r  s o c i a l  s t a t u s  on th e  b a s i s  o f  c a s t e .  Thus  
b u l lo t e d a r s  o f  th e  f i r s t  c a t e g o r y ,  who r e c e iv e d  th e  maximum 
r e m u n e r a t io n , n o t o n ly  in c lu d e d  lo w  c a s t e s  l i k e  th e  s o o t a r  
and th e  l o h a r . b u t a l s o  th e  u n to u c h a b le  M ah ar. On th e  o t h e r  
h a n d , th e  B rah m in  p r i e s t  who c la im e d  to  b e lo n g  to  th e  h ig h e s t  
c a s t e  o f  a l l ,  and a tte n d e d  to  th e  i d o l s  o f  th e  v i l l a g e  gods 
i n  s u b s t a n t i a t io n  o f  t h i s  c la im ,  was ra n k e d  a s  a b u l lo t e d a r  
o f  th e  t h i r d  and lo w e s t  c a t e g o r y ,  and was h a rd  p u t to  make 
b o th  end s m e e t. Y e t  by and la r g e  th e  b u l lo t e d a r s  made 
f a i r l y  s u b s t a n t i a l  in co m es from  t h e i r  s k i l l s ,  and i n  a 
m id d le - s iz e d  v i l l a g e  l i k e  K u rm a lla  i n  S h o la p u r  d i s t r i c t ,  
a r t i s a n s  o f  th e  f i r s t  c a te g o r y  had an a n n u a l incom e o f  R s . 2 4 *  
w h ic h  p la c e d  them i n  th e  same eco n o m ic s c a l e  a s  th e  m a jo r i t y  
o f  th e  t h u lw a h e e k s . tho ugh  t h e i r  s o c i a l  s t a t u s  was in  no way 
e q u iv a le n t  to  t h a t  o f  c u l t i v a t o r s  p o s s e s s in g  w atan  r ig h t s ^ ? .
V id e  L a n g fo r d ’ s  R e p o rt  c i t e d  i n  f n .  45 a b o v e .
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The v illa g e s  o f the Deccan have been shown to be 
is o la te d  s o c ia l  u n it s , regulated  by in s t itu t io n s  and values 
that reigned  supreme w ith in  the v i l l a g e , and fashioned  the 
moral and m aterial clim ate which governed the l i f e  of the 
p easan ts . It  has also  been demonstrated how the impact of 
extern al agencies l ik e  the bureaucracy and the Gods of 
Pandharpur upon the v il la g e  was cushioned and circum scribed 
by in s t it u t io n s  w ith in  i t :  the .iathas s u c c e ss fu lly  defy in g  
the attempts o f the bureaucracy to determine the d is tr ib u t io n  
of the land-tax w ith in  the v i l l a g e , and the ioshi le g it im is ­
ing  the obscure v il la g e  Gods as members o f  the Hindu pantheon 
as a counterpoise  to the le v e ll in g  and in teg ratin g  in flu en ce  
of the bhakti cults  o f Pandharpur. However, s ince  
Maharashtra contained  c it ie s  of the s i z e  of Poona, not to 
speak of pergunnah towns which served as market centres for 
c lusters  of surrounding  v i l l a g e s , i t  would be a m istake to 
regard the v il la g e  as a wholly iso la te d  u n it , and to dism iss 
lin k s  between urban and rural so c iety  as completely 
in s ig n i f i c a n t .
The economic o rgan isatio n  of urban and rural l i f e  
served to strengthen  t ie s  between the c ity  and the v i l l a g e , 
and i t  e stab lish e d  a re latio n sh ip  of interdependence between
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Urban Social Organisation
the sowcars» or urban financiers, and the village commun­
ities. These relations were geared to the dispersal of 
certain castes like the Marwari and Gujerati vanis, and they 
were shaped by the commercial style of these social groups. 
The Gujerati vanis, of whom there was a large concentration 
in Supa near Poona, had migrated into Maharashtra during the 
first quarter of the seventeenth century, when Surat was the 
chief centre of trade in western India. They first came as 
itinerant dealers in foreign spices, but after a time settled 
down, and took to moneylending, and became rich and influen­
tial. Two centuries later, they were still regarded as 
aliens by the kunbis, and for their own part went back to 
Gujerat to contract marriages or to perform important 
religious ceremonies. Except for a few rich bankers and 
traders in Poona, most vanis from this caste were widely 
dispersed in the country districts^®.
The elite among the commercial castes were the Marwari 
vanis. who had moved into Maharashtra after the Gujerati 
vanis» and were looked upon by the cultivators as aliens who 
took hoards of money to their homeland, and as Jain heretics, 
whose temples were often taken over for the worship of local
4§
Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency. Vol. SVIII, Part II, 
Poona District, (Bombay, 1885)* pp. 99-100.
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or Brahmanical gods. From the township of Vambori in the 
Ahmednagar district, which was the seat of a large Marwari 
community and the centre of their exchange and banking 
business, individual Marwaris fanned out into the pergunnah 
towns, and from thence to isolated villages, enmeshing the 
countryside and establishing a monopoly over the moneylending 
business. They began life in a humble capacity as clerks and 
servants of established moneylenders, but the moment they had 
put aside sufficient capital, they moved on to a village or 
township that had not been opened up, and soon commenced 
playing an important economic role in the life of the commun­
ity. The Marwari lender’s chief characteristic was a strong 
acquisitive instinct, to which he added ruthlessness and a 
disregard for local sentiment. Because of the shrewdness 
which formed part of his caste style, the Marwari could always 
outwit the kunbi who was his client in the rural areas. But 
he was unable to exploit the kunbis because of the control 
exercised by them over the levers of power in the village.
In the small townships, which served as markets for the 
agricultural surplus of the villages, and in cities like 
Ahmednagar and Poona, however, the Marwari came into his own. 
If the Patel of a village was unable to collect the land-tax 
which he had contracted to pay to the mamlatdar♦ and this 
happened frequently, he turned to a Marwari financier or
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sovcar in the nearest market town to secure assistance in 
fulfilling his obligations, and pledged the joint credit of 
the village for a loan. Debts contracted in this fashion 
are to be distinguished from transactions between the kunbi 
and the vani in the village, since they did not fall within 
the jurisdiction of the village panchayat, and because they 
enabled the sowcar to control the surplus of the village 
without involving himself in the actual business of agricul­
tural production. Both in the scale of his financial deal­
ings, and in the magnitude of his capital resources, the 
sowcar stood ppart from his caste-fellow, the village vani. 
Even obscure little pergunnah towns like Nandoobar and 
Sultanpoor near Dhulia could boast of sowcars who had between 
themselves lent Rs,200,000 to the Patels of the surrounding 
villages. Most of this money was provided by a few leading 
Marwaris: solid men like Ganpat Moorar, who had disbursed 
Rs.27>500 in all, of which a characteristic item was 
Rs.4000 loaned to the Patel of Dehwally; or relatively small 
sowcars like Dharamdas Sambhaldas, whose total claims amounted 
to Rs.4000, of which a sum of Rs.400 had been lent to the 
village of Bullair49.
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BA. H.T. Graham to G. Giberne dated 3 October 1828s R.D. 
Vol. 53/520 of 1833.
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Because of the importance of their role, and their 
financial standing, the Marwaris commanded considerable 
influence and prestige in urban society, despite their low 
ranking in the scale of caste. This, however, was not true 
of the artisan castes, which were engaged in productive as 
opposed to commercial activity. The gulf between the 
commercial and the artisan castes was virtually impossible 
to bridge. For despite the concentration of industry in the 
urban centres, a middle-sized town like Mulligaum in Kandesh 
district boasting of as many as 42 weavers, 32 goldsmiths,
44 oil-pressers, and 31 dyers, the unit of production was 
the individual household which was limited both in size and 
economic strength^. The technical factors which prevented 
artisans from bettering their lot, and improving industrial 
organisation, were reinforced by a system of taxation that 
stood in the way of the accumulation of capital through 
trenching heavily into profits. It is significant that such 
a pattern of taxation was a result of widely held concepts 
of social equity rather than of deliberate acts of State 
policy; for it follows that economic progress and social 
mobility through the accumulation of capital were notions
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alien, if not actually repugnant, to the social climate of 
the time. The procedure for the levy of pandraputty or 
mahturfa tax brings the quality of this climate into sharp 
relief-* The mohturfa was levied on all the trading and 
artisan castes, and it was customary for the representative 
of the State to demand a consolidated sum from the head of 
the caste in question, leaving him free to arrange the dis­
tribution of this consolidated sum on his caste-fellows.
While the leading members of a caste could, in the circum­
stances, have conspired to transfer an inequitable share of 
the total burden of tax on their less prosperous castemen, 
the normal practice was for individual members of the caste 
to pay according to their ability (as determined by the 
collective will of the community) to make good the total sum 
to be subscribed to the public treasury. What this meant can 
be appreciated through an investigation into the affairs of 
the caste of weavers in Mulligaum. Comprising 42 souls in 
all, the Mulligaum weavers paid a total mohturfa of Rs.330 to 
the State. Of this sum the major share was contributed by 
the 31 moderately prosperous weavers who paid Rs.8 each; 
however, the three most flourishing weavers in Mulligaum
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BA. T.W. Langford’s Report on Mohturfa taxes dated 31 
January I84O: R.D. Vol. 97/1181 of I84O.
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contributed Rs .48 to the common fund, while members of the 
caste who had not succeeded in establishing their business 
on a firm basis were required to make only a token 
contribution of Rs.2 eaclv>2#
The principles informing the levy of the mohturfa 
illustrate the collective basis of urban social organisation, 
and the popularity of social values which looked upon the 
accumulation of capital with disapproval* Taken in combina­
tion, these two factors were responsible for preventing social 
mobility, and they resulted in a social order in which the 
status and the standard of material comforts enjoyed by the 
individual were determined on grounds of prescription, 
rather than by the quality of the effort he put into his 
work. The foundations of such a society were provided by the 
institution of caste, which pinned the social order firmly to 
a static pattern, and mitigated the tension between mutually 
exclusive social groups by directing their allegiance to a 
common corpus of secular and spiritual values. Caste was the 
bed-rock of society. In conception caste was simple, denot­
ing an endogamous group with a specific area of dispersion 
and a distinct style of life. But from it stemmed a complex
52
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social structure comprehensible only through the values 
which shaped social life in Maharashtra.
At the apex of the social hierarchy in Maharashtra 
stood a cluster of Brahmin castes^ Qf which the two most im­
portant groups were the Deshasths and the Chitpavans. The 
Deshasths enjoyed a clear numerical preponderance over other 
Brahmin groups, and they regarded themselves as the first 
settlers in the region. They also believed that while all 
Brahmins were superior, they were even more superior than the 
rest. Upon the Chitpavans, who had shot into prominence after 
the eclipse of the house of Shivaji had raised a member of 
their caste to the first position in the land, they looked 
down with scarcely veiled contempt as parvenu elements, 
barely fit to associate on terms of equality with the 
noblest of the ’twice-born’. A Chitpavan who was invited to 
a Deshasth ceremonial was a privileged individual, and even 
the Peshwa could be refused permission to bathe in the ghats 
reserved for Deshasth priests when he made a pilgrimage to 
Nasik to rid his person of a very heavy accumulation of
13 I am indebted to Irawati Karve for the concepts of 
’castes’ and ’caste-clusters’• See her Hindu Society: An 
Interpretation, (Poona, 1961), pp. 9-10.
earthly sinsD4. The Deshasths were closely integrated into
the texture of rural society, and as kulkarnis and .i os his 
they featured far more prominently in the eyes, if not the 
affection, of the rural communities than any other Brahmin 
group. Before the rise of the Peshwas the Maratha bureau­
cracy was almost entirely recruited from their ranks; but 
Balaji Vishwanath’s accession to power shattered their 
monopoly over the bureaucratic cadres, even though as 
kulkarnis, and occasionally as deshmukhs, they were still a 
force to be reckoned with in the land. It was the Chitpavans, 
characterised by greater intellectual agility and political 
acumen than their slow country cousins, who dominated the 
bureaucracy prior to the British take-over; and it was the 
Chitpavans again who set the pace for the intellectual life 
of the community, and shaped the sanctions which moulded the 
mores of the entire caste structure. True, there were 
Chitpavans steeped in the unlovely intrigues of court life 
who struck even the sympathetic British civilian as fintrig­
uing, lying, corrupt, licentious and unprincipled’; but the 
caste was better represented by administrators of integrity 
like Nana Furnavees and Ramashastri; or advaitists like
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Mulhar Shrotee, the most highly respected Brahmin in 
Maharashtra; or distinguished scholars like Raghu Acharya 
Chintamun, a tragic but nonetheless attractive figure, who 
bridged the gulf between old and new, and was chosen by the 
British Government to preside over the college of Sanskrit 
studies established in Poona upon the ruins of the tradition­
al order^ .
The control of political power by the Chitpavan Brahmins 
in the person of the Peshwa, and the intellectual hegemony 
which they exercised as the ’intelligentsia1 of Hindu 
society, combined to create a degree of Brahmanical dominance 
over Maharashtra to which there existed no parallel in the 
rest of India, This dominance found expression in two 
directions: in institutions like the Dakshina: and in a work­
ing alliance between the Poona Government and members of the 
Chitpavan caste. The Dakshina (lit. gift) was the means 
through which the Peshwas extended support to the Brahmins 
as the custodians and propagators of the traditional values 
of Hinduism^. It involved the distribution of large sums of
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money as charity to scholarly but impecunious Brahmins who
came to Poona at a fixed time of the year and were examined
by a body of Shastris or learned Brahmins who ascertained
their mastery over the sacerdotal and metaphysical texts of
Hinduism, The Brahmin community looked upon the dakshina as
an institution of fundamental importance, and in return for
the recognition accorded to the Brahmanical role, it
extended full support to the regime of the Peshwasj
A knowledge of the Hindoo Shasters [the Brahmins 
asserted later on when this privilege was threaten­
ed] is of the utmost importance, and.,.the Shasters 
are indisputably necessary so that those who study 
them are entitled to the Dakshinnah as a gift which 
has been from a remote period continued, and many 
being thereby incited to the study of Hindu science 
have ultimately become eminent by their great 
learning...57
The Peshwas not only distributed the dakshina, but they 
also supported institutions directly concerned with the trans­
mission of values among the Brahmins. Throughout Maharashtra 
there existed pathshalas or schools which were run exclusive­
ly for upper caste pupils, and where each generation of 
Brahmins communicated to the succeeding generation the 
orthodox values of Hinduism. How extensive was this system, 
and how seriously the Brahmins took the task of keeping alive
57
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their intellectual traditions, is evidenced by the fact that 
in Poona alone there were I64 pathshalas where the classical 
texts of Hinduism were taught to young Brahmins through the 
medium of Sanskrit. Instruction in these pathshalas was 
given free of charge, since the shastris were not permitted 
to exploit their knowledge for the sordid business of earning 
a livelihood. But if tradition obliged the Brahmins to im­
part instruction gratis, it also imposed upon the State the 
duty of providing for their subsistence; which explains the 
frequency of grants like the one made by the Peshwas to the 
renouned pandit Vithal Upadhaya of Pandharpur for running a 
Sanskrit college^-.
The dominance of the Brahmin castes was an important 
factor in promoting cohesion and order in urban society. As 
the intellectual leaders of the community, and the guardians 
of the values of Hinduism, the Brahmins pursued the good 
life through voluntary restraints on their social behaviour. 
But that compliance with tradition which was self-imposed in 
the case of the Brahmins had to be enforced on the unsophis­
ticated castes by the authority of caste assemblies and caste 
heads and shastris versed in custom and law. The caste
53---------
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assemblies debated all matters affecting the interests of the 
caste. The Poona Brahmins, for instance, met frequently to 
discuss disputed points of custom, or novel problems confront­
ing the community, on the initiative of leading shastris like 
Neelkunth Shastri Thuthe or Waman Shastri Sathe. In questions 
affecting only one Brahmin caste the entire cluster could 
attend the proceedings, but only members of the sub-group 
directly concerned were permitted active participation. The 
larger assemblies which met to consider issues concerning the 
entire community were lively centres of discussion and debates
There were present [runs an eye witness account of 
one such meeting] Mulhar Shrotee, the most highly 
respected Bramin in the country; Nilcunt Shastree 
Thuthey and Wittal Oopaddea of Pundharpur, esteemed 
the most able men, and the most deeply versed in 
the whole of the Deccan in the learning of the 
shasters, who have instructed and still instruct 
many young Bramins; Raghoo Achayra, an eminent 
scholar, the Principal of the school at Poona;
Hurbhut Caseekur, a beneras bramin of great celeb­
rity; Chintamun Dixit, Ganesh Shastree of Rajapur; 
and many other eminent shastrees from all quarters.
The number of persons assembled was least five 
hundred, and the streets leading to the Boodwar 
Palace was filled with people curious to know the 
result of discussions regarding suttees, and the 
right of sonars to perform certain Brahmanical 
ceremonies, which last was also a question appointed 
to be determined at the meeting59.
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Through the absence of a sophisticated membership, 
caste assemblies in the middle and lower ranks of the social 
hierarchy lacked the popular base of the Brahmanical congre­
gations, and the power to make decisions in such assemblies 
was vested in a small group of individuals rather than in 
the ordinary members. Brahmin assemblies worked on the basis 
of consensus, while in the middle castes power was vested in 
an ’elective’ head who took into account the views of the 
leading members before deciding upon a course of action. 
Castes located at the bottom of the social scale, however, 
were subject to the will of an hereditary head who imposed 
his authority on the basis of the traditional domination he 
embodied in his person. Yet the caste head was nowhere a 
law unto himself. For he consulted the shastris on all 
intricate points of custom and convention, and accepted their 
advice as reflecting values to which high and low castes 
subscribed with equal enthusiasm. In this manner caste 
assemblies, which were instruments of social cleavage, 
served to impart cohesion to the community^®.
So---------
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Integration and cleavage were the twin foundations of 
stability and order in Maharashtrian society. Integration 
flowed from the great tradition of Hinduism, and from its 
popular derivatives, the bhakti cults, which linked remote 
peasant communities and urban caste clusters in a close 
relationship and gave meaning to the life of the individual 
and established his social identity: it also stemmed from the 
political and economic institutions which set up a chain of 
command between the Peshwa and the kunbi through the bureau­
cracy and the deshmukhs, on the one hand, and the urban and 
rural commercial castes, on the other. Cutting across these 
integrative influences, which embraced the whole of 
Maharashtra, there existed factors and institutions that 
split the Marathi speaking world into small and self-contained 
social units: the village community, with its thulwaheek 
council, its bullotedari orders and its local Gods; the urban 
castes with their deliberative assemblies and distinct atyles 
of life; the physical isolation of rural communities from one 
another, and from the urban world; and finally, the prevalence 
of values which supported a rigid and highly differentiated 
society despite voicing a mild protest against its worst 
features. All these influences combined to conjure into 
existence a polity whose stability was geared to its over all 
structure rather than to the relative position of any
specific caste. Because of the structure of this society, 
the substitution of a new for an old social group at its 
apex did not lead to any radical changes, except possibly for 
the introduction of a tension between the dominant elite and 
the rest of the community. The stability of such a society 
was reinforced rather than weakened by the conflict, and the 
clash of interest, between caste and caste, and social group 
and social group, and the consequent jockeying for positions 
of power and influence contributed to rather than detracted 
from the over all state of equipoise.
But this equipoise was undermined by the political and 
intellectual forces that were to impinge on Maharashtra after 
1818: and in the nature of these forces, and their impact 
upon the recipient society, lie the clues not only to the 
social changes which took place in the nineteenth century, 
but also to the emergence of the powerful caste lobbies and 
the rich peasants who dominate the political scene in 
Maharashtra today.
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CHAPTER II
THE POLITICS OF MODERATION
With the fall of Baji Rao Peshwa in 1818 the British 
Government of Bombay assumed control over territories which 
had for a century constituted the hub of a far-flung 
imperial system in India. I have already focussed attention 
on the political system and the social organisation which 
prevailed in this region prior to 1818, and I have high­
lighted the factors of conflict and consensus, and the 
patterns of social dominance, which flourished in the 
community. The most striking feature of Maharashtra was the 
consensus which bound high and low castes in a close intel­
lectual relationship. This consensus stemmed from the 
dispersal of the Brahmanical values of advaita among the 
lower and middle castes in the form of the bhakti movement. 
The spread of the bhakti cult through a folk literature which 
ranged from the compositions of Jnaneshwar to the abhangas 
of Namadeva and Tukarama had a forceful impact on 
Maharashtra. The religious and literary activity of the 
bhakti saints not only narrowed the gulf between the
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different castes, but it was also instrumental in shaping an 
ethos from which the heroic figures of Maharashtra drew their 
inspiration, and in creating a political climate which has 
been equated with the spirit of nationalism in Maharashtra^. 
Besides being linked to the kunbis and other inferior castes 
through the bhakti movement, the Brahmins of Maharashtra 
enjoyed a political and social dominance to which there 
hardly existed any parallel in the rest of India. This was 
particularly true of the Chitpavan Brahmins, who had come to 
occupy many important offices of State, and who were in 
addition awarded substantial grants in land, after the 
accession to supreme power of their caste-fellow, Balaji 
Vishwanah Peshwa^. Of the significant concentrations of 
power, namely, the religious order, the bureaucracy, and 
the landed aristocracy, the Chitpavan Brahmins virtually con­
trolled all three. Their caste status assured their spirit­
ual dominance and their intellectual leadership: their 
political hegemony stemmed from the existence of a Brahmin 
ruling dynasty: finally, in order to bolster and legitimise 
their position, the Peshwas had created a Brahmin landowning
1
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aristocracy which formed the coping stone of a social order 
in which the Brahmanical style of life set the pace for the 
rest of the community.
The Conservatism of Elphinstone
The task of pacifying Maharashtra presented Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, who was entrusted with the administration of the 
newly conquered territories, with a host of novel and press­
ing problems. Elphinstone’s solutions for these problems 
were shaped by his intimate knowledge of Maharashtra under 
the Peshwas, and by his faith in the moral basis of politics. 
He had joined the East India Company in 1795 as a junior 
civilian, and after serving for a few years at Beneras in an 
administrative appointment, he entered the ’diplomatic’ 
service, and thereafter represented the Company at the courts 
of Indian princes like the Raja of Berar and the Scindhia.
In 1811 Elphinstone was appointed the Resident at Poona, and 
as the agent of the power with which Baji Rao had contracted 
a ’subsidiary’ alliance, he virtually controlled the political 
destinies of the Peshwa’s territories. Elphinstone’s tenure 
as Resident at Poona gave him a deep insight into the 
political and intellectual life of Maharashtra. But at the 
same time it prevented him from acquiring that experience of 
problems of land-revenue administration which civilians
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employed in executive posts acquired. The result of this 
lack of experience, as we shall presently see, was that he 
was unable to apply to problems of land-revenue administra­
tion the insight and depth of comprehension which informed 
his policies in other spheres. However, when the indirect 
control exercised by the East India Company over Maharashtra 
after the subsidiary alliance was transformed into direct 
control, Elphinstone was a logical and inevitable choice as 
the first Commissioner of the Deccan.
The administrative policy which Elphinstone outlined 
for the Deccan stemmed in equal parts from his acquaintance 
with the Maratha system of administration, and from his 
cautious approach to innovation and reform. He believed in 
the enduring quality of values and institutions, and was 
convinced that they could be changed only slowly and 
gradually. Despite his flirtation with radical ideas at an 
early age, when fhe wore his hair long in imitation of the 
French Republicans, and was fond of singing nCa ira” he 
remained all his life a Whig of the old school, who saw the 
supreme test of statesmanship in the politics of moderation, 
rather than in reform designed to bring about sweeping
3 .....................................................T.E. Colebrooke, Life of the Honourable Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, (London^ 1§84) 9 Vol. 1^  pT 6"!
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changes. His natural ability to discern, and to appreciate, 
the intellectual quality of a traditional society was height­
ened by the training he received from individuals like Samuel 
Davis, the magistrate at Beneras, and his mentor in the 
Indian Civil Service, who was a distinguished scholar in 
Sanskrit, and who compiled the first scientific account of 
the astronomy of classical India. Elphinstonefs vision, 
however, was not shaped by a romantic yearning for the past. 
Instead, it stemmed from a recognition of those enduring 
qualities in a community which mould its personality in a 
unique way. Elphinstone’s ability to grasp the moral 
foundations of a society, and his vision of social progress, 
find eloquent reflection in entries in his Journal which 
speak of his concern over the controversies preceding the 
passing of the first English Reform Bill of 1832:
Yesterday I found the club in a hustle [he observes] 
from the news of the Duke of Wellington’s resigna­
tion, in consequence of being in a minority on the 
Civil List. The sentiments expressed were neither 
those of satisfaction nor regret, but of wonder who 
would succeed, and of anxiety as to the result...
The first expectations that present themselves for 
the future are that the Whig ministry, which we may 
suppose will be formed, will be embarrassed by its 
pledge in favour of retrenchment, which to any 
great extent is impracticable; and of reform, which 
beyond due limits would be perilous in the extreme.
Many well intentioned but ill informed persons, who 
may favour it at first, will be driven by this to 
join the Radicals, to whom the Whigs are always 
objects of detestation. The Ministry will sink, 
and with it all confidence in moderate reformers;
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power will either pass directly into the hands of 
violent reformers, or will come to them with more 
tumult and danger after having been for a time en­
trusted to ultra-Tories. Universal sufferage, pre­
ponderance of democracy, might be expected to 
follow, and to be accompanied by the annulment of 
the national debt...and other revolutionary measures 
.•.No contingency can render it safe or wise to 
withhold reform, or to delay making the necessary 
alterations in parts of the constitution, while 
there is sufficient attachment to the whole to 
prevent it being subverted during the operation.4
His reaction to the political storm which threatened 
the English constitution in the 1830s demonstrates that 
Elphinstone was not a blind opponent of change. He believed 
innovation and reform to be essential parts of the social 
process. In the development of a community, ran his argu­
ment, institutions and values which had once satisfied a 
genuine need often became completely purposeless. When this 
happened it was foolish and even dangerous to oppose their 
aboliton. For mere antiquity was insufficient to preserve 
inveterate abuse, and it was no defence of an outmoded order 
that it was an inheritance from the past. Those who sub­
scribed to a rigorous conservative position were guilty of 
extending support to the prescriptive order as though it had 
been a divinely ordained and unconscious growth. They 
refused to believe that values and institutions owed their
4
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creation to specific social needs, and that throughout the 
course of human history they had been subject to modifica­
tion according to changing social exigencies.
Because he held a sophisticated view of progress, 
Elphinstone was prepared to initiate reform in response to 
the law of change which determined the course of human devel 
opment. But he was convinced that arbitrary reform, which 
took no account of tradition, would only succeed in undermin 
ing the moral order which gave stability and cohesion to a 
community. The task of the reformer was therefore to 
reaffirm the enduring moral principles in new circumstances, 
while he aimed at the maintenance of a fine balance between 
progress and stability. Reform ought to reconcile the con­
flicting principles of conservation and correction, for thos 
who set out to reform a societjr assumed that some of its 
attributes were worthy of being preserved. True reform 
accepted the moral foundations of a society, and sought to 
establish their supremacy in the midst of change. It also 
made use of the existing institutions, and even in modifying 
them attempted to reinforce their spirit, and to preserve 
their style. True reform embodied the prescriptive social 
order shorn of obsolete forms and stultifying excrescences.
Since Elphinstone was intimately acquainted with the 
political system of the Peshwas, and because he was opposed
to reform which was initiated in defiance of the prescriptive 
order, as Commissioner of the Deccan he asked himself a 
aeries of question which would hardly have bothered a less 
experienced,or a more impetuous, individual. What was the 
most expedient policy to be pursued in the conquered terri­
tories? To what extent were the old methods of administra­
tion to be incorporated in the new? How were dominant 
groups like the Chitpavan Brahmins and the landed aristocrats 
to be treated? To what extent were their privileges to be 
recognised by the new order? What would be the fate of the 
village communities? Would there be any encroachments upon 
their autonomy? and was it at all necessary to devise a new 
pattern of authority in the villages of the Deccan? Finally, 
how was the State to look upon the prevailing moral order, 
which supported the institution of caste, and legitimised 
differences in secular and spiritual status?
If Elphinstone had subscribed to the values of Hinduism, 
and if he had approved of the political and social institutions 
of a traditional State, it would have been easy for him to 
provide forthright answers to the aforementioned questions.
But since he disapproved of Brahmanical values, and desired 
progress, the creation of a new order in the Deccan presented 
him with a serious dilemma. His views on the moral founda­
tions of Hindu society, as it flourished in Maharashtra, were
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clear and unambiguous. A set of values which sanctioned the 
temporal and spiritual superiority of the bigoted Brahmin 
was highly offensive to Elphinstone. In such a situation, so 
he believed, measures of reform seeking to strengthen the 
moral foundations of the community would have heightened 
social injustice and political iniquity. What was desirable 
in the circumstances was the propagation of a new code of 
social ethics, and the creation of an appropriate set of 
social and political institutions. However, Elphinstone’s 
conservative cast of mind prevented him from embarking upon 
so drastic and so comprehensive a programme of reform. He 
therefore tried to transform the existing institutions of 
Maharashtra into instruments for its modernisation.
Elphinstonefs attempt to exploit existing institutions 
for the infusion of new values in Hindu society is reflected 
in his decision to continue the patronage which the Peshwas 
had formerly extended to the Brahmin community through the 
distribution of the dakshina. This decision was taken out of 
political calculation, and it did not stem from any senti­
mental concern for the welfare of the community, since 
Elphinstone had no illusions about the Brahmins, and regarded 
them as narrow and bigoted in their attachment to their priv­
ileges. What prompted Elphinstone to continue the dakshina 
was the important role that the Brahmins had played in
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Maharashtra prior to 1818. The existence of a Chitpavan 
ruling dynasty had heightened their dominance to an extent 
which had no parallel in the rest of India, and the distribu­
tion of the dakshina had been merely one of the means through 
which the Peshwas had signified their approval of Brahmanical 
hegemony, and of the values of Hinduism, True, under Baji 
Rao the dakshina, which in the palmy days of the Peshwas had 
amounted to Rs.1,000,000, was reduced to a modest figure.
But despite his straitened circumstances, the last Peshwa 
had distributed small sums of money to no less than 50,000 
Brahmins, over and above awarding substantial prizes to 
pandits and shastris who distinguished themselves by their 
proficiency in the sacred texts of Hinduism. The former 
rulers had thus maintained a class of individuals whose time 
was devoted to the study of religious literature, and who 
kept alive the intellectual traditions of the community 5 .
Though the dakshina represented an alliance between the 
State and the intellectual leaders of the community, and 
reinforced the values of Hinduism, Elphinstone refrained 
from abolishing it despite the fact that it held no ’moral’ 
significance for the political order which prevailed in the
5
BA. (Bombay State Archives); Minute by Governor of Bombay 
dated nil: G.D. (General Dept.), Vol. 8 / 6 3 of 1826,
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Deccan after I8l8. He even refused to alter the agency 
through which the dakshina had been distributed under the 
Peshwas. A committee of five prominent Poona shastris, 
headed by Raghu Acharya Chintamun, was appointed to scrutin­
ise the lists of Brahmins who had enjoyed State patronage in 
former days; to examine them in their respective fields of 
expertise; and to diminish or to increase their bounties 
according to their scholarly attainments. In the first year 
in which the dakshina was distributed under British aegis, the 
committee of shastris submitted a list of 2,665 Brahmins, and 
recommended that they be paid a total sum of Rs.75>000, which 
was reduced to Rs.45>000 by the government^. Elphinstone 
regarded the continuation of the dakshina as more than a sop 
to the susceptibilities of the Brahmins, and a concession to 
the religious prejudices of the Hindu community. The dakshina, 
he argued, could be exploited to weaken the hold of tradition­
al values on the Brahmins, and to lead them to explore the 
new and exciting intellectual horizons which had suddenly 
opened up. For once British rule had consolidated itself,
’the dakshina might still be kept up, but most of the prizes, 
instead of being conferred on proficients in Hindu divinity,
6
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might be allotted to those more skilled in more useful 
branches of learning - law, mathematics, etc., and a certain 
number of professors might be appointed to teach these 
7sciences’'.
The Hindu College set up in Poona by Elphinstone was 
equally informed with the view that the most effective means 
of winning over the Brahmins to western values lay in the 
creation of an educational institution which would gradually 
shift its interest from a study of Hindu religious texts to 
an examination of the rational disciplines of the West. 
Established with the object, in the first instance, of im­
parting a catholic education to ’young men of the caste of 
Brahmans in the several branches of science and knowledge
which usually constitute the subjects of study of the learned
oIndians’ , the College incorporated Chairs in Advaita t the 
Shastras (religion and justice), Vyakaran (grammar), Nyaya 
(logic), Jyotish (astronomy), Vydic (medicine), and Alankar 
(belles lettres), apart from junior professorships for the 
study of the Vedas. Elphinstone had no illusions about the
7
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values which the Hindu College would disseminate in the 
community:
But we must not forget [he pointed out] that we are 
forming, or rather keeping up with no modifications, 
a seminary among a most bigoted people whose know­
ledge has always been in the hands of the priest­
hood and whose science itself is considered a 
branch of religion. In such circumstances, and 
supporting the expenses from a fund devoted to 
religious purposes, I do not think we could possibly 
have excluded the usual theological professorships 
without showing a hostility to the Hindu faith 
which it was our object to avoid, and irritating 
those prejudices of the people which it was the 
professed desire of the institution to soothe or 
remove.9
Despite the tenacity with which the Brahmins clung to 
their traditional values, Elphinstone was anxious to prepare 
them for the changes which lay ahead, and Raghu Acharya 
Chintamun, the Mukhya Shastri (Principal) of the Hindu 
College, was instructed to ’direct the attention of the 
College principally to the Shastras as are not only most 
useful in themselves, but will prepare their (i.e. the 
scholars’ ) minds for the gradual reception of more useful 
instruction at a later time’~^. To ensure this objective, 
only those scholars were admitted to the Hindu College who
9
BA. Minute by the Governor of Bombay dated nil: G«D., 
Vol. 8/63 of 1824.
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BA. W. Chaplin to Bombay Government dated 24 November
1.821: G.D., Vol. 10 of 1821.
knew enough Sanskrit to commence straightaway with the study 
of the Shastras or Vyakaran or Alankar. Besides, while the 
study of the Vedas was not actively discouraged, it was held 
inferior to that of the Shastras, and no scholar was permit­
ted to devote his time and attention exclusively to them, A 
Brahmin who chose to study the Vedas had to study the 
Shastras as well, and his proficiency in the latter was held 
to be his main qualification. A strong emphasis on the 
practical as opposed to the metaphysical> pervaded the whole 
system, and Elphinstone had every intention of heightening 
this emphasis with the passage of time. As he argued, once 
the Hindu College had won a place in the affections of the 
Brahmin community, it would be easy to modify the courses of 
instruction it offered, and transform it into an effective 
instrument for the dissemination of western values.
While he was anxious to prevent the alienation of the 
Brahmin intelligentsia, Elphinstone did not overlook the 
institutions or the problems of popular education. Although 
in urban areas like Poona, Ahmednagar and Nasik the Brahmin 
community maintained a network of well organised schools, 
there was no regular provision for the education of the rural 
masses even in the immediate vicinity of the capital^. The
TÏ
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few schools which did exist in the country districts were 
wholly inadequate to the needs of the rural population. Yet 
even if these schools had been more numerous, it is doubtful 
whether the kunbis would have made any use of them, since 
their poverty compelled them to send their children to work 
at an early age, and caste values led them to believe that 
proficiency in letters was not for them. Literacy in the 
rural districts was practically confined to the Brahmins and 
the vanis, and pupils in the rural schools learned little 
apart from the rudiments of arithmetic and the mythological 
lore which exercised so powerful a hold over the imagination 
of the people. But despite the lack of incentive for the 
peasants to educate their children, contemporary observers 
were agreeably surprised to find how ’extremely fond parents 
are of getting their favourite and eldest son taughtT^ .
If a Brahmin teacher resided in a village, then the kunbis of 
the neighbourhood would take advantage of his presence, and 
send their children to be instructed by him. It was again 
not unusual for the prosperous kunbis to engage a Brahmin 
teacher to reside in the village. Finally, the employment of 
learned Brahmins by the rich as private tutors for their sons 
was common practice.
12
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All this underscores the limited opportunities for 
education open to the kunbis, and emphasises the extent to 
which the Brahmins exercised intellectual dominance over the 
rest of the community. In the city of Ahmednagar, for 
instance, out of a total of 36 schools, 18 were meant exclus­
ively for Brahmin children, and offered specialised courses 
in the Vedas and the Shastras, The total number of school 
going children in Ahmednagar was 571* out of which 275 were 
Brahmins. Other social groups which found significant re­
presentation in the schools were the kunbis and the Muslims, 
of whom there were 64 and 90 respectively. The rest of the 
children came from inferior castes like the sonars (gold­
smiths), the weavers, the oil-makers etc. A caste breakdown 
of schools teachers is even more revealing of the extent of 
Brahmanical dominance, since 26 out of 36 schools teachers 
hailed from the Brahmin cas te^3.
Elphinstone was determined to organise popular education 
along lines which would take into consideration the intellect­
ual achievements of the West, and destroy the Brahmin monopoly 
over the teaching profession. He found an excellent instru­
ment for the execution of his educational policy in the
13
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ernment dated 18 August 1824: E.D., Vol. 1 of 1824*
86
Bombay Education Society. Founded in 1815* the Bombay Educa­
tion Society concerned itself, in the first instance, with 
the education of European children, seeking to bring them 
up in ’pious attachment to the principles of Christianity’. 
Because of its proclivity for religious education, the 
Society was ill-equipped to popularise education among 
members of the native community* But as soon as Elphinstone 
became Governor of Bombay, he gave a new turn to its activit­
ies. Through the support and encouragement which he extended 
to it, a branch called the Native Education Society was 
founded in 1820, with the object of putting mass education on 
a sound basis through the acquisition of existing schools, 
and the establishment of new ones. The Native Society further 
aimed at providing these schools with teachers trained in the 
English language and the western sciences^.
At Elphinstone’s instance, the Native Education Society 
presented a memorandum to the Bombay Government in which it 
spelt out the need for directing popular education along 
lines which would throw open the minds of the lower and 
middle castes to the world of science and rationality. By
14
Extract from First Report (1824) of the Bombay Native Edu­
cation Society in R.V. Parulekar and C*L. Bakshi, Selections 
From Education Records« Bombay, Vol. II, (1815-1840),
^Bombay, 1955)* pp. 43-5.
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contrast with the Brahmin castes, the memorandum pointed 
out, the non-Brahmin community could not boast of a 
scholarly tradition, nor did there exist any texts in the 
Marathi language, with which alone were the non-Brahmins 
familiar, that could form the basis of a sound secular educa­
tion. To fill in this lacuna, it was necessary to translate 
into Marathi didactic works fwhich without interfering with 
the religious sentiments of any person, may be calculated to 
enlarge the understanding and inspire the characterf^ , and 
the Native Education Society drew up for this purpose a list 
of books embracing fields as diverse as Newtonian physics 
and the origin of man in the light of scientific knowledge"^. 
Behind this attempt to revolutionise popular education lay 
the belief that since the lower and middle castes did not 
possess any intellectual traditions of their own, they were 
open to immediate conversion to rational values. The only 
possible opposition to such a scheme could come from the old 
style Brahmin teachers, who diligently fed their pupils on a 
diet of religious bigotry and superstition. To obviate this
15
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difficulty, the Education Society proposed to set up centres 
which would train teachers in the new pedagogic techniques. 
Once a cadre of teachers trained in the English language and 
the western sciences had been created, it would be easy to 
spread among the masses values which would transform them into 
advocates of progress and rationality, and anchor their loyal­
ty to the new order in Maharashtra. The implementation of 
this programme, the Society noted in conclusion, was depend­
ent upon the moral and financial support of the State. But 
the government could refuse such support only at the express 
risk of creating moral chaos and social disintegration in the 
community:
With means so disproportionate [ran the Society’s 
memorandum] the Committee are immediately prompted 
to look towards the Government for pecuniary 
assistance; the more especially as it has shewn 
such readiness hitherto to support the views of 
the Society. From the dissemination of education, 
the cultural and moral improvement of the human 
mind, there are consequences as truly advantageous 
to the governing as the governed; and it is not 
without any presumptuous feeling the Committee 
express their opinion, that it appears more bene­
ficial and glorious to check at first the propen­
sities and ignorance and vice, by affording sub­
jects the means of judging between right and wrong, 
then eventually to make a display of that power 
with which providence has entrusted the British 
Government, for the suppression of crime and the 
maintenance of order.17
17
See fn. 15 above.
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For Elphinstone, who supported the Native Education 
Society and the Hindu College with equal fervour, the spread 
of rational education among the Brahmins and the kunbis was 
an instrument for the modernisation of Maharashtra. He 
sought to transform the Deccan into a progressive community, 
which would respond creatively to the stimulus of the West, 
and reshape its ethos in the spirit of rational enquiry which 
it would imbibe under British aegis. However, even more sig­
nificant than Elphinstonefs objective was the policy he out­
lined for its realisation. This policy was based on a deep 
insight into the varying extent to which traditional values had 
influenced different sections of the community. The Brahmins, 
Elphinstone reasoned, clung with great tenacity to an intel­
lectual and social order \*hich assured them of their predom­
inance. On the other hand, the kunbis had no special regard 
for a system which imposed an inferior social role on them. 
Because of this, the Sanskritic and Marathi institutions 
established by Elphinstone had different attitudes towards 
prescriptive values. Since they were firmly attached to 
their traditons, Brahmin pupils were to be led slowly from 
their commitment to advaitic values to an appreciation of the 
achievements of western science and philosophy. The task 
vis-a-vis the kunbis, and the non-Brahmin castes in general, 
was more simple. For the non-Brahmin community had neither
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any articulate consciousness of a great tradition, nor any 
memories of social or intellectual dominance. Besides, 
unlike the Brahmins, the non-Brahmins were not to be initiat­
ed into the subtleties of science and rationality. As of 
old, once the projected revolution in values was consummated, 
it was still the Chitpavan rather than the vani and the kunbi 
who would set the intellectual style of the community. But 
in addition to the advaitic quality which shaped its basic 
pattern, the Maharashtrian ethos would then take account of 
the world of science and rationality.
The Administration of Land Revenue
The eradication of social values which supported 
Brahmanical predominance was only one of the many problems 
confronting Elphinstone in the Deccan. Questions relating 
to the state of the rural economy, and the economic policies 
to be pursued by the State, pressed down upon him with an 
urgency that was even more compelling. The hub of the 
economic order in Maharashtra was the land revenue system, 
which not only provided the State with a major share of its 
income, but made a decisive impact on the prosperity of 
rural society. The basic question to be answered by 
Elphinstone was: How would the gross agricultural produce 
from the land be distributed between the kunbi who tilled the
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soil, and the hierarchy of intermediaries, and the State, 
who subsisted on the fruits of his labour? The answer to 
this question hinged on the proportion of the gross produce 
claimed by the State as its share. An equitable tax on land 
could result in increasing prosperity for rural society: an 
oppressive one could lead the community to chronic poverty 
and a decreasing standard of living.
Wien he took over the Peshwa*s territories, Elphinstone 
found the administration of the land-tax in a state of 
complete confusion. The social organisation prevailing 
within the villages of the Deccan, and the counterpoised 
institutions of the bureaucracy and the land-owning aristoc­
racy, had made sure of an element of rough and ready justice 
in the collection of the land-tax, so long as a watchful 
Peshwa presided over the destinies of the State, and a 
modicum of control flowed down from the apex of the system 
at Poona to its base in the country districts. But under Baji 
Rao Peshwa discretion was thrown to the winds, and a host of 
arbitrary practices adopted, which destroyed the checks and 
balances that had characterised the system as it was origin­
ally conceived. The office of the mamlatdar, for instance, 
was no longer conferred on experienced administrators, who 
could be recalled if their conduct proved unsatisfactory. 
Instead, it was put to annual auction among the Peshwa’s
attendants and favourites, who were expected to bid high for 
the office, and fell out of favour if they failed to do so.
A mamlatdar appointed in this fashion had neither the time to 
enquire into the resources of the district under his charge, 
nor was he interested in promoting peace and prosperity. He 
normally let out the district at an enhanced rate to 
revenue-farmers, who repeated the operation until it reached 
the patel in the village. A mamlatdar who purchased revenue 
rights over a district became absolute master over it for the 
term of his lease, and no complaints could be lodged against 
him through the traditional leaders of rural society. If the 
patel, mindful of his role as the head of the village commun­
ity, refused to farm the village at an exorbitant rate, the 
mamlatdar entrusted the collection of the tax to his personal 
attendants, who performed their duties with a lack of consid­
eration that imposed intense suffering on the kunbis^^.
Immediately after the conquest of the Deccan, Elphinstone 
tried to revive the old system of revenue administration, 
purging it of the anomalies which had crept into it under 
Baji Rao Peshwa. The straggling revenue divisions of the
is---------
EAST INDIA PAPERSt Vol. IV, Report on the Maratha States by
Mountstuart Elphinstone dated 25 October 1819. Henceforth 
referred to as M.E.’s Note on Maratha States.
92
93
former administration were regrouped into compact districts, 
each yielding from Rs.50,000 to Rs.75>000. These districts 
were placed under native mamlatdars who were in turn subordin 
ated to the control of European officers called Collectors. 
The mamlatdars were instructed to abolish the practice of 
farming the revenue, and they were required to settle the 
land-tax in negotiations with the Patels and the principal 
kunbis of the villages concerned. They were to levy the tax 
according to the actual area of cultivation; to make the 
assessments light; to impose no new taxes; and to abolish 
none unless they were arbitrary and harmful. But above all 
they were to introduce no innovations^. All the mamlatdars 
worked on the principle of village settlement, though some, 
under instructions from their Collectors, executed it with 
greater rigorousness than had ever been attempted by their 
Maratha predecessors. W. Chaplin and H. Pottinger, the 
Collectors of Dharwar and Ahmednagar respectively, settled 
the revenue with the Patel for an entire village, and then 
proceeded to distribute the tax among the cultivators, giving 
each of them a deed or puttah which set out his fiscal obli­
gations to the State. Grant at Satara, and H. Robertson at
|
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Poona, settled the tax with the Patel, and gave him a puttah 
for the same, but only after they had ascertained the amount 
required of the cultivators, and had enquired of the 
cultivators informally whether they were satisfied with the 
arrangements^,
Despite Elphinstone*s attempt to revive the Maratha ad­
ministrative system as it had flourished prior to Baji Rao 
Peshwa, and despite his efforts to restore the authority of 
the traditional leaders of the village society, the disinte­
gration of the old order was well nigh inevitable. The new 
concepts of bureaucratic control and responsibility which 
Elphinstone applied to the tasks of administration were in 
effect quite revolutionary. The office of the mamlatdar, for 
instance, completely changed after the take-over. From an 
autonomous official with wide powers of initiative, the 
mamlatdar was transformed into a supine instrument of the 
Collectors will, with his actions controlled by a precise 
set of bureaucratic regulations. The deshmukha, who exercised 
traditional domination over rural society, suffered a similar 
eclipse. The majority of British officials regarded them as 
parasitic, and were reluctant to utilise their services in
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suffered a drastic diminution in authority. He could no 
longer attract cultivators to his village on preferential 
leases; nor could he grant a field to a kunbi ’from his free
9 owill and pleasure...’ While legal restrictions on the 
Patel’s prerogatives made deep encroachments on his tradi­
tional domination over rural society, the attempt of some 
Collectors to go over his head, and to negotiate puttahs 
with individual peasants, fatally weakened the ties of 
association between the members of the village community. 
Collective sentiment in the village resided in the fact that 
its total burden of tax was distributed among its members by 
the Patel and the principal cultivators without reference to 
any outside authority. Admittedly, even before 1818 attempts 
had been made to establish a direct connection between the 
kunbi and the State. But the weakness of the Maratha bureau­
cracy, and the strength of the village community, had combin­
ed to prevent thr State from exercising so direct and 
decisive an influence over individual members of village
21
Ibid.
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95
the administration of land revenue^. Finally, the Patel
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society. The riva.i or customary rates of tax, which repre­
sented the ’collective will’ of the village community, had 
therefore always triumphed over revenue settlements like the 
kama.1 survey of Madhav Rao Peshwa instituted in the 1760s to 
set the finances of the Poona Government in order.
Although his lack of experience in the administration 
of land-revenue prevented him from formulating a clear-cut 
policy of land-taxation, Elphinstone’s belief in a rational 
system of administration led him to support the view that it 
was necessary for the peasant’s fiscal obligations to the 
State to be defined precisely and equitably by the political 
authority, instead of being left to the whims of the patels 
and the principal cultivators of the village. The attempt 
to establish a contractual relationship between the State and 
the peasant or the ryot (as he was also called) was a 
stupendous undertaking, since it involved the setting aside 
of the village communit3r, and the riva.i rates, which had for 
so long determined the tax on the land. A revenue system 
which revolved around such a principle was bound to result in 
the atomisation of rural society, since it would undermine 
the collective responsibility for the land-tax which held the 
cultivators of a village in ties of close association. 
ElphinstoneTs belief in the superiority of a revenue system 
in which the peasant’s fiscal obligations were fixed by the
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State instead of the village communities, stemmed from the 
suspicion that in computing the rival rates the patel and 
the principal cultivators of the village transferred an 
inequitable share of the total village rental on the poor 
cultivators* Whether this suspicion was justified is 
difficult to say. But the attempt to do away with the 
traditional practice of letting the village community dis­
tribute the total tax among its members only added to the 
prevailing confusion. For, while it was easy to determine 
the total revenue that could be demanded of a village, it 
was extremely difficult to devise an equitable breakdown of 
this demand into the shares of individual villagers. A 
host of complications presented themselves when such a 
decision was taken. What was the proportion of agricultural 
produce which the State could claim as its own? What was the 
criterion on which this share was to be based? How was this 
criterion to be applied? Even if satisfactory answers were 
found to all these questions, there remained the apprehension 
that a sudden rise, or fall, in the fiscal obligations of a 
particular class of cultivators could spell ruin for rural 
Maharashtra.
The problems confronting the British administrators in 
Maharashtra did not admit to any simple answer, and an 
impetuous attempt at reform in the system of revenue
administration by John Briggs, the Collector of Kandesh, 
merely demonstrated the pitfalls that could trap the unwary^. 
Briggs had a particularly difficult charge: a wild and 
desolate district, infertile and inhospitable, and supporting 
a thin population of which the untamed Bhil tribes formed an 
important element. He found the revenue management of 
Kandesh in complete disarray. The kulkarni’s accounts were 
incoherent and undecipherable. Even in the same village no 
two fields were measured by an identical unit, and the class­
ification of soils was incredibly complex and intricate. 
Immediately after the conquest, Briggs restored to the stock 
expedient of settling the revenue with the patels of differ­
ent villages. But Briggs’ reliance on traditional practice 
proved a broken reed when a partial failure of crops obliged 
him to remit part of the revenue. Since he had settled the 
land-tax with whole villages instead of individual cultivat­
ors, it was impossible for him to ensure that the remission 
of revenue was actually passed on to the ryots, instead of 
being appropriated by the patel and the principal kunbis.
To eliminate the difficulties inseparable from the 
traditional system of revenue administration, Briggs decided
23
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to do away entirely with the riva.j survey, and to substitute
in its place a direct contractual relationship between the
kunbis and the State. According to the riva.j survey in
Kandesh, cultivable land was divided into three categories:
patusthal» or land irrigated by public waterworks; motusthal,
or land irrigated by private wells; and zorayet» or unirrigated
land. Rates on patusthal land were levied on the basis of
the actual crop grown, while in the case of land belonging to
the second and third categories, the assessment was based on
the quality of the soil, and the area of a particular field.
Briggs”considered the practice of taxing patusthal land on
the basis of the actual crop grown as highly objectionable,
since such a mode of assessment did not offer any incentive
to the ryot to cultivate the better variety of crops. The
additional profit a ryot might hope to make on a superior
crop was appropriated by the State in the form of an enhanced
rate. The ryots of Kandesh, consequently, frequently turned
to the cultivation of inferior crops merely to escape the
unwelcome attention of the official assessor:
In addition to the chance of under- or over- 
assessinent [Briggs pointed out] is the circum­
stances of the ryot not being free to cultivate 
what he chooses, in consequence of the differ­
ence of rates in the different kinds of produce: 
for the extra rates on the superior sorts of 
cultivation naturally drive him to rear the 
poorer kinds in preference to the more valuable 
production of sugar and rice, which are not only
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precarious in their returns, but are taxed at so 
much higher a rate than crops of an inferior 
value. Admitting this to be the case, it seems 
that the system is considerably defective... It is, 
therefore, advisable to equalise the rates of 
patusthal lands...24
Besides abolishing a system of assessment which discouraged
the ryots from showing any enterprise and initiative, Briggs
reduced the 68 scales of tax on motusthal land to eight, and
the 122 scales levied on zorayet land to 11. A settlement
based on these principles was introduced in Kandesh in 1821.
Even before the new survey could be appraised on the
basis of its results, W. Chaplin, now Commissioner of the
Deccan, had sounded the tocsin. Chaplin’s objection to
Briggs’ survey stemmed from his desire to ’abstain for the
present from making any considerable change in the former
revenue system, beyond that of removing such abuses as are
obviously calculated to affect the prosperity of the
country’"^. Like Elphinstone, whose conservative proclivities
he shared, Chaplin was not against the idea of a new survey
as such. But his extensive experience as a revenue officer
under Sir Thomas Munro in Madras had convinced him of the
inexpediency of a survey that was not based on ’known and
24Ibid.
25BA. W. Chaplin, Commissioner of the Deccan, to J. Briggs 
dated 3 January 1822: R.D., Vol. 26/50 of 1822.
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fixed principles that had already been approved by
o Aexperience* . When Chaplin turned to examine the premises 
on which Briggs had based his survey, he found them lacking 
in objectivity, and wanting in consideration for prescript­
ive rights and privileges. He was willing to concede that the 
practice of taxing patusthal land according to the quality of 
the crop grown was harmful for agricultural production, and 
subversive to the principle of incentives. But it was open to 
question whether Briggs* decision to substitute for the 
complex riva.j scale a single rate of tax, which represented 
the average of the rates formerly in force, led to any 
improvement over the previous state of affairs. Adverting 
next to the new categories in soil classification which had 
replaced the old ones in motusthal and zorayet lands, Chaplin 
observed that if the new classes were based on correct data, 
there could be no doubt that the simplicity of the new system 
would constitute an improvement:
But how have this data, [he wondered] the acquirement 
of which in other countries has occupied many years 
...been ascertained and verefied; surely not in a 
single year of labour of the mamlatdars and their 
deputies. (The) classification and assessment of 
fields, which is everywhere so nice and difficult 
a process, is not to be well accomplished by such 
easy means and such unprincipled agents; and the
26
Ibid.
102
basis of the system being therefore imperfect, if 
not incorrect, the superstructure will be entirely 
liable to totter to its fall...27
The elucidation of a practical revenue policy, Chaplin
pointed out, involved far more than the definition of
objective survey principles, and their rigorous application
to rural society. Before they could form the basis of
administrative policy, even the most desirable of principles
had to take into account questions of expediency, and to
make allowances for prerogatives whose antiquity had invested
them with the dignity of inalienable rights. Thus the
principle that the tax on a field ought to be determined
solely with reference to its productive capacity sounded
excellent in theory. But was it expedient to follow it
rigorously when its application led to a sudden and violent
fluctuation in the burden of tax on a ryot? Chaplin referred
to the sturdy kunbi of the village of Ootran who
owned 50 beegahs of land, of which about 10 beegahs 
was rated in the first class, 2/5ths in the second 
class, and 2/5th in the third class, and the whole 
assessed accordingly. By the new valuation the 
whole 50 beegahs...have been raised to the first or 
second class, and the rent by that rule increased 
50 or 100 per cent...It is possible that the whole 
of the 50 beegahs may be of equally good quality, 
and that the present rate, considered without 
reference to other circumstances, may be equitable.
But the ryot in question has all along been enabled
27
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only by the moderation of rent to hold so much 
land...The rent now being raised to the full, he 
must of course throw up his land.28
Two distinct, though not necessarily conflicting, 
issues were at stake in a revenue settlement. First, the 
elucidation of a rational body of principles, on whose basis 
the claims of the State and the ryot could be equitably 
determined; and secondly, the need to avoid any drastic 
alterations in the traditional distribution of the land-tax. 
For Chaplin these principles were of equal importance.
Briggs’ survey, of course, had failed on both counts, and as 
Chaplin had forecast, threw the revenue management of the 
entire district into complete disorder. What the Commission­
er found in the village of Bhanmod, for instance, was 
characteristic of the effects of the new survey. The total 
sum for which Briggs had settled Bhanmod was equitable, and 
in keeping with past assessments. But when Chaplin proceeded 
to the village to see how it had fared under the new survey, 
he was confronted by an angry group of 60 to 70 ryots ’who 
were loud in their outcry against the new classification and 
assessment’^ ,  since their burden of tax had been raised by
28---------
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bitterly against the new survey, 46 ryots of Bhanmod had
their assessments halved, and were only too pleased with the
new arrangements. Since the dislocation caused in Bhanmod
was typical only of those villages where the total assessment
had not been altered, it is easy to imagine how the new
settlement affected villages whose rental had been raised.
Briggs’ survey thus demonstrated the fallacy of the belief
that the land-tax could be determined on the basis of
’objective’ principles which completely disregarded the
traditional assessment:
It must be considered a revenue axiom [Chaplin 
concluded] that no settlement that is not con­
ducted with the general assent of the village 
authorities and the great body of the ryots can 
possess any stability. The classification and 
assessment of the lands must therefore be made 
in a great measure by the corporation of each 
separate village. To assist in determining the 
evaluations, the Patels and the kulkarnis, and 
a few of the principal ryots of the adjacent 
villages should be assembled and consulted. All 
these persons assembled together, and aided by 
an intelligent and experienced Karkoon from the 
district, and another from the Huzoor Cutcherry, 
might inspect and class each field with reference 
to its quality...(The) evidence of the ryots 
themselves, checked as I have suggested, will in 
general furnish the means of discovering pretty 
accurately what were the former rent and produce 
of the field, which point being determined, its 
classification may be safely left to the patel 
and the principal ryots.
50 to 60 per cent. As against the ryots who complained
30
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The problems which Briggs confronted in Kandesh were 
not unique to his Collectorate, And although the conse­
quences arising out of his survey discouraged other 
Collectors from embarking on any hasty surveys, it was clear 
that the rival rates could not for long form the basis of the 
land-tax under the new administration, Conservative adminis­
trators like Chaplin had no categoric answer to the question 
how the profits of agriculture could be equitably distributed 
between the peasants and the State, But their diffidence was 
not shared by individuals like Robert Keith Pringle, a young 
civilian in charge of the talukas of Pabul and Sewnare in 
the Collectorate of Poona in 1822, who had studied Ricardian 
economics under Malthus, the Professor of Political Economy 
in the East India College at Haileybury, Confident in his 
knowledge that political economy had a scientific explanation 
of agricultural profits in the Ricardian law of rent, Pringle 
launched a frontal attack on the administrators who sought to 
keep alive the spirit of the old Maratha revenue system. 
Unlike Elphinstone and Chaplin, who regarded the village 
community as an institution which formed the hub of the rural 
order, and was hence worthy of preservation, Pringle pointed 
out how the prevailing social organisation in rural society 
merely served to cloak the domination of the patel and the 
principal cultivators in the village. The kamal survey of
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Madhav Rao Peshwa, Pringle argued in his criticism of the 
’revenue axiom(s)’ set out by Chaplin, had been designed to 
absorb all the rent of the land, leaving to the cultivator 
the wages of labour and profit on the capital he had 
invested. But Madhav Rao’s attempt to devise a rational 
basis for the land-tax had provoked the hostility of the 
dominant groups in the village, which had exploited the 
rivaj rates to transfer a preponderating share of the village 
rental on the shoulders of the poorer cultivators. These 
dominant groups had proved far too strong for the Maratha 
bureaucracy, with the result that although the mamlatdars 
were able to use the kamal survey as a guide in levying the 
total village rental, they had never succeeded in breaking 
through the domination of the Patel and the principal ryots, 
and in imposing the kamal rates on individual c u l t i v a t o r s .
To prove the dominance of the patel and the principal 
cultivators over the village, Pringle turned to an examina­
tion of the principles and practice of the riva.j survey.
The unit of measure according to the riva.j was the cliowar, 
which paid a standard assessment irrespective of the quality 
of the soil. The chowar was not a fixed unit, and its
31
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dimensions, so it was believed, varied inversely with the 
quality of the soil, thus bringing about a measure of 
equalisation in the assessment. However, the kamal survey, 
which took into consideration the quality of the soil, and 
employed a standard beegah, had shown this to be untrue. To 
take an example, the estate of the Mallee .jatha in the 
village of Oswaree amounted to 4+1/40 chowars, while that of 
the Indoree iatha embraced five chowars, and their riva.j or 
customary assessments therefore stood in the proportion 
17:20. But the kamal survey showed that the holdings of the 
Mallees were of a superior quality, and it fixed the assess­
ments of the two .jathas in the proportion 275 :234» Since the 
Mallees had paid a lighter rental under the riva.j, they 
could hardly be expected to be over fond of the kamal survey. 
It is equally clear that the Mallees had formerly exploited 
their social position in the village to secure preferential 
treatment for themselves in the distribution of the riva.j 
rental.
The dominance of the patel and the principal cultivators 
over the village community, Pringle argued, could only be 
undermined through a survey based on entirely novel 
principles. The riva.j rates, it was obvious, constituted a 
reflection of their dominance, and it would be fatal, as 
Chaplin had suggested, to take any note of them at all.
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Rent, as defined by Ricardo, provided an objective criterion
for the determination of the share of agricultural produce
which the State could equitably claim as its own:
The character which land revenue has always borne 
throughout India [ Pringle concluded] is essentially 
that of rent, and not a personal or property tax.
It ought not to be equal to all individuals, nor 
vary with the circumstances of individuals. But 
ought to be regulated only by such incidents as 
affect rent; and the circumstances which affect 
rent are the powers of production anduthe value of 
the produce. The rent payable to government should 
depend upon these, and the net profit of the ryot 
should be the same in all lands, and under all 
circumstances...To regulate the respective rights 
of government and its subjects under this principle 
appears to have been the object of the different 
systems of administration under every Indian 
Government.•.32
In the discussions over revenue policy arising out of 
Briggs’ abortive survey of 1821, Pringle’s was a lone voice 
pitted against powerfully entrenched conservative adminis­
trators, who were anxious to preserve the traditional 
institutions of rural society, and who looked upon former 
methods of government with sympathy. Both of Pringle’s immed­
iate superiors, Henry Robertson, the Collector of Poona, and 
William Chaplin, the Commissioner of the Deccan, refused to 
support the revolutionary idea which he had put forth as the 
basis of a new revenue system, Robertson took his stand on
32
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the principle that ’in the present situation of our govern­
ment in the Dekhun, the ascertainment and preservation of 
rights, laics and customs of society subject to our control 
should be our first concern.,.’ He repudiated Pringle’s 
interpretation of the kamal survey, and debunked the view 
that the State had traditionally stood forth as the supreme 
landlord in the country. The kamal survey, Robertson be­
lieved, had been instituted in order to determine the 
resources and the tax bearing potential of the countryside. 
Its rates were never intended to supersede the riva.j, and 
they were never meant to be applied to individual cultivators 
or particular estates. What had prevented the application of 
the kamal rates was not the opposition of any dominant group 
in the village, but the fact that they had rested on very 
shaky grounds. In assessing fields, the kamal had only taken 
the quality of the soil into consideration, neglecting a host 
of other very important factors like proximity to markets and 
the state of communications:
By the kamal [Robertson pointed out ] the same 
quantity of land is rated at different values.
By the old custom of the villages, variable 
quantities of land are rated at the same value,
...By the algebraical process of alteration, 
these data would produce the same result. But... 
you will perhaps admit that the accuracy of the 
particulars of the one is not to be put in com­
petition with that of the other. The kamal rates 
were things of theory. They were the same in 
every village and in every talook. They were an
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estimate in general terms of what the assessment 
of lands of different qualities might be. They 
may therefore be termed accurate on the whole, 
but erroneous in detail. To say that the kamal 
rates were not applicable to particular estates or 
fields is not to prove that the realisations from 
such particular estates according to the old 
village rivaj was actually fair - but if we reflect 
on the constitution of village society, there is 
every reason to believe that the burdens of the 
corporations were originally equally distributed, 
however much the improvement of their lands by some 
holders may have enhanced at a subsequent period 
their apparent value...33
Since the principles of the riva.j survey had been 
obscured with the passage of time, both Chaplin and Robertson 
agreed with Pringle on the need for a reinvestigation into 
the resources of the countryside. A new survey, they 
believed, would furnish the authorities with a complete 
record of the productive capacity of the villages, and of the 
holdings located in the villages, and it would set the basis 
for a relationship between the State and the kunbi in which 
the rights and obligations of both parties would be clearly 
and equitably defined. However, while the conservative 
administrators supported the idea of a new survey, they 
differed from Pringle over the advisability of the adoption 
of a purely theoretical criterion for the regulation of the 
cultivator’s dues to the State. It was a fallacy, they
33
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believed, to assume that these dues could be determined 
solely by reference to the productive potential of holdings, 
since the ’rent which the assessment is intended to fix is 
that of government, not that of the ryot and his tenant;... 
the government rent should be that which can be produced by 
the ordinary means of cultivation in ordinary seasons ...T3 v 
In fixing the assessment, account had therefore to be taken 
of the actual produce and collections over a period of time. 
Because the collection of the land-tax under the Marathas 
had not been based on any consistent principle, reliance on 
past realisations could, in certain instances, prove to be a 
treacherous guide. But the detailed investigations to be 
conducted independently, and simultaneously, would provide a 
useful check in cases involving gross injustice. Once a 
survey based on such principles had been accomplished, the 
ryots could be made to enter engagements severally for their 
rents, and collectively for the rents of their villages. At 
the same time, the State could reserve to itself the prescrip­
tive right of levying extra assessments to make good losses in 
revenue arising out of individual failures.
34
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Clearly, then, Chaplin and Robertson were no apologists 
for the statns quo. They eschewed reform in the system of 
revenue administration, as they eschewed it in other spheres, 
only to the extent that it involved a complete departure from 
traditional practice. A revenue survey which was designed to 
remove obstacles in the way of rural progress, and which did 
not completely disregard the riva.j rates, had the full 
support of Chaplin and Robertson. But despite their regard 
for traditional institutions, and the caution with which they 
formulated their proposals, it is obvious that they were 
advocating the establishment of a new, and in some respects 
revolutionary, relationship between the ryot and the State.
The land-revenue system advocated by Chaplin and Robertson 
was not only dependent upon the creation of a legal and 
rational bureaucracy, but it was also designed to result in 
the atomisation of rural society.
How far-reaching were the changes advocated by Robertson 
and Chaplin was made clear by some administrators who 
attacked their proposals from a rigorous conservative stand­
point. G. More, the Secretary to the Bombay Government, 
voiced his opposition to a revenue survey in any form whatso­
ever because of the dislocation it would cause in the rural 
economy by suddenly raising, or lowering, the fiscal obligations 
of the ryots. He simultaneously emphasised the inadvisability
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of setting any fixed standards for the payment of tax by the 
ryot. The efficiency with which a ryot cultivated his field 
varied so much from one year to another that it was imposs­
ible for him to pay a fixed land-tax, and even if the rates 
of tax were computed on the basis of a scientific survey, 
the revenue officers would have to resort to the traditional 
expedient of negotiating the land-tax with the village 
officials annually03. F. Warden, a member of the Bombay 
Executive Council, raised even more fundamental objections 
to a revenue survey. Warden looked upon a survey as an 
’inquisitorial* probe into the rights and privileges of the 
peasants. The State, he believed, lacked the moral authority 
to carry out such a probe. Besides, the institution of a 
ryotwari, as opposed to a village, settlement involved a 
radical departure from the administrative system of the 
Marathas, and it was in conflict with the spirit of modera­
tion which informed Elphinstone’s policy of modernising 
Maharashtra0 .
The difference of opinion over revenue policy between a 
Utilitarian like Pringle, and conservative reformers like
35
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Chaplin and Robertson, revolved around fundamental questions 
of innovation and reform, and stemmed from conflicting social 
visions. Similarly, the objections advanced to the institu­
tion of a survey, even on ’traditional1 principles, by More 
and Warden served to illustrate the extent to which in the 
peculiar circumstances of the Deccan supposedly conservative 
administrators could espouse the cause of change. Amidst all 
this conflict of opinion, Elphinstone was unable to formulate 
a policy with the clarity and sophistication which had 
characterised his policy for transforming the intellectual 
climate of Maharashtra. His failure to seize the initiative 
in revenue administration was partly.a result of the nature 
of the problem, since it was impossible to set out a revenue 
policy without a thorough investigation into the rights and 
obligations of the peasants. But it was equally a conse­
quence of his unfamiliarity with economic problems, and with 
questions affecting revenue administration. Be that as it 
may, Elphinstonefs vision of social progress, and his belief 
in the inevitability and the desirability of change, led him 
to support the views of Chaplin and Robertson. The strongest 
argument in favour of a new survey, he observed, was the chaos 
which characterised the revenue administration of the Deccan. 
In a flourishing community it would be pointless to embark 
upon a new survey. But the Deccan was in a hopeless state.
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The rival rates had fallen into complete disarray as a 
result of the iniquitous practices of the revenue farmers 
employed by Baji Rao Peshwa. The disorder \vhich they had 
inherited from the previous regime obliged British revenue 
officers to make their annual settlements in complete 
ignorance of the resources of the country. Their settlements 
therefore combined the worse traits of a traditional bureau­
cracy with all the disadvantages of a rational administration. 
If British revenue officers had a careful survey to guide 
them in the settlement of the land-tax, their rates would be 
less arbitrary, and less harmful for rural prosperity, than 
they had proved in the years immediately following upon 1818. 
Of course, the important question whether the settlements 
were to be ryotwari or villagewise could be settled only in 
the concluding stages of the survey, and in the light of the 
evidence that it would bring forth. ’The survey must be 
ryotwar...that is, it must be based on an inspection of each 
field’. Elphinstone summed up. ’Which mode of settlement to 
adopt is a question for further decision. The one which I 
had the honour to propose for adoption when the survey should 
be completed was the mauzewar (villagewise)...’ ''7
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In the administration of land revenue, as in education, 
moderation in change, and concern for the gradual evolution 
of institutions, was the main theme of Elphinstone’s policy. 
The worst features of the Maratha revenue administration were 
to be abolished; yet the spirit of the former system would 
have its due place in the new order. The contradictions 
between the kamal and the riva.i were to be resolved through 
a new survey: but the principles informing this survey would 
not violate established revenue practice. The kunbi would 
henceforth pay a land-tax based on objective criteria: 
however, his prescriptive rights would not be trampled upon 
in the process. Elphinstone thus sought to secure the best 
in both worlds, and to preserve in the new order being shaped 
under his aegis facets of the old that were of enduring value.
Yet the old order was bound to undergo radical modifica­
tion because of the values which inspired Elphinstone, and 
which differed radically from those to which his Maratha 
predecessors had subscribed. In the circumstances of 
direct British rule over Maharashtra, it was beyond human 
ingenuity to bolster the position of the patel and the 
deshmukh and the mamlatdar. Their status in former days had 
stemmed from the fact that their powers and obligations were 
not precisely defined, and they were not subject to any rigid 
controls. Any attempt to transform them into the instruments
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of a rational and legal bureaucracy was bound to interfere 
with their freedom of action, and to undermine their domin­
ant position, Elphinstone’s attempt to reinforce the village 
community was equally futile, for the village community was 
an institution that could flourish only in a traditional, as 
opposed to a modern, State, Modernisation was thus bound to 
result in the destruction of the institutions, and the dis­
ruption of the social organisation, which had imparted 
stability and cohesion to Maharashtra under the Peshwas.
The Elphinstone Code of 1827
For despite chronic political instability and arbitrary 
government, the dominant note in Maharashtra at the time of 
the British conquest was struck by cohesion and order rather 
than by disunity and chaos. This is not to deny that even 
a conservative like Elphinstone found much that was repre­
hensible and objectionable in the institutions and values 
which flourished in the Deccan under native rule. This is 
merely to emphasise the undercurrent of stability 
characterising the social climate of the Peshwa’s territor­
ies. The climate of stability reinforced the reluctance of 
conservative administrators like Elphinstone to embark upon 
sweeping programmes of political reform, for it pointed, so 
they believed, to factors of enduring value in the community.
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Behind the stability characterising Maharashtra in 1818 lay 
the vitality of caste institutions, and the ’popularity* of 
caste values, which combined in a singular fashion the 
contradictory functions of differentiation and integration. 
Testifying to the important role played by caste organisa­
tions in the life of the individual, Elphinstone observed: 
’The influence of caste and public opinion as associated with 
religion is very strong; and the censures of the priest have 
perhaps in general more weight than the terrors of the magis­
trate* ^ . Perhaps the key to the vitality of caste institu­
tions in the Deccan lay in the accident of Brahmanical rule, 
and in the sagacity of groups like the shastris of Poona, 
who conducted the affairs of the Brahmin community with 
discretion and restraint, and in addition advised and guided 
the lower castes in their secular and spiritual concerns.
All this resulted in orderly social behaviour, and in the 
absence of serious friction between high and low castes. 
Elphinstone, for instance, was struck by the (relatively) 
high standards of public morality in the Deccan, and by the 
entire absence of that social violence and moral anarchy 
which characterised life in so many parts of India, including 
territories under British control:
38
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Judging from the iniquity [he pointed out] with 
which crimes might be committed...we should be 
led to fancy the Maratha country a complete scene 
of anarchy and violence. No picture, however, 
would be further from the truth...It is most im­
portant to ascertain the causes which kept the 
country in a state superior to our oldest possess­
ions (Bengal) amidst all the abuses and oppression 
of a native government...
The Maratha country presents in many respects a 
complete contrast to...(our territories in Bengal).
The people are very few compared to the quantity of 
arable land; they are hearty, warlike, and always 
armed till of late years; the situation of the lower 
orders was very comfortable, and that of the upper 
prosperous...All the powers of the State were con­
centrated in the same hands, and their vigour was 
not chastened by any suspicion on the part of the 
government or any scruples of their own...(Men) 
knew that if they were right in substance, they 
would not be questioned about the form...The 
mamlatdars were considerable persons, and there 
were men of property and consideration in every 
neighbourhood; Enanidars, Jagheeradars and old 
Zamindars. They were associated with the ranks 
above and below them, and kept up the chain of 
society to the prince; by this means the higher 
orders were kept informed of the situation of the 
lower, and as there was scarcely anyone without a 
patron, men might be exposed to oppression, but 
could scarcely suffer from neglect.39
Here then, according to Elphinstone, were vital pointers 
to the structure of a bureaucracy that could enforce peace and 
order in the conquered territories. The highest body in the 
line of command under government could either be a court, or 
an individual, vested with general control over the various 
branches of the administration. This court had to be
39
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frequently in circuit, and it had to be responsible for the 
general superintendence of the system, rather than be made to 
pay detailed attention to any part of it. Under the court 
would be appointed powerful Collectors, entrusted with 
supreme authority over the districts under their charge, and 
possessing extensive powers over the native administrators 
subordinate to them.
Though the bureaucracy to be erected under British 
aegis could profitably emulate features of the administrative 
system which had ensured peace and order under the Peshwas, 
it was clear to Elphinstone that both the powers and the 
responsibilities of the various public offices had to find 
precise and legal definition. Similarly, it was necessary 
to collate the religious and customary law which had guided 
the proceedings, and shaped the decisions, of indigenous 
Courts of Law in the form of a simple and comprehensible code. 
Elphinstone therefore sought to frame a body of regulations 
which would form the basis of a legal and rational bureaucracy, 
and present the customary laws in a clear and intelligible 
form. The Benthamite inspiration behind such an objective 
hardly needs any emphasis. But Elphinstone’s Benthamism was 
tempered with a regard for tradition, and a concern for con­
tinuity in the processes of change. He described the great 
legislator as ’a man of first rate ability, but also of first
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rate eccentricity; which, both in his doctrines and in his 
personal habits, probably arises from his little intercourse 
with the world1 It was all very well to advocate, as 
Bentham was wont to advocate, a simple and rational body of 
law which made a clean sweep of ill-defined and outdated 
laws. But, Elphinstone pointed out, ’foreigners should 
certainly be cautious how they made a code for a nation which 
they imperfectly know’ ■J. Hindu law was cluttered up with 
the most glaring inconsistencies, and it \\ras imprecise to a 
degree which defied comprehension. Yet the people of the 
country were deeply attached to the legal system which they 
had inherited from their forefathers. The creation of a new 
body of laws would net only confuse them; it would lead them 
away from habits of thought and action which had effectively 
guaranteed the social peace under the Feshwas.
Such then was the inspiration behind the investigation 
into The Laws and Customs of Hindoo Castes Within the Dekhun 
Provinces~ conducted in the 1820s by the Bombay civilian,
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Arthur Steele, at Elphinstone’s behest. Similar motives 
determined the creation of the Regulation Committee set up to 
draft a new Code for the Bombay territories. In his 
instructions to Steele, Elphinstone spelt out the difficult­
ies which would confront a latter-day Manu, and stressed the 
objectives he had in view. The Shastras. from which Hindu 
pandits derived their legal sanctions, were a collection of 
texts which were inconsistent and vague, and obscured by the 
interpolation of later commentaries. To make matters worse, 
in many instances shastrie law had been substituted by cus­
tomary practice which was based on pragmatic criteria and 
the convenience of different castes and communities. In such 
circumstances, Elphinstone pointed out, two alternative courses 
of action could be adopted: one could either formulate a com­
pletely new code based on general principles,or compile
a complete and consistent code from the mass of 
written law and the fragments of tradition, det­
ermining on general grounds of jurisprudence those 
points where the Hindu books and traditions present 
only conflicting authorities... The first of these 
courses, if otherwise expedient, is rendered com­
pletely impracticable here by the attachment of the 
natives to their own institutions, and by the 
degree to which their laws are interwoven with their 
religion and manners. The second plan is, therefore, 
the only one which it is in our power to pursue...43
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How the Regulation Committee set up by Elphinstone to 
draft a new code reconciled ’Maratha mamool with Jeremy 
Bentham* is best illustrated in a discussion in the Bombay 
administration over the powers of the judiciary and the 
executive. In violation of Indian tradition, Cornwallis in 
Bengal had made the judiciary completely independent of the 
executive, with consequences which British administrators in 
India had come to recognise, and to apprehend, in the 1820s. 
But despite the unhappy experience of Bengal, the Regulation 
Committee wanted to make the judiciary in Bombay supreme by 
investing it with the authority to interpret the Regulations 
on questions affecting the powers and jurisdiction of the 
Courts of Law44. Charles Norris, a member of the Regulation 
Committee, argued the case for an independent judiciary along 
familiar Whig lines. Since the Regulations comprised a 
compact between the State and its subjects, he reasoned, 
neither party ought to have the right to interpret the mean­
ing of this compact, least of all the party which had framed 
it. Even if the equity of the issue was over-looked, 
political considerations favoured the supremacy of the 
judiciary. Regulations had often to be applied in
44
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circumstances which antagonised important sections of the 
community. However, by pointing to the fact that the 
sanctions for such action had been provided by the judiciary, 
the executive could escape the opprobium which would other­
wise liave discredited it in the eyes of the people. In con­
clusion, Norris turned to examine the argument that a strong 
executive led to simplicity and efficiency in the business 
of administration. This argument, he observed, was devoid 
of any force whatsoever, since the rulings pronounced by the 
Courts of Law on various questions would yield a body of 
knowledge which would enable the executive to act in conform­
ity with the law of the land. Of course, it was always open 
to the executive to pass new regulations to meet specific 
situations, and in fulfilment of its political objectives.
But the interpretation of these regulations ought to rest 
with the Courts of Law^S,
The stand taken by Norris was disputed by Elphinstone, 
and by members of the Bombay Executive Council, who had seen 
the disastrous consequences stemming from the Whiggish 
edifice of government erected by Cornwallis in Bengal. As
G.C. Pendergast, a member of the Executive Council, pointed
Js
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out, Norris was guilty of confusing between ’laws1 and 
’regulations’46# Laws dealt with the right of individuals 
to the ownership of private property, and unless English 
principles of government were to be completely abandoned, 
the supremacy of the judiciary in this sphere was to be 
unquestioned. The regulations, on the other hand, set out 
the duties of the Courts of Law and defined the extent of 
their powers. If the Regulation Committee’s concept of 
judicial supremacy was accepted, then in a conflict between a 
higher and a lower Court the latter would sit in judgement 
over a case in which it was itself a party. The absurdity of 
such a situation was patent, and it would be to the advantage 
of the administration as a whole if the executive was invest­
ed with the authority to resolve such disputes. Elphinstone 
extended his support to the arguments of Pendergast. ’What 
I would recommend, therefore,’ he suggested, ’would be, 
that the Sudder Awawlut’s (Supreme Court’s) decisions in the 
interpretation of the Regulations be final in all cases 
when the question did not relate to an extent of its
46
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authority, but that in such cases, a reference should be 
made to the Government...’ ;;
But if Elphinstone was reluctant to invest the 
judiciary with supreme authority, he was equally unwilling 
to transform the executive into a Juggernaut. His Whig 
vision of the executive and judiciary as counterpoised and 
evenly balanced institutions led him to veto the Regulation 
Committee’s attempt to invest the Collectors with complete 
authority in the administration of land-revenue. The 
Regulation Committee was in favour of granting discretionary 
authority to the Collectors because of the difficulties 
involved in fixing the pitch of the land-tax. The problem 
of defining an equitable assessment was, of course, a very 
real one. For although in theory it was easy to fix the 
State’s share as a certain proportion of the gross produce of 
the land, the application of this principle presented grave 
difficulties. If the jurisdiction of the Courts of Law was 
extended to disputes between the kunbis and the State over 
the land-revenue, then the kunbi would always contest the 
collector’s evaluation, knowing full well that it was 
impossible for the Collector to substantiate his position
47 7"BA. Minute by Governor of Bombay dated 14 March 1823:
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before a Court of Law. It was to obviate this difficulty
that the Committee proposed to invest the Collector with
the authority to confiscate the holdings of ’obstreperous*
kunbis in order to lease them to more accommodating
cultivators:
Probably the ultimate authority [the Committee 
pointed out] for decision between the Collector 
and the cultivator must be arbitrary. Native 
arrangements have ever been so in fact however 
nominally modified; and it is not obvious that the 
state of proprietary landed interest admits of any 
other interpretation of the State’s rights.4°
Elphinstone, however, would have nothing to do with so
arbitrary a proposal. Even if the former officers of State
had exercised such a power, he observed, a Collector armed
with similar authority was capable of far more mischief
because of the greater concentration of power in the hands
of the bureaucracy under British aegis. No doubt the
proposal secured the interests of the State, but ’it would
not be equally efficacious in protecting those of the ryot,
left no resource in the event of excessive demand from the
Collector, but that... of giving up his land’49#
7?---------
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ElphinstoneTs ability to salvage those enduring 
features of the Maratha administration which embodied the 
ingrained habits of the people, and to weave them into the 
texture of western institutions, is particularly well 
reflected in the judicial edifice which he erected for the 
Deccan3 ’^. His approach to the problem of ensuring cheap and 
effective justice for the people was simple and ingenious.
He believed that a majority of disputes between the lcunbis 
concerned trivial issues, and could best be settled through 
institutions with which they were thoroughly familiar. It 
would, therefore, be a mistake to abolish the panchayats 
through which a majority of rural disputes had been tradition­
ally resolved. Yet panchayats could not be expected to 
dispense justice according to British notions of social equity. 
He therefore superimposed upon them an imposing structure of 
western style Courts of Law which dispensed justice according 
to western legal values.
If Elphinstone upheld the panchayats, he did so because 
he regarded them as an organic part of the community, and not 
because he had any romantic illusions about them. TI kept
50
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up panchayats because I found them’^', he told his friend 
and confidant, Edward Strachey, He was aware of their 
dilatory methods of procedure; their inability to execute 
their own awards; and of corruption among their members.
But he also recognised the fact that despite these defects 
the panchayats were popular with the rural masses, who 
referred to the institution as Punch Prumaishwar (The Voice 
of the Punch is the Voice of God). Behind the popularity 
of the panchayats, he argued, lay the inability of a 
traditional State to administer cheap and effective justice 
to its subjects. Realising the limitations of their power, 
Maratha administrators had left it to the people to procure 
justice for themsleves through institutions which owed their 
conception to popular initiative. As a result, these 
institutions had become a part of the social order, and 
their abolition would impose suffering and misery on the 
kunbis who looked upon them as their sole protection against 
injustice and oppression.
The role of the panchayat in the new judicial system 
was spelt out at length in a draft regulation. The preamble 
to this regulation stressed the need for panchayats in order
51
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to secure the ’easy and amicable settlement of disputes of 
a civil nature...’ " As in former times, there was to be no 
restriction on the complexity of cases that could be 
brought up before a panchayat, so long as the disputants were 
agreed upon the need for such arbitration. The membership 
of a panchayat was to be decided upon by the disputing 
parties, but no individual would be compelled to become a 
member of a panchayat, unless he was the patel, or the 
kulkarni, of the village concerned. Such a stipulation was 
made because although nothing could be gained by imposing 
the institution on the ordinary kunbi, the village officers 
were obviously under a moral obligation to devote a part of 
their time to public business. Finally, a panchayat was 
free to give its award either orally, or in writing, but a 
higher Court of Law could take cognisance of its decision 
only if it was written down in a prescribed form. A proper 
award made by a panchayat could not be set aside by any 
executive authority, but a disputant was at liberty to 
appeal to a higher Court if he had reason to believe that he 
had been denied justice. Such a limitation on the authority 
of panchayats was essential to provide safeguards against
52
BA. Draft of Regulation Concerning Panchayats dated 
17 August 1821: J.D., Vol. 48 of 1822.
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corrupt or partisan decisions. ’Although it is essential
that awards should be final...’ the Committee pointed out,
’yet it is necessary to guard against injustice arising out
of wilful impartiality on the part of arbitrators, and this
c 'ican best be done by a suit to set aside the arbitration.’
Even the regulation institutionalising the panchayat 
made it clear that the higher Courts of Law were to draw 
their sanctions from western notions of justice and equity, 
and that the panchayat was important only to the extent it 
represented the integration of a popular institution in the 
new judicial hierarchy. Taking its cue from the Benthamite 
belief that cheap and efficient justice could best be 
administered by the delegation of original authority to 
Subordinate Courts, and the retention of powers of supervision 
and control in a Supreme Court, the Regulation Committee 
envisaged a three tiered judicial system, which corresponded 
to Bentham’s three grades of Courts - the parish Court, the 
district Court, and the provincial Court. The coping stone 
of the judicial system was provided by a Sudder Adawlu 
(Supreme Court) vested with supreme civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over the entire territories. In its civil 
capacity the Sudder Adawlut could hear appeals against the
53
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decisions of the District Courts, while in its criminal 
capacity it could superintend matters relating to the 
administration of criminal justice by the magistrate-collec- 
tors. The Adawlut was in addition authorised to appoint 
Puisne Judges to hold Courts of Circuit for the trial of 
capital and other criminal offences. While on circuit, 
the Puisne Judges were expected to inspect the criminal 
proceedings in the Courts of magistrates, and to guide them 
in the interpretation of the law.
The District or Zillah Court was the hub of the 
judicial system. The Zillah Judge presided over two different 
Courts, the one possessing civil, and the other possessing 
criminal jurisdiction over the district. In his civil 
capacity the Zillah Judge was competent to try all cases of 
a civil nature in his district. Besides, his jurisdiction 
extended to appeals against original suits tried by judicial 
officers subordinate to him. Superintendence over the lower 
Courts, rather than attention to original cases, was the main 
responsibility of the Zillah Judge, for to quote the 
Regulation Committee, ’we are disposed to relieve the Zillah 
Judge as much as can conveniently be done from the cognisance 
of original suits...in order that he may have the leisure to 
superintend and regulate the proceedings of the inferior
courts...*- The Zillah Judge was equally powerful in the 
dispensation of criminal justice, since he was competent to 
try Tall natives and other persons not British subjects
r rcommitting any offence within the Zillah* . Under him came 
Assistant Judges whose duties were set by the Zillah Judge, 
and who retained the right to supervise their conduct and to 
hear appeals against them.
The rung of the judicial hierarchy immediately below 
the Zillah Court represented the first step towards the 
integration of two different judicial systems, of which the 
institutionalised panchayats represented the culmination.
To try civil cases not involving persons of European descent, 
the Zillah Judge could appoint Native Commissioners of 
Justice, whose original jurisdiction extended to cases 
involving sums less than Rs.500, These Native Commissioners 
were appointed to relieve European judicial officers of the 
more trivial cases, which prevented them from attending to 
serious disputes. *The greatest inconvenience to the 
judicial system throughout India*, the Regulation Committee 
pointed cut, *has been the wide range of suit which could
54BA. Draft of Regulation Concerning the setting up of a 
Judiciary dated nil: J.D., Vol. 48 of 1822.
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only be tried by European agency, providing an accumulation, 
and, in some instances a stagnation of business in the chief 
courts of the Zillah...TJ0 In answer to this problem, the 
Native Commissioners of Justice were expected to act in three 
different capacities: first, to decide cases referred to them 
directly; secondly, to lock into cases referred to them by 
the Zillah Judges; and thirdly, to investigate appeals against 
the decisions of the panchayats.
The differing concepts behind the institution of the 
Native Commissionships and the Zillah Courts were brought 
into sharp focus in a debate within the Bombay Government 
concerning the right of pleaders to represent disputants.
The Regulation Committee made short shift of the argument 
that pleaders encouraged litigation, and that they defeated 
the ends of justice by diverting the attention of the Courts 
from the real point at issue in a dispute. Whenever formal 
Courts of Justice were established, the Committee pointed out, 
the means of litigation formerly dispersed over a number of 
panchayats were brought within the ambit of a single 
institution, creating the illusion of increased social 
conflict. Once such Courts were established, the disputing 
parties had to be permitted to have their cases represented
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by legal agents, both on grounds of convenience and the 
complexity of the legal procedures involved. In other 
words, whether they were regarded as good or evil, pleaders 
were an inevitable consequence of the establishment of 
western style courts of law. The practical question was 
whether the judicial system would not work better if some 
sort of control was exercised over the pleaders. ’We 
propose, therefore,’ the Committee stated, Tto limit 
pleaders so far as to ensure their being qualified for their 
duty...’“' Rut while this was to be true of the Zillah 
Courts, any person could act on behalf of a defendent before 
a Native Commissioner, who was supposedly guided by popular 
notions of justice and social equity.
The tentative Regulations drafted by the Committee 
formed the basis of the Elphinstone Code of 1827» This 
code reveals Elphinstone’s deep insight into Hindu society, 
and it forms an eloquent tribute to the catholicity of his 
statecraft, and the sophistication of his social vision. 
Elphinstone is to be distinguished from rigorous conserva­
tives who wanted to leave the social fabric of Maharashtra 
undisturbed, and from reformers in a hurry who saw no 
obstacle in the rapid modernisation of the community. His
135
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cautious approach to reform led him to a sensitive awareness
of the tasks confronting the British administration in India,
and his belief in the moral basis of politics made him see
the intimate connection between the patterns of dominance in
Hindu society, and the social values to which the community
owed its allegiance. The Bralimin steeped in centuries of a
stultifying intellectual tradition, so Elphinstone believed,
could not be transformed over-night into an individual who
was ’English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in 
r 9intellect’“ . Nor could the Maratha polity be suddenly con­
verted into a modern State.
Elphinstone’s policy of gradualism exercised a decisive 
influence on social change in Maharashtra in the nineteenth 
century. His attempt to exploit traditional institutions 
for the propagation of western values had a profound effect 
on a community characterised by a remarkable intellectual 
consensus. Instead of inducing the deep cleavages which a 
drastic policy of reform would have necessarily created, the 
policy adopted by Elphinstone converted an influential 
section of the Brahmin intelligentsia to western values
5?---------
Minute by Lord Macaulay dated 2 February 1835 : Selections 
From Educational Records, Part I, 1781-1839, ed. by
H. Sharp, pp. 107
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without alienating it from the rest of Hindu society. As a 
result, the consensus which had flourished prior to I8l8 
was not undermined, and caste antagonisms in Maharashtra 
never assumed the intensity which characterised them 
elsewhere. In handling institutions like the village 
community, however, Elphinstone committed himself to a 
course of action which destroyed the cohesion originally 
characterising the villages of the Deccan, and led to the 
atomisation of rural society. The disintegration of the 
village community was inevitable because in questions 
concerning the structure and guidng principles of the 
administration, the gulf in values between him and his 
Maratha predecessors was far too wide to be bridged by a 
compromise. This breakdown of integration in rural society 
led to the agrarian disturbances of 1875> which were as much 
a consequence of the measures of change sponsored by 
Elphinstone, as they stemmed from the Utilitarian deluge 
which engulfed Maharashtra after his departure from the scene 
in 1828.
CHAPTER III
THE UTILITARIAN DELUGE
Elphinstone’s vision of a gradual transformation of the 
political institutions and social values of Maharashtra 
exercised an irresistible appeal over administrators brought 
up in a conservative political tradition. But it also em­
braced deep-rooted contradictions. The point at issue was 
the relevance of ’natural’ innovation in a situation where 
the reformer did not subscribe to the values of the society 
with which he was concerned. In such circumstances he could 
hardly avoid coming face to face with problems which did not 
admit of a Burkean solution. The alternatives before him 
were an abject surrender to gross forms of social dominance 
and political tyranny, or the creation of an entirely new 
institutional framework for shaping the processes which 
determine the good life in society. Yet Elphinstone refused 
to accept the existence of such a dilemma. Consequently, 
throughout the decade he ruled over the conquered 
territories, he had no answer to a host of urgent problems 
because of his refusal to accept without reservations the
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Maratha institutions he had inherited from the Peshwas, or to 
implement the policies in which he reposed confidence^. 
However, there are limits to which compromise can be trans­
formed into a grand principle of politics; and the impact of 
the reforming tide which swept over Maharashtra after 
Elphinstone’s departure stemmed, in equal parts, from his 
fruitless endeavour to hold back the flood, and from the 
refractory nature of the problems facing the new rulers.
The problems which confronted Elphinstone find their 
clearest expression in the question of land-revenue adminis­
tration, which was the subject of continuous debate through­
out his tenure as the Governor of Bombay. The issues at 
stake here were extremely significant for the future of 
Maharashtra. Was the kunbi to be alienated from the village 
community through the institution of the ryotwari system?
Did there exist a class of rich peasants in rural Maharashtra 
which dominated the village community and exploited it to its 
own ends? Were rationality and objectivity to ride roughshod 
over custom and tradition as principles informing the new 
administration? In the answers given to these questions by 
different administrators lay conflicting ideological
1
For an analysis of Elphinstone’s attitude towards Maratha 
institutions and values see Chapter II.
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preconceptions and rival concepts of the objectives of 
British rule in India.
A significant difference in values separated the con­
servative administrators like Chaplin and Robertson from 
Utilitarians like Robert Keith Pringle, who had come under 
the influence of Malthus in the East India College at 
Haileybury. Pringle scoffed at the timidity of the Burkean 
reformer with his concern for continuity in the processes of 
social change. His atomistic approach to social problems 
stood at variance with Elphinstone’s view of society as a 
polity embracing conflicting groups and interests in a state 
of over-all equilibrium. Instead of looking at social 
phenomena through institutions like class or caste, the 
Utilitarians focussed their attention on conceptually isolated 
individuals, and inferred the attitudes and proclivities of 
larger social units from the insights thus gained into the 
social process. The result of such an approach was a strong 
emphasis on the discreteness of the individuals who made up a 
society. To their atomistic view of social phenomena, the 
Utilitarians added a belief in the effectiveness of rational 
action. They held that once a precise and logical solution 
had been devised for a particular problem, all that remained 
to be done was to apply it rigorously to the affected parts 
of the polity.
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Pringle’s advocacy of a ryotwari system stemmed from 
his belief in Ricardian economics and in utilitarian ideals. 
He was convinced that the collective sentiment prevailing in 
the village, which received nourishment from joint respon­
sibility for the payment of the land-tax, and in turn 
perpetuated the dominance of the village officials and the 
principal ryots, was the one great obstacle in the economic 
progress of rural society. A clean sweep had therefore to be 
made of the Maratha revenue system since it sapped the 
cultivator’s will to improve his position through the 
exercise of individual initiative^. In its place a legal and 
rational relationship between the kunbi, as a tenant, and the 
State, as the supreme landlord in the country, ought to be 
established. The State’s share of the gross agricultural 
produce would then be the rent payable to a landlord, leaving 
the wages of labour and the profits of capital to the 
individual who cultivated the soil. In 1823, when Pringle 
first proposed the idea of utilising the ’net surplus’ 
criterion for a new land-revenue system, both Chaplin and 
Robertson expressed strong opposition to his scheme. 
Robertson, in particular, argued that the doctrine that the
2
BA (Bombay State Archives). R.K. Pringle to H.D. Robertson
dated 20 March 1823: R.D. (Revenue Department), Vol. 10/94
of 1824.
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subvert the traditional rights of the thulwaheeks, or the
meerasdars, and would unleash a disastrous social revolution
upon the rural areas. The thulwaheeks, who were descended
from the .jathas of old, had a clear proprietary right in the
soil. This was obvious from the value attached to their
tenure, which stood distinct from that of the uprees. It
was also proved by the numerous sales of landed property which
had taken place in the region before the British take-over.
To protect the proprietary interest of the meerasdar,
Robertson would have him pay the land-tax for all the fields
which stood in his name, even if some of them were not taken
under cultivation in a particular season:
The grounds upon which Government has a demand of 
right upon meeras land [he pointed out] arise from 
the nature of the tenure, i.e. the usufractory 
right of such land being exclusively vested in 
certain individuals and families, and Government 
being bound, if it acts justly, not to infringe 
this right, so long as those enjoying it perform 
the conditions concomitant on its acquisition...
Tell a meerasdar who endeavours to be freed from 
the assessment of the waste land - "You must resign 
your title to the usufractory possession of a 
portion of your good, bad and indifferent land of 
your whole estate, yielding a rent or tax equal to 
that portion left waste for which you did not pay 
tax,11 and remark his answer, "How can I do this?
How can I part with my land?n3
Sfcate stood as the supreme landlord in the country would
3
BA. H.D. Robertson to R.K. Pringle dated 22 December 1823:
R.D., Vol. 10/94 of 1824.
Although his conservative views predisposed him to the 
position adopted by Robertson, Elphinstone was struck by 
Pringle’s brilliant analysis of the kamal survey, and by the 
clarity with which he had outlined the principles which could 
inform a new revenue policy, Elphinstone was also aware of 
the Utilitarian influences to which the Court of Directors 
was exposed in the person of James Mill as the Chief Examiner 
of the East India Company, Since the revenue despatches from 
England were filled increasingly with short disquisitions on 
the virtues of Ricardian political economy, it was hardly 
surprising that he should appoint Pringle as the Superintend­
ent of the ’Revenue Survey and Assessment of the Deccan’. At 
the same time, Elphinstone did not shed his distrust of 
measures which could provoke a social upheaval, or disturb 
traditional rights. In entrusting Pringle with the survey of 
Indapur, a taluka in the Collectorate of Poona, he consequent­
ly struck a note of caution to check his protege’s 
exuberance^. The rights of the meerasdars, he said, would be 
the main concern of the survey, since they constituted the 
hub of the rural communities. The proprietary rights of the 
meerasdars were based on indisputable grounds of prescription,
4
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and they could not claim as a matter of right any remission 
in tax if they left a part of their estate uncultivated. 
However, to adhere rigidly to such a formula would place 
them under a grave handicap, especially since the Patels in 
former times had taken into consideration the actual 
condition of cultivators before distributing the village 
rental amongst them. Elphinstone settled the question by a 
characteristic compromise. *My present opinion isf, he 
stated, fthat it will be most expedient to allow meerasdars 
to throw up such portions of their land as they think proper; 
and to make a corresponding deduction in their payments 
until they shall be able to resume the land, which for a 
certain period at least, they should retain the right to do 
so1^. Elphinstone then proceeded to enunciate the principles 
on which the new survey was to be based^. Instead of 
advocating the fnet produce* criterion favoured by Pringle, 
he recommended a two stage process. In the first instance, a 
rough assessment of each village was to be made on the basis 
of the rentals levied in the past. Next, this amount was to 
be apportioned among individual cultivators, though in doing
5 Ibid.
6
Vide instructions enclosed in the minute of Governor of 
Bombay dated 14 August 1826.
so the surveyors were to take into consideration the 
productive capacities of different holdings, and the views 
of the ryots on what they could equitably pay, Tbut with 
such allowance in forms of privileged tenures as have been 
enjoined in the orders of Government...f?
The Pringle Survey
The taluka of Indapur to which Pringle first turned his 
attention as the Superintendent of the Revenue Survey was in 
many respects typical of the Deccan countryside in the 1820s. 
The first attempt at reducing its revenue affairs to order 
had been made by Malik Ambar during Muslim hegemony over the 
Deccan. The tankha settlement introduced by Malik Ambar in 
1620s was a cash rental based on a third share of the gross 
produce. The distribution of the tankha on individual 
estates in the village was left to the members of the village 
community. When the Marathas established their sway over 
Indapur, no attempt was made to disturb the tankha until 
1784-85, when the kamal survey launched under the Peshwa 
Madhav Rao was extended to the taluka. The kamal» unlike the 
tankha, was based upon an evaluation of individual holdings 
in the villages. It was undertaken for two reasons: to
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ascertain the productive capacity of the district in order to 
furnish the State with an accurate record of its resources; 
and to effect an increase in the public revenue. The kamal 
was unfortunate in its repercussions. Though the resources 
of Indapur had increased considerably since the institution 
of the tankha, the surveyors of Madhav Rao over-estimated its 
potentiality, and in raising the rental of the taluka from 
Rs.3*22,000 to Rs. 2^2,000, they imposed a crippling burden on
gthe cultivating classes •
The kamal assessment of Indapur remained a fictitious 
objective. Its failure led the Government of the last Peshwa 
to farm out villages to individuals who were willing to under 
take the collection of tax from the ryots. But in delegating 
this responsibility to revenue farmers who were free of the 
restraints to which the bureaucracy was subject, and who had 
no traditional ties with the rural communities, the Poona 
Government aggravated the seriousness of the situation. For 
the revenue farmers levied cesses over and above the standard 
assessment, in order to ensure quick and high profits for 
themselves. Their excesses had virtually depopulated Indapur 
when in 1807 the Poona authorities tried to reestablish the 
~
Report on the taluka of Indapur by Col. J. Francis dated 
12 February 1872: Selections from the Records of the Bombay 
Government, New Series. No. CLI.
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deserted villages through a system of leases (Istawa) 
providing for a small and annually increasing rent over a 
period of nine years, when the kamal rates were to be reached. 
However, so thoroughly had Baji Raofs farmers carried out 
their destructive role that even the istawa leases failed to 
attract the ryots to their villages, and the Poona authorities 
were experimenting with one expedient after another when 
hostilities broke out and the Deccan was ceded to the 
British Government.
When the new rulers of Maharashtra assumed charge over 
Indapur in 1818, its revenue administration had not recovered 
from the disastrous expedient to which Baji Rao had taken 
recourse in a desperate bid to bleed the countryside of its 
resources. The situation was further complicated by a 
succession of bad harvests in the 1820s, which necessitated 
large scale remissions in revenue. But the new administra­
tion’s troubles were partly self-created, since in their 
ignorance of the productive capacity of the taluka, British 
civilians believed that the kamal assessment was a reliable 
guide to the amount of tax which could be realised from the 
peasants in normal seasons. The difficulties facing the new 
rulers were heightened by the social dominance of the Patel 
and the principal cultivators in the rural communities, which 
existed despite the absence of clear cut economic cleavages
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in village society. Misled by the inflated figures of the 
kamal survey, British civilians at first imposed very high 
rentals on the Indapur villages, which it was the respon­
sibility of the Patels to collect for the State. As a result 
of the high rentals, the Government was compelled to grant 
annual remissions in revenue. These remissions were 
particularly large in bad seasons, when a complete or partial 
failure of crops reduced the great majority of ryots to a 
miserable plight. But the tragedy of the situation lay in 
that the remissions, instead of alleviating the misery of 
the poor cultivators, were more often than not swallowed up 
by the Patel and the dominant cultivators, to whom the 
revenue officials were compelled to entrust the ryotwar 
distribution of the concessions accorded by the government^.
The corruption fostered in the village communities by 
the annual remissions in revenue was brought to the notice 
of the Bombay Government by R.K. Arbuthnot, a young civilian 
in charge of Indapur. He pointed out that at the root of the 
problem lay the ’present high rates of assessment throughout 
the country’, which led the ryots to believe that the annual 
remission in land-tax was a normal feature of the revenue
9 BA. R.D. Mills, Collector of Poona to Bombay Government 
dated 23 September 1828: R.D., Vol. 6/212 of 1828.
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not only played into the hands of the dominant groups in the
village, but it undermined the collective sentiment which
formed the basis of the village community, and encouraged
rich and poor peasants alike to enter into an alliance to
defraud the State of its share of the agricultural produce:
The system of granting large remissions in refer­
ence to the quality of crops [Arbuthnot pointed out] 
...is of so bad an effect, that I feel very averse 
to putting it in practice to any great extent: for 
as soon as it is understood that Collections are to 
be made on this principle, it becomes the object of 
everyone to deceive the Government...When it is 
generally understood that all of one family assist 
each other in their concerns and that if the crop 
of one should particularly fail, he has recourse to 
his neighbour to lend him for this year, in expec­
tation, that he will be called upon in his turn in 
the following, there appears no injustice, where 
the assessment is moderate in insisting on it being 
paid, nor is it likely to produce injury throughout 
the country. (Emphasis in original)10
The confusion stemming from an inadequate knowledge of 
the resources of Indapur was heightened by the chaos arising 
out of the changes which had crept into the social organisa­
tion of rural society during the century preceding the 
British conquest. Villages in Indapur taluka were divided 
into sthuls or estates, and these estates were further 
apportioned into Jbeekas, several of which were held by the
system. Through perpetuating such a system the Government
10
BA. R.K. Arbuthnot to H.D. Robertson dated 1 March 1827:
R.D., Vol. 20/174 of 1827.
same ryot, often in different estates. The cultivable land 
in the village was also divided into areas of ghutcool 
tenure and meeras tenure. The cultivating community com­
prised meerasdars and uprees, the former being organised 
into ,j at has or family groups, each one of which was made up 
of the meerasdars of a family, and of such adventitious 
members as were incorporated into it by purchase of land or 
otherwise. The sthul and .jatha were originally corresponding 
and co-extensive designations. But in the 1820s the same 
jatha often held fields in different sthuls« and the same 
sthul was frequently held by different family groups. The 
situation was further complicated by the fact that the 
meerasdars could on occasions occupy ghutcool land, and the 
uprees cultivate the plots of meerasdars t with sometimes each 
holding portions of both. All this was hardly designed to 
simplify the task confronting Pringle as the Superintendent 
of the Revenue Survey^.
In order to reduce the confusion that had crept into the 
administration of revenue to a semblance of order Pringle 
created a survey machinery staffed by *a number of Brahmans 
...for surveying and assessing the land, the surveyors having
1 1
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over them Brahman assessors, and the assessors1 work being 
supervised by Head-Assessors, who were also Brahmans. Over 
the whole department was a Huzoor Cutcherry, composed of
1 9twelve Brahmans and an English gentleman (Pringle)...1 The 
employment of Brahmins in the revenue department was no 
innovation in Maharashtra. But in another direction Pringle 
made a significant departure from traditional principles of 
revenue assessment. The land-tax in India had been based on 
the exaction of a certain share of the gross produce of the 
soil by the State. British administrators like Sir Thomas 
Munro, who gave the problem their close attention, both 
accepted and acted upon this principle. However, Pringle 
rejected the traditional mode of assessment as based on 
faulty premises, since it made no distinction between rent, 
which was the landlordfs share of agricultural produce and 
a consequence solely of the superior fertility of the soil, 
and the profits of capital and the wages of labour, which it 
would be wrong to deny to the cultivator. The proportion of 
the gross produce which could be levied without absorbing 
the rent and trenching upon profits varied with the fertility 
of the land, decreasing progressively from the superior to the
1 2
BA. R.K. Pringle to Bombay Government dated 6 September
18*25*: R.D., Vol. 225 of 1828 .
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settlements of Munro in Madras had in all probability left
a fraction of the rent to the cultivator even on the
inferior soils. But to concede this did not involve an
acceptance of traditional principles of assessment, which
were concerned solely with the gross produce of the soil:
It is obvious that the surplus which remains from 
the gross produce of the land [Pringle pointed out] 
after deducting all expenses is the fair measure of 
its power to pay an assessment. But as that 
surplus varies in its relation to the whole 
produce in different soils, any tax proportional to 
the latter only must be unequal...(This) inequality 
by creating an artificial monopoly in favour of the 
soils yielding the greatest proportion of net 
produce...will have a tendency to check production
♦ ..It has always appeared to me...(therefore) that, 
as the net produce is the only accurate standard of 
exaction, and as in proportion the assessment is 
regulated by it, it will be distributed in the 
manner most favourable to the general wealth and 
prosperity of the community, it ought therefore to 
be distinctly recognised as the basis of our 
operations...^3
Having defined the principles of a rational revenue 
policy, Pringle instructed his Brahmin subordinates to apply 
them to the task of surveying Indapur. The entire survey 
was carried out in three distinct stages. In the first 
instance, the surveyors measured the holdings of the ryots; 
next, the assessors classified the fields so measured; and
inferior soils. Pringle was willing to accept that the
13 Ibid.
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finally, the data collected by the surveyors and assessors 
was utilised by Pringle to calculate the net produce of soils 
of different fertility. The actual rental was then fixed as 
a standard proportion of the net produce of different soils.
In presenting the results thus obtained to the Bombay 
Government, Pringle emphasised the fact that he had left the 
natural advantages of different soils completely unimpaired; 
and that his survey enabled a landlord to levy a rent which 
increased progressively from the worst to the best soils. The 
settlement was, of course, fatally dependent upon the accuracy 
of the data from which the net produce was calculated. But 
Pringle found no reason to doubt the honesty of the surveyors 
and assessors, or to question the accuracy of their findings. 
The crux of the problem was the effect of the new survey upon 
the traditional distribution of tax amongst different classes 
of cultivators, Pringle was struck by the drastic changes 
which the survey had produced in the fiscal obligations of 
individuals, and of entire villages. But, he argued, these 
were consequences for which the Government ought to have been 
prepared. If the assessment on individual cultivators had 
been equal and equitable under the former system, there would 
be no need for a new survey. If it was unequal, a survey 
based on objective principles would inevitably change the
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relative position of different cultivators in regard to 
their rental obligations to the State.
Pringle treated the rationality of the principles 
informing his survey as axiomatic. Yet he realised that 
1 this (survey) is not a mere question of political economy, 
and that, affecting as it does the rights and interests of 
a large portion of the community, it must be considered on 
broader and more general grounds1. He had no apprehensions 
about cultivators on whom the burden of land-tax had been 
reduced by the survey. But the position of cultivators whose 
rental had been increased required serious consideration.
For although it was desirable to equalise the pitch of the 
assessment on different peasants, such an argument could 
never be put forth as an excuse for the violation of prescrip­
tive property rights. It was in this context that altera­
tions in rentals impinged upon the position of the meerasdars, 
who possessed a clear proprietary interest in the land.
Pringle pointed out that as the idea of a survey in the 
Deccan had gained ground in official circles, it was assumed 
by the conservative administrators that the assessment on 
meerasdars would in no circumstances be increased, since an 
increase in rental meant an encroachment on their property 
rights. Yet he failed to see any characteristic in the 
tenure of meerasdars which entitled them to such indulgence:
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I am at a loss to discover [he pointed out] the 
grounds on which this notion of the right of 
meerasdars to exemption from increased payments on 
a general revision of the assessment was originally 
taken up. I have looked in vain for any confirma­
tion of it in the numerous notices and regarding 
the rights and immunities of this class...I have 
looked for it in vain in the deeds by which the 
land is transferred...I can find no trace of it in 
the management of our predecessors... I have 
frequently conversed on this subject with 
intelligent natives... and I have never heard from 
them but one opinion...Arbitrarily to raise the 
assessment of an individual meerasdar beyond that 
of his fellows would be an outrage to public feel­
ing. But they have no conception of the existence 
of any contract to prevent Government... from caus­
ing it to be apportioned on the fields either of 
meerasdars or uprees in any way which in its wisdom 
it may think fit.14
However, none of the crucial questions were raised by 
the Indapur survey since it reduced the fiscal demands of the 
State on the meerasdars. It was the uprees rather than the 
meerasdars who were adversely affected by the new arrange­
ments. But Pringle held that since the uprees cultivated 
land on an uncertain tenure, they had no reason to expect a 
continuation of the attractive rentals they had enjoyed 
formerly, and were at liberty to fend for themselves else­
where. Pringle1s cavalier attitude towards the uprees did 
not stem from any opportunistic motives; and he knew that he 
could be bargaining for a decrease in the area of cultivation 
as an immediate consequence of the survey. But this did not
14 Ibid.
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impair his confidence in his survey. For he did not believe 
that an extension of cultivation was desirable in all circum­
stances. The idea of attracting uprees on low rentals was in 
his view ill-conceived and mischievous. It encouraged a 
ruinous competition against the meerasdars, and promoted 
inefficient and slovenly cultivation on the part of the 
uprees. * Like the Poor Law in England1, Pringle pointed out,
* it is a system which sets out upon the principle of making 
the poor rich, by making the rich poor, and ends by making 
paupers of all*^5.
The cogency with which Pringle set out the principles 
underlying his survey finds eloquent reflection in the fact 
that Sir John Malcolm, who had succeeded Elphinstone as 
Governor of Bombay in 1828, and was known to be even more 
cautious in his approach to innovation and reform than his 
predecessor, was completely overwhelmed by the logic and 
rationality of his arguments, and immediately sanctioned the 
extension of the survey to other districts in the Deccan. As 
Malcolm put it, the reasons put forth by Pringle for fixing 
the assessment as a proportion of the net instead of the gross 
produce of the land were so convincing that TI must believe 
it to be rather apparently than actually the case that the
15 Ibid.
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conceded that the faulty execution of any one of the
intricate processes of survey and assessment could affect
the Pringle settlement fatally. But he saw no reason to
doubt the accuracy of the operations carried out in Indapur.
On the contrary, he looked forward to the prospect of
increased prosperity in the countryside as the operations
gained momentum. fWithout...(the survey) we proceed in
darkness. With it we have light’, he stated.
The minuteness of our acquaintance with the 
receipts, the rights, and the condition of every 
individual instead of limiting our liberality, 
enables us to give it a just direction, and so 
to render the benefits we confer on the community 
real blessings for their being given with a dis­
crimination that ensures their happy operation.17
assessments were at any time not so f i x e d M a l c o l m  also
The Kunbis* Reaction to the Pringle Survey
The Pringle Settlement was introduced in Indapur in 
I8 3O in a remarkable mood of optimism. Yet it embraced one 
disturbing feature which would from the outset have raised 
doubts in the mind of an individual less doctrinaire than 
Pringle. It has already been observed that he believed that
16
BA. Minute by Governor of Bombay dated 18 November 1828: 
R.D., Vol. 225 of 1828.
17
Ibid.
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the more substantial peasants in the village dominated the 
community and exploited the riva.i survey to their selfish 
ends. Pringle’s case for a new survey, and for a ryotwari as 
opposed to a village settlement, rested on the supposition 
that the dominant cultivators had formerly paid a ridiculous­
ly low rental to the State. But as the results of the survey 
poured in, Pringle observed to his astonishment that the 
tax-burden on the meerasdars» whom he regarded as the 
exploiters of rural society, would be reduced instead of 
being increased under the new system. In the Pabul and 
Sewnair talukas of the Poona Collectorate, for instance, the 
rental on the meerasdars was reduced from Rs.3 ,5 5 , 8 2 7 to
Rs.2,67,196, representing a diminution of 20 per cent in the 
1 8total rental . If Pringle had been less confident of the 
principles underlying his survey, or of the honesty of the 
agents employed for its execution, such a drastic alteration 
in the burden of tax on the meerasdars would have shaken his 
confidence in the Settlement. But he was above all doubts. 
Executing a neat sleight of hand, he explained away the 
diminution in tax on meerasdars on the grounds that they had
18
BA. Collector of Poona to Bombay Government dated 1 April
1830: R.D., Vol. 7/287 of 1830.
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to the ghutcool lands of the villages on low rents.
Nevertheless, because they were so important a social
group in rural society, Pringle found the reduction in the
burden of tax on the meerasdars a convenient consequence of
the survey. Ever since the question of a survey had been
broached in official circles, conservatives like Chaplin and
Robertson had been apprehensive, largely because of Pringle’s
analysis of the distribution of power in the village community,
that an assessment based on rational criteria would raise the
burden of tax on the meerasdars♦ and would encroach upon
their prescriptive property rights. But Pringle was now
able to turn on his critics and claim that the new survey had
reinforced, and not weakened, the position of the meerasdars:
There is [Pringle observed] no class of the commun­
ity which will benefit so much by the survey (as 
the meerasdars). Indeed, were it otherwise, I 
should entertain much greater doubts of the advan­
tages than I do. I am fully sensible of the 
importance, with a view to the welfare of society, 
and every purpose of good government, of maintain­
ing and promoting that independence of spirit, 
elevation of character, and attachment to the 
soil, which is the result of proprietary rights...
So far from advocating any system which will lead 
to annihilate them, I should be glad to see them 
extended to a much wider sphere than they at 
present occupy.19
formerly over-taxed themselves in order to attract uprees
19
BA. R.K. Pringle to Bombay Government dated 6 September
1828: R.D., Vol. 28/1811 of 1827.
The real test of the survey, however, was the reaction 
it evoked among the poor but numerically more significant 
cultivating classes: and so far as they were concerned, it 
soon became obvious that the experiment launched with such 
hopes was doomed to failure. Early in 1830 reports poured 
into Poona of the great difficulty the Assistant Collector 
of Indapur was experiencing in persuading the ryots to
o r\cultivate their fields under the new Survey rates'6 . Far 
more ominous was the virtual desolation of the villages of 
Indapur through the large scale migration of the kunbis to 
the neighbouring territories of the Nizam in a bid to escape 
the rigours of the new settlement. The peasants had virtually 
voted against Pringle with their feet! The elements too 
joined in a conspiracy against Pringle, since there was a 
partial failure of the monsoon in I8 3O. But the state of the 
government rent-roll made it clear that the vicissitudes of 
the weather had been reinforced by an ill-conceived revenue 
policy to precipitate a disastrous situation. In 1829 Indapur 
had been assessed at Rs.58,702, and actually yielded a 
revenue of Rs.42,299* Pringle had assessed the taluka at 
Rs.91>569, But so many peasants had fled from Indapur after
20
BA, Collector of Poona to Bombay Government dated 1 April 
1830: R.D., Vol. 7/287 of 1830,
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the introduction of the Pringle rates that even the wildest 
optimist could not have forecast a collection exceeding 
Rs.l6,410 in 1830, The Collector of Poona was reluctant to 
pronounce upon the validity of the survey at so early a 
stage. But he advocated the réintroduction of istawa leases 
in order to persuade the kunbis of Indapur to return to their 
villages.
Faced with a virtual collapse of the survey through the 
intransigence of the ryots, Pringle turned to the defence of 
his settlement policy. He touched upon the extensive 
enquiries into the rights of the ryots and the nature of 
their tenures carried out under the survey, and referred to 
the impressive bulk of statistical data upon which the calcu­
lation of the net produce, and of the assessment, was based.
To claim infallibility in the prosecution of so intricate and 
involved an operation would be foolhardy. But, Pringle 
insisted, it was easy to see how a measure having for its 
object the correction of inequalities in assessment was bound 
to provoke the opposition of those whom it had affected 
adversely. The ryots’ resistance to the settlement ought not 
therefore to shake the Government’s confidence in its accuracy
For I am persuaded [Pringle observed] that in the 
opinion of the majority of the people...the magni­
tude and importance of this work are fully 
appreciated, and held to be worthy of the govern­
ment by which it was undertaken. It is certainly
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looked upon with hope,...and will come to be 
recognised and relied upon with confidence, as 
the character of their privileges over a point so 
interesting to our Indian community as the adjust­
ment of the land-tax and the rights and claims 
connected with it become increasingly clear...^-*-
The extent of the failure, however, was too calamitous 
to be dispelled either by pious platitudes or by a reitera­
tion of the principles informing the survey operations. 
Administrators like Robertson, who were brought up in the 
conservative traditions of the Elphinstone school, had 
always been sceptical of Pringle’s ability to exploit the 
Ricardian concept of rent as the basis of a new revenue system. 
They now set out to demonstrate how the survey had disastrous­
ly altered the rental structure of different villages and 
seriously affected the fortunes of different classes of 
cultivators. From actual enquiries in surveyed villages, 
they were able to pinpoint the fallacies in the principles 
of Pringle’s revenue policy, and in the application of this 
policy to the survey of Indapur.
The decrease in the burden of tax on the meerasdars, on 
which attention has already been focussed, was the most 
significant facet of the settlement to attract Robertson’s 
attention. While Pringle was aware of this phenomenon in
21
BA. R.K. Pringle to Bombay Government dated 28 January
1831: R.D., Vol. 426/427 of 1830.
qualitative terms, it took a detailed investigation by 
Robertson to reveal how drastic a change the survey had 
actually effected in the burden of tax on different classes 
of cultivators in the villages. In the village of Mouze 
Kowrey, for instance, the Pringle rental agreed closely with 
the kamal assessment of Rs.3304. But Robertson discovered 
that rents on fields held by the meerasdars, which were 
located in the most fertile parts of the village, had been 
lowered from Rs.2152 to Rs.l8l5> while the upreesT share of 
the village rental had shot up from Rs.1152 to Rs.1343.
These alterations were effected through a simple expedient. 
The fertile rice-fields held by the meerasdars. which were 
formerly assessed at the maximum rates, had been transferred 
to an inferior category (.jerayet) by Pringlefs assessors, 
who had at the same time upgraded the fields held by the 
uprees. The collection of revenue from Mouze Kowrey before 
and after the new settlement constituted a telling indictment 
of the survey operations. In 1829 the village raised a sum 
of Rs.2690; in 1830 the total anticipated collection was 
estimated at Rs.l8l9^.
22
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Bombay Government dated 20 January l834i Home Department 
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The survey, so Robertson discovered, had not only 
altered the relative burden on the meerasdars and the uprees 
to the advantage of the former, but it had also disturbed 
the proportion in which the meerasdars of a particular 
village distributed the rental amongst themselves^. This 
became clear when Robertson focussed his attention on the 
impact of the survey operations on a ,jatha of six families 
which held the estate called Kurdela in the village of Kurra 
(see Table A). The heads of these families were bound to 
each other by close ties of kinship: and in the not too 
remote past their forefathers had divided the estate into 
shares according to their several rights of inheritance.
By the riva.i evaluation the first four meerasdars of the 
.1 atha held equal shares; the fifth a double share; and the 
last a share and a half. However, when Pringle’s surveyors 
measured the estate, they discovered that the actual area of 
the different holdings did not correspond with the picture 
set out by the traditional accounts: Byheroo Kurdela’s 
holdings, for instance, were practically three times those 
of Pandojee Kurdela, though the riva.i put them as only twice 
the size of the latter’s possessions. The effect of the
23
BA. II.D. Robertson to Bombay Government dated 1 November
1831: R.D., Vol. 434 of 1832.
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survey, therefore, was to introduce radical alterations in 
the traditional distribution of tax among the Kurdelas.
While the ,j at ha as a whole had its rental reduced, the famil­
ies it embraced were affected to different extents, Arjunah 
and Pandojee Kurdela, for instance, had their rentals halved, 
while the tax on the rest of the Kurdelas had been reduced 
by only 33 per cent.
The members of the Kurdela .jatha were completely baffled 
by this inexplicable change in their fortunes. As the Kurra 
Patels Luxman Gonday and Balloojee Dholay explained to 
Robertson, when the Kurdela estate was originally partitioned, 
the .jatha had resolved the problem of differential fertility 
through apportioning shares in beegahs of varying superficial 
extent. The riva.j beegaht consequently, took into account 
both the area and the quality of the field. The measurement 
of the village lands in such a unit simplified the business of 
revenue management. Thus the former Government had levied a 
rental of Rs. 1.25 on every riva.j beegah in the village. If in 
a particular year it raised the total rental on the village, 
all that was required to divide the enhanced demand evenly 
among the cultivators was a proportional increase in the 
rental per beegah sufficient to meet the new assessment.
By disturbing the traditional distribution of the rental 
within the Kurdela .jatha, Pringle had undermined the 
principles on which the shares of the Kurdelas, and the
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breakdown of the village demand, were based. To offset the 
effects of the survey, the Patels Gonday and Dholey did not 
rule out the possibility of the Kurdela .jatha ’ effecting such 
a redistribution of the land as would bring their shares back 
to an equality1. Their verdict on the long range effects of 
the survey was, however, even more ominous: ’All the people 
do not yet know the effect of it (the new survey); but as 
soon as they comprehend it, we think that the meerasdars 
will generally quarrel among themselvesf^4#
The confusion into which the survey had thrown the 
affairs of the Kurdela .jatha highlights the arbitrary treat­
ment meted out to the meerasdars by Pringle. His attitude 
towards them was dictated by the suspicion that they had paid 
a very light rental under the former rulers, and that the 
distribution of tax on them was both inequitable and unequal. 
Such suspicions blinded Pringle to fallacies in the principles 
of his survey, or to errors in the application of these 
principles. They also led him to repose complete confidence 
in the findings of his subordinates, even when these findings 
contradicted the traditional riva.j accounts. Last of all, 
Pringle’s belief in the State’s discretionary right to raise
24BA. Report of an Interview between H.D. Robertson and the 
Patels of Kurra enclosed in Robertson’s letter to Bombay 
Government dated 1 November 1831: R.D., Vol. 434 of 1832.
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the rental on the meerasdars manoeuvred him into a 
catastrophic position:
That Meerasdars [Robertson pointed out] had their 
assessments raised or lowered by Government is 
true; but Government has no right to raise or 
lower the assessment of only one meerasdar of a 
village. It must raise or lower the assessment 
of all in equal proportions, for their assessments 
were originally equalised by their tenures and 
joint responsibility; and any alterations of the 
proportions, except in singular circumstances of 
fraudulent concealment, is precisely rendering 
their assessments unequal...25
Since they indicated how the prosperous cultivators of 
Indapur had emerged with substantial diminutions in rentals 
as a consequence of the survey, Robertson’s inquiries provid­
ed a convincing explanation for the failure of the Pringle 
Settlement. But it required the detailed investigations of 
Robert Shortrede, a revenue officer who was requested to 
investigate the reasons for the failure of the Pringle 
Survey, to establish Robertson’s suspicions beyond doubt^. 
The prosecution of the survey by the Brahmin officials under 
Pringle had involved two distinct stages: the measurement of 
the area of holdings; and their classification on a relative
25
BA. H.D. Robertson to Bombay Government dated 1 November 
1831: R.D., Vol. 434 of 1832.
26
NAI. Robert Shortrede’s Report on the Revenue Survey and 
Assessment of the Deccan dated 24 October 1835 : Revenue 
Department Proceedings No. 4 dated 23 January 1837.
168
scale according to their fertility. The first operation was 
carried out with reasonable accuracy. But the classification 
of the fields was completely undependable, and throughout the 
taluka, Shortrede pointed out, Tin two instances only did I 
find three successive fields correctly assessed*. He illus­
trated the extent to which the surveyors had bungled in the 
classification of fields through an ingenious device:
I have called the misclassification general and 
systematic [Shortrede observed] because had it been 
otherwise, had the class of each field been 
determined by lot, it might have been expected 
where there were nine classes, that one field in 
nine should have been correct, and of the remaining 
eight, four should have been above and four below 
the proper class. In order to try the classifica­
tion in this way I made a spinning top on which I 
made nine marks corresponding to the nine classes, 
and in several villages I found that the class 
determined by the spinning top was nearer the truth 
than that determined by the Survey.27
Here, according to Shortrede, was evidence beyond refuta­
tion that the errors in classification were deliberate rather 
than accidental. Behind them lay the attempt of a social 
group in rural society to defraud the State of its revenues. 
The significance of the calculated errors in classification 
is brought out extremely well in the way in which the 
surveyors prosecuted their task in the village of Indapur 
itself. The estate called Brahman sthul in Indapur
T?----
Ibid
possessed the best soil available in the Deccan. The 
portion of Brahman sthul which belonged to deputy Patel 
Masaye Galande was of the superior black category; but it 
had been classed as inferior red by the surveyors. Similarly, 
the 750 acres of black soil held by the Despandya Kulkarnis 
of Indapur were grossly under-assessed. In the latter 
instance, there were errors both in measurement and in class­
ification: 23 acres of the land had been entered as 1 black; 
299 as 2 black; 166 as 3 black; 140 as red; making in all 
only 63I acres. The Kulkarnis thus paid a lighter tax than 
they should have because their fields were under-assessed, 
and because there were errors in measurement.
All this pointed to collusion between the subordinate 
officials of the Survey Department and the dominant groups 
in the rural communities like the village officers and the 
principal ryots. Shortrede suspected this collusion to be 
the principal cause of the diminution in the burden of tax 
on the meerasdars. In village after village, the surveyors 
and assessors sent out by the Huzoor Cutcherry had been 
bribed by the more substantial peasants to under-assess 
their holdings. The decrease thus effected in the rent-roll 
had been made good by an increase in the tax on the uprees t 
who could least of all afford to pay anything extra, in order 
to work out respectable rentals for villages as a whole.
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fI am credibly informedf, Robertson pointed out in confirma­
tion of Shortrede’s suspicions, fthat in most instances where 
the aggregate assessment of a village is now less than it 
formerly was, a contribution was raised from the village
f\ Oofficers and ryots* . Shortredefs verdict on the unholy
compact between the dominant groups in the village and the
Brahmin revenue officers of Pringle was equally emphatic:
There can be no doubt [he pointed out] that the 
principle of assessing the land according to the 
net produce is the only one which is universally 
true..I must therefore give my full assent to the 
general theory of assessment. I must at the same 
time declare in terms as unqualified my dissent 
from the general application of that theory to the 
particular cases I have examined.29
Although Robertson and Shortrede had stumbled upon an 
important reason behind the failure of the Pringle survey, 
they failed to grasp the full implications of the ryotwari 
system. The most important feature of revenue administration 
under the Marathas was collective responsibility for the 
payment of the village rental by the meerasdars. It was the 
meerasdars as a body who distributed the total demand on the 
village on the basis of the riva.j once the village rental had
IE
BA. H.D. Robertson to Bombay Government dated 1 November 
1831: R.D., Vol. 434 of 1832.
29
Shortredefs Report cited in fn. 2 6.
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been settled in the course of negotiations between the 
Patel, the mamlatdar, and the deshmukh. Pringle1s views on 
the dominant position of the more substantial peasants in 
village society were based on sound logic, since it was 
natural for the Patel and the more prosperous meerasdars to 
exercise control over the levers of power in the village 
community. But the further inference, drawn from the 
comparison between the riva.j and kamal surveys, that the 
dominant cultivators were able to transfer a part of their 
burden of tax to the uprees, was incorrect. There was a 
strict limit to the share of the village rental which the 
meerasdars could pass on to the uprees, since the latter 
could always express their disapproval of excessive rentals 
by migrating to a new village. Besides, there was nothing to 
be gained by assessing the uprees at a rate higher than what 
they could actually pay, since it was the meerasdars who 
stood collectively committed to the mamlatdars for the 
payment of the village assessment.
All this was no longer true once the kunbis1 traditional 
ties with the village community were disrupted through the 
institution of a ryotwari system involving a direct con­
tractual relationship between the peasant and the State. A 
cultivator now stood to gain if he could secure a diminution 
in his share of the village rental, since it was the Statefs
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responsibility to ensure payment of the rental from the 
villagers severally, instead of the community collectively.
In instituting a survey on a ryotwari basis Pringle threw 
open to the meerasdars and to the village officers a means 
for bettering their position which had never existed before. 
This explains the alliance between the influential rural 
elements and the Brahmin officials of the Survey Department 
that was responsible for the more startling features of the 
Pringle Settlement. Pringle was right in postulating the 
existence of dominant groups of cultivators in village 
society. But ironically enough, the means he devised to 
destroy their power only strengthened their hold over rural 
society.
It would, however, be a grave mistake to attribute the 
failure of the survey solely to corruption in the Survey 
Department, and to the machinations of the meerasdars. The 
calculation of the fnet produce* was so intricate an opera­
tion that just as many cases of faulty assessment arose out 
of genuine error. But irrespective of their origin, mistakes 
in assessment produced identical results. The fate of the 
village of Oolhi provides a fascinating glimpse of what could 
happen to a prosperous rural community when the heavy hand of 
the Survey Department fell upon it:
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One of the most heavily assessed villages is 
Oolhi, distance from Sholapur 8 miles [pointed 
out a revenue official in I8 4O while revising 
the Pringle Survey], The rate here is Rs.2 as 10 
per acre. This place I well recalled a flourish­
ing village 7 years ago, it had a couple of shops, 
and was to all appearance populous. It is now 
mostly deserted. The shops are ruined, all the 
trees disappeared, walls down, and the place in 
ruins; and of 4 ,000 acres 2475 are waste; revenue 
fallen from Rs.1066 to Rs.6l8. Patel and kulkarni 
both ruined, being involved in defalcations they 
could not prevent. An acting Patel and kulkarni 
doing duty, and an outstanding balance of Rs.3466.
Several of the villagers now cultivate in 
neighbouring villages. The year prior to the 
Pringle survey the village produced net revenue 
Rs.2,000. The rest of the over-assessed and mis- 
classified villages have all partaken more or less 
similar ruin and misery...30
Here was a flourishing rural community reduced to a 
state of desolation by the Pringle Survey. Because of its 
ineptitude, and its corruptability, the Survey Department 
dealt a death blow to prosperity in the taluka and discredited 
the principles informing the ryotwari system of Pringle.
The Bombay Scheme of Survey and Assessment
Although the disruptive impact of the ryotwari system 
on the rural communities was inadequately appreciated by 
Pringlefs critics, the failure of his revenue policy finally 
scotched the attempt to base the administration of
30
BA. J.D. Bellasis to G. Wingate dated 26 January 1839:
R.D., Vol. 114/1198 of 1840.
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land-revenue exclusively on rational principles. Robert 
Grant, who had succeeded Malcolm as Governor of Bombay in 
1831? echoed a universally held sentiment when he minuted 
that the only general rule that could be laid down for the 
conduct of a future survey was that ’there ought to be a 
patient, searching, and accurate enquiry into the individual 
nature and capabilities of every beegah of soil...No abstract 
principles can be applied in such a case*J '.
But apart from the growing scepticism in the effective­
ness of rational action, the nature of the rural communities, 
and the arrangements within the village for the payment of 
the land-tax, were at long last becoming clear to the 
revenue officials. The confusion which prevailed in the 
1820s around revenue policy partly stemmed from the fact that 
a majority of the Deccan administrators had gained their 
initial experience under Munro in Madras, and they were con­
sequently inclined to apply his methods and his assumptions 
concerning social organisation in rural society to the newly 
conquered territories without taking local conditions 
sufficiently into consideration. Since the Pringle Settle­
ment had resulted in so abysmal a failure, the conservative
31BA. Minute by Governor of Bombay dated 12 October I8 3 6:
R.D., Vol. 11/698 of 1836.
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administrators in the Deccan set about to re-examine the 
Maratha revenue system in the hope of isolating, and emulating, 
features of the former system which had been overlooked in 
the first instance. One such administrator was Thomas 
Williamson, the Revenue Commissioner of the Deccan, who sub­
scribed fully to the Burkean values of an Elphinstone, and 
believed in the futility of drastic attempts at reform:
The results of all my researches and experience 
[Williamson stated in his critique of Pringle’s 
Survey] have strongly impressed me with the idea 
that there is no system as good as the established 
custom of the country, and that when it has ap­
parently failed, we have been misled by signs 
which did not properly belong to that system, but 
were the consequence of confusion, or decay, aris­
ing from it being neglected, or misunderstood...
(Of) our own well-meant plans for the amelioration 
of this country, none have proved so successful as 
those directed at the support and restoration of 
local institutions, and none so unfortunate as 
those which have a contrary direction.32
In searching for the reasons behind Pringle’s failure
Williamson gained a new insight into the collective quality
of the former revenue system in Maharashtra, though he was
unable to transform this insight into a practical revenue
policy. As opposed to Pringle, Williamson defined a ryotwari
settlement as a system in which the rights and obligations of
cultivators were first ascertained severally, and then made
32
NAI. T. Williamson to Bombay Government dated 30 July
1834: Home Department (Revenue Branch), Con. No, 3 dated 30
July 1834.
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the basis of the total village rental. The superiority of 
such a system lay in the precision with which it set out 
the cultivators dues. It thereby prevented excessive 
taxation by the State and arbitrary exactions by the 
officials. Williamson saw a perfect expression of the 
ryotwari tenure in the bhayachara system of the North-Western 
Provinces, where a detailed inquiry was first instituted into 
the productive capacity of a village, and the total rental 
thus evaluated was apportioned into individual shares by the 
members of the village community. He recognised that the 
shares so determined would not necessarily have equal 
capacities, since some fields would be better looked after 
than others. But no additional rent could be levied on this 
account. Such a limitation embodied, according to Williamson, 
the most striking advantage of the system. For through the 
economic incentives the bhayachara tenure offered to the 
enterprising cultivator without ’alienating* him from the 
village community, it provided a stimulus for efficient 
agricultural operations. The ryot no longer wandered from 
one village to another in search for holdings bearing a low 
rental. Instead, he was firmly attached to his plot of land, 
and directed his energies solely to its improvement. It 
would be fatal, Williamson pointed out in conclusion, to 
weaken this attachment through a new assessment, which would
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not only alter the riva.i rental, but would tax improvements 
which had been effected under the impression that they would 
not be subject to an additional levy.
It was left to Richard Mills, the Collector of Dharwar, 
to pursue the principle enunciated by Williamson to its 
logical conclusion. Mills hit upon the basic weakness of 
the ryotwari system (as interpreted by Pringle) when he 
pointed out how the Pringle Settlement, through alienating 
the kunbi. from the village community, had weakened its 
cohesion and had encouraged the dominant cultivators to 
bribe the Survey Department with the object of defrauding the 
State of its revenues and of imposing an oppressive tax upon 
the uprees°J. Yet the alternative adopted by him was open to 
equally serious objections. In eleven villages in his 
Collectorate, Mills had given leases on moderate terms as an 
experimental measure to the Patels for a period of ten years.
He thereby hoped to preserve the cohesion of the village 
community, and to provide it with incentives for improvement. 
Before embarking upon the venture Mills had wondered whether 
the Patels would be willing to undertake responsibility for 
the village rental. But the reason which encouraged him to
33
NAI. R. Mills to Bombay Government dated 30 May 1839:
Home Department (Revenue Branch), Con. No. 10 dated 14 December
1840.
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bring the experiment to the notice of the authorities was 
the enthusiastic response the idea evoked from the Patels 
and the village communities concerned34. However, Mills’ 
proposal for the settlement of entire villages with the 
Patels was so strongly reminiscent of the notorious farming 
system which had prevailed under Baji Rao, and it could so 
easily be perverted by the Patels and the dominant kunbis to 
their selfish ends, that it was not even seriously considered 
by the revenue authorities35.
For it was impossible to revert to former methods of 
revenue administration. The riva.j rates had been laid 
aside for so long that their réintroduction was impossible, 
not least because they had been ’shockingly mutilated’, and 
in places ’obliterated’, through the arbitrary practices 
which flourished under Baji Rao3^# Any practical system, 
therefore, would have to be a compromise between traditional 
methods of assessment, and the rational criteria on which 
Pringle had based his settlement. In his critique of the
34
NAI. R. Mills to Bombay Government dated 1 June 1839: 
ibid.
35
NAI. Memorandums by L.P. Reid, Secretary to Bombay Govern­
ment, and the Governor of Bombay dated 10 August 1839 and 11 
January 1840 respectively: ibid.
36
NAI. T. Williamson to Bombay Government dated 16 May 1 8 3 6:
Revenue Branch Procs. No. 3 dated 22 January 1837*
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Pringle survey, Shortrede, for instance, advocated an assess­
ment based on a proportion of the gross produce, diminishing 
from the rich to the poor soils, in the place of Pringlefs 
attempt to calculate by detailed analysis the net produce of 
each variety of soil.37. His application of this principle to 
Indapur shows to what extent he was willing to abandon 
rational criteria when confronted by practical questions. 
Setting aside the investigations carried out by Pringle, 
Shortrede proposed that the Government let out land at a very 
moderate rate of assessment on the 1 chower1 or riva.j unit of 
measure; in the first instance for a year, but with a view to 
an eventual decennial settlement. Williamson threw himself 
squarely behind Shortredefs proposal, since ’from the sim­
plicity of the system, and the moderation of the rent, it 
would at once be intelligible and acceptable to the people 
Nor did his intuition mislead him. For as soon as the 
Pringle rates were abolished, and the light assessments 
recommended by Shortrede substituted in their place, the 
situation in Indapur took a turn for the better. Journeying 
through the taluka shortly afterwards in 1836, Williamson
37
NAI. ShortredeTs Report cited in fn. 26.
38
BA. T. Williamson to Bombay Government dated 26 March
1835: R.D., Vol. 73/933 of 1 8 3 8.
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spoke with satisfaction of the returning confidence of the 
kunbis in the good intentions of the Government, and their 
consequent return to their villages. fAn interesting group 
of men, women and children who passed my camp the other day1, 
he noted in his Journals, fsaid they had left the Nizam’s 
country and were going to their native village in Indapur in 
consequence of the security now enjoyed thereT^9#
Despite the favourable reaction of the ryots to the 
virtual revival of the riva.j rates, Shortrede’s proposals 
were too arbitrary, and too unequal in the burden they 
imposed on individual cultivators, to form the basis of any 
lasting revenue arrangements. It was left to a group of 
revenue officials led by H.E. Goldsmid and G. Wingate to 
devise in the late 1830s a system of revenue administration 
which combined the practical features of the Pringle survey 
with the experience of the rivai. In devising such a 
synthesis they laid down the foundations of land settlement 
policy in the Deccan. Goldsmid opposed the desperate 
expedient of rejecting the measurement of holdings carried 
out under Pringle’s aegis, and of substituting in its place 
the TchowerT, which was a fluctuating unit of measure, and did
39
BA. T. Williamson to Bombay Government dated 30 January
I8 3 6: R.D., Vol. 73/933 of 1838.
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not, as it was supposed to, vary inversely in area with the 
quality of the soil. Equally ill-conceived in his view was 
the idea of attracting the kunbis to the deserted Indapur 
villages through the low rates proposed by Shortrede. Such a 
measure would not only cause a serious loss in Government 
revenue, but it would create a grave imbalance in the 
economy of the surrounding districts by inducing kunbis from 
all around to throw up their fields and migrate to an area 
where they could rent land on very attractive terms.
But the most important feature of the policy advocated 
by Goldsmid and Wingate was the abandonment of Pringle’s 
attempt to fix the rental on the land as a fraction of the 
net produce. Through the adoption of this criterion Pringle 
had aimed at rewarding cultivators according to the fertility 
of the soil they cultivated, rather than in proportion to the 
amount of capital they invested in the land, or the quality 
of the effort they put into their agricultural operations. 
Such a policy, he argued, was neither morally reprehensible 
nor politically inexpedient. The Ricardian law of rent 
proved that it was natural that the benefits reaped by 
cultivators should be determined by the quality of the land 
they cultivated, decreasing progressively from the best to 
the worst soils. From a political standpoint there was 
everything to be said for the introduction of such an
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inequality, for it would enable the more substantial kunbis 
to save capital, which could then be reinvested in the land 
to secure higher returns. Such an accumulation of 
agricultural capital would promote the rise of a class of 
rich peasants whose prosperity would flow from an equitable 
taxation policy, rather than from the exploitation of its 
dominant position in the village community. Fashioned into 
the coping stone of rural society under the aegis of the new 
political order, this class of prosperous cultivators would 
not only constitute the principal impetus behind increasing 
rural prosperity and rising agricultural productivity, but 
it would also provide a stable social base for British rule 
in India.
According to Goldsmid and Wingate, Pringle’s calculated 
attempt to foster the interests of the dominant cultivators 
was the most serious fallacy in his settlement policy, and 
the most important reason behind the failure of his survey.
In an enquiry which they conducted in 1835 in 86 villages of 
Indapur, they observed, like Robertson and Shortrede before 
them, that while the measurement of holdings had been carried 
out with reasonable accuracy, the classification of fields 
was completely erroneous. Yet Goldsmid and Wingate were 
reluctant to attribute the failure of the survey solely to 
errors in classification. True, the ryots had opposed the
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new scale of rates because it had raised the rents on 
inferior, and lowered them on superior, soils. But this 
feature of the Pringle survey ’cannot be accounted for... 
(exclusively) by the numerous cases of error and defect 
exposed by Lt. Shortrede; it is so general and unusual, that 
we must look for its cause in the system, and not in the 
execution of the survey1 Goldsmid and Wingate were able 
to pinpoint in Pringle’s application of the net surplus 
criterion the reason why his survey had dealt so harshly 
with the poor cultivators. Pringle had defined the net 
surplus as the rent which the cultivator was able to pay to 
his landlord after deducting costs of capital and wages of 
labour. But he had overlooked the fact that the most 
inferior soil taken into cultivation at any particular 
moment did not yield a rent to its owner. In taxing soils 
of the lowest fertility, Pringle had therefore trenched into 
the profits of the poorer cultivators, and had advanced a 
scale of assessment which favoured the meerasdars as against 
the uprees.
The erroneous application of the Ricardian law of rent 
undermined Pringle’s claim that his assessment had not
40
BA. A. Nash to G. Wingate dated 23 March I8 3 8: R.D.,
Vol. 73/933 of 1 8 3 8.
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disturbed the benefits likely to accrue to the cultivator 
from the natural fertility of the soil. But having 
indicated where Pringle had erred in the application of the 
law of rent, Goldsmid and Wingate did not proceed to apply 
the net surplus criterion to the regulation of the assess­
ment. In subsequent discussions on revenue policy they 
cited the ’net surplus’ as the theoretical basis for their 
assessment, but in practice they employed pragmatic 
criteria for fixing rates of assessment on different soils. 
While Pringle’s settlement was quite deliberately loaded in 
favour of the prosperous cultivator who normally owned the 
fertile lands, and geared to the creation of a class of rich 
peasants which would acquire a rational acquisitive instinct 
and habits of prudence under the settled conditions of 
British rule, Goldsmid and Wingate regarded this policy as 
ill-conceived and injudicious. For instead of rewarding 
kunbis with identical capital resources and agricultural 
skills to the same extent, it showered benefits on them in 
relation to the fertility of the soil they chanced to 
cultivate. Wingate, for instance, showed how a ryot having 
at his disposal a capital outlay of Rs.100 would, according 
to the Pringle scale of rates, make a profit ranging from 
Rs.32 as 8 on the best soil, to Rs.12 as 5 on the worst
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soil^l• Such an assessment appeared to Wingate to be 
monstrous in its partiality for the more fortunate peasant, 
and contrary to all notions of social equity. What he con­
sidered equitable was a scale of assessment which would leave 
the kunbi with the same margin of profit, irrespective of the 
fertility of the soil he cultivated. That a settlement based 
on Wingate’s principles would have violated the ’net surplus’ 
criterion is obvious; and a comparison of columns 3 and 6 in 
Table B illustrates how drastic a change in the Pringle 
evaluation it would have necessitated. Rentals on the best 
soils like 1st black, and 1st red, would have had to be 
raised by 25 per cent, while those on the worst soils like 
3rd red, and 3rd burud, would have had to be reduced to 33 
per cent of the Pringle evaluation.
The anti-rich peasant inspiration behind the changes 
advocated by Goldsmid and Wingate is also in evidence in 
their proposal to levy an additional tax on well-irrigated or 
Baghaet land, which was usually owned by the dominant 
cultivators in the village^. No corresponding levy had been 
imposed under the Marathas, though the former rulers had
41
BA. G. Wingate to R. Mills dated 17 April 1838 : R.D.,
Vol. 73/933 of 1838. 
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BA. H.G. Goldsmid to R. Mills dated 8 Octobrr 1835: R.D.,
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collected a separate tax on wells called the Veer Hoonda, 
which was abolished under the Pringle survey. Since the 
annual settlements made on an ajd hoc basis by Shortrede had 
lowered the assessment on all categories of soils, not 
excluding Baghaet, Goldsmid saw no reason why the State 
should sacrifice its share of the extra produce resulting 
from well irrigation, particularly when it was proposed to 
fix the assessment for a period of 10 years* The apprehen­
sion that an additional levy on well-irrigated land might 
discourage the ryots from digging wells to irrigate their 
fields was voiced by Richard Mills43# gut the majority of 
officials in the Survey Department subscribed to the view 
that Tin the decennial settlement of the Indapur Taluka, 
which Mr. Goldsmid is on the point of fixing, we should not 
suddently throw away a good share of the State’s share of the 
produce’44? ancj on this plea baghaet land was reserved for 
special treatment at the hands of the assessor.
Despite the repudiation of Pringle’s attempt to foster 
the interests and encourage the growth of a prosperous 
peasantry, it would be a grave mistake to think that Goldsmid
43
BA. R. Mills to T. Williamson dated 26 January 1 8 3 6:
R.D., Vol. 12/699 of 1836.
44
BA. Minute by Governor of Bombay dated 22 February I8 3 6:
R.D., Vol. 12/699 of I8 3 6.
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and Wingate permitted any egalitarian principles to shape 
their revenue policy. The fate of the Pringle settlement 
had already shown the dangers of a doctrinaire approach to 
revenue problems. But Goldsmid and Wingate were as a matter 
of conviction willing to be guided by experience, and to be 
restrained by the riva.j , in fixing the assessment. While 
Pringle had relied solely on objective criteria in devising 
his scale of rates, and had entrusted the practical tasks of 
the survey to his subordinates, Goldsmid and Wingate showed 
a shrewd awareness of the pitfalls it was necessary to avoid
in arriving at a practical scale of assessment:
0It is absolutely necessary [they pointed out] that 
in assessing the land every field should be 
visited, and its soil and situation carefully 
assessed (by the European Superintendent). To 
conduct such an assessment wholly by myself... 
would be a work requiring years for its completion.
Nor is it requisite that I should attempt to do 
so. For although I can place no confidence in 
native officials of the class we can afford to 
employ...still I should entertain 4 natives, uncon­
nected with the districts, whose duty it would be 
to...prepare statements of the quality, quantity 
and situate of the land, and although not probably 
wholly present in the very fields in which the 
carcoons are engaged, I should take care to be so 
near at hand...as to prevent the possibility of 
fraud on the part of the native subordinates...^5
45
BA. H.G. Goldsmid to R. Mills dated 27 June 1835: R.D.,
Vol. 44/660 of 1835.
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Goldsmid and Wingate accepted, with minor alterations, 
the measurement of holdings carried out by their predeces­
sors. Pringle’s classification, however, they found to be 
worthless, and decided to conduct anew, the holdings of the 
ryots being graded into one of nine categories of soils, with 
their fertilities determined according to a relative scale. 
But instead of actually calculating the net surplus of each 
grade of soil, and then fixing its assessment at 55 per cent 
of this figure (as Pringle had done), Goldsmid and Wingate 
derived their rates of assessment ’from local enquiry and the 
experience of qualified persons, without any very minute 
investigations into actual produce...’4^ The rates at which 
they assessed holdings of different fertility are indicated 
in column 4 of Table C.
Two features of the scale of rates proposed by Goldsmid 
and Wingate deserve special mention. Taken as a whole, 
their rates indicate a considerable diminution in the demand 
on the land; a diminution which they justified on the premise 
that Pringle had used inflated figures for the prices of 
food-grains in calculating the net-produce. More important 
still was the fact that while all grades of soils had their 
rates reduced, the reduction on the inferior soils like the
46
Ibid.
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buruds was significantly greater than that on superior soils 
like the blacks. The result was that while both the 
meerasdar and the uprees had their rentals lowered by the 
revised settlement, the tax paid by the latter was reduced 
to a far greater extent than that paid by the meerasdar. In 
this way the imbalance in the burden of tax on the poorer 
cultivators, which had been the most objectionable feature of 
the Pringle settlement, was abolished. Yet how far removed 
was the new scale of assessment from the egalitarian scale 
devised by Wingate, which would have put all ryots on the 
same footing, irrespective of the quality of the soil they 
cultivated, becomes clear through a comparison of columns 3 
and 5 i n  Table C. To achieve the objective set by Wingate, 
Goldsjnid had not only to reduce the Pringle rates on the 
poorer soils by 33 per cent, but he had also to raise the 
rates on the black soils by 25 per cent. However, Goldsmid 
was guided by practical considerations rather than by ab­
stract notions of social equity. Instead of basing his scale 
of assessment on theoretical criteria, he deliberately took 
his cue from ’local inquiry and the experience of qualified 
persons’ in calculating how much rental the different soils 
could with facility pay to the State.
Though Goldsmid’s rates of assessment were thus less 
favourable to the more substantial peasant than those of
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Pringle, they still had the very important effect of widening 
the economic gulf between the dominant and the poorer 
cultivators in the village. This was so because formerly the 
State demand had pressed heavily on the village community, 
and had trenched deeply into the profits of the dominant 
kunbis, who were responsible for the total village assessment 
to the mamlatdar, and were consequently obliged to make up by 
large personal contributions the sum which the village had 
contracted to pay. Under the Goldsmid settlement, however, 
the meerasdars1 obligations were fixed for the period of the 
settlement, and they could not be called upon by the village 
community to make an additional contribution. The resulting 
improvement in their economic condition, and in their style 
of life, struck the attention of the Survey Officers when 
they revised the Goldsmid settlement after a period of three 
decades. Throughout the region the dominant peasants gave 
expression to the security and enhanced status they enjoyed 
under the new land policy by erecting chowris and 
dharamsalas♦ which added to the respectability of their 
villages, and by turning their attention to capital intensive 
activity like the digging of wells to irrigate their fields^?.
47
Vide Col. Francis’ Report on the Taluka of Indapur quoted 
in fn. 8.
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So marked, indeed, was the improvement in their style of 
life, and so ostentatious were its manifestations, that the 
revenue officials of the 1860s mistook their prosperity for 
a general rise in living standards in the rural areas; an 
assumption which was rudely shattered by the agrarian dis­
content which came to the surface during the disturbances of
1875.
Since Utilitarian ideas exercised so powerful a hold 
over the British administration in India, the absence of 
rationality in the principles informing the Goldsmid survey 
was a matter of serious concern to the higher authorities.
For instance, Lord Auckland, the Governor-General, conceded 
the harm done by the Pringle Settlement and the need for a 
revised survey. But he also insisted that it was important 
to know fupon what principles the new survey and assessment 
...(were) to be made*^. However, revenue officials in 
Bombay like Thomas Williamson refused to pay any attention to 
such objections, since 1 to introduce an entirely new assess­
ment on a uniform system...(could) be liable to be vitiated 
by the very same errors as the (Pringle) survey itself*. In 
illustration of the spirit and the principles informing the
48
NAI. Minute by the Governor-General of India dated 26
November I8 3 6: Home Department (Revenue Branch), Con. No. 4
dated 12 June 1837.
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which had guided Goldsmid and Wingate in the revision of the
Indapur Settlement. They had been directed to
restore and revive the mamool (traditional) assess­
ment where that system was tolerably complete, 
carefully correcting the survey rates when it was 
found not difficult to discover and remedy their 
defects - and when the mamool system was obliterat­
ed, and the survey was found not to admit of 
corrections, introducing an entirely new assessment, 
combining as far as possible moderation and sim­
plicity with correctness, and permanency, suiting, 
in short, the measure to be adopted to the peculiar 
circumstances of each village, reverting where 
practical to the ancient customs with regard to the 
assessment of the land, and where that could not be 
done, attempting to fix a sufficiently fair assess­
ment, with as little violent change as possible.49
Notwithstanding Williamson,s conservative predilections, 
and his concern for ’the ancient customs with regard to the 
assessment of the land*, the extent to which the ryotwari 
system, even as modified by Goldsmid and Wingate, undermined 
the traditional village institutions and affected rural 
social values was brought out by J. Thornton, Secretary to 
the Government of the North-Western Provinces, in a memoran­
dum reviewing the ’Bombay Plan of Survey and Assessment’^ .
new revenue policy, Williamson recounted the instructions
49
NAI. T. Williamson to Bombay Government dated 13 April 
1837: Home Department (Revenue Branch), Con. No. 4 dated 
12 June 1837.
50
Memorandum by J. Thornton on ’Bombay Plan of Survey and 
Assessment’ dated 11 July 1850: Parliamentary Papers. Vol. 
LXXV for 1852-53, PP. 439-45.
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The revenue policies pursued by the Bombay Government, 
Thornton pointed out, were based on an erroneous notion of 
’common ownership’ as it applied to tenures in India. It 
would, for instance, be a mistake to think that in the 
North-Western Provinces members of the village community 
could not, and did not, hold separate property in land; or 
that they did not reap the fruits of their labour. Common 
ownership by the community only implied that the properties 
of individual cultivators were subject to certain common 
obligations; and that part of the profits attached to them 
consisted of a share which the community had of its own 
volition agreed to set apart to meet the demands of the 
State:
The village communities of Upper India [Thornton 
observed] might easily be reduced to the same state 
as those in the Deccan. The process would be, first, 
to fix the payments to be levied from such shares, 
field by field, for the term of settlement, instead 
of allowing them to vary, as now, with the extent 
of cultivation in the villages, and other circum­
stances; secondly, to destroy the joint responsi­
bility; thirdly, to collect the revenue from each 
man separately, instead of through the representa­
tives of the body; fourthly, to assume possession 
on the part of the government ’ghutcool’ of all 
land the owners of which might die without immediate 
heirs. We should then find, in one or two genera­
tions, the precise state of things which.,.exists 
in the Bombay Presidency.51
51
Ibid.
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The most disastrous consequence flowing out of a 
ryotwari system of the Bombay pattern was the alienation of 
the ryot from the village community. The kunbi was as a 
result deprived of the material and the moral support which 
he would have derived from participation in a community 
whose members were bound together by ties of mutual interest. 
In the individualistic environment created by the ryotwari 
system, every ryot either fended for himself, or depended 
upon State assistance, and there was an entire absence of 
that opportunity for the exercise of initiative which existed 
where the village community still reigned supreme. The 
existence of collective institutions exercised a beneficial 
effect on rural society. For such institutions encouraged 
co-operation and promoted a harmonious relationship among 
the cultivators themselves, and between the cultivators and 
other social groups in the village. They were also necessary 
for the well-being of a society in which the rural masses 
were denied access to the more conventional levers of 
political power.
The destructive impact of the ryotwari system on village 
society, Thornton believed, was not compensated by any 
ability to promote a capitalist transformation in the rural 
areas, or to induce the cultivators to extend the sphere of 
their activities. On the contrary, the Bombay system placed
restrictions on the investment of capital in land. The rise 
of mercantile castes possessing surplus capital to be 
invested in some profitable channel was an inevitable conse­
quence of British rule in India. In the North-Western Prov­
inces, when the member of such a caste had saved some 
capital, he could invest it in the purchase of entire 
villages, or of large and contiguous estates. The splitting 
up of the former estates in the Deccan enabled such transfers 
to be effected only through a succession of purchases, which 
frequently did not add up to compact properties. The inter­
mixture of large landed estates with the small holdings of 
the ryot was eminently desirable. Even the staunchest 
proponent of ’peasant proprietorship’ could not deny the 
beneficial effect which such estates exercised in promoting 
efficient agricultural activity. New and superior methods 
of cultivation had first to be tried out in the large 
estates before they became popular with the small cultivators 
who formed the backbone of rural society.
Apart from reinforcing the corporate ethos of rural 
society, and promoting efficient agricultural activity through 
the build-up of large estates, village settlement provided 
more economic incentives for the extension of agricultural 
operations than the ryotwari scheme adumbrated by the Bombay 
administrators. This was so because in the former system the
cultivable waste of the village was left at the disposal of 
the community on the payment of a nominal rent. It was thus 
up to the villagers to develope the waste land and reap the 
benefits of their labour while paying a negligible tax to 
the State, a condition conducive to waste land being taken 
under cultivation. The Bombay scheme, by contrast, had 
nothing comparable to offer to the ryot. Each field in a 
village, whether under cultivation or not, was surveyed and 
assessed by the revenue authorities; and the enterprising 
cultivator who wanted to till a plot of waste land had to 
pay the full rental from the outset. TThe stimulus to im­
provement is evidently much greater under...(the former 
system) than it is under that pursued in Bombay’, Thornton 
pointed out in conclusion. ’In the one case every extension 
of cultivation relieves the pressure of the government 
demand; in the other, it has no such effect’^ .
For Goldsmid and Wingate, however, Thornton’s critique of 
their revenue policy was composed in equal parts of ignorance 
about conditions in the Deccan, and misapprehensions about the 
effect of a ryotwari system on rural society. While Thornton 
looked upon a direct relationship between the ryot and the 
State as the fatal weakness of the ryotwari system, it was
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Boimbay administrators based their hopes for a far reaching
change in the quality of rural experience and in the values
shaping the style of life of the cultivators:
The limitation of a landholder’s liabilities to 
his own estate, [they pointed out] under the Bombay 
plan of survey, must tend to foster free and in­
dependent habits of thought and action, which are 
greatly wanting in the agricultural population of 
India, ground down into slavish subserviency and 
apathy by long ages of despotic rule.,.(Yet the) 
municipal institutions have in no wise been des­
troyed in the surveyed districts. It does not 
appear that the villages of the surveyed districts 
are less favourably placed for acting in concert 
than those of parts of India where joint responsi­
bility for the discharge of land assessment obtains.53
A similar misconception, so they believed, informed
Thornton’s view that village settlements offered a greater
incentive for the extension of agricultural operations. The
spread of cultivation depended upon the availability of
agricultural capital; and the system which permitted the
most rapid accumulation of capital was the one which provided
the maximum encouragement for the extension of agriculture.
Viewed from this angle, the ryotwari system enjoyed a clear
superiority over other systems of revenue administration.
The limitation of the State demand to the land actually
precisely on this feature of their settlement policy that the
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cultivated left a larger surplus of capital in the hands of 
the cultivators, than if they were obliged to pay an assess­
ment, no matter how light, on the cultivable waste in the 
village. Once they had a surplus in hand, the ryots were 
not only encouraged to take vacant fields under cultivation, 
but they could afford to pay the State a full share of the 
profits they gained through the extension of their agricul­
tural operations. The superiority of the ryotwari system, 
Goldsmid and Wingate said in conclusion, rested on solid 
ground, ’since in all the surveyed districts of Bombay, it is 
probable that cultivation has extended beyond what the amount 
of agricultural capital warrants, and the revenue returns 
subsequent to the survey settlements show that...(they) have 
greatly augmented cultivation...’-^
In framing a revenue policy for the Deccan, Goldsmid and 
Wingate abandoned the Ricardian premises of Pringle’s Settle­
ment policy, and toned down its partiality for the prosperous 
cultivators in the village community. Nevertheless, since 
they subscribed to some basic utilitarian values, the objec­
tives they had in view differed in emphasis rather than in 
quality from those set out by Pringle. While shedding the 
importance which Pringle had attached to rationality as the
54
Ibid.
199
inspiration behind social action, they stuck tenaciously to 
his atomistic approach to social phenomena, and to the 
belief that a social revolution could be effected only 
through offering economic incentives to the individual ryot, 
rather than to a collective institution interposed between 
him and the State. Their atomistic view of social action 
was in fact the great driving force behind their modified 
version of Pringle’s ryotwari system. If their new land 
policy was calculated to infuse an acquisitive spirit and a 
rational attitude towards economic activity in the ryot, then 
it was also designed to undermine the collective ethos of 
the countryside which stemmed from the autonomy which the 
village community had hitherto enjoyed in its public concerns. 
The resulting change in the quality of social experience 
combined with the freedom from arbitrary exactions, which the 
dominant kunbis enjoyed under British rule, to promote the 
emergence of a class of rich peasants which was destined to 
become the lynch-pin of rural society and the hub of the new 
political order in Maharashtra.
Bureaucratisation and Social Fragmentation in Rural Society
We must now return to consider Pringle’s attempt to 
rationalise the local village administration, and to place 
relations between different social groups in the village on a
200
firm legal basis, of which the ryotwari system of land 
revenue was merely one facet. There was no difference of 
opinion between Pringle and the conservative administrators 
on questions relating to the rationalisation of the adminis­
tration. For despite difference in their social visions, 
British administrators were agreed on the need to abolish 
the arbitrary principles which had formerly shaped relations 
between different social groups in the village, and which had 
in addition provided the inspiration for administrative 
action. Pringle’s attempt to build a legal and rational 
bureaucracy received the enthusiastic support of adminis­
trators brought up in the traditions of Elphinstone. The 
creation of such a bureaucracy brought about the kunbi’s 
alienation from the village community, and it resulted in 
the atomisation of the collective style of life in the 
villages of the Deccan.
A typical village in Maharashtra embraced three 
significant social groups: the cultivators; the village 
officials, like the Patel and kulkarni; and the bullotedars 
or the village artisans. Over and above these social groups 
stook Hukdars (lit. persons with prerogatives) like the 
deshmukhs, who did not form a part of the village community, 
though they had an important say in its revenue concerns, and 
received a share of its assessment as the perquisites of
upon the regulation of the obligations of these groups to
each other, and to the State.
While the Ricardian law of rent had provided a rational
basis for calculating the kunbis* obligations to the State,
even a doctrinaire like Pringle confessed that the Tfees of
the bullotedars could not easily, were it desirable, be
regulated on more definite principles than they are at 
c rpresentTJ . The principle on which the village community 
rewarded the bullotedars was the value of the services they 
performed, and their remuneration was in no way related to 
considerations of caste and social status. Thus the untouch­
able Mahars and the lowly Sootars were ranked as bullotedars 
of the first order, while the Brahmin priest barely qualified 
for a ranking of the third and lowest order. Such a ranking 
of the artisans found widespread acceptance. fI have never 
known the (bullotedari fees) to be the subject of dispute1, 
Pringle stated, Tand their nature and quantity appears to be
£T 6well understood by the parties themselves13 . Because the 
riva.j had resolved the question of bullotedari fees to the
55BA, R.K. Pringle to Bombay Government dated 6 September 
182F: R.D., Vol. 225 of 1828.
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their office. Peace and prosperity in the village depended
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satisfaction of everyone concerned, Pringle instructed the 
Survey Department to ascertain the amount which the 
cultivators of a particular village traditionally paid to 
their artisans, so that this amount could be taken into 
account in the calculation of the assessment to be paid by 
the village.
While the regulation of the cultivators* obligations to 
the bullotedars did not present any problem, the position of 
the Hukdars was quite different. Prior to the Survey, their 
dues were paid to them directly, though they also featured 
in the official kulkarni accounts. Pringle suspected in this 
procedure scope for extortion and oppression. He was also 
aware of the anxiety with which the Hukdars regarded the 
measures of the new Government, and their apprehension that 
the authorities would exploit the first opportunity to 
abolish their prerogatives altogether. In fairness both to 
the ryots and the Hukdars, he instructed the officials of the 
Survey Department to institute an inquiry into their claims, 
and to fix their remuneration as a percentage of the village 
assessment. However, the application of this seemingly 
simple principle presented Pringle with numerous problems, 
because the remuneration of the hereditary officers varied 
from village to village, and taluka to taluka. The Patels, 
for instance, had in most villages an Inam or gift in land,
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like Patel Burmana Wullud Dongra of Rangaum, who cultivated 
65 acres rent free in recognition of his services^?. In 
addition, they received a small cash allowance from the 
authorities. Finally came a series of cesses, some legal and 
others illegal, which they levied on the ryots. The total 
emoluments of the Patels varied from the seven per cent of 
the revenue they were able to appropriate for themselves in 
the taluka of Indapur, to the two per cent they levied in the 
talukas of Pabul and Sewnair. On purely pragmatic grounds 
Pringle decided that a salary amounting to three per cent of 
the total assessment would suffice to Tsupport the respecta­
bility and efficiency1 of the Patel’s office. There was to 
be no diminution in a Patelfs remuneration if it exceeded 
this figure; but in villages where the Patel received less 
than three per cent, the deficiency was to be made up by a 
gift of rent-free land.
Though it did not question the equity of the scale of 
payment recommended for the Patels by Pringle, the Bombay 
Government was obliged to reject his recommendations because 
of the widespread corruption that had characterised the 
survey conducted under his aegis. The Despandya Kulkarnis
57BA. J.B. Bellasis to G. Wingate dated 26 June 1839: R.D.,
Vol. 114/1198 of 1840.
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and Deputy Patel Masaye Galande of Indapur were typical of
a whole class of district and village officials who had
bribed the subordinate officials of the Survey Department to
secure reductions in rentals, and increases in perquisites
of office. Small wonder then that Pringle’s critics found
such groups vociferous in their support of the survey:
The oratory of the zemindars would be influenced 
by gratitude for the increase of their huks; and of 
the Patels and Kulkarnis for those of their salaries 
and graum khurch [Robertson pointed out]. I do not 
mean to imply injustice, or thriftlessness, in 
making these increases...All that I wish at present 
to draw the attention of Government to on this 
point is, that it was a most fortunate circumstance 
for the survey-assessment, that the leaders of the 
sentiments of the people, the zemindars and the 
village officers, should have reason to think so 
well of the measure as it affected their own 
personal interests.58
The scramble by the dominant social groups in the 
villages to further their interests at the expense of the 
community was by no means the only consequence of the intro­
duction of the ryotwari system, and the bureaucratisation of 
the administration. An equally important effect was the 
diminution in the Patel’s status. It has already been 
observed that the Patel’s authority lay in a combination of 
traditional and legal domination which made him the
58
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unquestioned leader of village society. How essential were 
both these sources of power to the maintenance of his posi­
tion requires no further emphasis. But even Elphinstone, who 
appreciated the Patel’s vital role in the village community, 
had failed to grasp the fact that in defining his powers in a 
Regulation, and in closely associating him with the revenue 
machinery, he was undermining the Patel’s position in village 
society. In defining the rights and obligations of the Patels 
and other Hereditary Officers, Regulations XVI and XVII of 
the Elphinstone Code of 1827 virtually signed the death war­
rant of this class by making it subservient to the official 
hierarchy, and by integrating it into the bureaucracy. Thus 
the Patel’s emoluments, instead of being a recognition of his 
authority over his fellow villagers, and his ability to guide 
them in matters of common interest, were henceforth ’to be 
considered strictly as the official remuneration of the person 
filling the office’. He was also placed under the administra­
tive control of the Collector, and was obliged to render the 
usual services of his office ’under the penalty of suspension 
from office and emoluments’. An exposition of his status 
under the former rulers vividly illustrates the extent of his 
fall:
The Patel of a huge village was, indeed a substan­
tial person, and, compared with the humble 
inhabitants of his village, occupied an influen­
tial and enviable position: his authority was 
unquestionable, and his will absolute; while his
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privileges of precedence on all public and social 
occasions formed, according to native taste, an 
imposing picture of greatness. The profits of the 
office depended of course on the system of revenue 
pursued, and on his influence in the village.
Under Native Governments his gains were seldom 
inquired after, as long as he produced the full 
amount of revenue, and the village generally pros­
perous. His direct imposts would therefore 
depend on his influence over the people, and the 
perquisites of his office upon the nature of the 
revenue system and the character of its 
executors.59
The effect of the Elphinstone Code on the Patel’s 
position was recognised by officials like Barnard, the 
Judicial Commissioner of the Deccan, who as early as 1831 
drew attention to the consequences of an hereditary official 
being treated as a member of the bureaucracy^. Barnard 
regarded the Patel as a leader of the village community who 
also acted as an intermediary between the administration and 
the cultivators. The question he posed was whether it was 
possible for such an individual to speak for the interests of 
the village if he was regarded as the juniormost official in 
the revenue hierarchy. To Barnard the answer was obvious.
The Regulations had defined the duties and obligations of the
59
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Patel in such a way that even if a Collector wanted him to 
defend the interests of his constituents, the ’necessary 
consequence of making him liable to departmental penalties 
is that he cannot do so’. Barnard’s analysis of the Patel’s 
position under the regulations was disputed by Robert Grant, 
the Governor of Bombay, who held that he had always served in 
the ’dual capacity’ oif a spokesman of the village community, 
and an official of the State; and that there was no contra- 
diction in the simultaneous performance of these roles . 
Barnard’s objections stemmed from the impression that there 
existed a conflict between the interests of the State and 
those of the ryots, with the Patel being obliged to make a 
choice between the two. Nothing, Grant stated, could be 
further from the truth; for the State did not expect the 
Patel to foster its interests to the detriment of those of 
the ryots. Instead of creating confusion in revenue manage­
ment, it was only because the Patel in his ’dual capacity’ 
enjoyed the confidence both of the ryots and the adminis­
tration that he could act usefully as an intermediary between 
the village community and the authorities. The two roles he 
played were to the Patel a source of strength rather than of
61
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weakness, Grant stated in conclusion, for ’Government listen 
to every representation which the Patel may make for the 
benefit of the community, and to each representation the 
official character of the Patel imparts a weight and con­
sideration which would never be advanced to the mere agent 
6 2of one party’ .
Barnard had made a correct appraisal of the effect of 
the Regulations on the Patel’s authority; but he had failed 
to pinpoint the true significance of the changes stemming 
from the promulgation of the Elphinstone Code. Grant’s 
argument that the Patel had traditionally acted in the dual 
capacity of a leader of village society and a revenue official 
was a valid one. But he had shut his eyes to the fact that 
the Elphinstone Code, with its excessive concern for the 
institution of legal controls within the revenue machinery, 
had disturbed the delicate balance between the two roles 
traditionally played by the Patel. Since under British 
aegis the Patel’s actions were rigorously controlled by the 
mamlatdars and the Collectors, it was very difficult for him 
to give positive leadership to the village community. The 
Regulations, in effect, undermined one of the two pillars on
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which his authority rested. The Patel was consequently 
alienated from the cultivators of his village, and he 
became increasingly incapable of communicating their views, 
on issues affecting them, to the authorities. The extent 
and significance of this alienation dawned upon the Govern­
ment on the occasion of the Agrarian Riots of 1875»
The decline of the traditional leaders of village 
society was inevitable because of the values to which the new 
rulers of Maharashtra subscribed, and it was quite indepen­
dent of the differences between a Utilitarian like Pringle 
and the administrators brought up in the Burkean traditions 
of Elphinstone. However significant may have been the 
differences between British civilians of conflicting 
persuasions, the gulf which separated them from a traditional 
Maratha administrator like Nana Furavees or Pandit 
Ramashastree was infinitely wider. The emphasis on a legal 
and rational basis for the bureaucracy, and the attempt to 
define the duties of (and the relationship between) different 
officers with precision, constituted a radical departure from 
Maratha practice, and was subversive of traditional forms of 
government. Whether it stemmed from conservative motives, or 
from a desire for reform, the very act of defining the duties 
and obligations of an office, or setting out the functions of
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an institution, gradually changed its complexion and altered 
its characteristics.
The inevitability of change is best illustrated by the 
attempt Elphinstone had made to preserve the dignity of the 
Patel’s office through banning its sale. This interdict was 
inspired by the best conservative motives, though it violated 
past practice, since the Patel had been formerly free to sell 
his office, and often did so. Elphinstone banned the sale of 
Patelships in order to prevent the political transformation 
of 1818 from resulting in the rise of a new class of Patels 
having no ties with the communities over which they presided. 
But the interdict created a fresh dilemma, since it inter­
fered with the process through which control over the rural 
communities was formerly transferred to individuals who 
commanded the resources necessary for the extension of 
agricultural operations, and who possessed the capacity and 
the initiative for leadership. Immediately after the 
promulgation of the Code, the revenue authorities were flooded 
with applications, on the one hand, from Patels who wanted to 
sell their rights of office, and on the other, from individ­
uals who wanted to purchase hereditary rights in their 
villages. Patel Ooka Wallud Jeysingh of Davgood, for 
instance, wanted to part with half the prerogatives of his 
office in favour of one Janu, a meerasdar of some property
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and enterprise, who had undertaken to restore the decayed 
fortunes of his village. Similarly, Patel Kanjee of Dadree 
desired to sell his rights to a fellow villager called 
Abbajee, who proposed to invest in ten ploughs and 
re-establish the village*^. Equally significant were re­
quests like the one from Poolajee Kalley, a retired 
Subadar-Major of the Pioneer Corps, for permission to 
purchase the Patelship of Phoogaon; and another one from 
Gireppa, a native official of the revenue department, for 
the purchase of the kulkarni’s rights in a village*^.
Executive officials who had a first hand experience of 
rural society regarded the interdict on the sale of Patel- 
ships as an ill-conceived measure. As one of them pointed 
out, the prestige and status associated with hereditary 
offices was so highly prized that a wuttun was a possession 
which Tin ordinary circumstances no money will purchase, no 
influence will procure... f \\ft\y then was it sold at all?
TOnly when the holder has by a long series of misfortunes,
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arrived at that helpless state of ruin which demands the 
greatest and last of sacrifices, the sale of his wuttun...T^  
The effect of an interdict on the sale of hereditary offices 
was consequently the reverse of what had been intended; for 
the non-alienability of the Patelship lowered its value in 
the eyes of the rural classes. The problem became so acute 
by the 1830s that even loyal Elphinstonians like Thomas 
Williamson confessed to a change in their opinion on the 
ques tion:
I am still of opinion [he stated] that if the sale 
of Patelships becomes general and was indiscrimin­
ately sanctioned, then it would often produce bad 
effects by placing strangers at the head of village 
communities in place of the old respected heredit­
ary families...(Again, in places) where the 
villages are large and the independent ryots re­
quire little assistance from the Patels, I feel 
satisfaction that the system would seldom succeed, 
but in the small impoverished villages...(it) 
might often be attended with beneficial effects. '
The Bombay authorities were sufficiently agitated over
the issue to move an amendment to Regulation XVI of 1827 in
order to permit the fsubstitution as Patels for members of
needy, decayed families, men who from their resources and
energy are desirous, as well as capable, of inspiring changes
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£ owhich1 would work to the benefit of the village community 
as well as the Government. But the opposition of the Central 
Government at Calcutta prevented them from embarking upon so 
radical a departure from the Elphinstone Code.
As the aspiration of Poolajee Kalley and Gireppa to a 
hereditary status indicates, the whole question impinged 
upon issues which could never have assumed importance under 
the former administration. The subordinate native bureaucrats 
were bound to grow in numbers and in importance under British 
rule. There could be no better object of their legitimate 
ambition than a Patel’s wuttun at the end of a term of loyal 
service to the State. Nor would the village communities stand 
to lose through the accession to their strength of a class 
whose accumulations of capital would be gainfully employed in 
the promotion of agricultural activity^. But there was one 
aspect of this question which no one in a position of responsi­
bility could afford to overlook. As the Supreme Government 
at Calcutta pointed out:
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(Even) admitting the undoubted prerogative of Gov­
ernment to bestow these rights and offices on such 
individuals as it may think fit to select, without 
consulting the wishes of the people over whom they 
are to possess influence and authority,...(we) ap­
prehend that the practice, if generally adopted, 
would be open to much abuse, and might frequently 
cause great dissatisfaction to the villagers 
affected by these arrangements.70
But was it at all expedient to make such an assumption? 
Who had sanctioned such appointments under the Marathas? And 
to what extent were the sentiments of the community concerned 
worthy of attention in the selection of an hereditary officer? 
An inquiry into former practice at the Supreme Government’s 
instance revealed an absence of uniformity only to be expected 
in an administration in which bureaucratic procedures had not 
been rationalised. In the outlying districts of Maharashtra, 
where the Peshwa’s authority was weak, the deshmukhs had 
appointed their proteges in Patel wuttuns which had fallen 
vacant for want of heirs. But nearer to the seat of Govern­
ment at Poona, the right had been exercised in the main by 
the State. This meant that the authority to dispose of 
lapsed Patelships, if exercised at all, had been a usurpation 
by the deshmukhs rather than a part of their prerogatives of 
office; an inference supported by the fact that when in 1822 
the British Government had stripped them of this power, no
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protests had followed, as would necessarily have been the 
case if a prescriptive right had been abolished. J. Vibart, 
Williamson’s successor as Revenue Commissioner, was emphat­
ically of the opinion that not only had the former rulers 
reserved this right to themselves, but they had also never 
hesitated to create new hereditary rights, and fit would 
appear that no feeling against this system was entertained...’71 
The very notion of consulting the ’feelings and wishes of the 
village community’ in the appointment of a Patel, for 
instance, was alien to the principles informing the Maratha 
administration. However, even if the stand taken by Vibart 
be conceded, there still remained for a Government having no 
’natural’ ties with the masses the need not to ’disturb the 
minds of the people and create general distrust’ through 
creating new hereditary rights, or promoting the rise of a 
new class of Patels and deshmukhs^. This inconclusive 
debate over the alienability of the Patelship brings out the 
conservative dilemma in Maharashtra. For even an attempt to 
reinforce a traditional institution could alter the status quo
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rulers of the land.
While reducing the status of traditional officers like
the Patels and the deshmukhs, the bureaucratisation of the
revenue administration enhanced the importance of the
kulkarnis in rural society. A recognition of this change in
the distribution of power within the village community led
British revenue officials to suggest that the kulkarnis*
scales of remuneration be increased, particularly because it
was believed that they no longer conunanded the means for
unofficial exactions which had formerly been open to them:
The business of kulkarnees [a revenue official 
pointed out] is very much increased since the 
accession of our Government, and the various par­
ticular statements and accounts required by us 
seem to entitle them now to a higher scale of 
remuneration than they enjoyed before. It is not 
easy to ascertain what are the exact amount of 
money payments made to this class under the former 
Government; but it is indisputable that their 
incomes and profits are greatly decreased since we 
got this country (sic).73
The scale of remuneration recommended by Pringle was, of 
course, thrown overboard the moment it was realised how the 
kulkarnis had exploited the survey operations to secure exag­
gerated claims for themselves. But a scheme based on similar
in a significant way, and raise crucial problems for the new
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principles was proposed by Richard Mills, the Principal 
Collector of Poona, in 1835« MillsT proposal embraced two 
basic features: first, that apart from the rent-free lands 
gifted to them, the cash Huks received by the kulkarnis from 
the Government should be their only source of income; and 
secondly, that the emoluments of a kulkarni should be fixed 
on a sliding scale according to the size and assessment of 
the village(s) under his charge^ .
The assumptions and the preconceptions behind the attempt 
to determine a fixed scale of remuneration for the hereditary 
officials were made explicit in 1845 by R.N. Goodine in his 
’Report On the Village Communities Of the Deccan’75. Combin­
ing with the atomistic view of social phenomena peculiar to 
the Utilitarians an evolutionary approach rare even among 
advanced thinkers at this stage, Goodine rejected from the 
outset the notion, so dear to Elphinstone and the conserva­
tive administrators, of the village community as a ’primitive 
commonwealth, held together by the individual interests of
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traditional village to be a ’minor branch of the feudal
system of the earlier ages’ and the ’natural effect of an
unorganised Government...’
A village, then, [Goodine stated in an elabora­
tion of his thesis] may be termed a self-consti­
tuted corporation, organised rather from the 
primitive necessity of its inhabitants than by 
design, and strengthened and perpetuated by the 
hereditary succession of its office-bearers.
The numerous and rapid changes of Government in 
dissolving all stability, taught men to seek for 
protection of life and property within them­
selves, and conferred a degree of importance 
upon village communities, which, under more 
stable governments, they might never have 
attained to. A new and ephemeral ruler could 
have no inducement to displace village officials, 
when he had everything to gain from their 
co-operation; and the spokesman of a community 
had only to make himself master of their 
persons to extort the tribute of the village, 
their sufferings exciting the compassion, and 
exalting them in the eyes of the people...The 
village thus became the only centre of stability, 
and the only repository of civil rights; it was 
the only institution which the people possessed, 
and the only object of their national attachment 
...(Emphasis added)70
The stability of the village community had persuaded 
most administrators into looking upon it as the embodiment of 
the political sagacity and the organisational genius of a 
bygone age. These administrators had also come to regard the 
rights and privileges of the various social groups in rural 
society as sacrosanct and inviolable. But Goodine, after a 
minute inquiry, came to a diametrically opposite conclusion.
its inhabitants...’ Closer investigation revealed the
76
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The village system, with its three-tiered organisation of 
the kunbis, the bullotedars, and the hereditary officials, 
was kept going mainly through the self-interest of the 
latter; and by its adaptation, not only to the genius of the 
rural masses, but also to the Tvices of their arbitrary 
rulers’! The vast majority of the cultivators did not enjoy 
any special rights or privileges under it. They possessed 
no independence or equality; they enjoyed no civil rights; 
and they were unable to attach themselves to any progressive 
principles of liberty. The true advantages of the prevailing 
form of rural social organisation rested with the hereditary 
village officials, who enjoyed under it wide powers of 
initiative and an extensive discretionary authority. The cul 
tivators themselves derived little tangible benefit from it, 
save the ’natural pride’ arising from the respectability 
attached to the tenures of uprees and meerasdars.
The stability of rural society, Goodine noted in con­
clusion, was thus based on the authority and prestige of the 
village officials, and on the exclusion of the majority of 
the ryots from the levers of power in the village communities 
At the same time, the village community possessed two redeem­
ing features: first, it afforded a convenient means for the 
collection of land revenue by the State; and secondly, it 
erected a strong buffer between the otherwise helpless ryots
and the unstable centres of political authority which 
characterised Maharashtra before the British conquest. But 
if the village system was inseparable from the ’spirit1 of 
the Government formerly in force, then ’the change that has 
now taken place has entirely altered the position of the 
chief actors’. The interests of the deshmukhs and the 
kulkarnis and the Patels had been undermined, while those 
of the ryots had been reinforced, through the ryotwari settle­
ment, which set out the obligations of the peasant to the 
State with equity and precision. In addition, the village 
officials had been stripped of their authority as the natural 
leaders of rural society, since their interests were closely 
identified with those of the bureaucracy, and because they 
acted as the State’s representatives at the village level, 
merely performing the mechanical tasks of revenue collection. 
It was important for this change in the status of the 
hereditary officials to be reflected in the channel through 
which they received their emoluments. No doubt, Goodine 
pointed out, should be left in their mind that they drew 
their authority from the State, and not from the community. 
Consequently, whatever extra remuneration was to be given to 
the hereditary officials, ’should be given in the direct name 
of pagar (salary), and not on the principle of huk or bab
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(prerogative), thereby precluding all possibility of such 
remuneration being claimed as a right...f77
The new concepts of social order and political authority 
which inspired administrators as far apart in their ideolog­
ical preconceptions as Elphinstone and Pringle thus became 
increasingly important in shaping relations within the 
village community and the bureaucracy. Under the former 
rulers there had been no systematic attempt to interfere in 
the affairs of rural society, apart from measures taken to 
ensure the flow of the land revenue to the State. The 
Maratha administration did not try to shape, or to alter, 
the patterns of authority and the centres of conflict within 
the village. Nor did it try to break through the facade 
which a village presented under the aegis of the Patel to an 
external authority. Maratha statesmen did not tamper with 
the social order as they found it for three reasons: first, 
because the idea of economic progress and social mobility as 
an activity promoted through State action had no place in 
their thinking; secondly, because they subscribed to an 
organic view of society characterised by a collectivist 
rather than an atomistic quality; and thirdly, because they 
believed that the springs of social action could only be
77
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located in corporate institutions like castes (in the urban 
world) and the village communities (in the rural world).
British administrators differed radically from their 
Maratha predecessors in their concept of the role of the 
State in society, and in their belief that effective social 
action had to impinge on the individual rather than on 
collective institutions. The ryotwari system of land-revenue 
which involved a contractual relationship between the kunbi 
and the State to the exclusion of all intermediaries, and 
was designed to stimulate agricultural activity through play­
ing on the kunbiTs acquisitive instinct, embodied the applica 
tion of these values to the problems of rural social organisa 
tion. It was supplemented by attempts at regulating social 
relations within and without the village community along 
legal and rational lines. The various hereditary officials, 
for instance, were no longer to act as representatives of 
the community, or as the leaders of rural society. Instead, 
they were to be regarded as representatives of the State, 
with their freedom of action determined by a well defined 
body of laws and regulations.
The resulting change in the quality of social experience 
and shift in emphasis from the collective to the individual, 
was therefore a consequence of calculated policy. From it 
stemmed a fragmentation of rural society which was defended
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on the plea that it would foster Tfree and independent 
habits of though and action, which are greatly wanting in 
the agricultural population of India, ground down into 
slavish subserviency and apathy by long years of despotic 
rule...T Behind the various measures of reform initiated 
under Utilitarian aegis lay the belief that once the ryot was 
set free from the collective obligations which weighed down 
upon him, he would fashion his destiny unhampered by slothful 
kinsmen of the .jatha, or by unenterprising cultivators in the 
village community. But barely two decades of British rule 
made it clear that the traditional institutions were breaking 
down under the impact of the legislation of reform without 
being replaced by anything competent to provide a basis for 
concerted action towards progress and prosperity. The fate 
of one community described at some length by Goodine high­
lighted this widespread social malaise:
Yewla [Goodine pointed out in 1845] is a thriving 
centre of some note, which was founded about the 
conclusion of the last century by an ancestor of 
the present Patel...Yewla prospered; but it suffer­
ed from a scarcity of water during the hot season 
...The munificence of some individual in bygone 
daj's had founded a tank, but it has since been 
choked with mud, and is consequently useless. As 
usual in such cases, the Patel might have afforded 
some assistance from his profits, but he...lacked 
the means; or he might, in virtue of his office,
(by forcing a subscription, or what not) have made 
the necessary arrangements; but this was contrary 
to the regulations of the present government.
During the last few years several attempts have
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been made to induce the present government to 
form an aqueduct; and it has consented to defray 
half the expense, if the inhabitants would defray 
the rest. A subscription list was set on foot, 
but the amount of promised subscription fell 
short of the sum required, and the measure 
failed, through the dissensions or disunion of 
its promotors...These facts are not peculiar to 
this...(community) alone, but, with slight modi­
fications, are easily applicable to...(the wholeof) the Deccan...7°
The consequences of Utilitarian reform are vividly 
reflected in the virtual disintegration of community feeling 
in Yewla. The tragic fate of Yewla epitomises the inability 
of the Utilitarians to put their ideas to any creative use 
in Maharashtrian society. With the authoritarian sanctions 
behind British rule, it was all too easy to reject the 
values which had inspired State policy under the Peshwas, 
and to undermine the corporate institutions, and the 
collective quality of social experience, which formed the 
basis of the old order. But unless Utilitarian reform was 
to result in social anarchy, traditional institutions had 
not only to be destroyed, but new ones had to be created 
in their place. Utilitarian reformers failed to realise 
this because of their strong commitment to laissez-faire 
values. Their ill-conceived attempt to base their programme
78
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of reform on the springs of individual action sharpened 
antagonisms within the village community, and led to a 
breakdown of integration in rural society which found ex­
pression in the agrarian disturbances of 1875*
CHAPTER IV
The realignment of power in rural society which stemmed 
from Utilitarian measures of reform led to a build up of 
social tensions within the villages of the Deccan that 
erupted in the disturbances of 1875* While all the social 
groups in rural society were affected by the patterns of 
authority which took shape after 1818, the tensions which 
resulted from the administrative changes introduced by the 
British Government found their clearest expression in the 
relationship between the kunbi and the vani, Even before 
the British take-over, rural indebtedness was widespread in 
Maharashtra, and an inquiry into the state of a village like 
Lony in 1820 illustrates something of its extent-^. But 
under native rule the kunbis dominated the village despite 
an overwhelming burden of debt, because they enjoyed a 
numerical preponderance, and because the vani was isolated
1
T. Coats, TAccount of the Present State of the Township of 
Lony*, Transactions of the Literary Society of Bombay, III,
(London^ 1823 ) , pp. 1$3~250.
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from his caste-fellows in other villages. The officers of 
the Poona Government remained unconcerned about the vaniys 
fate so long as he kept the rural economy on the move. The 
only judicial institution to which the vani could appeal for 
the recovery of his debts was the panchayat. But since the 
panchayat was dominated by the Patel and other influential 
kunbis in the village, it was hardly an institution that 
gave fair consideration to the vanifs claims. Because the 
kunbis controlled the judicial institutions that resolved 
conflicts within rural society, the vanis were prevented from 
exercising a social dominance over the village comparable 
with their role of keeping the rural economy on the move.
The Growth of Kunbi Vani Antagonism
The changes brought about in the Deccan after the 
British conquest effected a redistribution of power within 
the village. The most crucial of these changes was the 
introduction of the ryotwari system of land revenue. The 
ryotwari system weakened the cohesion of the village through 
abolishing the collective responsibility which the kunbis had 
formerly borne for the village rental. It was also 
responsible for reorganising rural credit along novel lines. 
Under native rule, the role of the village vani had been 
sharply differentiated from that of the urban sowcar. The
vani was a member of the village community, and subject to 
its judicial and executive authority. He was a shopkeeper 
as well as a moneylender; and his meagre capital resources 
were tied up either in small monetary advances to the kunbis, 
or in grain loans to cultivators who were passing through a 
difficult phase. Due to his isolated position, and because 
he was dependent upon the kunbis for the security of his 
person and property, the vani never presented the village 
with any threat. The urban sowcar, on the other hand, was a 
somewhat different person, not only because of the scale on 
which he conducted his financial transactions, but also 
because of his position vis-a-vis the rural community.
Instead of dealing with the cultivators directly, he advanced 
loans to each individual village as a community in order to 
enable it to fulfil its revenue obligations towards the 
political authorities. The sowcar therefore very often con­
trolled all the surplus produce of the village that was 
available for disposal in the urban market. However, he did 
not desire to establish a more intimate control over the 
village economy, even though such a control lay well within 
his grasp, since to do so would have been to contravene the 
social style of his caste. Thus when in 1827 the Bombay 
Government tried to free the village communities of their 
burden of debt by compensating the sowcars with land-grants,
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the sowcars revealed their unwillingness to participate 
directly in agricultural production by refusing these 
land-grants^.
The introduction of the ryotwari system, however, 
changed the role of the sowcar in the supply of credit to the 
village. Since the new system emphasised individual 
responsibility for the payment of the land-tax, credit was 
now required by the peasant, and not by the village community, 
The sowcar» therefore, no longer had any dealings with the 
Patel as the head of the village community. Instead, he 
dealt with each peasant individually. But since it was 
difficult for the sowcar to conduct business directly with 
the peasant, he preferred to work through his caste-fellow, 
the vani in the village. An immediate result of this re­
organisation of rural credit was that the vani was now united 
with his caste-fellows outside the village to a far greater 
extent than ever before; and that the sowcar supported him 
in every possible way to fulfil the new role which had 
become open to him. All this not only strengthened the 
position of the vani vis-a-vis the kunbis, but it also in­
creased the occasions for conflict, and the extent of
2
BA (Bombay State Archives), R.K, Arbuthnot to Bombay Gov­
ernment dated 23 September 1826: R,D, (Revenue Department),
Vol. 43/196 of 1827.
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friction, between the two castes. Indeed, in the decades 
following the British take-over, the antagonism between the 
kunbi and the vani became the most significant cleavage in 
the villages of the Deccan.
Nothing did more to sharpen this antagonism than the 
operations of the new Courts of Law which were instituted by 
the British Government. These Courts not only wrested 
judicial authority from the kunbis« but their operations were 
guided by concepts of social equity and contractual responsi­
bility which favoured the vani rather than the kunbi. The 
consequences of the new Courts of Law were brought to the 
notice of the British authorities in a petition addressed by 
the ryots of Thana to the Bombay Government in 1840. The 
petition opened with an enumeration of the ,blessingst which 
British rule had conferred on Maharashtra. Life and property, 
the ryots pointed out, were secure as they had never been 
before; arbitrary taxes had been abolished; and the territor­
ial aristocrats who had formerly oppressed the peasantry were 
firmly under control. But, the ryots continued, fthough we 
live under such protection and prosecute our labour free of 
any apprehension of oppression, yet our families are reduced 
to a miserable condition, so much so that their ordinary 
wants even cannot be supplied1. The reason behind this state 
of affairs was simple. To carry out their agricultural
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vani. Under the former rulers, the moneylenders had levied
interest on money loans at rates varying from 25 to 50 per
cent; and on grain loans at rates varying from 30 to 60 per
cent. In the case, however, of usmani sultani (natural or
artificial calamaties) the vanis had recovered their
advances with moderation, since the Maratha Government
never allowed its ryots to be oppressed by 
usurious demands, and consequently the Sahookar 
did not carry any complaint to the Government. 
Considering the Sahookar as our parent and that 
he would save our lives at a critical moment, we 
settled our claims according to our circumstances.
Thus both the ryot and the Sahookar were able to 
sustain their situations.3
But the harmonious relationship between the ryot and 
the vani had been transformed through the institution of the 
Courts of Law, and the promulgation of the Regulations, into 
one of acute antagonism. The vani now inveigled the ryot 
into ruinous agreements, and, if the ryot failed to fulfil 
the obligations set down in such a contract, he instituted a 
civil suit against him. As a result, the Twhole of his (i.e. 
the ryotfs) property is disposed of; and he is reduced to 
such a condition as never to regain his footing in society*. 
This was made possible because the ryots were ignorant of the
3
operations, the ryots were forced to borrow money from the
BA. Petition signed by 7 ,215 Ryots of Thana District dated
27 July 1840: R.D., Vol. 110/1194 of 1827.
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significance they had no idea. In contrasting their wretched
state under British aegis to their condition under the rule
of the Peshwas, the ryots pointed to the obvious solution of
the problem:
Under the late Government we suffered great 
oppression, but no one could sell our immovable 
property or lands etc., and therefore we were 
able to endure the oppression both of Government 
and of the Sahookars... Under the present Govern­
ment, by the sale of our immovable property we are 
reduced to a starving condition in the same manner, 
as a tree when its roots are pulled out, dies.
We are neither Shroffs, nor traders, and we are 
not acquainted with the regulations of the Courts.
The Vakeels whom we employ, extort money from us 
in the first instance, under various pretences, 
and when the cause is lost, advise us to make an 
appeal. Let Government therefore consider whether 
the cultivator is able to litigate with the Sahookar 
...(We) beg...that our cases may be referred to the 
Panchayats, who should decide on the claims and 
liabilities of the parties with reference to the 
circumstances of each, agreeably to the ancientcustom.4
The Thana appeal pointed to a social malaise of alarming 
intensity. It is true that in representations to the govern­
ment the peasants as a rule painted their misery in lurid 
colours; but the accuracy of the kunbisT indictment was con­
firmed by an official inquiry into the condition of the 
Deccan districts. Because rural indebtedness had been
Regulations, and could be enticed into agreements of whose
4
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widespread even before 1818, the magnitude of the problem 
caused little surprise to the authorities, even though a 
District Officer pointed out that in the talukas of Khair and 
Mamul under his charge there was scarcely a village in which 
it was possible to find ’three persons, ryots or zamindars, 
not in debt for sums above rupees one hundred*.5 But what 
perturbed the Bombay Government was the predominance which 
the moneylender was gradually acquiring over the ryot. By 
the 1840s the predominance of the vanis had become so 
characteristic* a feature of the villages in the Deccan, that 
not a single British administrator questioned its existence, 
even though there were differences of opinion on its implica­
tions for the future of rural society, and the administrative 
policies of the government. The majority of executive 
officials linked the problem with the rapacity for which the 
vani was notorious, and the usurious character of his 
financial dealings^. But administrators like Pringle held 
that while the vani was no less selfish than other men, it 
was wrong to assert that the rates of interest he charged 
were exorbitant and exceeded the normal profits of capital.
5 BA. B. Frere, Assistant Collector of Poona, to P. Stewart, 
Collector of Poona, dated 2 July I84O: R.D., Vol. I664 of 1844«
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234
Looking to the condition of rural society in Maharashtra, 
Pringle characterised the vanis as a class which formed the 
only connecting link between fcivilisation and barbarism*.
He also pointed out that although the ryots were *loud in 
their complaints against their creditors, yet I imagine they 
would be the first to suffer by, and not less ready to com­
plain against, any restrictions which would deprive them of 
the aid of so useful a class*7.
However, in focussing attention on the important part 
played by the vanis in the rural economy, Pringle was 
emphasising a point on which there was no difference of 
opinion. For the administrators who looked upon the vanis 
as a rapacious class recognised only too well the significance 
of their social role. The ryots rarely possessed any 
reserves of capital, and they seldom had access to ready 
money. It was the vanis who helped them pay their instalments 
of land revenue, and who provided them with the means of 
defraying the expenses they incurred on caste ceremonials and 
on religious festivities. The vani was consequently a 
valuable member of the village community, without whose 
assistance the cultivators could be reduced to the greatest
7
BA. R.K. Pringle, Collector of Kandesh, to Bombay Govern­
ment dated 17 July 1840: R.D., Vol. I664 of I8 4 4.
distress for want of money. What the *anti-vani* administra­
tors deplored, however, was the lack of consideration with 
which the moneylenders conducted their business. In the 
districts around Poona, for instance, an experienced admin­
istrator like Bartle Frere regarded a return of 10 per cent 
as reasonable in a region where there was so little employ­
ment for capital. Yet interest on loans in the Poona country­
side ranged from 25 to 60 per cent. Looking to the social 
costs at which the vani met the needs of the cultivators,
Frere described him as fone of the greatest obstacles upon 
the prosperity of society*8.
The relations between the kunbi and the vani barely two 
decades after the British conquest had assumed a pattern 
which boded ill for the future. With his greater all round 
sophistication, and his deeper grasp of the law, the vani was 
becoming more and more of a power in the rural world. His 
progress towards social dominance was facilitated by the 
Courts of Law. The increase in civil suits instituted 
against the ryots proves that the moneylender recognised in 
the new judicial institutions an instrument for self-aggran­
disement. In Ahmednagar district, for instance, cases
s-----------
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involving ryots increased by 50 per cent (from 2,900 to 
5,900) between the years 1835 and 1839. This increase is 
convincing evidence of the fknowledge that the Marwarree has 
acquired of the Regulations, and of the powerful regime they 
afford him for exacting the fulfilment of the most usurious 
contracts which ever disgraced any country... f9 A consider­
able proportion of these suits led to the transfer of hold­
ings from the kunbis to the vanis. But since the cast style 
of the moneylenders prevented them from cultivating the land, 
they were mostly content to let the former proprietors labour 
in their fields, and appropriated all the profits of their 
labour apart from what was necessary for their subsistence. 
The social values of the vanis constituted the most frustrat­
ing feature of the agrarian scene. For they stood in the way 
of a social transformation through which the small peasant 
proprietor would have yielded to a class of capitalist 
farmers owning large landed estates, and possessing the 
resources necessary for efficient agriculture. The vani, 
Frere pointed out, did not
by a liberal expenditure of his part of his gains 
make up for the poverty of the ryots...Seldom do 
you see them (the vanis) improving any property 
that may have come in hand, or in embarking on any
9
BA. Letter from the Collector of Ahmednagar to Bombay Gov­
ernment dated 30 October I84O: R.D., Vol. I664 of I8 4 4.
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speculation such as sugar plantations, cotton or 
the cultivation of silk. Their thoughts and 
speculations are confined to their ledger and 
money transactions, and in no instance have I 
ever found a banian step forward...to aid in any 
work of public activity.10
The transfer of economic dominance over the village from 
the kunbis to the vanis proceeded at a rapid pace after the 
completion of the Goldsmid Settlement in the 1840s, which put 
British land revenue policy in the Deccan on a firm basis. 
Barely three decades after the completion of this Settlement, 
the Commissioners investigating the disturbances of 1875 
discovered that in one village after another the landowning 
families had been gradually dispossessed of their holdings 
by the marwari moneylenders who flourished under the new 
order. In each village a basic pattern of change was in 
evidence. The Patel and the principal cultivators, who had 
formerly guided the affairs of the village, were reduced to 
the status of tenants tilling the fields of the moneylenders. 
Their position as the most privileged and dominant group in 
rural society was a thing of the past. It was the vanis who 
now dominated the rural world. Yet caste prejudices and 
conservative habits of thought prevented the vanis from 
assuming that active leadership over the village which had
1 0
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238
formerly been exercised by those whom they had dispossessed 
of their land.
The process through which a noveau riche caste of 
vanis rose to positions of dominance in rural Maharashtra can 
be reconstructed by looking closely in the affairs of a 
village like Parner in Ahmednagar Collectorate^-*-. Parner was 
a largish village, the headquarters of a taluka, and a 
mamlatdar’s station. In it resided 50 moneylenders, mostly 
marwaris by caste, whose financial dealings were not confined 
to the village, but extended over the neighbouring country­
side. The Patelship of Parner was held by the Kowrey family. 
At the time of the British conquest, it was a coveted office, 
with the Patel owning 160 acres of fertile land. In I84O the 
Kowrey estate was partitioned into two shares of 80 acres 
each. A further subdivision took place soon afterwards, with 
Rowji Kowrey and Babaji Kowrey, two grandsons of the Patel at 
the time of the British conquest, receiving shares of 40 
acres each. In 1863 Rowji Kowrey borrowed a sum of Rs.200 
from Rajmull Marwari to buy a standing crop. He paid a sum 
of Rs.150 on the original bond by the sale of his own stand­
ing crop, and signed a second bond of Rs.100 for the balance.
1 1
Report of the Deccan Riots Commission, (Bombay, 1876), II, 
Appendix C, pp. 66-9.
239
He then paid Rs.24 yearly for three years, and in 1866 the 
bond was renewed for Rs.175« Rajmull subsequently sued him 
for a sum of Rs .388 in Court, and obtained a decree on the 
strength of which he was able to appropriate Rowji’s share of 
the Kowrey estate. Being dispossessed of his holdings, Rowji 
Kowrey drifted to his wife’s village, where he eked out a 
miserable existence as a labourer on daily wages. Babaji 
Kowrey’s fate was no better than that of his brother, since 
his share of the family estate was in possession of Vittoo 
Marwari of Parner. Between them the marwaris Rajmull and 
Vittoo had thus humbled the once proud Kowreys to the dust.
TThere is not now one yoke of bullock or acre of land in 
Parner village held by the Kowreys,’ the Deccan Commissioners 
stated, ’though some of the family are still cultivating land
in the hamlets.’12
The decline of the cultivators and the rise of the vanis
can be illustrated from a comparison of the eclipse of the
Kowreys with the emergence of a marwari family like the
Karamchands of Parner:
The first immigrant of this family was Karamchand, 
who came to Babulwari in Parner, about 60 years 
ago. Karamchand had four sons. Tukaram, the 
eldest, came to Parner about 39 years ago as his 
father’s agent; served him in that capacity for
12
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two years. Then his father lent him Rs.150 at 
annas 12 percent, per mensem, and he set up on 
his own account. Now his khata in Parner and 
Nagar talukas is Rs .664 for government assessed 
land...(which) represents an annual produce of 
Rs.3>600. How much land is mortgaged to him, and 
what may be the amount of his annual dealings, it 
is impossible to say with any accuracy...(The) 
kulkarni states that Tukaram was assessed in 
1871-72 at Rs.2,000 per annum.13
The fate of the Kowreys and the Karamchands is not an 
isolated instance of the decay of landowning families, or the 
rise of the moneylenders. The deshmukhs of Parner, for 
instance, held 500 acres in 1818, but in the intervening 
period all their land had passed into the hands of local 
marwaris. At a more mundane level came ryots like Andu 
Dhondiba, once the proud owner of 30 acres of land, which 
were now mortgaged to the village vani; or Tantia bin Bapu 
Gaikwad, whose holding of 150 acres had passed over to 
Kapurchand Marwari for the paltry sum of Rs.75; or Navji bin 
Trimbakji, whose 48 acres were held by Oodaram Marwari against 
a loan of Rs.35 contracted in i860. Typical members of the 
vani caste whose rise parallelled the eclipse of the landown­
ing families were individuals like Chandrabhan Bhuban, who 
started from humble beginnings in I84O, and had acquired land 
assessed at Rs.2,000 by 1875; or Hariram Bhuban, who hailed
13
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from a family which had settled in a village near Parner 
at the time of the British conquest, and who had since then 
amassed a small fortune for himself.
The extent of marwari dominance over rural society in 
1875 is also reflected in the affairs of a village like Oorli 
located in the taluka of Haveli in Poona district^. Oorli 
had a population of 1,264 souls, an annual assessment of 
Rs.3>735> and 2,158 acres of cultivable land. It was also 
the happy hunting ground of five marwaris, whose claims 
amounted to Rs.16,000. Tukaram vani was the most substantial 
of these. His biggest debtor was Buggaji Panduji, who owed 
him a sum of Rs.1,300, and paid him in return Rs.75 worth of 
produce and cash yearly. In addition, Tukaram had acquired 
control of the fields of two of the ryots of Oorli, Marooti 
and Genoo Subaji, and he proposed to institute court proceed­
ings against another ryot called Jotee. Of the other money­
lenders only two, Muniram Marwari and Govinda Vani, were of 
any substance. Muniram had claims amounting to Rs.2,500 in 
all, while Govinda had loaned Rs, 1,000 to the various cul­
tivators in the village. Between them the vanis of Oorli 
controlled all the ryots living within the village, and they
14
Ibid.
242
appropriated the agricultural surplus of Oorli for disposal 
in the Poona market.
While the extent to which the cultivators were being 
dispossessed of their holdings is revealing in itself, the 
full repercussions of the growth of vani predominance can be 
appreciated only if account is taken of the social values 
which shaped the attitudes of the ryots, and the wider 
economic setting in which this transformation was being 
consummated. The agrarian changes described above were not 
accompanied by the growth of urban centres of industrial 
activity. In the absence of any outlet to the urban world, 
the dispossessed peasant was forced to eke out a wretched 
existence as a landless labourer, often on those very fields 
which he had formerly cultivated as an independent 
proprietor. However, even if an expanding urban economy had 
provided an alternative avenue of employment for the kunbis, 
it is doubtful whether caste prejudices would have permitted 
them to adapt themselves readily to a new style of life. All 
this meant increasing frustration for the kunbis, who were 
being dispossessed of their land by the vanis through legal 
processes which violated traditional notions of social equity.
The Revision of the Deccan Settlement
The increasing bitterness between the cultivators and 
the moneylenders of the Deccan contained the seeds of a major
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agrarian crisis. But while the dispossession of ordinary 
ryots like Andu Dhondiba or Navji bin Trimbakji was serious 
enough in itself, the simultaneous decline of important 
landed families like the Kowreys, or the deshmukhs of Parner, 
generated social frustration of an intensity that was bound 
to result in an upheaval. What was implicit in the social 
climate became explicit through two factors which heightened 
antagonism between the kunbis and the vanis, and added to the 
atmosphere of unrest in the country districts. The revision 
of the Goldsmid Settlement in the 1860s combined with the 
economic dislocation caused in the Deccan by the American 
Civil War to transform the dormant antagonism between the 
kunbi and the vani into open class and caste conflict in 
rural society.
The revision of the land Settlement was an important 
undertaking in an agrarian society like Maharashtra, where 
the entire population subsisted directly or indirectly on the 
land. The importance of the revision was enhanced by the 
Ricardian principles which underlay the revenue system. 
According to these principles the State was the supreme land­
lord in the country, and could alter at will, and according 
to the dictates of political expediency, the share of the 
profits of agriculture which it awarded to the cultivators.
A resurvey involved too an evaluation of the changes in
economic conditions as they affected the profits of 
agriculture, and of the proportion of these profits which 
the State could claim as its own. A revision of the Settle­
ment was therefore bound to stimulate excitement, and could 
easily arouse discontent, among the cultivators.
The changes which had come over Maharashtra during the 
period of the Goldsmid Settlement can be seen clearly through 
focussing attention on a region like the taluka of Haveli, 
which stretched around Poona, the former capital of the 
Peshwas. Poona itself had fallen into reduced circumstances 
in the 1860s, though it was still a considerable city, with 
a population of 75,000. The deserted palaces of the Peshwas, 
and the empty residences of the great territorial chiefs, 
bore silent testimony to its political decline. But the 
institution of a municipality in 1 8 6 4, which was run by an 
urban elite that had been created under British rule, and 
which had in three years cleaned and widened the main 
streets of the city, spoke in clear accents of the shape of 
things to come. Similarly, the flourishing market held daily 
in front of the deserted Shanwar Palace, the former residence 
of the Peshwas, epitomised the change that had come over the 
region.
For the establishment of Pax Britannica had transformed 
the Deccan in a way it had never been transformed before. Peace,
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political stability and the rule of law were only three of 
the influences at work in the new order. But there were 
others no less important moulding Maharashtrian society in a 
new shape. The state of communications, for instance, had 
altered beyond recognition. Since it embraced a city of the 
size and importance of Poona, Haveli was particularly 
fortunate in this respect; but what happened in the taluka 
was equally characteristic of the rest of the Deccan, In 
contrast to the primitive conditions of transport prevailing 
under the Marathas, a railway line now ran through the 
taluka, having four stations within its limits. There were 
in addition roads of good quality linking Poona with places 
like Bombay, Nasik, Satara and Sholapur. Since all the roads 
converged on the former capital, they afforded easy access to 
the vast quantities of supplies required for so large a city. 
The increasing facilities for the movement of agricultural 
surpluses, and the growth of markets for their disposal, 
stimulated the growth of population and the extension of 
cultivation in the Deccan. The population of 81 villages in 
Haveli (for which figures are available) rose from 37,695 in 
1840, to 58>829 in 1870. While statistics are not available 
for the preceding decades, it is probable that the population 
was static before the British take-over. The increase in 
population led to an increase in the amount of land
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cultivated, and equally inevitably, inferior soils were 
pressed into cultivation. In the Haveli villages already 
referred to the area under cultivation rose from 176,974 
acres to 2 0 4 , 1 3 5  acres during the duration of the Goldsmid 
Settlement. Already the Deccan appeared to be poised on the 
edge of a Malthusian abyss!-^5
Such then were the altered conditions which confronted 
J. Francis and W. Waddington, the Superintendents of the 
’Revenue Survey and Assessment of the Deccan’, when they 
turned their attention to the revision of the Goldsmid 
Settlement in 1867. Like their predecessors, it was to the 
taluka of Indapur that Francis and Waddington first directed 
their attention in the hope of devising a scale of assessment 
which could be extended to other districts after appropriate 
changes in the light of local variations. The spirit in 
which they entered upon the revision of the survey was 
divorced from the doctrinaire predilections which had made 
the Pringle Survey of I8 3O so disastrous an operation. But 
they did subscribe to the Ricardian view that the extension 
of cultivation which had taken place under the Goldsmid 
Settlement indicated a rise in profits of agriculture, and
15
Report on the Taluka of Indapur by Col. J. Francis dated 12 
February 1867: Selections From The Records of the Bombay Gov­
ernment , New Series, No. CLI. Henceforth referred to as 
Francis’ Report on Indapur.
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With this assumption George Wingate, who along with Goldsmid
had laid the foundations of the ’Bombay System of Survey and
Assessment’, was in complete agreement:
The land assessment... is not a tax at all [stated 
G. Wingate in a memorandum approving of Francis*
Report on Indapur], but a share of the rent which 
the land yields to its possessors. This share of 
the land rent has from the dawn of history formed 
the great fund from which expenses of government 
in India have been defrayed, and in an agricultural 
country like India the land must ever remain the 
great source of taxation from which the expenses 
of Government will have to be supplied. The gov­
ernment right to increase the land assessment is 
the property of the public, and forms a sacred 
trust, which, in my humble opinion, the government 
is bound to transmit... to its successors unimpaired..
The Ricardian argument for the revision of the Goldsmid
Settlement was reinforced by the errors discovered by Francis
in the measurement of holdings by the former surveyors. All
these errors were not fortuitous. The Goldsmid Survey had
concerned itself exclusively with the measurement of the
better quality of land, and it did not take into account
inferior soils. However, apart from land left deliberately
unmeasured, holdings had increased in area because field
boundaries had not been erected by the Survey Department till
T5
Memorandum by Sir G. Wingate (on Francis’ Report on Indapur) 
dated 12 February 1869: Selections From The Records of the 
Bombay Government, New Series, No. CLI.
justified an increase in the rents levied by the State.
a decade after the first Settlement; and during this interval 
the ryots had taken under cultivation the unclaimed land 
which surrounded their fields. Thus in the Haveli villages 
of Baura, Kalas, Shetphal and Nagunda, the ryots had 
appropriated between 1 , 5 0 0 and 2,000 acres of land of which 
no account existed in the official survey. The surreptitious 
extension of their holdings by the ryots obliged Francis to 
devise a new classification of fields. The need for reclassi­
fication became obvious when remeasurement revealed a 
particular field to be 40 acres in area instead of 30 acres, 
the figure under the old survey. If the 30 acres formerly 
taken into account were of medium fertility, and the 10 acres 
* added* by the ryot of a poor quality, then the entire field 
had to be reclassified if its owner was to escape over-assess- 
ment.
However, since the revenue system was based on Ricardian 
principles, the need for a revised scale of assessment exist­
ed independently of inaccuracies in the measurement of hold­
ings. There were no intermediate proprietors in the Deccan 
between the State and the ryots, whose increased rentals could 
provide Francis with an index of the rise in profits of 
agriculture over the period of the Goldsmid Settlement. He 
was therefore obliged to rely on a more fallible criterion in 
calculating the increase in the net surplus of different
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soils during the thirty years of the lease. The rise in the 
price of .jowri, the staple crop of the region, during the 
currency of the Goldsmid Settlement constituted, in the 
circumstances, the best index on which a revised assessment 
could be based.
During the first decade of the Goldsmid Settlement 
(see Table A) the price of iowri fluctuated from 72 seers per 
rupee in 1843-44 to 36 seers in 1845-46; and the average over 
the ten years was 56+^ seers. The following decade opened 
with an unfortunate season, when near famine conditions 
raised the price of the food-grain to 48 seers. However, in 
the very next year .jowri had plummeted to 72 seers per rupee. 
A steady increase in price set in after that date, and in 
1856-57 the grain was selling at 32 seers, the average for 
the entire decade being 45+3/4 seers per rupee. Beginning 
with a price of 32 seers in the last decade of the lease,
.jowri did not experience any pronounced fluctuation in the 
first few years, and till 1861-62 its price remained stable 
at the figure of 30 seers. But thereafter, the outbreak of 
the American Civil War caused a sudden dislocation in the 
economy of the Deccan. The export of raw cotton from the 
United States to England having ceased abruptly, India was 
called upon to furnish the supply necessary for the English 
market. Indapur had not been a cotton growing district
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earlier. But as soon as reports of the profits reaped from 
the cultivation of cotton reached the ryots, they immediately 
applied themselves to its growth, and by 1867-68 3 0 , 0 0 0 acres 
of land had been pressed into the cultivation of cotton. The 
diversion of such a large area to the cultivation of cotton 
gave a boost to the price of food crops, and jowri sky-rocket­
ed to twice its normal price, raising the average to 26 seers 
per rupee in the last decade of the Settlement^•
The exceptional circumstances arising out of the 
American Civil War, Francis argued, could hardly form the 
basis of a new scale of rates because of the inflationary con­
ditions caused by the sudden, and temporary, demand for 
cotton. During the thirty years of the Goldsmid Settlement, 
therefore, the price of .jowri in Indapur in effect rose from 
66 to 55 seers per rupee. But before this rise could be 
transformed into an increased rental, Francis had to answer 
two questions: at what stage during the currency of the 
Settlement had the ryots accumulated the capital necessary for 
the efficient cultivation of their fields? and what was the 
price of grain at this stage?
To answer these questions Francis turned to an appraisal 
of economic conditions in Indapur during the thirty years of
17
Vide Francis’ Report on Indapur.
the Goldsmid Settlement. The introduction of the Goldsmid 
rates had lowered the rental of the taluka from Rs.203,000 to 
Rs.89,000. This reduction gave considerable encouragement to 
cultivation. In the five years following I8 3 6, the area 
under cultivation increased by 60,0 0 0 acres, and there was a 
proportionate rise in the yield of land revenue. But it soon 
became obvious that the low rentals had tempted the ryots to 
spread their resources far too thinly in order to cultivate 
as large an area as they could secure for themselves. When 
the inevitable reaction set in, the ryots were not only 
forced to yield a considerable portion of the land they had 
taken up, but they were also compelled to seek remissions in 
land revenue. It was only late in the 1840s that conditions 
became stable, and from then onwards there was neither any 
need for large scale remissions in revenue, nor any diminution 
in the area under cultivation. This favourable trend con­
tinued throughout the 1850s, indicating that the conditions 
of the cultivators had improved to an extent where they could 
pay their rents in bad as well as in good seasons. Their 
ability to do so also proved that they had built up a substan­
tial reserve of capital, and could cultivate their land with 
reasonable efficiency. From this turning point in the state 
of the Deccan districts in the 1850s, Francis drew the follow­
ing conclusion:
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I think, therefore, we may fairly assume that 
towards the latter end of the second decennial 
period (1846-47 to 1855-56) the cultivators had 
acquired that amount of capital and that well to 
do position which we could assign to them in the 
name of profit to be left to them after payment 
of the government assessment. I am consequently 
of opinion that we may take the average price of 
grains during the latter half of the second 
decennial as the index by which we may estimate 
from prices what our present assessment ought to 
be. In other words, the percentage increase which 
has taken place during the last ten years will 
represent generally the percentage addition to the 
present assessment which may now be made.18 
(Italics in original)
With the increase in price of grain during the decennial 
preceding the Civil War as the index on which the rise in 
assessment was to be based, Francis’ task was relatively 
simple. The average price of ,jowri during the last five 
years of the second decennial of the Goldsmid Settlement 
stood at 42 seers per rupee; the corresponding figure for 
the decennial ending 1865-66 was 26 seers; a difference of
16 seers in all. ’We may assume, therefore,’ Francis stated, 
’that between 50 and 60 percent is the addition (calculated 
solely with reference to the price of grain) which may be 
made to the present assessment.’ 19 The rate at which Goldsmid 
assessed the best soil in Indapur was 12 annas per acre.
I S
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
253
Francis raised it to one rupee per acre. This constituted a 
rise of 33 per cent. The total assessment, however, was 
raised by 50 per cent, because of the concealed cultivation 
unearthed by by Francis, and all told, the revision of the 
survey raised the rental of Indapur from Rs.89,000 to 
Rs. 124,700
The Kunbisf Reaction to the Francis Settlement
When confronted with the high rates imposed by the 
Pringle Survey in 1830, the ryots of Indapur had forced the 
Survey Department to reassess the taluka through the simple 
expedient of migrating in very large numbers to the surround­
ing districts. The events of the 1830s implied that even 
though British Survey Officers did not take the peasants into 
their confidence in making a revenue settlement, the peasants 
could nevertheless exercise a decisive influence on the 
pitch of the land-tax. The success of the new rates 
recommended by Francis, therefore, hinged on their acceptance 
by the kunbis. However, the timing of a new Settlement was 
just as crucial an issue as the pitch of the assessment, and 
the Bombay Government could not have chosen a worst moment 
for launching a revised Settlement. For by 1870 the stimulus 
given to the rural economy of the Deccan by the American 
Civil War had yielded to an acute depression which left the
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peasants improverished, and in a discontented state of 
mind .
The imposition of an additional burden of tax on a 
peasantry whose economic life had been dislocated by a 
sudden but only ephemeral demand for a cash crop could 
hardly evoke a favourable reaction, particularly in view of 
the effect of the new rates on individual ryots and on 
specific villages. Francis was aware that while the total 
rental of Indapur had only been raised by 50 per cent, the 
increase in rent was as high as 200 per cent in the case of 
particular villages20. What he never bothered to investigate 
however, was how individual ryots were affected by the 
changes he had recommended. The fate of the ryots of the 
village of Kullum was in this respect typical of the conse­
quences of the new survey. It is clear from the alterations 
proposed in the rent roll of Kullum that a kunbi like Madoo 
Mitoo, whose assessment had been increased from Rs .6 to Rs.24 
because of the 10 acres of land he had surreptitiously added 
to his original holding of 20 acres, was bound to become hope 
lessly indebted under the new Settlement. A similar fate 
awaited ryots like Madhoo Bawanee and Naroo Rowji, whose
Ibid.
20
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assessment had been raised from Rs.7 to Rs«19* and from 
Rs.12 to Rs.21, respectively^.
Yet the mass migration to which the peasants had resort­
ed in I83O in disapproval of the Pringle rates was no longer 
possible in 1870 because of the great increase in the popula­
tion of the Deccan in the intervening period. Apart from 
demographic pressures, the creation of property rights, and 
the generation of an acquisitive spirit through the light 
rates of the Goldsmid Settlement, had tied the ryots to their 
villages in a way which made it impossible for them to throw 
up their fields and wander about the countryside in search of 
more attractive leases. However, the abandonment of their 
villages was not the only traditional form of peasant protest 
against arbitrary bureaucratic action. Under the former 
rulers, the deshmukhs and the territorial families had in 
comparable situations communicated the grievances of the 
ryots to the authorities at Poona. While the increase in the 
power of the bureaucracy under British aegis had virtually 
shorn the deshmukhs of their status as the patrons of rural 
society, the traditional leaders still exercised a certain 
hold over the imagination of the peasants. It was
21
BA. P e t i t i o n  from the Ryots o f  Kullum  d ate d  5 O ctober
1 8 7 4 :  R . D . ,  V o l .  96 o f  1 8 7 4 .
•consequently not surprising that they should have turned to 
a traditional leader like Gopal Narsingh Deshmukh, who had 
assumed the new style sobriquet of TAgent of the Ryots of 
Indapur*, to communicate their grievances over the enhanced 
rates to the Bombay Government.
The petition presented by Gopal Narsingh Deshmukh on 
behalf of the ryots of Indapur to the Bombay Government was 
a remarkable document, both for the values it expressed, and 
the use it made of a traditional and supposedly defunct 
institution for communication between the peasants and the 
State. The petition originiated at a meeting held in Indapur 
in July 1873* This meeting was attended by the more 
influential cultivators from the villages of the taluka, who 
had assembled to formulate their grievances for transmission 
to the British authorities. The appeal drafted at the 
Indapur meeting was circulated until 2,694 ryots had attached 
their signatures to it. The peasant origin of the appeal is 
evident from the old style sentiments and the traditional 
values which inspired it: a romantic yearning for the past; 
a refusal to look facts straight in the face; faith in a 
beneficent ruler, to whom the ryots could appeal against the 
acts of an unjust bureaucracy; and a belief that the mere
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expression of discontent would oblige the government to 
yield to their d e m a n d s ^ .
The principal theme hammered home by the Indapur 
Petition was the tragic contrast between the ryotsT affluence 
under the liberal Goldsmid Settlement, and the abject desti­
tution to which the rates introduced by Francis and 
Waddington were reducing them. Pringle’s attempt in I8 3O at 
settling Indapur had left the taluka desolate; and when the 
’popularly beloved Mr. Goldsmidf was appointed to resurvey 
the taluka, he had realised that the peasants were so poor 
that only a very light assessment could induce them to re­
cultivate their fields:
A moddel (sic) survey of the taluka was aimed at,
[the ryots pointed out] and such were the 
settled rates, that after defraying all expenses 
of cultivation etc., including the assessment, 
they (i.e. the peasants) received no less than 
l/8th of the produce as a reward to the 
cultivators.
Moreover, an ample provision had been made by these 
truly circumspect officers for our cattle etc., 
in excluding all and every sort of waste land, 
amounting to about 4 3 , 0 0 0 acres, which had been 
used by us as grazing lands, but are since the 
late survey about all assessed along with the 
cultivable lands proper.23
22
BA . P e t i t i o n  from the Ryots of  In d a p u r  to  Bombay G o v ern ­
ment dated  29 J u ly  1 8 7 3 :  R . D . ,  V o l .  96 o f  1 8 7 4 .
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To the ryots of Indapur it appeared as though Francis 
and Waddington were inspired by motives completely opposed 
to the generous principles which had guided their predeces­
sors. The new rates of taxation, they observed, were not 
only too high in themselves, but the inclusion of the former 
waste land under assessable categories made them positively 
ruinous. Yet the enhanced scale had been imposed by Francis 
»without reflecting for a moment what calamaties he was about 
to bring on the helpless poor . . . 1 The effect of an oppressive 
scale of rates was heightened by the harshness with which the 
revenue officials enforced the payment of the land-tax.
Because of inadequate rain in 1871 and 1872, the yield of 
agricultural produce had been only 50 to 75 per cent of the 
normal figure, but when this had been brought to the notice 
of the Collectors, fnot the slightest notice had been taken 
of all our cries for exemption from this heavy tax*. Did the 
Collectors [the ryots posed the rhetorical question] pause to 
consider the damage they were inflicting by selling landed 
property worth thousands of rupees for the non-payment of a 
few beggarly revenue instalments? Did they realise the 
misery they were imposing on a peasantry impoverished through 
circumstances completely beyond its control? Faced with the 
cruel demands of the revenue officers, the ryots were obliged 
to turn to the moneylenders for assistance in meeting their
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obligations. This ensured for them a fate worse than death, 
for they were reduced to being the bonded slaves of the 
vanis. fThe monstrosity of our subordinate rulers has been 
so great that words cannot express them,1 the ryots stated in 
conclusion :
The usurpation of our rights by both the money­
lenders and the government together, really brings 
to our recollection the jolly old times in which 
our fathers swayed the sceptre in prosperity. It 
really cuts one to the core to reflect on the past 
and present conditions; i.e. the freedom and 
affluence in which our fathers lived and died, and 
the serfdom in which we are doomed to live and dieI 
From past history it is evident that during the 
2,000 years back a great many rulers have been in 
possession of India; but notwithstanding their 
great abilities and power, no sooner they manifest­
ed a desire for worthless gain...the Almighty God 
supplanted them by others more human; for God will 
hear the cries of the afflicted and punish the
wicked.24
The significance of the Indapur Petition lies in the 
light it throws on the hold of traditional institutions over 
rural society, and on the ryotsf reaction to the new Settle­
ment. Whether the petition was able to prove the existence 
of high rates of assessment, which it did not, is irrelevant 
to either of these considerations. For the ryots’ problems 
stemmed basically from the economic dislocation caused by the 
American Civil War, and a succession of bad harvests, which
24
Ibid.
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had combined to trench into their slender accumulations of 
capital, and to render their economic condition precarious^.
But despite the depression which followed the Civil War, 
and the run of bad harvests, the grievances expressed in the 
Indapur Petition were not entirely unrelated to the enhanced 
rates imposed by Francis, It took, however, civilians like 
Sir Auckland Colvin, a revenue official who served on the 
Deccan Riots Commission, and W.H. Havelock, the Commissioner 
of the Northern Division, to reveal through an objective 
analysis what a deshmukh playing his traditional role could 
only express in emotive terms. Colvin questioned from the 
outset the assumption of increasing rural prosperity which lay 
behind the enhancement of the rates by Francis. In support 
of his view that a high assessment had contributed to ’disturb 
(for the worse) the relation of creditor and debtor in the 
Poona district’, he invoked the Malthusian nightmare which 
had already cast its shadow over the Deccan. Looking to the 
rise of population in the four talukas of Haveli, Pabul,
Supa and Bhimthari during the thirty years of the Goldsmid 
Settlement, Colvin observed that while this upsurge had been 
accompanied by an increase in economic resources, it was ’very
25
BA . P e t i t i o n  from the Ryots o f  In da p ur  to the Bombay Gov­
ernment dated  15 February  1 8 7 5 :  R . D . ,  V o l .  106  o f  1875«
TABLE SHOWING EXTENSION OF CULTIVATION IN TURKS TALU&IS OF POONA 
COLLECTORATE DURING THE GOLDSMID SETTLEMENT. (Taken from Sir A. 
Colvin’ s Memorandum on the Deccan Riots dated 8 November, 1875)*
TABLE 3
Indapur Haveli
1 . Waste Land at the end of first decennial(acres) 24*550 10 ,000
2 . M . » " " " " second » 1 5300 1, 922
3. " " ,! " " " third » 930 634
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significant that the growth in population is out of all 
proportion to the growth of plough cattle or homes.••(It 
seems) that individual property in stock has declined...’26 
The problem acquired an added intensity if account was taken 
of the manner in which demographic pressures had forced the 
ryots to cultivate soils of marginal fertility. The extent 
to which the waste land was being pressed into cultivation 
expressed the ryot’s dilemma with great clarity and pre­
cision (see Table B). For here was evidence beyond refuta­
tion that the increase in the area of cultivation had kept 
pace with the rise of population ’until, generally speaking, 
the whole available area has been occupied. For further rise 
of population there is no further margin of waste.’27
But the most devastating indictment of the revised rates 
came from Havelock, who was requested by the Bombay Government 
to look into a complaint lodged by some villagers from 
Sholapur that the new rates weighed more heavily on inferior 
soils than on superior soils. To ascertain the accuracy of 
this charge, Havelock analysed the effect of the revised 
rates on a number of villages in Sholapur, of which Alipur in
26
Memorandum by A. Colvin dated 8 November 1875 J Report of 
the Deccan Riots Commission, Vol. I.
27
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Barsi taluka can be taken as typical. On doing so he dis­
covered that the assessment on soils of the most inferior 
category in Alipur had been raised by 67 per cent, while 
medium and superior soils were paying only 18 per cent more 
than they had paid formerly. The inquiry he had instituted 
convinced Havelock that
there has been a judicious increase (of rates) in 
the highest class of lands; but that, notwithstand­
ing a most salutary and well designed reduction in 
the two lowest classes of the...(Goldsmid) scale, 
and a slight reduction in the 7th class, the new 
scale has not suited the special circumstances of 
the region; that the application of the revised 
classification at too high a rate on much of the 
former unculturable land, and on the lower and 
medium lands, has raised the assessment to be too 
high on such lands.28
To what could the imbalance in the scale of assessment 
be attributed? Unlike the Pringle survey, the establishment 
of an efficient survey machinery by 1870 ruled out the 
possibility of collusion between the rich peasants and the 
native officials of the revenue department. Havelock conse­
quently traced the high pitch of the new rates to Francis’ 
belief that Goldsmid and Wingate had left a standard propor­
tion of the net surplus of the land to the rich as well as 
the poor peasant. This belief, he pointed out, was founded
28
BA. Memorandum by W.H. Havelock dated 20 April 1874:
R.D., Vol. 97 of 1874.
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on a misapprehension; because Goldsmid and Wingate had not 
made any rigorous use of the Ricardian law of rent in devis­
ing a scale of assessment for the Deccan. Their rates were 
based on the pragmatic principle that the poor cultivators 
deserved a larger share of the net surplus than the more 
prosperous cultivators. In revising Pringle’s rates, which 
were based on Ricardian criteria, Goldsmid and Wingate had 
reduced the rent on superior soils by 40 per cent, but the 
rent on soils of medium and inferior quality had been reduced 
by 60 per cent and 70 per cent respectively, ’with the entire 
success which had been recognised at all hands’. Francis had 
repeated Pringle’s error, and had tried to ensure a profit to 
the cultivator bearing the same proportion of the net produce 
irrespective of the quality of the soil he cultivated. But a 
successful scale of rates, Havelock concluded, had to be 
based on a progressive decrease in the pitch of assessment as 
it proceeded from the best to the worst soils.
The Poona Sarva.janik Sabha’s ’no-tax’ Campaign
The reasons why the ryots of Indapur opposed the intro­
duction of the Francis rates were pinpointed by Colvin and 
Havelock with a cogency that completely eluded a traditional 
leader like Gopal Narsingh Deshmukh. In his failure to build 
a convincing case against the Francis Survey, the Deshmuck
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revealed the inability of the traditional leaders of 
Maharashtra to channelise rural discontent in any meaningful 
way in the altered circumstances of British rule. The 
influence of the traditional landed families had not dis­
appeared by the 1870s. But the gulf in values which lay 
between them and the new rulers restricted their effective­
ness in positions of leadership. Contrast, in this context, 
the inanity of the Indapur Petition with the powerful case 
for a revision of the Francis Settlement made by Colvin and 
Havelock. How much more effective would have been the argu­
ments of a Colvin or a Havelock if they had been put forth by 
the ’Agent of the Ryots of Indapur’? Could the British 
authorities have overlooked so forceful an indictment of 
official policy by a ’natural’ leader of the people? And 
finally, would not a rational belief in the justice of their 
cause have imparted additional strength to the peasants them­
selves ?
To raise these questions is to focus attention on the 
need for a new and more effective leadership in the community. 
In response to this challenge a number of Poona Brahmins 
founded in 1867 an organisation called the Poona Association. 
The Poona Association was created with the dual object of 
educating public opinion on the crucial issues of the day, and 
of communicating the views of the people to the British
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Government. In 1870 the Association was reorganised along 
more ambitious lines as the Poona Sarva.janik Sabha. The 
Sabha not only claimed the sympathy of traditional aristocrats 
like the Pant Pratinidhi of Aundh and the Maharaja of Kohlapur, 
but it also counted among its members Brahmin intellectuals 
like Mahadev Govind Ranade, the most sophisticated political 
thinker of his time in western India, and Ganesh Vasudev 
Joshi, a liberal, and a leading figure in Poona politics.
While the association of the traditional aristocrats gave 
legitimacy to the Sabha, it was the westernised elite repre­
sented by Ranada and Joshi which shaped the style of its 
political activity. The popular base of the Sabha was provid­
ed by 95 representatives from all over Maharashtra who 
attended the inaugural meeting on 2 April 1870. These repre­
sentatives had been ’elected* by »over 6,000 persons, repre­
senting all castes, creeds, and interests...129 Concurrently 
with the founding of the Poona branch of the Sabha, a number 
of affiliated bodies came into existence in the principal 
towns of Maharashtra such as Satara, Wai, Sholapur, Nasik 
etc. The object behind the creation of these Sabhas was
29
Memorandum on the founding of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha 
taken from the unpublished collections of Bombay State 
Committee for a History of the Freedom Movement in India. 
Henceforth cited as BSCHFMI.
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set out with great clarity in the preamble to the constitu­
tion of the Poona branch:
Whereas it has been deemed expedient that there 
should exist between the government and people 
some institution in the shape of a mediating body 
which may afford to the latter facilities for 
knowing the real intentions and objectives of 
Government, as also adequate means of securing 
their rights by making timely representations to 
government of the real circumstances in which they 
are placed, an association has been formed and 
organised with the appelation of Poona Sarvajanik 
Sabha.30
The Sarvajanik Sabha has often been regarded as a body 
which concerned itself merely with presenting cautiously 
phrased petitions to the British Government. But its leading 
members like Ranade and Joshi did not conceive their role in 
a purely passive light. For they were anxious to establish 
themselves in the affections of the peasants, and to build a 
social base for the Sabha in the rural areas. The Sabha 
resembled a caste organisation to the extent that it provided 
an institutional framework for the political activities of the 
elite castes (Chitpavan Brahmins etc.) in the urban areas.
But it simultaneously tried to assume the traditional role of 
the rural aristocracy as a bridge between the peasants and 
the State. The new elites of the Sabha were not only
30
From an article by V.M. Potdar on the history of the Poona 
Sarvajanik Sabha in BSCHFMI.
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advaitic intellectuals who fashioned their politics in the 
style of John Stuart Mill. They also stood as »deshmukhs» 
defending the interests of their rural clients through invok­
ing Ricardian and Utilitarian theories.
The resettlement of the Deccan by Francis, and the 
opposition of the kunbis to the enhanced rates of assessment, 
offered the Sabha a unique opportunity to champion the cause 
of the peasants and to broaden its social base. Immediately 
after the introduction of the Francis rates Ranade and Joshi 
tried to express the peasants1 opposition to the new rates, 
and to secure a diminution in the land-tax, in conscious 
imitation of the traditional role of the deshmukhs. Their 
attempt to do so found expression in political activity at 
two levels: the drawing up of petitions which communicated 
the grievances of the peasants to the government; and the 
despatch of trained cadres to the villages in order to 
acquaint the peasants with the reasons behind their miserable 
plight. An elite which combined traditional techniques of 
agitation with a commitment to western political ideals 
presented a serious threat to British authority, and the sig­
nificance of this development was not lost on the British 
Government.
The »Report of the Sub-Committee of the Poona 
Sarvajanik Sabha» on the Francis Settlement, which was
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presented to the British Government in 1873, concerned itself 
with themes identical to those elaborated in the Indapur 
Petition. But in contrast to the *romantic* idiom of the 
Petition, the Report was couched in the rational language of 
political economy, and a wide gulf separated the arguments 
which it advanced in substantiation of its charges from the 
traditional principles on which Gopal Narsingh Deshmukh had 
based his indictment. Though written contemporaneously, the 
Petition and the Report stood worlds apart in the intellectual 
attitudes they represented. They displayed the cleavage in 
Maharashtra between those who subscribed solely to tradition­
al styles of politics, and the emerging westernised elite 
which was engaged in the task of securing positions of 
leadership within the community. There can be no doubt of the 
greater impact of the agitation of the Sabha on the Govern­
ment as well as on the rural community. For the leaders of 
Sabha combined with a comprehension of the political be­
liefs of the new rulers the techniques of agitation with 
which the kunbis were already familiar*.
7‘ I have been unable to trace the Report presented by the 
Sub-Committee of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha to the Bombay Gov­
ernment. This inadequate precis of the Report is taken from 
extensive quotations of the same given in a despatch to the 
Secretary of State by the Bombay Government dated 27  December 
1 8 7 5 :  R.D., Vol. 44A  of 1 8 7 5 .
The rational terms in which the Report spelt out the 
charge of the impoverishment of the kunbis put the Bombay 
Government on the defensive, and a searching inquiry was 
instituted in 1873 into the condition of the Deccan districts 
of which the Sabha had presented so gloomy a picture.
District Officers who were intimately associated with the 
administration of the rural areas did not reject the Report 
as a polemical tract devoid of all objectivity. They 
emphasised, however, that the changed quality of social 
experience in the villages of the Deccan had to be given the 
same prominence as the statistical realities of rural life 
if any balanced assessment of the agrarian situation was to 
be achieved. Civilians like A. Wingate, the Collector of 
Satara, argued that adverse pronouncements on rural prosperity 
mostly stemmed from the changes in expectations, and in social 
values, which had come about as a consequence of British rule. 
Under the former rulers the material requirements of the 
ordinary peasant were extremely modest.*(The)...wants of a 
man scarcely exceeded those of an animal...(A) few bits of 
rags, a hut, and a cooking pot or two constituted the family 
accumulations...1 All this was related to the fact that in a 
community where the means of transport were primitive, and 
markets undeveloped, the surplus agrarian produce could 
easily be appropriated by the State and the dominant sections
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peasantry which was passive and apathetic, and reconciled to
its wretched conditions of existence. The situation had
changed dramatically under British rule. A generation of
peace and stability, and the introduction of a rational
revenue policy, had encouraged acquisition and accumulation
and had opened the eyes of the kunbi to a new range of materi
al wants. These influences had also revealed to him how he
could satisfy these wants, and in doing so had made him
thoroughly disgruntled with his lot. A competitive spirit
and a desire for the good life were generating a revolution
in the outlook of the peasant:
Western energy [Wingate pointed out] is introducing 
the element of labour to eastern apathy and with 
the desire to accumulate comes the necessity to 
work. People are no longer content with what 
satisfied them 50 years ago; their own and their 
neighbours1 estimate of the fitness of things has 
changed... For example, one mamlatdar states that 
during the decade 1820-30 the ryots1 condition was 
all that could be desired. The crops ripened well, 
grain was plentiful, and the instalments in kind 
were easily given. Great men in the State supported 
numerous retainers, and these in turn supported 
their families, so that labour was cheap, the neces­
sity for buying little, and so long as the rains 
fell seasonally, everybody got enough to eat...It 
is true that there were no shops, no roads, no trade, 
and little encouragement for labour; no one could 
afford either to leave his village or to purchase 
his clothes or ornaments or fair stock. But then... 
(these things) were not wanted...31
of rural society. Such conditions in turn produced a
31
BA. A .  Wingate, Collector of Satar, to Bombay Government
dated 3 October 1874: R.D., Vol. 44B of 1875, Part II.
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The Pax had thus created an undercurrent of discontent 
among the peasants by generating a desire for a higher 
standard of life. It had also stimulated the rise of a 
class of kunbis whose standards of consumption, and whose 
accumulations of capital, were fin every way so superior to 
what the same people were 40 years ago as it is possible to 
conceive*32# jn contrast, however, to the prosperity of these 
rich kunbis stood the poverty of the great majority of the 
cultivators. This was reflected in the widening gap between 
the wages of agricultural labourers and the prices of the 
major food-crops, on the one hand, and the decreasing 
margins of profit on the inferior soils which were being taken 
under cultivation through a rise in population, on the other. 
In Ahmednagar district, for instance, the wage of an agri­
cultural worker had risen from Rs.28 per annum to Rs.60 per 
annum during the course of the Goldsmid Settlement. Yet this 
rise did not represent any real gain, since the price of 
basic food grains like jowri and bajra had risen by 250 and 
I85 per cent respectively over a corresponding period33.
The inquiries instituted in response to the Sabha’s 
Report demolished the picture of increasing rural prosperity
32
Ibid.
33BA. H.B. Boswell, Collector of Ahmednagar, to Bombay Gov­
ernment dated 28 August 1874: R.D., Vol. 44B of 1875*
which formed the background to Francis’ revision of the 
Goldsmid Settlement. But while the Sabha had attributed the 
deterioration in economic conditions to the revenue policy in 
general, and the Francis’ survey in particular, the Bombay 
Government ascribed it to the population upsurge which follow 
ed the British take-over, and to the absence of prudence and 
thrift among the peasants. In the Government’s view, an un­
controlled rise in population in a country which did not have 
a diversified and an expanding economy could lead to only 
one result. The rising pressure on the land would oblige 
the cultivators to take soils of inferior quality under culti 
vation, and would in the course of time lower the profits of 
agriculture. ’Some experienced officers under us are already 
of opinion that the land is less productive now than former­
ly’, the Bombay Government pointed out in a despatch to the 
Secretary of State of India which rebutted the Sabha’s 
accusations. But there were obvious limitations to what the 
Government could do in the circumstances. All ’civilised’ 
communities exercised a voluntary restraint on the increase 
of population. In India the limit was set by famines and 
epidemics. Marriage was enforced by religious sanctions, and 
the possession of heirs was the precondition of salvation. 
Small wonder then that the great bulk of the people lived and 
multiplied ’with the only check to the rise of population
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being starvation and disease*. The persistence of such 
social beliefs was leading to disastrous consequences, for 
while
a government can do much to foster the development 
of the country, it can do little or nothing to en­
rich such of its subjects as are wanting in thrift 
or enterprise...(Progress) depends more on the 
desire of the people to learn than on the capacity 
of the government to teach, and after all the 
principal object of government is to afford pro­
tection to life and property, and the accumulation 
of wealth must be left to individual action. It 
cannot be denied that as regards security of life 
and property, opportunity of education, etc., 
there is no comparison between present and former 
ideas...But still the people are worse off than 
they were ten or fifteen years ago...34
The Sarvajanik Sabhafs ability to put the Bombay Govern­
ment on the defensive indicates how effective the new elite 
was becoming. The SabhaTs success also highlights the im­
potence of a traditional leader like Gopal Narsingh Deshmukh. 
But to play the role of a deshmukh to the full, it was essen­
tial for the Sabha to secure participation by the peasants in 
its campaign against the Francis Settlement, not least because 
the elites who comprised its backbone were urban based and 
urban oriented, and lacked that intimate connection with the 
kunbis which lay behind the power and influence of the 
fnatural* leaders of rural society. In pursuit of this tactic,
34
BA. Despatch to Secretary of State for India dated 27
December 1875: R.D., Vol. 44A of 1875, Part I.
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villages, to whip up the kunbisT opposition to the rates
imposed under the new survey, and to apprise them of the
reasons behind their impoverished condition. The Sabhafs
success in arousing the peasants against the new Settlement
was dramatic, and became immediately apparent to the
authorities. One Superintendent of the Revenue Survey, for
instance, ran into organised opposition the moment he tried
to introduce the Francis rates to the ryots of Barsi taluka:
I had scarcely concluded my explanatory remarks 
[Waddington wrote to Francis] when most of the 
assembled ryots stood up, refusing to have their 
Tkhatasf examined, and declaring their intention 
to pay no more assessment than they had hitherto 
been in the habit of paying. I endeavoured to 
reason with them and to point out the grounds on 
which it was but equitable that their payments 
should be raised; but without success, and so ex­
cited and disrespectful was their demeanour that I 
felt myself bound to report the matter to you for 
further instructions... I have little doubt that 
the opposition has been fostered by the Sarvajanik 
Sabha of Sholapur.35
Waddingtonfs experience was not an isolated instance of the
SabhaTs ability to arouse opposition to the new scale of
rates. The revised assessment had been introduced without
any trouble in the talukas of Madhe and Sholapur in 1872.
But while the ryots had quietly accepted the new rates in the
the Poona Sabha and its branches sent agitators to the
35
BA. Letter from W. Waddington dated 18 April 1874: R.D.,
Vol. 104 of 1874.
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first instance, they refused to pay the land-tax the moment 
agitators connected with the Sabha appeared in their midst, 
and told them that in raising the rental the Survey Depart­
ment had encroached upon their rights and was depriving them 
of the fruits of their labour. The Collector of Satara 
believed that these agitators had urged the cultivators ’to 
refuse to pay the new assessment, trusting to them, the 
Surwajanik Sabha (sic), to make it all right for them to do 
so* 36 .
The Outbreak of the Deccan Riots
The disaffection aroused by the Sabha*s agitation 
thoroughly alarmed the Bombay authorities, particularly 
because the depth of this disaffection was obvious from the 
alarming reports which poured in from one taluka after 
another of the increasing resistance which the ryots were 
offering to the payment of the new taxes. It was true that 
most revenue officers were of the opinion that the ryots1 
intransigence stemmed from the impoverishment which had 
overtaken them as a result of a succession of bad harvests. 
But an inability to pay the rental due to the State was not
36
BA. L e tte r  from C o l l e c t o r  of  S h o la p u r  d ated  3 December
1873: R . D . ,  V o l .  97 o f  1874.
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the only reason behind the truculence exhibited by the 
kunbis, as Waddington had discovered to his great surprise 
while introducing the new rates in Barsi taluka. The high 
pitch of the Francis rates had led to an alliance between 
the traditional leaders of rural society and the new elites 
of the Sabha, and this alliance was an important factor in 
shaping the peasants1 attitude to the new Settlement, Point­
ing to the active role which a few leading families of the 
taluka of Bhimthari had played in the Sabha’s ’no-tax’ cam­
paign, the Collector of Poona observed: ’It may seem strange 
to connect a general failure in the collection of a whole 
taluka long under our rule, with the discontent of a few 
f a m i l i e s . B u t  it must be remembered that these families 
had considerable influence under the former Government, 
which still exists to some d e g r e e . . . ’37
The situation took so serious a turn that in April 1874 
Havelock, the Revenue Commissioner, called a meeting of the 
revenue officials of the affected districts in order to 
chalk out a course of action that would relieve the tension 
prevailing in the rural areas. In a letter written to the 
Collector of Poona on the eve of the conference, Havelock
37
BA. Letter from Collector of Poona to Bombay Government
dated 14 December 1873: R.D., Vol. 97 of 1874.
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outlined his views on the problem, and the means he con­
sidered expedient for its solution. He was prepared to view 
with sympathy appeals for reductions in tax from ryots who 
were unable to pay their rents, but he would not yield an 
inch to the spirit of opposition fostered by the Sabha and a 
few disgruntled territorial families38. However, the dis­
cussions which took place at the conference revealed how 
difficult it was to arrive at any definite conclusions re­
garding the peasants’ ability (or inability) to pay the 
enhanced rental. Rao Saheb Balwant Sitaram, the mamlatdar of 
Bhimthari, felt that the peasants were genuinely unable to 
pay the new rates, because the opposition ’was as great in 
the revised villages that had good crops, as in those that 
had bad crops’. But the mamlatdar was opposed by the 
Collector of Poona, who held that the opposition sedulously 
propagated by the Sabha in alliance with the disaffected 
territorial families had alienated the ryots to such an 
extent that they were thirsting for a collision with the 
authorities. The solution suggested by the Collector was 
of a piece with his prognosis. Once the spirit of the 
leading families had been broken by the confiscation of
38
BA. Letter from H.D. Havelock to the Collector of Poona
dated 26 December 1 8 7 3 :  R.D., Vol. 97  of 1 8 7 4 .
their estates, he pointed out, the peasantry would no longer 
dare to oppose the revised rates39.
But the Bombay Government refused to embark upon a 
repressive course of action because a deterioration in 
economic conditions had been brought to light by the in­
quiries provoked by the Sabha.Ts charges; and because the 
revised rates had hit the poor cultivators harder than the 
more prosperous ryots^O. Instead of accepting the sugges­
tions of the Collector of Poona, the Government extended a 
series of concessions to the ryots in order to obviate their 
hostility to the revised rates. It resolved that in no case 
should the assessment of a taluka or a group of villages be 
raised by more than 50 per cent; or that of a single village 
by more than 75 per cent. It also decided that if a 
cultivator was unable to pay his tax, then the Revenue Depart 
ment would in the first instance attach his movable property, 
the ryotfs holdings being auctioned only when his movable 
property proved insufficient to cover the full ammount of 
the tax^l,
39BA. Letter from Collector of Poona dated 13 May 1874: R.D. 
Vol. 97 of 1874. Also see Minutes of a Departmental Confer­
ence held in Poona on 14 April 1874: R.D., Vol. 97 of 1874»
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R . D . ,  V o l .  97 o f  1874.
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The imposition of a ceiling on the extent to which the 
assessment could be raised mitigated the ryots1 hostility 
to the authorities and to the Francis Settlement. But the 
decision to attach the ryotsT movable property, if they 
failed to pay the land-tax, held implications which suddenly 
intensified the tensions in rural society. It is important 
to bear in mind that despite the opposition provoked by the 
Francis Settlement, the disquiet prevailing in the Deccan 
stemmed basically from the loss of their lands by the kunbis, 
and the dominance which the vanis had consequently come to 
acquire over rural society. Undoubtedly the American Civil 
War and a series of bad harvests had combined to provoke a 
degree of rural ferment which was unusual . But the most 
important cleavage in the rural world still flowed from the 
antagonism between the peasants and the moneylenders. Because 
of the dependence of the ryots on the vanis for the payment 
of the land-revenue, the decision to impose a preferential 
alienability on movable property was a concession which was 
immediately exploited by the vanis. The vani had hitherto 
advanced the assessment to the ryot in the knowledge that if 
the latter defaulted, then the only security which he had to 
offer, namely, his land, had to be attached by the Revenue 
Department. Since the government had now declared its 
intention to alienate the ryotfs movable property in the
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first instance, the vani did not see any threat to the ryotfs 
land, and refused to advance him the land revenue.
The dormant antagonism between the moneylenders and the 
cultivators was consequently transformed into open class and 
caste warfare, and the pressures which had been building up 
within rural society erupted in the form of a violent con­
flict between the kunbis and the vanis. It would be mislead­
ing to look upon this upheaval as a phenomenon stemming from 
a single cause. The dislocation of the rural economy by the 
American Civil War; an ill-conceived Settlement by Francis; 
the agitation launched by the Poona Sarva.janik Sabha and 
backed by the dominant rural families; and finally, the 
simmering hostility between the kunbis and the vanis, conjoin­
ed to contribute to the tension and the social frustration 
which expressed itself in the riots of 1875. The social com­
plexion of the disturbances was determined by the Govern­
ment's decision to make the ryotsT movable property alienable, 
which put an abrupt end to financial transactions in rural 
society; it was also influenced by the fact that the tie 
between the kunbis and the vanis was the weakest link in the 
chain which bound different classes and castes in rural 
society.
In contrast to the opposition to the Francis rates, the 
Riots of 1875 were spontaneous and did not bear any evidence
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of the organisation that had gone into the Sabha’s ’no-tax’ 
campaign. Moreover, while the anti-Settlement agitation had 
revealed the extent to which the old landed families still 
exercised influence over rural society, the upsurge against 
the moneylenders brought into sharp focus the fragmentation 
between the different castes and groups of the village com­
munity whose close interdependence was formerly a distinguish­
ing feature of rural life. Thus the Patel had become so 
closely associated with the administration that he was now 
incapable of leading the cultivators, and was looked upon by 
them with suspicion as the member of a hostile institution. 
Similarly, the partial introduction of the cash nexus, and 
the spread of an acquisitive spirit, had driven a wedge between 
the cultivators and the bullotedars which had been absent 
earlier.
In the initial stages of the upsurge of 1875 the 
cultivators restricted their action to the imposition of 
social sanctions against the vanis in an attempt to browbeat 
them into acquiescence without resorting to violent measures. 
Their moderation is brought out in a sama patra (bond of agree­
ment) executed by the ryots of Kallas in Indapur, which 
illustrates at the same time the fragmentation that had come 
about along caste and functional lines in the village at this 
juncture. The main fire of the sama patra was directed
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kunbi cultivating the field of a vani
will neither be allowed to come to caste dinners 
nor intermarry amongst his own society. Such 
person will be considered outcaste. He will not 
be allowed to join the community without their 
unanimous consent, and will have to pay the fine 
which the community may inflict on him, and 
further to give one meal to the community.42
But there were many indications of the lack of co-operation,
if not actual friction, between the kunbis who were the
driving force behind the anti-vani upsurge, and the village
officers and the bullotedars. The latter were threatened
with the termination of their customary dues if they did not
join the rest of the village in the boycott of the vanis; and
the Patel, instead of leading the kunbis to whom he was
related by bonds of class and caste, had to be warned that
fif he joins the moneylending people, his hereditary rights
will be discontinued...1
Coercion of the vanis along the lines adumbrated by the
ryots of Kallas soon spread extensively to the villages of
Poona, Ahmednagar, Sholapur and Satara. In the absence of
any centralised control, it is difficult to trace the lines
along which the movement gained momentum. But a letter
42
Substance of a Sama Patra by the Villagers of Kallas in the 
taluka of Indapur dated 7 May 18 7 5 :  Report of the Deccan 
Riots Commission. Vol. II.
against the moneylenders, since it pointed out that any
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Community of AkolaT gives an indication of the mechanism
responsible for the spread of the anti-vani agitation.
Rebuking the ryots of Akola for their apparent refusal to
co-operate with their caste-fellows in other villages, the
cultivators of Kallas asserted in their letter:
It is very wrong of your people to keep communica­
tion with the marwaris whom we excluded from the 
community of this village. Unanimity is very 
important at this time. You will perhaps know this 
if you give the subject mature consideration, and 
we therefore refrain from making further remarks 
about the matter.43
They proceeded to appeal to Akola in the name of the tradi­
tional ties binding the two villages (’We have always regard­
ed Kallas and Akola one’); they asked them to send two 
responsible elders to thrash out the issue at a meeting; and 
they concluded with a renewed plea for unity at so critical 
a period: ’We shall be helpless’, they said, ’should you take 
no measure to (prevent co-operation with the moneylenders),.. 
For the good of all of us it is necessary that we should 
co-operate with each other.’
The widespread adoption of social sanctions against the 
moneylenders created so tense a situation in the Deccan that
43
Letter from the Villagers of Kallas to the Villagers of 
Akola dated 15 May 1875: Report of the Deccan Riots Commis­
sion, Vol. II.
written by the ryots of Kallas to the neighbouring ’Village
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a violent clash between the kunbis and the vanis became in­
evitable. The first outbreak occurred at Supa, a largish 
village in Bhimthari taluka, on 12 May 1875« The victims of 
the ryots were the vanis, of whom there were a goodly number 
in Supa. Their houses and shops were stripped of everything 
which the rioters could find, and then burnt, but no 
violence to any person was committed. Within 24 hours of 
the outbreak at Supa, the leading marwari of Khairgaon, a 
village 14 miles away, had his residence burnt. In the 
following days riots occurred in four other villages of 
Bhimthari, and threatened in 17 more. The contagion then 
spread to the talukas of Indapur and Purandhar. Outside 
Poona district, the disturbances were concentrated in the 
talukas of Parner, Shrigonda, Nagar and Kargat in the Col- 
lectorate of Ahmadnagar. The riot at Supa was singular in 
the wholesale destruction of property; and that at Damareh 
in the murderous assault on a vani. In a few other cases 
the ryots threatened the vanis with violence. But on the 
whole the disturbances were associated with little violent 
crime. The object of the rioting cultivators was to obtain 
and destroy the bonds and decrees in possession of the money­
lenders. Where these were given up without any resistance, 
no bodily harm was done; but if the marwaris refused to yield 
the legal documents in their possession, violence was used
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the kunbis forced to resort to extreme measures, and the
’non-violent’ character of their proceedings impressed itself
forcibly on the Commission investigating the disturbances:
In reviewing the character of the disturbances 
generally [ran the report of the Commission] 
the most remarkable feature presented is the small 
amount of serious crime. A movement which was a 
direct appeal to physical force was over a large 
area usually restrained within the limits of a 
mere demonstration; the moderation is in some 
measure to be attributed to the nature of the move­
ment itself. It was not so much a rebellion 
against the oppressor, as an attempt to accomplish 
a very definite and practical object, namely, the 
disarming of the enemy by taking his weapons 
(bonds and accounts), and for that purpose mere 
demonstration of force was usually enough.44
The unique features of the Deccan Riots of 1875 were a
reflection of the tensions generated within rural society
through the legal and administrative reforms carried out by
the British Government. Before 1818, rural society in the
Deccan was characterised by an intimate interdependence
between the different caste and functional groups which went
into the making of a village. The dominance of the ryots, a
feature which found expression in the power and influence of
the Patel, created the consensus which held these groups
together. It was also responsible for generating a social
to intimidate them. Fortunately, only in a few cases were
44
Report of  the  Deccan  R io ts  C om m ission« V o l .  I ,  para  15«
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climate in which collective action rather than individual 
endeavour formed the basis of the social order. All this 
was transformed under the impact of Utilitarian policies 
which tried to mould rural life along individualistic and 
acquisitive lines. The key-note to the resulting changes in 
Maharashtrian society was provided by the increasing 
dominance of the vanis, and the growing antagonism between 
the latter and the ryots.
The tension between the vani and the kunbi was not the 
only line of cleavage within the village, but it was the 
relationship which displayed the maximum antagonism in rural 
society. The climate of individualism and acquisitiveness 
encouraged by Utilitarian measures of reform undermined the 
collective structure of the village and split it into dis­
crete functional groups: alienating the Patel from the kunbis 
through stripping him of his traditional authority; setting 
the bullotedars against the ryots through introducing them to 
the notion of a cash nexus; and transforming the harmonious 
relationship between the vani and the kunbi into one of con­
flict by the introduction of new legal principles and the 
creation of new judicial institutions. To an extent these 
changes were calculatedly fostered by the advocates of reform 
in the fond hope that the breakdown of the village community 
would set in motion a revolution in rural society. But the
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caste styles which fashioned the pattern of rural life 
stood in the way of the transformations which the Utilitar­
ians regarded as politically expedient and socially desirable. 
The caste values of the marwaris, for instance, prevented 
them from becoming capitalist farmers even after they had 
acquired large holdings of agricultural land. Instead, they 
preferred to lease their estates at rack rents to the 
former proprietors. The marwaris thereby generated a climate 
of conflict and strife which had been absent earlier, and 
which could have been avoided if they had taken to farming 
on capitalist lines.
The basic cause of the Deccan Riots of 1875 thus lay in 
the social frustration generated through the growing antagon­
ism between the cultivators and the moneylenders. Other 
factors which contributed to the upheaval were the demograph­
ic pressures created through the peace and stability flowing 
out of British rule; the depression following the all too 
brief stimulus provided by the American Civil War; the 
impolitic revisions of the Goldsmid Settlement by Francis; 
the alliance of the new elites with the traditional leaders 
of rural society against the new rates of assessment; and, 
last but not the least, the increasing fragmentation of what 
was before I8l8 a cohesive village community. Once tensions 
within the village had touched the level of explosive
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intensity, the breakdown of rural consensus came along the 
axis of maximum antagonism, namely, that between the kunbi 
and the vani. Behind the changes responsible for this 
outbreak lay the ideals of the Utilitarian reformers. Their 
vision of Maharashtra was shattered beyond hope of repair by 
the Agrarian Riots of 1875*
CHAPTER V
RECONSIDERATIONS AND REAPPRAISALS
The Agrarian Riots of 1875 revealed the bankruptcy of 
the Utilitarian programme of reform for Maharashtra. The 
lynch-pin of Utilitarian policy was the ryotwari system of 
land revenue, which was introduced to undermine the collec­
tive quality of life in rural society, and to substitute in 
its place a competitive social environment. The Utilitarian 
reformers wanted to liberate the kunbis from their obligations 
to the .jatha and the village community, and to create the 
conditions for the rise of an affluent peasantry whose 
acquisitive instinct would form the basis for economic pro­
gress in rural society and establish a stable social order.
But their disregard of prevailing social values, and their 
lack of concern for Maratha institutions and the structure of 
power in the village, led to consequences which defeated the 
very objectives they had in view. The breakdown of tradition­
al rural institutions, and the introduction of a rational 
revenue system, did to a limited extent promote the rise of 
an affluent class of ryots. But these ryots were completely
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eclipsed by the growing dominance of the vani castes, and the 
simultaneous decline of the landed families whose power and 
prestige had formerly been the mainstay of the rural social 
order.
The implications of the rise of the vani castes had been 
recognised long before growing tensions within the village 
erupted in the distrubances of 1875. But so stultifying was 
the influence of Utilitarian values and laissez-faire precon­
ceptions on British administrators in India, that no steps 
were taken to ward off the possible dangers which loomed 
ahead. The inertia which characterised responsible adminis­
trators in the face of a problem that was bound to grow in 
complexity with the passage of time is reflected in the 
debate provoked by the representation of the ryots of Thana 
in I84O which set out the dangerous proportions assumed by 
the power and influence of the vanis over rural society.
When the disturbing picture set out in the ryotsT representa­
tion was confirmed by its District Officers, the Bombay Gov­
ernment raised the question whether the concepts of legal 
responsibility which guided the British judicial system did 
not require modification in view of their adverse effect on 
the distribution of power within the village. But so strong 
was the belief in the virtues of free enterprise, and so deep 
the attachment to the notion of a free economy, that even
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while acknowledging the magnitude of the evil, a civilian 
like J. Vibart, the Revenue Commissioner of the Southern Divi­
sion, felt that ’however injurious, in some respects, the per­
fectly free traffic in money may be to the advancing prosper­
ity of the country, any interference on the part of the 
government, in the way of limiting the legal rate of interest 
...would be of doubtful tendency; and possibly lead to 
greater extortion on the part of the moneylenders,.,’-*- While 
Vibart acknowledged the parasitic role of the vani, some ad­
ministrators viewed any attempt to curb the vani as impolitic 
and looked upon his role as worthy of support and encourage­
ment :
The moneylenders [the Collector of Surat pointed 
out] have already sustained a severe injury to 
their trade by the introduction of one universal 
currency and, in our zeal to protect the poorer 
classes, we should not forget the policy of con­
ciliating an industrious and very influential 
tribe, one of the few who are still attached by 
interest and inclination to our supremacy in India.
These people might be seriously injured, and 
entirely alienated from us, by precipitate legisla­
tion on the subject under review, while our revenue 
might be imperilled by a stoppage of customary ad­
vances, and the ryots themselves disturbed by the 
very means taken to benefit them.2
1
BA (Bombay State Archives). J. Vibart, Revenue Commissioner 
of the Southern Division to the Bombay Government dated 28 
February I84O: R.D. (Revenue Department), Vol. I 664  of 1844*
2
BA. L e t t e r  from the C o l l e c t o r  o f  S u r a t  to  J ,  V i b a r t  dated
29 J u ly  1 8 4 0 :  R . D . ,  V o l .  I 664 o f  1 8 4 4 .
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However, executive officers who had first hand exper­
ience of the social consequences of the dominance of the vani 
castes were convinced of the irrelevance of laissez-faire 
concepts to the problems of rural social organisation in 
Maharashtra. The growing dissatisfaction of such administra­
tors with the doctrinaire approach of their superiors was ex­
pressed by Bartle Frere, when as a junior official in the 
Poona Collectorate in the 1840s he pressed for bold govern­
mental action to remedy the serious turn the situation had 
taken in the Deccan districts. Frere traced the ryotsT 
difficulties to the principles enshrined in Regulation V of 
the Elphinstone Code of 1827, according to which loan transac­
tions between the vanis and the kunbis were governed by rates 
of interest regulated by a free market economy. He conceded 
that in a commercially developed country like England there 
was a lot to be said for the removal of restraints on the 
free movement of money. But in the Deccan ’where the popula­
tion are mostly needy, thoughtless and ignorant, and the 
Banians enjoy a monopoly of the money market, unrestricted 
license...(is highly undesirable)...13 Even a casual ac­
quaintance with conditions in the villages, Frere pointed out
3
BA. L e t t e r  from B a r t l e  Frere  t o  P. S t e w a r t ,  C o l l e c t o r  of
P o o n a ,d a t e d  2 Ju l y  I 84O:  R . D . ,  V o l .  I 664 o f  1 8 4 4 .
revealed the irrelevance of arguments in favour of a free 
market economy. The ryots were supposedly free to deal with 
a vani of their choosing; but in practice they were complete­
ly dependent upon the vani of the village, and looked upon 
him as a fwuttundar, and it would require an entire change in 
the constitution of the ryots to get them to seek pecuniary 
aid elsewhere14.
The conditions prevailing in the rural areas led Frere 
to suggest the determination of an official rate of interest 
to check the widespread practice of usury by the vanis. But 
while there existed considerable agreement with his prognosis 
of the rural situation, opinion was divided on the possible 
effects of an artificial restraint on the rate of interest.
The Collector of Poona, for instance, was in sympathy with 
the reasons that had encouraged Frere to suggest the adoption 
of so drastic a step. But he apprehended that any attempt to 
lower the rate of interest would have the reverse effect. It 
would encourage the vani to enforce even higher rates of 
interest than before in order to compensate himself in advance 
against the risks involved in the evasion of the law, and it 
4
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R.D., Vol. I664 of 1844.
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would lead him to charge high premiums for the loans he ad­
vanced to the cultivators^. The difficulties involved in 
enforcing an official rate of interest thus made some adminis­
trators chary of legislative interference in the operations 
of the money market, and turned their attention to more 
subtle means for supporting the ryots, Vibart, for instance, 
thought that the ryots would benefit enormously if all debt 
bonds had to be registered before they could be regarded as 
legally valid^. The registration of bonds, he pointed out, 
would impress upon the cultivators the precise conditions 
under which they were contracting a loan. It would also 
prevent the evasion by the vanis of the principle of dam 
dupat, which was rigorously enforced by the new Courts of 
Law, and according to which interest on a loan could not 
exceed the principal. The vanis circumvented dam dupat by 
forcing the ryots to sign fresh bonds every two or three 
years for sums made up of the principal and the interest, A 
system of compulsory registration would make such evasion 
impossible by exposing the succession of bonds through which 
the vani dragged his helpless client.
5
BA. Letter from the Collector of Poona to J. Vibart dated 
20 July 1840; R.D., Vol. 1664 of 1 8 4 4.
6
BA. J. Vibart to the Bombay Government dated 28 February
I84O: R.D., Vol. 1664 of 1844.
The legislative remedies suggested by Frere and Vibart 
were not without their merits. But they did not penetrate 
very far beyond the surface of the rural problem. For while 
the principles guiding the British Courts of Law were in no 
small measure responsible for the growing dominance of the 
vanis, the crux of the problem revolved around the ryot’s 
need for credit to carry out his agricultural operations, and 
the antagonism between the kunbi and the vani created through 
the institution of the ryotwari system. Formerly, when the 
payment of the rental was the joint responsibility of the 
entire village, the village community had borrowed money from 
the urban sowcar to fulfil its revenue obligations to the 
State. But through establishing individual responsibility 
for the land-tax, the ryotwari system directed the flow of 
capital to the cultivator through the village vani, instead 
of the village community. It thus created a relationship of 
tension between the ryot and the moneylender in a situation 
in which all the trumps lay in the moneylender’s hands. To 
reinforce the position of the ryot it was necessary to 
provide him with an alternative source of credit that would 
reduce his dependence upon the vani. It was with this object 
in view that P. Stewart, the Collector of Poona, suggested 
the establishment of banking institutions similar to the 
Montes de Piete of western Europe. Such institutions,
Stewart held, would ’ protect the helpless and needy (peasants) 
from being plundered by irresponsible persons...like the 
village banians...1 They could, under official patronage, go 
a long way towards undermining the vani's grip over the rural 
classes. But Stewart’s proposal was rejected out of hand by 
Vibart, who felt that the State was under no obligation to 
assume the responsibilities of a sowcar in relation to the 
cultivating classes.
A proposal which resembled the one made by Stewart, 
but stemmed from a more sensitive appreciation of the dis­
tribution of power in the rural communities came from H.E. 
Jacomb, a junior civilian in the Ahmednagar Collectorate. 
Proceeding at the very outset to the crux of the problem, 
Jacomb pointed out that in order to restore the cultivating 
classes to their former position in rural society it was 
essential to ’counterpoise the baneful influence of the 
village sowkars, and...(to inculcate) habits of thrift and 
carefulness among the rural population...7 But before any 
steps could be taken in such a direction it was necessary to 
grasp the basis of the vani’s dominance over rural society.
7
Letter from H.E. Jacomb, Assistant Collector of Ahmednagar 
to C.E. Fraser-Tytler, Collector of Ahmednagar dated 6 Decem­
ber I8 5 8: Report of the Deccan Riots Commission. Vol. II, 
Appendix A~^  (Bombay 1876). This Report is henceforth referred 
to as DRC.
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British rule had conferred a great boon on the ryot through 
awarding him property rights in the soil. Yet the expecta­
tions with which this step had been taken were not realised. 
Instead of making rapid progress, the ryot had sunk more and 
more into a state of impoverishment. This had come about 
because of his abject poverty, which prevented him from 
developing his land, and induced in him an apathy that was 
fatal to all notions of progress and social mobility. The 
ryots1 poverty could in turn be attributed to debts contract­
ed for the payment of the land revenue, and debts arising out 
of caste and other social obligations. Between his meagre 
capital resources and an accumulated burden of debt, the ryot 
was trapped in a vicious circle from which escape was diffi­
cult, if not impossible. But one method, Jacomb pointed out
by which the incubus of debt may be gradually but 
surely overcome (is) by endeavouring to raise small 
capitalists to act as a check on the listless sole 
possessor of money (the vani) in a village, and by 
which the great moral lessons of thrift and care­
fulness may be instilled, fostered, and nurtured, 
by the force of example in the minds of the native 
agricultural population. Could these debts be 
swept away or even modified, the ryots saved from 
their deteriorating influence, would be free and 
most probably willing to expend his energies, both 
in capital and labour, on the land so firmly 
guaranteed to him.®
8------
Ibid.
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The absence of an affluent class of ryots could be a formid­
able obstacle in the realisation of Jacomb’s scheme. But 
surely, he argued, there existed in most villages in the 
Deccan a group of cultivators who could be persuaded to save 
small sums of money for the establishment of credit institu­
tions like the English Savings Bank. The capital so accumu­
lated, and controlled, by the ryots could be used to meet 
the credit requirements of the poor peasants. The establish­
ment of Savings Banks would undermine the insidious influence 
of the vanis and would creat an atmosphere free from social 
bitterness in the village:
In endeavours to improve the social system of the 
millions of our subjects [Jacomb stated] it is only 
by small commencements and by striking directly at 
the root of an evil that we can hope to succeed.
It is in the aggregate of useful institutions that 
a good social system exists. But the aggregate can 
only be attained by careful and well considered 
atoms. The mechanist must bestow equal care and 
attention on the details as on the undertaking it­
self. The strategist must attend to individual 
training ere he can consider his organisation com­
plete. So with Indian society the details of the 
system must be remodelled, if we look for collective 
impr ovement.9
The Rational Conservatism of Sir Henry Maine
Jacomb’s proposal for the creation of credit institu­
tions controlled by the cultivators reveals his awareness of
Ibid.
the imbalance that had crept into the distribution of power 
in rural society as a result of the introduction of Utili­
tarian measures of reform. But even in attacking specific 
aspects of Utilitarian policy, he fully shared the atomistic 
approach to social phenomena which characterised reformers 
like Pringle. Because they shared the basic values of the 
advocates of reform, critics of Utilitarian policies in the 
1840s and 1850s failed to carry any conviction with the 
higher authorities, despite the fact that their analyses, 
and the remedies which they proposed, were most relevant to 
the problem confronting the British administration in 
Maharashtra.
What was required then was a new vision of society, and 
a new conception of the institutions and legislative measures 
necessary for the realisation of this vision. The accepted 
philosophy of social action was a creed proceeding from Adam 
Smith and Jeremy Bentham. Conceived at a time when mercantil 
ist ideas stood in the way of free commercial intercourse 
between the nations of Europe, and out-dated feudal laws 
inhibited the growth of industrial societies, Utilitarianism 
Thad been a corrosive solvent of everything that clogged the 
free play of individual activity'^. It condemned State
299
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interference in the name of social and economic liberty; but 
unfortunately, it continued to condemn such interference even 
when condemnation could only serve the cause of social oppres­
sion. When applied to Maharashtra, liberty for the vani and 
the sowcar did not necessarily mean liberty for the ryot. 
Actually, it meant the reverse. There was consequently a 
pressing need for a change in the premises of social action; 
a change which was essential if social improvement was not to 
be frustrated by an intellectual system whose founders had 
been unequivocally committed to the cause of progress and 
prosperity.
Utilitarian reformers of the second generation were not 
blind to the adverse consequences flowing from the application 
of Utilitarian notions of law and government to the problems 
of social organisation. It was precisely such a realisation 
which prompted John Stuart Mill, described as ’one of the 
finest minds and most generous natures of the nineteenth 
century1^ ,  to modify the ideas which the advocates of reform 
had inherited from Smith and Bentham and the elder Mill. In 
his essay On Liberty, J.S. Mill expressed a more sophisticat­
ed interpretation of the concept of liberty. From the notion 
of liberty as freedom from external restraint, Mill came to
11
Ibid., p. 3.
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the definition of liberty as free play for that intellectual 
originality which could alone form the basis of a progressive 
society. Similarly, in his essay On Representative Govern­
ment , he conferred a new dimension on the Benthamite concept 
of democracy. Instead of regarding popular self-government 
as freedom for the people to pursue their self-interest at 
the expense of organised social groups, he conceived repre­
sentative institutions as the necessary condition of that 
individual energy of mind and character which had to be 
stimulated in all directions, and which could be stimulated 
only if the area of individual thought and will was extended 
to include the affairs of the whole community-^.
While the modified Utilitarianism of J.S. Mill provided 
some answers, inadequate though they may have been, to the 
problems of an industrial society, the position was quite 
different so far as the British possessions in India were 
concerned. In India Utilitarianism exposed only its most 
vulnerable flanks. Utilitarian reformers lacked a sense of 
historical perspective, and they were ignorant of social evo­
lution as a phenomenon with a rationale peculiarly its own. 
These two factors combined to invest the school of reform
R.P. Anschutz, The Philosophy of J.S. Mill, (xford, 1953)> 
Chapters II and III, passim.
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with an insensitivity towards prevailing social values, and a 
facile optimism concerning the pace at which legislative 
measures could change deeply ingrained habits of thought and 
action. The shortcomings of the Utilitarian approach are 
clearly reflected in the failure to transform the kunbi into 
an acquisitive peasant who would exploit the opportunities 
offered by the ryotwari system to build for himself a posi­
tion of increasing economic prosperity.
In view of the consequences of the application of 
Utilitarian ideas to India, it was appropriate for one of 
the most significant anti-Utilitarian currents to be associat­
ed with a political thinker whose Indian career exercised a 
decisive influence on his intellectual development. Conceived 
as a conservative reaction to the Benthamite calculus of 
utility, and the doctrine of natural rights propounded by the 
radical thinkers associated with the French Revolution, Sir 
Henry Maine’s School of Historical Jurisprudence drew heavily 
on British experience in India in defining the place of tra­
dition and prescription in progress and social evolution. 
Intellectually, Maine was eclectic. But he wove different 
intellectual strands into a fabric that bore the unmistakable 
stamp of his genius. Darwin’s Origin of Species preceded 
Ancient Law by two years, and it introduced Maine to social 
evolution, and to the scientific method which distinguished
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his rational conservatism from Burke’s notion of the social 
order. Maine’s approach to social phenomena was inductive 
and rested on generalisations based on the observation of 
facts. In an address before the students of Calcutta Uni­
versity he outlined his approach in terms which marked him 
out as a thinker typical of his scientific age:
There can [Maine pointed out] be no essential dif­
ference between the truths of of the Astronomer, of 
the Physiologist, and of the Historian. The great 
principle which underlies all knowledge of the 
Physical World, that Nature is ever consistent with 
herself, must also be true of Human Nature and Human 
Society which is made up of Human Nature...If 
indeed History be true, it must teach what every 
other science teaches, continuous sequence, inflex­
ible order, and eternal law.13
But the most important influence on Maine was the Historical
School of Eichhorn and Savigny in Germany, which set out to
demolish social theories drawing their inspiration from
’natural laws’ like Rosseau’s general will, or Bentham’s
principle of utility. Abandoning a. priori assumptions of the
first causes of human society, the historical school entered
upon a scientific criticism of social phenomena in the light
of the historical data of law. It analysed society in terms
of its changing legal structure, using a method that was
13
H. Maine, Village Communities in the East and the West, 
(New York, 1876), p. 230. For" an excellent exposition of 
Maine’s ideas see P. Vinogradoff, The Teachings of Sir Henry 
Maine, (London, 1904).
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historical, in that it was based on data arranged in chrono­
logical sequence, and comparative, in that it relied on in­
duction from the condition of different societies in compar­
able stages of growth.
The chief value of Maine’s approach to social phenomena 
lay in his firm grasp of the idea of evolution, and of the 
relativity of values and social institutions. The insight 
which his method provided into the social process is illus­
trated by the analysis of rural society in India by Maine’s 
most distinguished Anglo-Indian disciple, Sir Raymond West, 
a judge of the Bombay High Court. In a polemical tract 
entitled Land and the Law in India which appeared in 1873, 
West hit upon the key Utilitarian weakness when he accused 
the reforming administrators of disregarding the quality of 
social experience which prevailed in India, and of assuming 
that the mere application of advanced notions of law and 
government would suddenly transform the habits of thought and 
action which influenced rural society. Progress was an 
orderly process which could not be quickened by the adoption 
of ideas in advance of the stage of development in which a 
society existed. Progress possessed a logic peculiarly its 
own:
History teaches us [West pontificated] that in all
nations growing up in a process of spontaneous de­
velopment, a change of institutions follows
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regularly on a change in the dominant ideas of the 
people. In this way the new blends itself imper­
ceptibly with the old, and the law is the mirror 
of the various aims and needs that it has to sat­
isfy. Thus healthily evalued, it rests healthily 
on the tendencies from which it has sprung, and 
affords at each stage a fresh starting point for 
some new advance of the ethical or political 
standard. Without saying that such a course as 
this is possible in India under British rule, one 
may yet say that the circumstances which make it 
difficult or impossible ought to be profoundly 
studied; that the results should greatly control 
our application to this country of abstract 
theories or empirical laws gathered in a wholly 
different field; and that as our institutions are 
the out-growth of special character, we should, 
before introducing any one of them...draw the 
popular mind in some measure within our own sphere 
of thought in that particular subject. No polity 
can be enduring which does not find room under it 
for the national virtues and defects; and while we 
are striving to improve the moral and intellectual 
tone of the Hindus by the influence of new and 
wholesome ideas, we ought in some things to wait 
patiently for their fruition. If our supercilious­
ness prevents our doing this, we may often place 
ourselves on some mechanical success while we may 
in truth have been sowing the seeds of political 
disaster and of a dissolution of society.14
Here then was the crux of the imperial dilemma as seen 
through the eyes of a conservative deeply influenced by the 
scientific spirit of the age. To every stage of social de­
velopment, ran West’s argument, there corresponded a set of 
social values and political institutions, and between the two
14
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there existed a definite and indissoluble relationship. 
Imperialism embodied the political control of an under-devel­
oped society by an evolved society. In governing the subject 
people the imperial administrator was often guided by his own 
advanced notions of law and government, and in attempting to 
apply these advanced notions to the subject society, he 
created difficult problems for himself. However, the very 
concepts of progress and order which made West critical of 
the Utilitarian approach to reform, also pointed out to hin 
the changes which British rule could bring about in India 
without risking social disintegration or political chaos.
The reason behind the tension generated in rural society was 
the application of sophisticated concepts of contract and 
legal responsibility to the problems of rural social organisa­
tion. The solution lay in a redefinition of these notions in 
conformity with the values with which the peasants of India 
were familiar.
In defining the extent to which the State could regulctd 
private property, or enforce legal obligations, West was 
drawn into an historical enquiry concerning the development 
of property rights in India. Premising himself on Maine’s 
investigations into the interaction between religious ideas 
and social structure in classical Europe, he pointed out ttat 
the growth of the State’s interest in the life and propertj
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of its citizens was closely connected with the development of 
religious values. In primitive societies the family first 
expanded into the clan; then the clan became a tribe; and 
finally the tribe was transformed into a nation. The primi­
tive State flourished under the protection of a deity propit­
ious to its founder; and this deity had to be subdued before 
a new conqueror could establish himself over the political 
community. By the same logic, the reigning deity was wor­
shipped by the national community which collectively owned 
the agricultural land lying within the State’s frontiers. The 
citizens comprising this community had to support the State 
by contributions from their agricultural produce, and this 
was an obligation from which no one could escape. ’A Roman 
proprietor could be fined for negligence in the cultivation 
of his own fields, as under the Hindu system he might have to 
make good ten-fold the loss occasioned by similar careless­
ness . The numerous agrarian laws were repeated assertions of 
the State’s permanent title to the soil...’15
Till a certain stage, according to West, the notion of 
the State’s permanent title to the soil developed along 
parallel lines in the entire ’Aryan’ world, whether it be 
Hindu India, or the Europe of classical antiquity. But with
15
Ibid.
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the emergence of caste as a social institution, and the 
spread of Brahmanical values, India entered upon a course of 
evolution peculiarly her own. The growth of an hereditary 
priesthood stripped the ruling chiefs of their jurisdiction 
over the sacred world, and the Brahmin priests, on their 
part, never attempted to usurp the secular functions of the 
chiefs. Memories of the chief’s priestly character were 
erased by the Brahmanical intelligentsia, though his politi­
cal power was exalted in the most extravagant terms. As a 
result the notion of challenging the secular authority, and 
rejecting its pretensions to the ownership of land, never 
occurred to the Indian peasant, as it did to his Greek or 
Roman counterpart. Hence the idea came down to modern times 
that the land was held by a powerful ruler or conqueror, and 
not by the tiller of the soil. Of course, Hindu lawgivers 
saw no inconsistency between such a view and the assertion 
that the cultivator held an inalienable though subordinate 
usufructory right in the land. According to one classical 
authority (Yajnavalkya) ’the cultivator is not destitute of 
ownership, (but) his ownership is a qualified one, and, being 
subordinate to that of the king, cannot be transferred without 
his consent...’^
T5
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With the State’s right over the soil resting on such 
firm prescriptive grounds, West elaborated his thesis, the 
extent to which it was desirable to prevent free transfers of 
land had to be determined exclusively on grounds of political 
expediency. Further, the ordinary kunbis, who were weighed 
down by a heavy burden of debt, had to be considered separate­
ly from the landed families which were losing their dominance 
to a noveau riche marwari caste. Just as the State possessed 
a prescriptive and inalienable property right in the land, 
similarly, rural sentiment had been traditionally opposed to 
’the severance of the family from the family estate...’
British rule had introduced the idea of free contract, which 
was a progressive notion. But it was completely out of tune 
with the state of Hindu society, and had resulted in the 
transfer of agricultural land to the vanis on an unprecedented 
scale. The notion of free contract had thus enhanced the 
vani’s ability to dominate rural society, and it was necessary 
to exercise a check on his power through legislative action.
Quite different, and more frankly conservative, were the 
considerations which West brought to bear on the problem of 
the decaying territorial families whose domination had for­
merly been the mainstay of the rural social order. He con­
ceded that an effete aristocracy incapable of looking after 
its interests deserved to be replaced by men of initiative
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and resources. It was a law of nature that the weak and the 
incompetent should go to the wall. However, the social 
cleavages which characterised Hindu society, and determined 
the values of different social groups, could be overlooked 
only at the cost of social chaos. It would be equally dis­
astrous to lose sight of the ultimate objectives of British 
rule in India:
This continued disappearance [West observed] of 
families, either of old repute, or just as their 
hours are mellowing by time, must be of the most 
serious import. India, which we are striving to 
make a political community, has no political 
nationality, no historical consciousness greatly 
diffused, out of which a true nationality can be 
developed to give force and impulse to its future. 
Families of distinguished social position, impel­
led to a certain loftiness of feeling by the pride 
of ancestry, and acting on hereditary principles 
of political conduct, are virtually indispensable 
in such a community. In this, and in this alone, 
the sense of public honour maintains its existence.
They use without effort an habitual power of com­
mand; and form a nucleus of organisations in the 
midst of what is else a mere chaotic mass of human 
atoms tending to no common centre as they are drawn 
by no common force.^7
The rational conservatism which West applied to problems 
that had defied the ingenuity of an entire generation of 
Utilitarian administrators created a climate that was favour­
able to legislative reform seeking to protect the cultivators 
interests. It simultaneously enabled British civilians to
17
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escape the grip of concepts which restricted their freedom of 
action, and prevented them from examining administrative and 
political problems on their merits. Perhaps the best example 
of the stultifying influence of Utilitarian ideas was the 
Ricardian doctrine of land rent, which tied up property rights 
with the fnet surplus’ yielded by the land. This doctrine 
enabled revenue officers like Pringle and Francis to present 
high assessments as generous on the specious plea that the 
State had created property rights for the ryot which he had 
never enjoyed before through leaving him a portion of the rent 
over and above the normal returns of capital.
When confronted with the disastrous consequences flowing 
from the application of Ricardian principles to land revenue 
administration, a Utilitarian like J.S. Mill raised doubts 
regarding the relevance of the law of rent to India. The 
Indian ryot, he argued in his Principles of Political Economy, 
was neither a wage labourer nor a capitalist farmer. Instead, 
he was a peasant earning his subsistence from the soil by his 
own labour and capital. For this reason his rent did not 
follow the ordinary workings of economic law, but was deter­
mined by the relation between population and land, rather 
than the proportion between population and capital. A farmer 
working on capitalist lines paid in rent only what he was 
able to produce over and above the prevailing rate of profit.
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But the Indian ryot was forced to cultivate the land as the 
only means of livelihood open to him, and could be bullied 
into paying a rent which absorbed all the profit except the 
minimum necessary for his subsistence^. Yet if J.S. Mill 
appreciated the dangers of a doctrinaire approach, he still 
viewed the problem from an exclusively economic standpoint, 
and extended strong support to a land revenue policy based 
on Ricardian principles^. For this reason, West’s analysis 
of the concepts of Land And The Law In India, which related 
property rights and the State’s competence to enforce legal 
obligations to a broad range of social and political issues, 
introduced a breath of fresh air in an environment which had 
for long been subject to the stultifying influence of laissez 
faire preconceptions. Maine’s ideas did not make any con­
verts in the dramatic fashion of philosophical radicalism a 
generation earlier. But it succeeded in focussing attention 
on the relativity of social values and institutions, and en­
couraged a catholic approach to the problems of social organ­
isation and political authority on the part of British admin­
istrators. Without ceasing to be Utilitarians, and without
J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, (London, 1909), 
pp. 318-28.
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substituting belief in laissez-faire values for active State 
interventionism, British administrators were henceforth to 
exhibit a new awareness of the complexity of problems which 
they had hitherto attempted to resolve on rigid doctrinal 
grounds.
The Deccan Agriculturists* Relief Act
MaineTs rational conservatism not only inspired the 
debate initiated by West, but it also defined the scope of 
the remedial legislation enacted to restore that balance in 
rural society which had been undermined by the advocates of 
reform. Casting his eye in the 1870s over the changes which 
had come over Maharashtra under British rule, W.G. Pedder, 
the Secretary to the Bombay Government, pointed to the decline 
of the landed aristocracy as the most significant transforma­
tion of all. Given the social mobility which characterised 
society in the West, such a change would have proved advan­
tageous. For it would have been accompanied by the flow of 
new capital to the rural areas, and the exploitation of 
rational techniques of agriculture by a new and enterprising 
class of capitalist farmers. But in India it was not so:
The landowner [Pedder pointed out] who had lost his 
estate sinks into abject poverty, embittered by the 
memory of the position he has lost, and, if a man 
of energy or influence, becomes politically danger­
ous... The moneylender, on the other hand, who ac­
quires the estate, though he likes the possession
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of land well enough, has no idea beyond that of 
getting all he can out of it, and would shrink 
with horror from the notion of leaving the town 
life, the security of his caste-fellows, the bus­
iness, habits, and the petty gains to which he is 
accustomed in order to reside in solitary dignity 
in a remote village.20
It was, however, the indebtedness of the ordinary ryot 
rather than the decline of the landowning aristocracy which 
aroused acute concern in official circles. This was because 
few administrators in the Deccan subscribed to a vision of 
society in which the landed aristocracy played any important 
role. On the other hand, as pointed out by civilians like 
the Collector of Ahmednagar, no government could afford to 
overlook the political consequences of the dispossession of 
the ryots on the scale on which it was being carried on in the 
Deccan. The point to be remembered was that this change, 
instead of being a ,naturalt one, had been brought about by 
giving to the country Tlaws, and I may say, advantages, for 
which it is not prepared*. The government was faced with a 
series of important questions; How would agricultural pro­
duction be affected when the land was owned by a social group 
ignorant of agriculture, and cultivated by a class of dis­
contented kunbis? What would be the effect of the large
20
DRC, Vol. II. W.G. Pedder’s Report quoted in Precis of 
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scale dispossession of the kunbis on the stability of 
British rule? Would it not be more difficult to control a 
community of disgruntled labourers, than one of happy peasant 
proprietors? Yet for the authorities to confine their atten­
tion to such questions was to give a very limited construction 
to the objectives of British rule in India. For surely, the 
Collector of Ahmednagar argued, the British Government had 
other ends in view apart from the maintenance of its polit­
ical authority:
The glory of the government has been that it has 
hitherto secured to a great extent the prosperity 
of the masses, and the highest credit of our Revenue 
Survey has been that it appeared to have settled 
these on a firmer basis than ever. How then can it 
but be a matter of great anxiety and uneasiness to 
Government to discover that the prosperity of the 
masses is declining and their happiness passing away 
before the encroachments of an alien community.21
The vanisT refusal to advance credit after the disturb­
ances of 1875 placed the ryot in so desperate a position that 
J.B. Richey, a member of the Bombay Executive Council, turned 
his attention to the possibility of State assistance to help 
the ryot cultivate his land. Richey observed that although 
the reluctance of the vanis to advance money had made agri­
cultural operations virtually impossible, the situation was
21
DRC, Vol. II. Letter to the Deccan Riots Commission by 
H.B. Boswell, Collector of Ahmednagar dated 5 October 1875.
not without its redeeming features. The riots had left the 
two classes ’on more equal terms than they have ever been’. 
The vanis had been chastened by the outbreak, and had come 
to realise the extent to which they were exposed to peasant 
retribution. The kunbis, on their part, had seen that 
violence did not pay any lasting dividends. The logic of the 
situation had drawn the ryots and the moneylenders together. 
In several villages of Poona and Ahmednagar panchayats had 
been called on popular initiative to settle differences 
between the kunbis and the vanis. In Supa such a panchayet 
had persuaded the vanis to accept payment on a graduated 
scale according to the antiquity of their claims. The crux 
of the problem, of course, was the availability of credit.
The ryots had no ready money of their own. But, Richey sug­
gested, it would ’be advisable to turn the present attitude 
of the sowcars and the ryots towards each other to account 
by assisting them to a compensation of claims’^ ,  if the 
Government assisted the ryots in clearing their former debts 
with the vanis, then the kunbis could start with a clean 
slate, and they would be in a position to draw the maximum 
benefit from the protective legislation which the authorities 
would enact in due course.
22
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Richey’s proposal received strong support from Pedder 
as Secretary to the Bombay Government. In a memorandum out­
lining the implications of the scheme, he pointed out that 
assistance would have to be extended to all ryots who were 
not hopelessly involved in debt. The ryots, on their part, 
would be required to mortgage their crops to the Government 
till their debts were repaid. In implementing the scheme, 
revenue officials would let the cultivators have enough grain 
to last through the year, and they would credit the remainder 
to instalments of the debt. The undertaking implied an 
entirely new conception of the State’s obligations and 
responsibilities, and it involved a considerable financial 
risk for the Government and an additional burden on the 
revenue officials. But the benefits flowing from it would 
be equally substantial. ’We shall’, Pedder pointed out,
’ have to spend a great deal more than this if we have a 
famine in the Deccan and shall then only save life, instead 
of providing the rise of the people as well.’23 However, even 
though the spread of Maine’s ideas had undermined a doctrin­
aire belief in laissez-faire principles, the degree of Govern­
mental involvement associated with Richey’s scheme appeared
318
23BA. Memorandum by W.G. Pedder dated 31 August 1875 J R.D.,
Vol. 118 of 1875.
319
Bombay. The proposal, he pointed out, would virtually
oblige the State to assume the responsibilities of the sowcar,
who provided the ryot with advances for the purchase of seed
and cattle, and for the payment of the land-tax. It would be
exceedingly foolish for the Government to take upon itself so
heavy a responsibility:
The more I enter the subject [Wodehouse stated] the 
more convinced I am that any measure tending to 
curtail the relations of the sowcar with the ryot 
must work prejudicially. We cannot possibly free 
the latter from their dependence upon the sowcars 
...Our aim must be to maintain friendly relations 
with the sowcar, to satisfy him that while we 
will do our best to prevent extortion, we will 
throw no obstacle in the way of the reasonable in­
volvement of his money. I am far from assuming that 
attempts in this direction will be successful; but 
if one attempts more, one will do great mischief.24
The rejection of Richey’s proposal set the broad frames 
of reference for the Deccan Riots Commission, which was ap­
pointed immediately after the disturbances of 1875, when it 
met to consider measures that would restore the balance of 
power in rural society in favour of the ryots, and protect 
their interests from encroachment by the vanis. The cultivat­
ors could be reinforced by either of two methods: the State 
could take upon itself the responsibility for supplying the
far too hazardous to Sir Philip Wodehouse, the Governor of
24
BA. Minute by Sir Philip Wodehouse, Governor of Bombay, 
dated 17 September 1875: R . D . ,  Vol. 118 of 1875« Also see 
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320
ryot with cheap credit, or it could modify the legal system 
in his favour. With the former means ruled out by 
Wodehouse’s commitment to laissez-faire principles, the 
remedy had to be found in preventive legislation and judicial 
reform. The most consistent step would have been a complete 
interdict on the sale of land in satisfaction of debts.
Taking their stand on historical grounds, West and Pedder had 
emphasised the legitimacy of such a step on the basis of the 
level of social development which prevailed in India, and the 
political and judicial values apposite to that level of 
development. But Wodehouse was against so drastic a change 
in the legal concepts underlying the British administration. 
He believed that if the right to private property in land was 
upheld, then it was also incumbent on the State to enforce 
responsibility for debts justly contracted, even if such en­
forcement led to the large scale transfer of landed property. 
Any attempt to interfere in such a process, he pointed out, 
would create serious complications through flying in the face 
of a natural process^.
25
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The Deccan Commission was therefore obliged to seek a 
solution of the problem through alterations in the legal 
machinery. The ignorance of the ryot, the Commissioners 
pointed out, placed him under a grave handicap in the struggle 
in which he was pitted against an astute moneylending class. 
The removal of the ryots’ ignorance was a slow and laborious 
process, and concerned issues which the Commission was not 
competent to discuss. But till the time this ignorance was 
removed, the Government bore a moral responsibility to see 
that the ryot’s lack of sophistication did not work to his 
disadvantage in judicial proceedings. The compulsory regis­
tration of debt bonds by public notaries, followed by the 
detailed record of subsequent proceedings, would be a great 
help to the cultivating classes. Courts in the Bombay dis­
trict, the Commissioners further observed, were situated at 
great distances from most villages, so that the ryots found 
it virtually impossible to appear as defendents in suits filed 
against them. The obvious remedy for this state of affairs 
was an increase in the strength of the judicial personnel, and 
the institution of Courts of Circuit which toured through the 
country districts^.
26
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The cautious recommendations of the Deccan Commission 
were framed to secure the approval of Sir Philip Wodehouse, 
who had made no secret of his commitment to laissez-faire 
principles. J.B. Richey, a leading member of the Commission, 
had special reason to be aware of the restricted construction 
which Wodehouse placed on the role of the State in the commun­
ity, since his proposal for the extension of credit to the 
cultivators had already been turned down by the Governor of 
Bombay. But despite the Commission’s moderation, it was 
only after Wodehouse’s departure that active steps were 
taken to reinforce the ryot’s position in rural society 
through judicial reform. Sir Richard Temple, who succeeded 
Wodehouse as Governor of Bombay, was an administrator cast 
in an entirely different mould. Temple was a product of the 
Panjab school of Sir John Lawrence, which combined a conserva­
tive and evangelical strain with a Benthamite concern for 
rationality and simplicity in law and administration. He 
looked to a vision of rural India as a community of strong 
and independent ’yeomen farmers’, who had to be protected at 
all costs from the corrosive influences of a commercial
civilisation^.
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Temple’s concern for the well-being of the ryot, and his 
belief in the effectiveness of State action as a social 
determinant, were reinforced by the preconceptions which West 
and Fedder had already applied to the analysis of the rural 
problem. Immediately after assuming office in 1877? he 
sponsored a draft Bill that went considerably beyond the 
legislation recommended by the Riots Commission in altering 
the legal system in favour of the cultivator. In a minute 
defining the objectives of the Bill, Temple pointed to the 
natural poverty of the land, and the demographic pressures 
flowing out of the stability established under British rule, 
as factors over which the legislator exercised no control 
whatsoever. He also referred to the creation of private 
property in land, and the institution of a rational adminis­
trative system, as changes which were irreversible, and which 
contributed to the social antagonism between the different 
rural classes. In a community subject to such strains, if 
the kunbis and the vanis took upon themselves to enter into 
conflicts like the one characterising the Riots of 1875> then 
there was little the State could do about it. ’But we ought,
I think,’ Temple stated, ’to see that our laws do not tend 
to bring about this state of things. At present they actually
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do so. Indeed, it is probably the case that unless this were 
so people would not be treading such dangerous paths.»2^
The remedy, Temple suggested in a radical reinterpreta­
tion of the principle of contract, lay in imposing an obliga­
tion on the Civil Courts to examine the detailed history of 
all debt cases brought before them for adjudication. Hither­
to, Courts of Law had looked only to the formal aspects of a 
case. On being presented with a bond that was properly 
executed, a Court was obliged to pass a decree against the 
ryot. The cultivators consequently preferred to keep away 
from the Courts altogether. Yet the bond which handed over 
the ryot to a life of slavery could be »utterly unjust - 
indeed...(was) generally more or less unjust». The original 
sum borrowed by him was in most cases a small fraction of the 
sum for which he was sued. The rest of the debt was made up 
of interest which was added to the principal at successive re­
newals of the bond. The debt could also be an inherited one, 
with the ryot having only the vaguest of ideas of the obliga­
tions which he had taken on himself:
With an innocent peasantry dealing with an astute 
and practised class of moneylenders [Temple 
stated] these circumstances constitute real
18
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grievances. Therefore the Courts should not only 
be empowered, but obliged to go into all the 
points to separate the real debt from the fic­
titiously accumulated debt. There should be a 
limit imposed on the accumulation of debt...There 
should (also) be a distinction between a ryot’s 
liability for his own debts and his liability for 
the debts of his ancestors•..29 (Emphasis added)
Temple’s draft Bill set about to redress the imbalance 
in rural society arising from the application of laissez-faire 
principles. Without questioning the concepts of economic 
rationality underlying British rule, Temple was advocating 
changes in the judicial machinery to support the interests 
of the ryot, and to undo the dominance of the vani over rural 
society. But the measures outlined in his draft Bill were 
opposed by the Supreme Government at Calcutta, which saw no 
reason to alter the existing law in favour of the cultivat- 
ors^O, Law Courts in India, the Calcutta authorities pointed 
out, already required proof that consideration had been 
received by the indebted ryot according to the terms of the 
bond produced by the creditor. For the Bombay territories, 
the principle was even more explicitly enshrined in Regula­
tion V of 1827? according to which ’written acknowledgement 
of debt in any shape shall not be held conclusive in any
29
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Court of Law...if the defendant shows that a full considera­
tion had not been received.’ The existing law thus offered 
reasonable protection to the ryot. To go any further in his 
favour would be impolitic. Temple desired the Courts to 
investigate debts even if the ryot did not put up any defence 
for himself. But the Supreme Government
doubted the expediency of legislation in this 
direction at present. It would cast upon the 
Courts an amount of work which it seems very 
questionable whether they could, as at present 
constituted, get through; it would afford many 
opportunities for fraud and evasion to dishonest 
debtors, and ought thus to be an incentive to 
reckless borrowing.31
The objections advanced by the Supreme Government at 
Calcutta failed to shake Temple’s belief in the need for an 
enlarged construction of the responsibility of Courts in 
adjudicating debt cases. He did not deny that there were 
provisions in the existing law which a vigilant peasant could 
turn to his advantage in his struggle against the vanis. But 
it was obvious, Temple pointed out, that the peasant was 
unable to do so because of his ignorance, and because of the 
superior business acumen of the moneylender. It was conse­
quently necessary to amend the law in such a way that the
31Ibid.
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duty of Courts to investigate debt cases became obligatory,
instead of being volitional.32#
The intervention in the debate at this juncture by Lord 
Cranbrook, the Secretary of State for India, turned the 
scales in favour of Temple, and resulted in legislation far 
more comprehensive in the protection it afforded to the 
ryots than the draft Bill sponsored by the Bombay Government, 
A glance at social and economic conditions in the Deccan 
convinced Cranbrook of the validity of Temple’s view that 
the poverty of the ryots stemmed largely from factors over 
which the legislator could not exercise any control, British 
administrators, he pointed out, had tried to grapple with the 
problem by investing the ryots with property rights, and by- 
developing a rational land revenue policy and a modern judi­
cial system. Their efforts had been rewarded with partial 
success through the emergence of a small class of affluent 
peasants. But they had simultaneously created acute tension 
between different social groups in rural society. The 
creation of private property had enhanced the ryot’s credit, 
and had encouraged him to incur indebtedness on a scale which 
was impossible earlier, while the vani had exploited the
32
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himself a position of social dominance in rural society:
This last observation [Cranbrook told the Bombay 
Government] brings me to the consideration of the 
Bill now before me. Your government has distinct­
ly perceived that the Courts of Justice we have 
constituted, and the law they administer, operate 
most harshly, and frequently with injustice, on 
debtors, who form the bulk of the population.
Here, therefore, is an opportunity for the bene­
ficial interference of Government...(The legislation 
proposed should therefore be) framed with the view 
of mitigating the law, and of extending the power 
of judges to modify the contracts entered into 
between man and man.33
There were, according to Cranbrook, two areas in which the 
Government could concentrate its efforts to assist the ryot. 
The remoteness of the Courts from most villages discouraged 
the ryots from appearing as defendants in suits filed against 
them, while the situation was further aggravated by a system 
of law based on freedom of contract. Both these difficulties 
could be resolved through the creation of new Courts which 
were suitably dispersed in the rural areas, and which dis­
pensed justice based on notions of social equity which the 
ryots understood and appreciated.
The Benthamite emphasis on cheap and efficient justice, 
and the Maine inspired recognition of the forms of law and
opportunities offered by the new Courts of Law to build for
33Despatch to Bombay Government dated 26 December I8 7 8: 
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administration apposite to Indian society, which combined to 
inspire the Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Act of 1879 found 
eloquent expression in the speech made by T.C. Hope in the 
course of piloting the Bill through the Supreme Legislative 
Council. Touching briefly on the reasons behind increasing 
rural indebtedness in the Deccan, and the consequent growth 
of an antagonism between the moneylenders and the cultivators, 
Hope pointed to the increasing dispossession of the kunbis 
by the vanis as the crux of the rural problem. It was, he 
confessed, legitimate to look upon this change as a symptom 
of social progress. The creation of private property in 
land was necessary for the well-being and progress of a 
society. It was equally essential that the land should be 
held by those who were qualified to turn it to the best 
account. If ownership of land was vested in a class which 
was unequal to its social responsibilites, and had burdened 
its inheritance with a load of debt that could never be 
repaid, then it was in the interests of the community for 
this class to be dispossessed. But while such principles 
were effective guides to administrative policy in western 
societies, considerable caution was necessary in applying 
them to India. So many of the dilemmas confronting the 
British Government could be traced to measures of reform 
which paid no attention to the traditional values and social
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legislation institutions which popular consent has maintained
for centuries,1 Hope stated, ’we sometimes forget that we are
not the bearers of a political revelation from Heaven’:
In the present instance there seems genuine reason 
for doubting whether the premises on which a 
policy of laissez-faire is based are sound. If 
the present condition of the Deccan ryots is 
caused by inherent moral and physical defects,... 
if they encumber the land to the exclusion of a 
class of intelligent, enterprising and energetic 
capitalists,...then indeed we must sit down and 
sit out the process of gradual transfer of the 
rights of property from one class to another...
But consideration will show that no such circum­
stances exist in the Deccan. The Maratha kunbi 
is not the useless and defective creature postu- 
lated.#.His embarrassed condition seems to be 
rather his misfortune than his fault, induced by 
the calamaties of the last century, the obligation 
of ancestral debt, the burden of the land revenue 
- firstly in amount and latterly in imposition - 
and the facilities for extortion conferred by our 
laws upon his creditor.
On the other hand, those into whose hands the land 
is now observed to be passing are not yearning for 
it to improve it by their capital or intelligence.
With solitary exceptions, the transferees are the 
professional moneylenders, who have no wish even 
to hold the status of landed proprietors...Such 
conditions deprive the transfer of land from dis­
tressed to moneyed classes of all the glosses with 
which political economy would surround it. They 
show that the noble gift of property in land, made 
by the British Government to the peasants for their 
sole benefit, is passing, contrary to their inten­
tions, and in frustration of their objects to a 
class unfitted to receive it.34
institutions of India. fWhen one overturns by an act of
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To Hope, then, it appeared that the Deccan offered a 
clear case for legislative action to prevent the emergence of 
the vanis as the heir to the decaying power of the cultivat­
ing classes. It was, he pointed out, necessary to restrain 
the moneylender from dominating the kunbi, though it was 
equally essential to ensure that he would continue to keep 
the kunbls supplied with credit. Any measure proposing to 
deal with the rural problem had therefore to assure fair play 
to the two social groups whose co-operation was vital for 
agricultural production.
The first concern of the Relief Act of 1879 was to 
establish safeguards against frauds by debtors or by credit­
ors in the original transaction of the loan. For this pur­
pose a bond to which a cultivator was a party had to be 
drawn under the supervision of a village registrar. Next 
came the provision of Conciliators for informal arbitration 
in disputes between ryots and moneylenders. If arbitration 
proved abortive, and the disputing parties decided to resort 
to litigation, they could proceed to newly instituted Courts 
of Law, which were situated within easy reach of villages, and 
were less dilatory and less expensive than the already exist­
ing Courts. These Courts were presided by Munsiffs, who were 
selected from respectable rural families. The Courts of the 
already existing Subordinate Judges, which came next in the
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judicial hierarchy, were strengthened in two directions.
Their number was increased from 24 to 31> and they were 
empowered to try a wider range of cases. However, in keeping 
with the best Benthamite principles, the extensive powers of 
the Subordinate Judges were counterbalanced by a machinery 
for supervision and control. Immediately above the Subordin­
ate Judges, therefore, came a Special Judge who was authorised 
to inspect, supervise and revise the proceedings of the judi­
cial officers under him. Apart from the reorganisation of the 
judicial machinery, the Relief Act introduced changes in the 
substantive law administered by the Courts of Law. These 
changes concerned the definition of a debtor’s liability, and 
were inspired by the belief that ’the passing of a bond by a 
native of India is often of no more value as proof of a debt 
...than the confession of a man under torture of the crime 
he is charged with’. In conformity with the new concept of 
social equity advanced by Temple, the Courts of Law were 
obliged to go into the history and merits of all debt cases 
that came up before them to establish the extent of the 
debtor’s obligation35.
35
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The impact of the Relief Act on the disturbing accumula­
tion of power in the hands of the vanis under British rule 
was immediate and decisive. Through obliging the Courts to 
go beyond the bonds which made the ryots the helpless 
prisoners of the vanis» the Act at one stroke eliminated the 
inadvertent bias in favour of the vani which had previously 
characterised the legal system. However, the changes which 
had come over rural society since the British conquest did 
not fail to influence the implementation of the Act. Not all 
peasants could benefit from its enactment. And the vanis, 
who had grown into a powerful class by the 1870s, were able 
to exploit some of its provisions to defeat the very object­
ives with which the Act had been framed. While Temple and 
Hope had made no secret of their desire to restore the 
cultivators to their former position of dominance, the extent 
to which the ryots were able to regain their power was deter­
mined by their prosperity, and their ability to exploit the 
Act to their advantage. Of course, the popularity of the 
Relief Act with the ryots was unquestioned. 1 In the various 
places through which I have passed during my late tour,T a 
Revenue Officer noted in 1883, fI have found that by all true 
agriculturists the Act is regarded as their charter of safety,
The Kunbi, the Vani and the Relief Act
and that no measure of government for many years past can be 
compared with it in point of popularity.f36 Yet the kunbis* 
enthusiasm for the measure did not bear any direct relation 
to their ability to comprehend its provisions, or their 
capacity to exploit the opportunities it offered them. For 
only the more affluent peasants were able to draw any sub­
stantial benefits from the Relief Act.
For the purposes of the Relief Act the peasants of 
Maharashtra can be divided into three groups according to 
their state of indebtedness, and the material resources at 
their command. First came a group of cultivators represent­
ing 10 per cent of the rural population. This group culti­
vated large holdings of superior quality with adequate stock 
and capital. Its prosperity was largely a consequence of the 
peaceful conditions prevailing under British rule, and the 
rational economic policies pursued by British administrators. 
These rich peasants of Maharashtra possessed small but not 
insubstantial reserves of capital, and when they incurred 
debts, they were fully competent to meet their obligations, 
and could therefore be regarded as solvent and independent.
A series of bad harvests, or a serious famine, could trench
36
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The rich peasants were followed by a group of cultivators 
who formed 40 per cent of the rural population. This group 
was the one most intimately affected by the Relief Act since 
its position, although serious, was not beyond all hope of 
recovery. Members of this group owned between 20 to 70 
acres of land of medium quality, and their best fields were 
usually mortgaged to the vanis. Despite the industry with 
which they cultivated their fields, they barely managed to 
keep body and soul together, and a succession of bad seasons 
could reduce them to a state of abject poverty. For the 
remaining 50 per cent of the rural population, which was poor 
even by the miserable standards of the Deccan, life was a 
perpetual struggle against the threat of starvation. Ryots 
belonging to this group owned between 10 to 20 acres of land 
of such poor quality that the vanis were reluctant to advance 
them loans on the security of their holdings. They did not 
own sufficient cattle to plough their fields, and they were 
obliged to depend upon their fellow villagers for this 
purpose, whom they repaid either by working on their fields, 
or by giving them a share of the produce. Even in normal 
seasons the poor ryots barely raised enough to feed their 
families all round the year; but if the rains failed, they
heavily into their resources, but could not ruin them.
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were forced to sell their cattle, and work as labourers on 
daily wages37.
Despite its bias in favour of the cultivating classes, 
the Relief Act was double edged in its consequences. By 
obliging the Courts of Law to go into the history of loan 
transactions it protected the interests of the ryots; but 
at the same time it made the vanis reluctant to advance loans 
to the cultivators because of the arbitrary and inquisitorial 
powers, so the vanis believed, with which it armed the judges. 
The reluctance of the vanis to advance credit to the culti­
vators could, as critics of the Act were quick to point out, 
have grave repercussions because of the dependence of the 
ryots on the vanis for carrying out their agricultural opera­
tions, But the Act did not precipitate any serious crisis, 
because different groups of cultivators were dependent upon 
the vanis to varying degrees, and the extent to which their 
credit was affected varied with their prosperity. Rich 
peasants were least dependent of all on the vanis. Their in­
debtedness could generally be traced to a desire for social 
ostentation; and the contraction of credit which followed the 
Relief Act did not affect them in any significant way. The 
reverse was true of peasants belonging to the second and third
37“I bid.
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groups since they were forced to borrow money to carry out 
their agricultural operations, and to pay their taxes to the 
State. But considering the social consequences of an unre­
stricted flow of credit from the vanis to the kunbis, the 
restrictions placed by the Relief Act proved to be more of a 
blessing than a calamity.
The fate of the ryots of the taluka of Kopargaon sub­
stantiates this assertion. Kopargaon experienced a series of 
bad seasons after 1879> but on the failure of their crops the 
ryots were unable to persuade their vanis to advance them 
credit because of the fear in which the vanis held the new 
legislation. In the absence of assistance from a source on 
which they had relied in former years, the ryots were forced 
to migrate to the neighbouring talukas to work as labourers 
on daily wages. But for the obstacles raised by the Relief 
Act, the ryots of Kopergaon would have received advances from 
the vanis, and would not have been obliged to migrate from 
their villages. However, their fields and cattle would have 
been pledged to the moneylenders, and they would have been 
reduced to the status of tenants. The ryots were actually^ 
better off as agricultural labourers than they would have 
been as the tenants of the vanis under the old order of things. 
Their wages sufficed to keep body and soul together, and they 
still retained their land and hope for the future. A return
to normal conditions of rainfall would see them back in 
their villages. One good season would improve their situa­
tion considerably, while a succession of good harvests would 
restore them to their former state of prosperity. If this 
was true of districts where conditions were unfavourable after 
1879? the improvement in the condition of the ryots was even 
more marked in areas where the crops were good. The contrac­
tion of credit which follot\red upon the passing of the Relief 
Act obliged cultivators to reduce their customary expenditure, 
and since they could no longer borrow money as easily as they 
had done before, they were thrown back on their own resources, 
and no longer looked to the vani for assistance. As a 
result, the share of agricultural produce which had formerly 
been appropriated by the vanis as interest was now retained 
by and distributed among those who actually tilled the soil38. 
While the ryots therefore welcomed the Relief Act as a 
measure that would rehabilitate them as the dominant class in 
rural society, the vanis construed it as an attempt to under­
mine their position, and immediately raised a loud outcry 
against its Tiniquitous* provisions. They were, at the same 
time, confident that the bid to relieve the ryots of indebted­
ness would prove abortive, since they believed that the credit
38
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agricultural operations:
The intention of the Government [the vanis pointed 
out in a representation to the Bombay authorities] 
is to relieve the agriculturists from indebtedness, 
but it is impossible to carry out the profession of 
agriculture without involving oneself in debt, be­
cause agriculture is a speculation. One is suppos­
ed to lay out money on land, and labour on for 
twelve months, maintaining himself by borrowing.
If, unfortunately, the crops are damaged, the cul­
tivator is required to ask from his creditor twelve 
months time to pay off the debt...And the creditor, 
on his part, is obliged to lend money for the next 
year, in order to recover his past dues. Thus a 
creditor and a debtor stand in need of each other; 
but it appears that the legislators have not suf­
ficiently considered this point.39
The crux of the problem, the vanis emphasised, did not lie 
in indebtedness as such. The real difficulties stemmed from 
the climate of distrust and suspicion which had been generat­
ed through the institution of a rational legal system.
Before the British conquest the relation between the kunbi 
and the vani had been one of co-operation and mutual trust.
The vani was regarded as a useful member of the village com­
munity, and his participation in the rural economy had been to 
the advantage of everyone concerned. TThe agricultural work 
...(was) not hindered owing to the agriculturalists1 dealings 
with a sowcar, just as the management of a family is not
which they supplied to the cultivators was essential for
39
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hindered owing to the wife having a husband1, the vanis 
stated. But the moment legal procedures were rationalised, 
the partnership between the kunbis and the vanis had dis­
solved, and the moneylenders were forced to secure their 
advances by bonds and legal documents, instead of trusting 
the pledged word of the ryots, which they had done formerly.
As the laws became increasingly formal, the moneylenders were 
forced to turn the screw on the cultivators. The resulting 
antagonism between these two classes led to occurrences like 
the agrarian disturbances of 1875« British legal institutions 
and British judicial values had driven a deep wedge between 
the two most important rural classes; while partisan measures 
like the Relief Act had undermined the vanisf faith in the 
integrity of the Government:
The Regulations of 1827 [the vanis held] protected 
all people, and gave no trouble and expense to 
Government in any way. New laws were not framed 
every year. The traders never hesitated to carry out 
their dealings. Now new laws are frequently framed, 
and so the traders have lost their trust in laws.
The traders and agriculturists do not know what laws 
may be framed by Government...Therefore they are very 
cautious, and cannot attend to agricultural work.
But the Government should point out a way by which 
the agriculturists would be enabled to get timely 
pecuniary aid. This would do good to all.40
Thoughthe vanis regarded the entire Relief Act with dis­
approval as a measure that would disrupt the rural economy of
40
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the Deccan, what they found most offensive was the provision 
which obliged the Courts to investigate the history of debt 
cases which came up to them for consideration. Such a pro­
vision, the vanis believed, openly encouraged the ryots to 
disown debts which they knew to be legitimate. Since the 
authorities were acting in a manner so blatantly partial to 
the cultivators, the vanis decided to discontinue their credit 
operations in order to impress upon the State, and the culti­
vators, the importance of their role in agricultural opera­
tions. Their decision to restrict the flow of credit to the 
cultivators is reflected in a reduction of 75 per cent in 
loan transactions in the years following the passing of the 
Act. But what was a calculated attempt on the part of the 
affluent vanis to force the Government to its knees, was in 
the case of the poorer vanis a genuine inability to carry out 
their business under the provisions of the new legislation.
We have already dwelt upon the changes effected in the vaniTs 
role through the institution of the ryotwari system, which 
channelised the flow of credit from the urban sowcar to the 
ryot through the village moneylender, instead of the village 
community. While some vanis like the Karamchands of Parner 
had blossomed into independent capitalists in the course of a 
generation, a considerable number of village moneylenders 
possessed little resources of their own, and they borrowed
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ryots in the village. For such vanis the passing of the
Relief Act was a major c a l a m i t y 4 1 . The new legislation did
not shield them from their creditors, the urban sowcars; yet
the ryots to whom they advanced money were fully protected by
the Act. The dilemma confronting these vanis found cogent ex*j
pression in an appeal from the TSmall Sowcars1 of a village
in the Junnar taluka to the Bombay Government:
Before Act XVII of 1879 came into force [they 
pointed out] we used to borrow money from larger 
sowcars at a low rate of interest and advance the 
same with or-without security to the agriculturists.
As we received our dues from these agriculturists 
without any very serious difficulties, we were 
better able to support ourselves and pay off our 
sowcars. Since the Act came into force we are 
called upon to produce our accounts from the begin­
ning in support of our claims against agriculturists.
We generally do not keep accounts. Our difficul­
ties do not end with obtaining decrees against 
agriculturists. The Civil Courts (now) have no 
powers to attach agriculturists1 movable property 
...(and) after obtaining decrees against agricul­
turists we are left to all intents and purposes 
in the same position in which one would find him­
self when his claim is time barred...The large 
sowcars have now ceased lending us money, and con­
sequently we have ceased lending money to the 
agriculturists. All money dealings have come to a 
standstill, and we are left without any means to
money from the urban sowcars in order to advance loans to the
41
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support ourselves. Our prayer, therefore, is that 
the Act be cancelled and the old order of things 
restored.42
Despite the * anti-vani* bias of the Relief Act, and 
despite the fate of the small sowcars, it would be a mistake 
to think that the measure led to a complete suspension of 
credit operations, or that it placed the moneylenders 
entirely at the mercy of the cultivators. Among other things 
it is important to bear in mind the ignorance of the kunbis 
who lived in the more inaccessible villages. A revenue 
official touring the *relieved1 districts in 1883 found such 
cultivators totally unaware of the enactment of legislation 
to protect their interests. They were aware that they could 
no longer secure loans as easily as they had done formerly. 
But they lacked the curiosity to find out the reason behind 
this state of affairs. There were, in addition, cultivators 
whom the vanis had always treated with consideration, and for 
whom the Act was therefore unnecessary. Such cultivators 
clung to their traditional values, and they still cherished 
the notion of an harmonious relationship between themselves 
and the vanis, so much so that their ffeelings...(were) 
strongly opposed to litigation, and they preferred almost any 
sacrifice rather than resort to the Courts*43.
42Petition by the *Small Sowcars* of Otur, Taluka Junnar, 
dated 28 July 1883: PARA, Vol. I, p. 401.
43Report on the Peccan Agriculturists Relief Act by H. 
Woodward dated 25 June 1883 : PARA t Vol. I, pp. 335-59.
But the most important reason for the survival of the 
vanis was their ability to exploit their dominant position in 
turning certain provisions of the Relief Act to their advan­
tage. Besides changing the substantive law, the Relief Act 
had provided for Conciliators who were meant to resolve con­
flicts between the kunbis and the vanis through informal 
arbitration and traditional notions of social equity. The 
Conciliators were appointed from the dominant rural families; 
and the office was created to partially restore to the tradi­
tional leaders of rural society the control over judicial 
institutions which they had formerly exercised under the 
panchayats. Behind the appointment of the Conciliators lay 
the assumption that the former rural elite was still capable 
of providing the ryots with leadership, and of playing an 
active role in the affairs of rural society. This assumption 
was erroneous. For like the Kowreys of Parner, the old landed 
families had mostly been eclipsed by the rise of the vani 
castes. The social climate in the village had changed to 
such an extent that influential and respectable cultivators 
actually shrank from accepting the responsibilities of office 
because of the odium they feared to incur in carrying out 
their duties. ’Individuals are more apt to stand apart and 
interest themselves less in communal matters’, a civilian 
pointed out. ’The Deshmukh, or mouthpiece of the community,
344
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whom every member of it looked to and heeded, is, in all but 
name, a thing of the past.f44 The individuals whom the au­
thorities persuaded to act as Conciliators bore little 
resemblance to the independent and influential cultivators 
who had formerly controlled the affairs of the rural commun­
ities. A majority of them were heavily indebted, and were 
consequently looked upon by the ryots with suspicion as the 
supine instruments of the moneylenders.
The vanis leapt upon conciliation as their opportunity 
to circumvent the offensive provisions of the Relief Act.
This is obvious from a comparison (see Tables A and B) of the 
decrease in suits filed against cultivators in the higher 
Courts of Law with the flood of applications which immediately 
confronted the Conciliators appointed under the provisions of 
the Act, As Table A indicates, suits filed against the 
cultivators in 1880 and 1881 dropped to 50 per cent of the 
figure before 1879? but this decrease was amply compensated 
for by the volume of judicial business handled by the Concil­
iators. The ’popularity* of conciliation led some British 
officials to view it with great suspicion. Ideally, the 
system required Conciliators of integrity, and disputing 
parties that were evenly matched in their legal acumen and
44
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intellectual sophistication. Neither of these conditions was 
forthcoming, since most Conciliators were heavily indebted to 
the moneylenders, who were at the same time far more intelli­
gent than the cultivators against whom they were pitted. 
Conciliation, therefore, often led to collusive agreements; 
and the institution was regarded by the vanis as a channel of 
escape from that ’inquisitorial* investigation into the past 
history of debts which was for them the most repugnant feature 
of the Relief Act45.
Yet conciliation was not without its advantages. It 
saved the villagers a lot of time and energy by bringing the 
Courts to their very doorsteps. It eliminated the friction 
between the vanis and the kunbis which was an inevitable 
result of the reference of disputes to formal law courts.
And finally, it intercepted a body of legislation which would 
have swamped the higher courts, and prevented them from carry­
ing out the investigations into debt transactions which they 
were expected to conduct under the new legislation. Judicial 
Officers like M.G. Ranade, who carried no brief for the money­
lenders, felt that the awards given by the Conciliators 
showed little evidence of collusion with the vanis. In the
45
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districts of Poona and Satara, for instance, Conciliators 
had reduced the claims of the vanis by 50 per cent before 
awarding decrees against the cultivators. This, Ranade 
argued, 1satsifactorily disproves of the allegation that the 
conciliation system gives a legal sanction to the claims of 
the creditors...T46 A glance at Table B would lead one to 
the conclusion that while the vanis may have preferred the 
courts of conciliation to the regular courts, the Conciliators 
were certainly not their creatures. For if conciliation 
amounted to the acceptance of the vanl’s diktat by the ryots, 
then it is difficult to explain the high rate of failure (50 
per cent of the suits filed) in the Conciliator’s attempts at 
arbitration between the ryots and the moneylenders. Despite 
the loopholes it afforded to the vani» the Relief Act com­
pletely transformed the quality of social feeling in rural 
society, and for the first time after the British conquest 
the kunbi was made to feel that in any dispute with the vani 
the weight of the administration would be thrown in his 
favour rather than against him. The effect of such an assur­
ance being held out was dramatic, and it restored the kunbi*s 
confidence in his ability to hold his own against the money­
lenders :
46--------
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(The ryots)...are no longer debarred from the hope 
of one day being free and independent [a British 
civilian pointed out in 1 8 8 3]. They are far from 
being oppressed and harrassed by the creditors.
They have ceased to regard him with stark dread and 
to accord to his dictates a submission which no one 
else could command. The local power and influence 
of the sowcar, more often abused than not, was 
paramount. All, or nearly all, with whom he came 
in contact were his debtors, and so his servants 
and fawning sycophants. The effect of the Act has 
been to change all this.47
The Relief Act of 1879 redressed the imbalance in rural 
society which had been created by Utilitarian measures of 
reform. This imbalance had resulted in the dominance of the 
vani castes without effecting that revolution in agriculture 
which alone would have justified the dispossession of the 
peasant proprietor by the moneylender. The Act was a recog­
nition of the inadequacy of the Utilitarian solution for the 
problems of Maharashtra. It was also a consequence of the 
rational conservatism through which Maine and West gained a 
new insight into the structure of rural society. Social evo­
lution and the relativity of values and institutions were two 
concepts which were central to MainêTs thinking, and they 
demolished the assumption made by the advocates of reform 
that a ’primitive1 society could be transformed overnight
47
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into an acquisitive community through appropriate changes in 
law and administration. By focussing attention on the 
rationale of evolution, and the relationship between values 
and social structure, Maine presented a convincing explana­
tion for the Utilitarian failure to transform the kunbi into 
an acquisitive peasant, and to persuade the vani to assume 
the role of a capitalist farmer. He simultaneously pointed 
to a way out of the impasse. Progress, he said in effect, 
could best be achieved through changes which took account of 
the level of social development prevailing in a community.
In his concern for tradition and continuity in the processes 
of change, Maine stood very close to conservatives of the 
Burkean school. But he reinforced their arguments with tools 
of rational analysis, and with a social vision, which com­
pletely undermined the supremacy of the Utilitarian world 
view. Maine substituted the facile optimism of the Utilitar­
ians with a sophisticated appreciation of the extent to which 
the British administrator could pursue economic progress and 
social justice in India.
The Act of 1879 was the first legislative measure which 
tried to refashion the law in harmony with traditional notions 
of social equity, and in conformity with the requirements of 
a kunbi dominated rural society. Since it undermined the 
dominance which the vanis had come to acquire over rural
349
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society, and laid the basis for a more healthy relationship 
between the ryots and the moneylenders, it was eminently 
successful in achieving its short term objectives. But the 
Act did not live up to all the expectations with which it had 
been launched. In introducing the Bill to the Imperial Leg­
islative Council, Hope had not only emphasised its ability to 
undermine the power of the vanis, but he had also prognosti­
cated that it would promote the rise of a prosperous peasantry* 
This did not turn out to be true. The Relief Act suc­
cessfully protected the ryot from exploitation by the vani.
But it also deprived him of the sources of credit upon which 
he depended, and to which he had no alternative till such 
time as he had accumulated the capital necessary for efficient 
farming. Yet the trouble here rested with the exaggerated 
expectations raised by Hope, rather than with any inadequacy 
in the provisions of the Act. A legislative measure seeking 
to change the judicial machinery could at best create a suit­
able climate for economic progress by the kunbi; it could do 
little to actually bring about such progress. Ranade had a 
clearer vision than Hope of the potentialities of the Relief 
Act when he pointed out that
the proper standpoint from which the working of the 
Act must be judged appears to me to be that it is 
admittedly an experiment dictated by an emergency 
and that it is further a compromise between the 
let-alone policy and extreme communistic suggestions 
...Whenever its effects on the credit of the ryots
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and the economical prosperity of the country are 
considered, then three characteristics of the Act, 
namely, that it is an experiment, a compromise and 
one of several administrative reliefs which were 
to have simultaneous operation, should not be lost 
sight of. A too sanguine or exaggerated view of 
its beneficial effects is necessarily doomed to dis­
appointment . 48
Once the legal disabilities which retarded economic develop­
ment in rural society had been removed, the one pressing 
problem confronting the ryots was an acute shortage of 
capital to develop the land and exploit improved techniques 
of agriculture. The inadequacy of credit was made all the 
more acute by the Relief Act, since it dried up the sources 
upon which the ryot had traditionally depended for carrying 
out his agricultural operations. It was consequently to the 
problems of rural finance that the State in Maharashtra 
next turned its attention.
4S--------
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CHAPTER VI
THE NON-ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY
The consequences flowing out of the Relief Act of 1879 
revealed the judicial system to be merely one of the factors 
responsible for the crisis which overtook rural society in 
1875» It also proved that alterations in the judicial 
machinery alone could not put the peasant on the path to pro­
gress and prosperity. What enabled the vani to establish his 
dominance over rural society was the ryotfs need for credit 
to finance his agricultural operations, and to meet the social 
obligations imposed on him by his caste status and his stand­
ing in the village. The Relief Act protected the ryot from 
legal exploitation at the hands of the moneylender. But it 
did little to assure him of a cheap supply of credit, partly 
out of an erroneous reading of the rural problem by the legis­
lators, and partly because of their restricted view of the 
responsibilities of the State towards the community. The 
rational conservatives who sponsored the Relief Act not only 
refused to pay adequate attention to the problem of rural 
credit, but by amending the law in favour of the ryots, they
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made the vanls reluctant to advance loans to the cultivators, 
and created a situation which threatened to undermine the 
foundations of the rural economy of the Deccan.
Because of the ignorance and the apathy of the peasants, 
and the commitment of the British Government to principles of 
social action which frowned upon minute interference in the 
affairs of the community by the State, it was up to the 
sowcars to devise a solution that would break through the 
impasse and restore the flow of urban capital to the ryot in 
the village« That the moneylenders had a shrewd idea of the 
importance of their social role is obvious from the tenor of 
their protests against the Relief Act, and their attempt to 
browbeat the Government into acquiescence through withholding 
credit from the cultivators after 1879« But the sowcarsf bid 
to force the government to its knees through starving the 
peasants of credit turned out to be a double-edged weapon«
For if the peasants banked upon them for carrying out their 
agricultural operations, then the vanis, in turn, could not 
afford to let their capital lie idle indefinitely, since they 
depended upon the business of moneylending for their liveli­
hood« Indeed, the decrease in loan transactions after 1879 
was not entirely a result of a boycott by the sowcars, but 
also reflected the inability of the small sowcars to conduct 
their business under the provisions of the new legislation«
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The accumulation of idle capital in the hands of the sowcars 
called for a solution that would remove the obstacles in the 
flow of urban capital to the ryot in the village* The need 
for such a solution was all the more pressing because of the 
rise of new social groups, like retired Government officials 
and the professional classes, which had substantial capital 
to invest, and whose faith in the ordinary channels of in­
vestment had received a rude jolt through the crises which 
had overtaken so many business houses in Bombay during the 
depression that followed the Civil War in America^.
The Proposal for Agricultural Banks
With the passing of the Relief Act the Government had 
for the time being exhausted its resources, and the initia­
tive for further action rested entirely on the moneylending 
community« Encouraged by leading members of the Poona 
Sarva.ianik Sabha like M«G. Ranade and S.H. Chiplonker, and 
supported by sympathetic officials like Sir William 
Wedderburn, a group of Poona sowcars headed by Rao Bahadur
1
NAI (National Archives of India)« Memorandum by Jhaveri 
Lai Yajnik, a Gujerati banker, dated 9 May 1882s Dept« of 
Revenue and Agriculture (Rev« Branch), A Procs. No« 13/20, 
June 1884«
Viziarangam Mudliar2 proposed the formation of Agricultural 
Banks with the idea of finding profitable employment for the 
capital lying idle in the hands of the urban classes, and 
supplying the ryot with the credit he needed for the cultiva­
tion of his fields^. Behind this proposal lay the belief 
that the flow of credit from the sowcar to the ryot through 
an institution which enjoyed official patronage would ensure 
fair play both to the cultivators and the vanis, and create 
the conditions for prosperity in the countryside« The system 
of rural credit which prevailed before 1879 had resulted in 
the social and economic dominance of the vanis over the 
cultivators: equally, the Relief Act, by amending the law in 
favour of the ryots, had undermined the vanis* faith din the 
impartiality of the State, and had persuaded them not to 
advance loans to the cultivators• Agricultural Banks were 
designed to avoid both these evils« For if the vanis were 
organised in banks which enjoyed the blessings of the State, 
they would have no reason to seek dominance over the culti­
vators, since the banks would protect their interests without 
involving them in legal processes of dubious morality«
2
Parliamentary Papers « Vol« LXII of 1887 s Communication from 
the Bankers of Poona to Bombay Government dated 18 August 1882«
3 Pari« Papers« Vol. LXII of 1887s *A Proposal from the Poona 
Bankers Regarding Agricultural Banks* dated 20 November 1882«
355
356
Though Agricultural Banks appeared sound in conception, 
the Poona sowcars did not underestimate the difficulties 
involved in launching a new experiment in rural finance« 
Before taking up the proposal with the Bombay Government, 
they propagated the idea of a rural bank among the leading 
sowcars of the mofussil towns in order to win them over to 
the scheme« Mudliar believed the co-operation of the 
mofussil sowcars to be vital for the success of his proposal, 
since the Agricultural Banks would have to depend upon them 
for a part of their capital, and because the influence which 
they exercised over the cultivators in their areas could, 
if directed against the Bank, seriously jeopardise the 
success of the scheme«
The Poona sowcars bestowed equal care on the choice of a 
suitable base of operations for an experimental Agricultural 
Bank« One of the most prosperous talukas in Poona district 
was Purandhar, which had a population of 75*678 distributed 
in 92 villages over an area of 457 square miles« Of the 
15*000 peasant households in the taluka, 13,400 possessed 
land of their own« The distribution of holdings din 
Purandhar indicates the existence of a sizable group of 
affluent peasants, who owned fields between 10 to 30 acres in 
extent« The annual income of the taluka was Rs«7>50,000, of 
which costs of cultivation accounted for Rs«3,00,000« The
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Government assessment for Purandhar amounted to Rs«1,00,000« 
The cultivators of the taluka were therefore left with a 
surplus of Rs«2,00,000, over and above the wages of labour 
and the profits of capital^.
For a taluka whose total indebtedness amounting to 
Rs*10,00,000, Purandhar, with an annual surplus of Rs«2,00,000, 
was in a sound financial condition« The prosperity of 
Purandhar persuaded the sowcars of Poona to choose it as the 
site for an experimental Agricultural Bank, since there was 
every prospect of its ryots being relieved of their burden 
of debt with a little encouragement and support« The 
scheme which the Poona sowcars outlined before the Bombay 
Government involved, in the first stage, the liquidation of 
the debts of the ryots of the taluka5# For this purpose they 
proposed the appointment of a Commission comprising an 
official of the Revenue Department, and two non-official 
members representing the vanis and the kunbis. This Commis­
sion was to settle the amount of debt to be paid by the 
cultivators« Once this amount had been settled, the Bombay 
Government was to undertake the immediate payment of the sums
4
Pari« Papers« Vol. LXII of 1887: Poona Sowcars to Sir 
William Wedderburn dated 21 October 1885*
5 Pari« Papers« Vol* LXII of 1887: Poona Committee to Sir 
William Wedderburn dated 9 January 1883.
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due to the sowcars. The Commission would then arrange for 
the repayment of these sums to the Government in the shape 
of annual instalments by the ryots* The payments made to the 
sowcars by the State, the Poona capitalists assured the 
Bombay Government, would be largely a fictitious transaction* 
For as soon as the Commission had concluded its inquiries, 
the proposed Agricultural Bank would assume responsibility 
for all advances; and since the sowcars would become share­
holders in the Bank for the sums of money due to them, the 
State would not have to advance any money to the ryots at all.
The crux of the sowcars1 proposal concerned the assis­
tance which the Bombay Government was to give to the Agricul­
tural Bank for the recovery of advances from the ryots. The 
Relief Act, the sowcars held, had made the recovery of loans 
impossible, and no bank could be run successfully so long as 
its provisions were not amended* The loans made by the Agri­
cultural Bank ought to fbe a first charge on the land after 
the assessment, and should be recoverable through the revenue 
agency free of costs like the arrears of land revenue16. The 
sowcars also assured the authorities that if in a year of 
scarcity the Government decided to suspend the land-revenue, 
the Bank would follow suit* But to provide for the
Z----------
Ibid*
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contingency of the ryots defaulting in the payment of the 
revenue, the Bank would have to be empowered with the 
authority of buying the ryotfs land, or the new proprietor of 
the land would have to be compelled to assume the full obli­
gations of the former owner. If assured of the support out­
lined in their proposal, the Poona sowcars noted in conclu­
sion, an Agricultural Bank would provide the ryots with the 
capital they required to build a prosperous future for them­
selves and for rural society as a whole.
The fate of the proposed Agricultural Bank depended upon 
the attitude adopted by the Bombay Government towards the 
conditions set out by the sowcars of Poona, For his own 
part Sir James Fergusson, the Governor of Bombay, assured the 
delegation of Poona capitalists who met him on the 23rd of 
November 1882, that fhe was favourably disposed towards the 
scheme,,,(and that) he and his honourable colleagues would 
give their best consideration to the proposal*7. But a memo­
randum by W. Lee-Warner, a senior Bombay civilian, expressed 
the reservations with which even sympathetic officials were 
inclined to look upon a scheme based on a new conception of
7
Pari♦ Papers, Vol, LXII of 1887: Reply by Sir James 
Fergusson, Governor of Bombay, to an address by a delegation 
of the Poona sowcars dated 23 November 1882,
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Lee-Warner opened his critique with an emphatic repudiation
of the •exaggerated views of the duties of Government which
had lately been put forward by some distinguished advocates
of State assistance in this Presidency,••1 He conceded that
in an agricultural society where the State stood as the
supreme landlord, the cultivators had a special claim on its
resources, and a strong case could be made for the extension
of State assistance to facilitate the flow of capital to the
villages in order to resolve the dangerous situation created
by an increasing pressure of population, and a decreasing
fertility of the soil. To mitigate these evils, Lee-Warner
observed, it was proposed that the State should extend support
to the sowcars, and at the same time protect the cultivators
by controlling the activities of the moneylenders:
All these statements [Lee-Warner continued] are 
more or less truisms, and on them X found my first 
proposition, that it is desirable for Government 
to render some assistance to capitalists for 
bankers who undertake to advance money to the land­
holders, and to exercise some control over their 
business. But in deciding to what lengths the Gov­
ernment should go, X hold that the former must be 
left to private enterprise, and that if this private 
enterprise is to be floated with cork-jackets by a 
Government guarantee, it will not be private enter­
prise, but a spurious form of State interventionism 
•••involving a check to real private enterprise.
The assistance which Government must give should, 
therefore,... fall short of being any part of the 
weight of the liabilities of the capitalists...But 
the State might place the business of land banks
the responsibilities of the State vis-a-vis the community«
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under special advantages, supplying none of its 
capital, taking none of its shares, and accepting 
none of its liabilities, but offering it special 
facilities for investigating titles, collecting 
interest, recovering arrears, and generally for 
carrying on its business by allowing the bank to 
employ the State machinery,8
While Lee-Warner was reluctant to commit the financial 
resources of the State to an Agricultural Bank on grounds of 
economic doctrine, Revenue Officers in Bombay were apprehen­
sive of the political repercussions of the assurances which 
the sowcars considered essential for the success of Agricul­
tural Banks. The ryotwari system of land revenue, they 
pointed out, involved a direct settlement of the land-tax 
between the State and the ryot; and the exigencies of the 
system often required the application of coercion by the 
revenue official to compel the cultivators to pay their 
taxes to the State. This inevitably led to some bitterness 
between the cultivators and the authorities. But if the 
revenue department undertook the collection of the instal­
ments due to the Agricultural Bank over and above its normal 
duties, then it would be increasing the possibility of 
friction between the ryot and the State, since the distinction
3----------
NAI. Memorandum on the question of State assistance to 
Agricultural Banks in India by W. Lee-Warner of the Bombay 
Civil Service dated 20 April 1882: Dept, of Revenue and Agri­
culture (Rev. Branch), A Procs. No. 13/20, June 1884.
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the Bank, would be lost on the ryots:
I cannot bring myself to believe [stated one Settle­
ment Officer] that the economic advantages which 
will be derived from agricultural banks in the 
Dekkhan talukas will outweigh the political objec­
tions to Government undertaking the duties of a bill 
collector towards a poor community of cultivators*
Since the days of the early settlements it has been 
the great boast of Bombay revenue officers that each 
cultivator has his one fixed Government demand ex­
plained to him once for all*««If this principle of 
fixity of payment is liable to be altered by the in­
clusion in the Government demand of fluctuating sums 
on account of agricultural banks, one great guarantee 
for the success and popularity of the Settlements 
will be removed* Let Government give every assis­
tance in its power to the establishment of an Agri­
cultural Bank,...but this one portion of the pro­
gramme should***be completely abandoned.9
Despite the reservations voiced by Lee-Warner, and
despite the possibility of increased friction between the
State and the ryot to which attention was drawn by the
Revenue Officers, the proposal for an Agricultural Bank
received support both from the Bombay Government and the
Supreme Government at Calcutta* This support was largely due
to the interest taken in the scheme by Sir Evelyn Baring, the
Finance Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, who
applied his experience of Agricultural Banks in Egypt to the
between the land-revenue, and the sums collected on behalf of
9
Pari* Papers» Vol* LXII of 1887: Report by Survey and 
Settlement Commissioner dated 13 December 1882*
problem of rural finance in India^®, Baring did not dis­
agree with the objections advanced by Lee-Warner to the in­
discriminate extension of State assistance to private enter­
prise, particularly if this assistance took the form of 
financial support* But he saw little harm in the recovery of 
the Bank’s advances to the ryots through the machinery of 
the State* Admittedly, in assisting the Agricultural Bank to 
recover its loans, the administration would be acting as an 
instrument of the sowcar, and would share with him the odium 
attached to his role* But the consequences of inaction, 
Baring pointed out, were even more dangerous* A peasantry 
which was being progressively impoverished presented a 
serious political danger; and unless this deterioration was 
checked in time, the rising tide of peasant discontent could 
undermine the stability of British rule in India* The force­
ful logic of Baring’s argument clinched the issue for the 
authorities in India, and the Supreme Government recommended 
the Poona scheme to the Secretary of State for India as an 
experiment which deserved official assistance, and which 
would not only reveal the degree of indebtedness and the 
general condition of the Deccan ryot, but would also
To
NAI* Memorandum by Sir Evelyn Baring dated 17 August 
18&2s Dept* of Revenue and Agriculture (Revenue Branch), A 
Procs* No. 13/20, June 1884*
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indicate the extent to which State action could contribute to 
the progress of rural society**.
At the India Office, however, caution prevailed over the 
arguments in favour of a bold policy for the resolution of 
the problems which obstructed the progress of rural society. 
The Secretary of State for India questioned the bona fides of 
the Poona scheme as a genuine example of ’private enterprise1 
on which alone rested the responsibility for financing 
agricultural operations. The Poona sowcars, he pointed out, 
not only wanted contributions in capital from the Government, 
but they insisted that the machinery of the State be placed 
at their disposal for the recovery of their advances. It 
would be politic to extend such support f only on the assump­
tion that it (i.e. the bank) is to work on behalf of Govern­
ment for political or social objects rather than be conducted 
on ordinary business principles1*2. But it was obvious that 
such an assumption would be unwarranted. Even if political 
considerations were for a moment set aside, there was little 
evidence to support the view that the Bank would succeed in 
its objectives. The vani in the village not only advanced
n
Pari. Papers. Vol. LXII of 1887: Revenue Despatch No. 7 
dated 31 May 1884 to the Secretary of State for India.
1 2
Pari. Papers. Vol. LXII of 1887: Despatch to the Government
of India dated 23 October 1884*
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credit to the cultivator, but he also provided him with a 
market for his surplus. Would the Bank too try to become a 
dealer in agricultural produce? If it attempted to do so, 
it would be embarking upon a business for which it was ill 
equipped. If not, then the ryots would remain exposed to 
the designs of the moneylenders. The Bank’s problems were 
hardly made any easier by the fact that the ryot, instead of 
negotiating a single loan in the course of a year, kept a 
running account with the vani on which he drew from time to 
time to meet his needs as and when they arose. An Agricul­
tural Bank was incapable of conducting business on such 
lines; and it could Aot therefore restrain the cultivator 
from conducting business simultaneously with the vani in the 
village:
It appears to me doubtful [the Secretary of State 
said in conclusion] whether any ingenuity can pro­
vide an effectual substitute for the operation of 
the ordinary laws between the ryots and those, 
whether sowcars or banks, from which they obtain 
advances; and...whether any bank could carry on its 
business with success. There is a strong presump­
tion that Government cannot directly do much for the 
relief of the agricultural debtor than take care 
that in disputes between him and his creditors the 
law shall provide, and the courts shall administer, 
speedy, cheap and equal justice, and that the ryot 
shall be as little liable as possible, from his ig­
norance, his poverty, or his position, to be de­
frauded or oppressed.*3
13Ibid.
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The Secretary of State’s rejoinder put an abrupt end to 
the initiative of the Poona sowcars to launch a credit in­
stitution that would restore the flow of urban credit to the 
cultivators. The Poona scheme aimed at creating a machinery 
for financing agricultural operations that would avoid the 
progressive impoverishment of the ryots, and at the same time 
prevent them from dominating rural society. The sowcars 
were justified in assuming that an Agricultural Bank would 
not try to dominate the ryots in the fashion of individual 
vanis before 1879* But to accept their standpoint in no way 
lessens the force of the arguments advanced by the antag­
onists of State assistance to an Agricultural Bank: namely, 
that the State would become unpopular if it acted on behalf 
of the sowcar in collecting his dues; and that it was impos­
sible for a Bank to replace the village vani as a source of 
credit for the ryot* The consequences of a policy of 
laissez-faire. however, could prove equally disastrous. For 
the odium which the State would earn through associating 
itself with the recovery of the Bank's dues paled into insig­
nificance when compared with the political tension that would 
flow from a progressive deterioration in the economic condi­
tion of the peasants.
But the supreme irony of the situation lay in that the 
official advocates of the Poona sowcars supported their
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proteges because of a mistaken understanding of the working 
of rural banking institutions. Underlying their support of 
the Mudliar scheme lay the assumption that the Agricultural 
Banks would provide the ordinary ryot with an abundant 
supply of cheap credit. This assumption was completely 
erroneous, since Agricultural Banks were equipped to deal 
with large landholders, rather than with a peasantry owning 
small plots of land. In Egypt, for instance, the Credit 
Foncier found it practical to deal with large capitalist 
farmers, who could profitably exploit annual loans ranging 
from L(E) 5*000 to L(E) 10,000, rather than with the fellahin 
for whom the institution had been created in the first 
instance. If Egyptian experience had any relevance for the 
Deccan, and the fellah bore a remarkable resemblance to the 
kunbi, then it is obvious that the ryotsT problems could not 
be solved by an Agricultural Bank*4#
How then could the ryots of the Deccan be supplied with 
the credit which they required for cultivating their fields, 
and improving their condition of existence?
14Pari, Paper, Vol. LXII of 1887: Despatch to Government of 
India dated 9 February 1885 and enclosures.
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For an answer to this question British administrators 
in India turned to Germany, where a remarkable experiment in 
agricultural co-operation had shown the improvement that 
could be effected in rural society by the peasants on their 
own initiative through the proper organisation of their 
resources* The movement for village credit societies owed 
its genesis to Raiffeissen, the mayor of an obscure town in 
Germany, who was distressed by the way in which the scarcity 
of capital stifled the enterprise of the peasants*^. Being a 
person of deep religious faith and conservative political 
principles, Raiffeissen was equally perturbed by the atomisa­
tion of rural society through the influx of individualistic 
and acquisitive values* He consequently looked for means to 
improve the moral and material life of the peasant* 
Raiffeissen discovered a remedy for the ills affecting rural 
society in credit associations run by the cultivators on 
their own initiative for helping each other in times of dis­
tress, and for financing schemes of improvement in normal 
seasons* The most striking feature of the credit societies 
or village banks launched by Raiffeissen was the
15C.R* Fay, Co-operation At Home And Abroad, (London, 1948)* 
Vol. I, pp. 19* and 42-50.
The Raiffeissen Land Banks
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non-acquisitive principle which inspired their conception, 
and the co-operative spirit which guided their day-to-day 
operations. The village banks started from very humble 
beginnings. The peasants of a village, endowed neither with 
worldly sophistication nor with an abundance of capital, 
would pool their resources to form a credit society with un­
limited liability. This society would then borrow capital 
from all available sources, and would advance loans to 
industrious and enterprising cultivators to enable them to 
carry out schemes of improvement in their holdings. The 
success of Raiffeissen societies did not stem from the 
business acumen of the peasants who managed them, but was a 
result of the intimate knowledge they possessed of their 
fellow villagers, and the restraint which the principle of 
unlimited liability imposed on their financial transactions. 
Raiffeissen societies flourished in Germany despite initial 
hostility by the State, and they were responsible for bring­
ing about a striking change in the conditions of life in 
rural society:
You should go into the valley of the Rhine [ob­
served a British disciple of Raiffeissen] where 
the Raiffeissen Banks have been longest at work 
and observe to what extent homes have been made 
habitable and comfortable; how culture has been 
improved...; how the small peasant can now buy 
his implements and seeds of the best quality at 
the cheaper wholesale prices, and yet...at six
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months credit; you should see how small industry 
and trade have developed, how the usurer, once all 
powerful, has been driven out of the fold, and 
these once poor men have become small capitalists*
One is afraid of falling into strain of rhapsody in 
describing all these results**6
Into the valley of the Rhine went Sir Frederick 
Nicholson, a Madras civilian, to observe Raiffeissen socie­
ties in action, and to draw appropriate lessons for the 
rural problem in India* The result of Nicholson's inquiries 
was an encyclopaedic Report Regarding The Possibility Of In­
troducing Land And Agricultural Banks Into The Presidency Of 
Madras which constitutes the inspiration behind the 
co-operative movement in India* In his Report Nicholson 
laid emphasis on two points: the close resemblance between 
the peasant societies of Germany and India; and the inability 
of Agricultural Banks (of the type proposed by the Poona 
sowcars in 1882) to provide credit for small cultivators as 
opposed to large landholders and farmers working on capital­
ist lines* When Raiffeissen started his movement in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, the condition of the rural 
classes in Germany was in no way different from that of the 
Indian cultivators* Like the ryot, the German peasant was
16
H*W* Wolff as quoted in F*A. Nicholson, Report Regarding 
The Possibility Of Introducing Land And Agricultural Banks 
Into The Madras Presidency* (Madras i§98). I, p* 146* This 
Report is henceforth referred to as Nicholson's Report on 
Co-operation.
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Ignorant, poor and opposed to change; he held land in small 
and scattered patches; he was exploited by the usurers, in­
capable of any sustained effort to improve his lot, and both 
unable and unwilling to apply techniques which had revolu­
tionised agriculture elsewhere. As many as 87 per cent of 
the peasants in Germany owned fields less than 25 acres in 
extent* The Agricultural Banks instituted by the German 
State left this vast mass of peasants completely untouched, 
partly because of the suspicion with which the peasants 
looked at these institutions, but primarily because of the 
reluctance of the Banks to undertake the risk involved in ex­
tending credit to hundreds upon thousands of small peasants* 
At the time Nicholson instituted his inquiries two rival 
and conflicting systems of co-operation had developed in 
Germany, both of which sought to inculcate self-confidence 
and thrift among the peasants and the urban working classes, 
and to help them improve their conditions of existence*?*
The Village Banks started by Raiffeissen ran along 
non-acquisitive lines, and they were as much concerned with 
the spiritual as they were with the material well-being of 
the peasants* The inspiration behind them was conservative 
and clerical, and they sought to protect rural society from
17
See Editorial in The Pioneer dated 12 November 1903*
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the influx of acquisitive values, and from the impact of an 
encroaching commercial civilisation« Raiffeissen secured 
his objectives by confining the operations of a Bank to a 
single village, where all the cultivators knew each other 
intimately; by enforcing the principle of unlimited liability, 
which inhibited the development of a business ethic; by keep­
ing the share capital to a low figure, and enforcing a low 
rate of dividends, which kept in check any latent acquisitive 
tendencies; and finally, by granting long term loans which 
were necessary to enable the peasants to invest what they 
had borrowed in the development of their holdings«
Totally different in spirit were the credit societies 
started by Schulze-Delitsch, who subscribed to radical and 
anti-clerical views, and who tried to promote rather than to 
inhibit the growth of an acquisitive instinct in those who 
participated in co-operation« Like Raiffeissen, Schulze- 
Delitsch had an enduring faith in co-operation, and he 
believed that progress could be achieved only when the weak­
ness of the isolated individual had been replaced by the 
strength and cohesion of disciplined groups« But the belief 
in co-operation formed a point of departure for these two 
movements« A Schulze-Delitsch society had little in common 
with a Raiffeissen Bank« It did not confine its activities 
to a closed area; it did not impose any limit on the share
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capital or the dividend paid to the shareholders; and being 
on the lookout for quick returns, it advanced loans for 
small periods of time only. Because of these differences, 
Schulze-Delitsch societies were popular with the artisans 
and the working classes who lived in towns and cities, while 
Raiffeissen societies endeared themselves to the peasants 
who lived in a world of traditional values.
Since he was concerned with a peasant society, and 
because he was engaged in the task of restoring a social 
fabric which had been undermined by individualism and 
acquisitiveness, Nicholson had little hesitation in selecting 
Raiffeissen Banks as the expression of the co-operative move­
ment most apposite to India*®. The problem of rural finance, 
he pointed out, could not be solved by Agricultural Banks 
managed by the sowcars under State patronage; its solution 
lay in Village Banks run by the cultivators on co-operative 
and non-acquisitive lines. A Raiffeissen society confined 
its operations to a single village with whose affairs its 
members were thoroughly conversant. It also accepted un­
limited liability for its financial dealings. For these 
reasons, a village bank was able to inspire confidence among 
the urban sowcars, and to persuade them to subscribe to its
1$
Vide Nicholson's Report on Oo-operation. I, pp. 370-80.
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A Raiffeissen society possessed a number of other advantages 
over Agricultural Banks and Schulze-Delitsch societies. Its 
intimate knowledge of its clients ruled out the possibility 
of spurious loans; its simple methods of procedure suited 
the unsophisticated peasants; and it could act as a useful 
brake on social ostentation, and on expenditure which was 
wasteful and not productive of any benefits*
Yet his enthusiasm for co-operation did not blind 
Nicholson to the difficulties which Village Banks would face 
in India. The atomisation of rural society by the advocates 
of reform had made the peasants incapable of concerted action, 
and suspicious of attempts to organise them or to channelise 
their activities along collective lines. The situation was 
further aggravated by the poverty of the cultivators, and the 
hostility with which the sowcar was bound to view the move­
ment. It would therefore be necessary, Nicholson pointed out, 
to extend State assistance in the form of capital and 
leadership to the co-operative movement in the initial 
stages. But although the difficulties confronting co-opera- 
tion in India were considerable, there was no reason for 
pessimism. The pioneers of the movement had faced, and had 
successfully carried out, a far more difficult task in 
Germany. For in the ultimate analysis the problem could be
working capital in the form of interest bearing deposits*
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Indian society, and to those who considered themselves to be
its natural leaders:
What is really wanted [Nicholson noted in conclu­
sion] is the advent of men of zeal, enthusiasm, 
devotion and perseverance who will take up the 
western ideas and methods, and, by personal 
labour, solve the difficulties of the problems, 
not on paper, but in actual practice; the philan­
thropic reformer of the East must sit down in the 
villages as did their prototypes of the West, and 
must then establish the petty societies which, as 
in Europe, shall contain the germs and promise of 
infinite potentialities. There can be no higher 
honour for any man than to achieve the role of.•• 
the Raiffeissen of India...19
Implicit in Nicholson's advocacy of co-operation, and 
his support of village banks on the Raiffeissen model, lay a 
conservative bias and a social vision which repudiated the 
values of the proponents of reform in India. Inspired to 
pursue measures of reform by Utilitarian ideals and the 
Utilitarian approach to social change, radical administrators 
had based their policy on the proclivities of the individual 
rather than organised social groups, and had attempted to 
create a rational and an acquisitive environment in order to 
persuade the peasant to exploit the opportunities open to him 
under British rule to build for himself a position of in­
creasing material prosperity. Co-operation, on the other
reduced to human dimensions, and it was a challenge to
19
Ibid., I, p. 25
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hand, was based on a collective rather than an individualis­
tic view of social action; and on notions of Christian 
brotherhood and mutual assistance rather than on acquisition 
and rational economic behaviour. It consequently sought to 
cushion peasant societies from the impact of a commercial 
ethic and a rational social order:
The ideal which the founders of the co-operative 
movement had before them [pointed out Marshall] was 
that of regenerating the world by restraining the 
force of competition and substituting for it 
brotherly trust and association. They saw that 
under the sway of competition much of men's energy 
is wasted on the endeavour to overreach one another. 
They saw...the seller striving to give as little 
and that of as poor a quality as he could. And 
they saw the buyer always trying to take advantage 
of the seller's necessity...The "Co-operative Faith" 
•••(is) that these evils can be in a great measure 
removed by that spirit of brotherly love and open­
ness, which though undeveloped, is yet latent in 
man's nature* It looks forward to a time when man 
•••shall think of promoting the general welfare as 
much as promoting his own interests•••20
The conservative implications of Raiffeissen Banks for
rural society were seen with great clarity by H. Dupernex, a
revenue official of the North-Western Provinces, who shares
with Nicholson the distinction of being one of the founding
fathers of co-operation in India. While Nicholson had
focussed his attention on the problem of rural credit, and
20
Quoted in H. Dupernex, People's Banks for Northern India. 
( ? )> PP. 52-3*
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stressed the ability of Raiffeissen societies to supply the 
ryot with capital without reducing him to a state of serfdom, 
Dupernex concerned himself with the effect of co-operation 
on the structure of rural society, and the values which 
shaped the peasant's style of life2**
What struck Dupernex as highly significant was the 
close resemblance between the co-operative societies of 
Raiffeissen, and the village communities which had flourished 
in Maharashtra before the British take-over* The key to 
social organisation in the traditional village community was 
the intimate association of the co-proprietary group of the 
village; in co-operation, the members of a village society 
were held together by ties that were equally close. What 
gave the village community its unique character was joint 
responsibility for the land-tax, since the more prosperous 
cultivators were thereby impelled to stimulate their less 
fortunate fellows to greater efforts: similarly, the 
principle of unlimited liability encouraged the more affluent 
members of a Village Bank to keep a close watch on the 
affairs of their poorer associates* But the most important 
similarity between co-operative societies and the village 
community was a common approach towards acquisition and the
21
Ibid*. pp* 69-70*
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profit motive« Through combination the members of a village 
community gained a security which they could not obtain 
otherwise« But this security was obtained through subordin­
ating their personal interests to the interests of the village 
as a whole. Thus a co-sharer would never dream of abandoning 
his hereditary association for the sake of rack-renting an 
unfortunate neighbour, since the village community was based 
on the subordination of individual gain to the principle of 
association. Co-operative societies demanded similar sacri­
fices of their members, and co-operation was equally 
emphatic on the contradiction between individual gain and 
collective welfares
The two things [Dupernex pointed out] are incompat­
ible* Once the idea of gain is allowed to obtain 
a footing, its ultimate predominance is inevitable, 
and its predominance entails the triumph of indi­
vidualism over mutuality••«Experience teaches that 
the only way to safeguard the interests of the com­
munity. •*is by limiting the amount of dividend, or 
better still by abolishing it altogether. Profit 
and individualism are interchangable terms* The 
desirability of eliminating profits as far as pos­
sible is apparent when it is borne in mind that 
where the individual is strong enough to stand alone, 
he should have no difficulty in obtaining a suitable 
reward for his efforts; but as the combination of 
persons into an association is for the express 
object of obtaining benefits which they could not 
obtain singly, it ought to be regarded as an incon­
sistency for members to seek to appropriate to 
themselves profits which rightly belong to the
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community as they are gained by the community and 
not be individual members.22
As conceived by Nicholson and Dupernex, therefore, 
co-operation aimed at the total regeneration of rural 
society rather than the simple restoration of the flow of 
urban credit to the ryots in the village. They believed 
that the growth of Raiffeissen societies would check the 
atomisation of rural society, inhibit the spread of the 
acquisitive spirit, and retard the development of individual­
ism. All these qualities had been generated in rural society 
by the application of Utilitarian notions of law and admin­
istration to the problems of rural social organisation, and 
they had created conflict and tension within the villages of 
Maharashtra. It was to mitigate this tension that the advo­
cates of co-operation proposed to substitute a corporate and 
non-acquisitive community for a rational and acquisitive 
society.
The Co-operative Credit Societies Act of 1904
Since co-operation along the lines advocated by 
Raiffeissen sought to organise village society on principles 
so different from those which had hitherto formed the basis
22
Ibid.
of the rural social order under British rule, official reac­
tion to Nicholson’s recommendations was one of scepticism 
concerning the possibility of establishing Village Banks; and 
reservations were expressed regarding the possible conse­
quences of the non-acquisitive climate which they would gen­
erate, and under which alone they could flourish^. What 
made Nicholson’s proposals particularly vulnerable was his 
admission that Village Banks in India would in the first in­
stance have to be supported by the State with financial 
assistance. The Madras Government, which had deputed 
Nicholson to study the Raiffeissen movement in Europe, not 
only denied the existence of acute indebtedness in its terri­
tories, but it also pointed out that to float Village Banks 
with official support was to destroy the fundamental objec­
tives of co-operation. Raiffeissen had launched the movement 
to create self-reliance, thrift and industry among peasants 
who had despaired of improving their lot. A spontaneous 
growth of Village Banks would revive the peasant’s faith in 
himself, and it would demonstrate to the rest of the world 
his ability to strive for his moral and material improvement. 
However, if the banks were floated with official assistance,
23
NAI. Resolution of the Madras Board of Revenue on 
Nicholson’s Report dated 6 November 1896: Dept, of Revenue 
and Agriculture (Rev. Branch), A Procs. No. 7/10, November 
1900.
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the cultivators would gain little apart from access to a new 
source of credit. Although such a facility was not to be 
lightly discounted, Raiffeissen had aimed at far more than 
the mere organisation of rural credit. What he had 
emphasised was feducative credit..»based not on subventions 
from the State, but on the thrift and prudence of the cul­
tivators. ..f Village societies which were launched on local 
initiative would, according to Raiffeissen, bring about a 
revolution in the outlook of the peasants; and they would set 
in motion a complete transformation in the social climate 
of rural society. Since financial assistance from the 
State would undermine the objectives of Raiffeissen 
societies, the Madras Government had 'no hesitation1 in turn­
ing down Nicholson's proposal for officially sponsored 
Village Banks
However, the seriousness of the rural problem and the 
political implications of a disaffected peasantry prevented 
the Supreme Government at Calcutta from sharing the com­
placency of the Madras Government, particularly in view of 
the pressure that was being brought to bear on the Secretary 
of State for India by the 'Indian lobby' for the adoption of
24NAI. Order in Council by the Madras Government dated 13
October 1899: Dept, of Revenue and Agriculture (Rev. Branch),
A. Procs. No. 7/10, November 1900.
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measures to remedy the deteriorating economic conditions in 
the country2 .^ jq reviewing the Madras Government’s resolu­
tion on the Nicholson Report, therefore, T.W. Holderness, the 
Secretary of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture, ex­
pressed regret at the ’cynical and unsocial’ manner in which 
the Madras Government had reacted to a proposal which embrac­
ed far reaching possibilities* The Madras Government, 
Holderness pointed out, appeared to see no difference between 
the assistance demanded by the Poona sowcars in the 1880s, 
and the help which the Village Banks would require for an 
initial period* In France and Germany, where urban credit 
was efficiently organised, the principle of unlimited liabil­
ity had from the very outset established the credit of the 
Raiffeissen societies, and had encouraged urban credit insti­
tutions to advance money to the village societies without any 
hesitation* But in India the situation was different, since 
urban credit was not well organised* Dupernex, Holderness 
stated, had proposed the floating of Banks in district towns 
and provincial capitals to facilitate the flow of urban 
credit to the ryots. His suggestions deserved serious
25NAI. Minute by E. Maconochie, Under-Secretary in the 
Dept, of Revenue and Agriculture dated 22 January 1900s 
Dept, of Revenue and Agriculture (Rev. Branch), A. Procs. No. 
7/10, November 1900.
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consideration, and pointed to a conceivable way out of the 
dilemma. Alternatively, it was possible for the State to 
step in with its financial resources, and to extend assis­
tance to the village credit associations2^#
The desultory exchanges between the Governments of 
Calcutta and Madras were transformed into a creative dialogue 
through the intervention of Sir Edward Law, the Finance 
Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, who believed that 
co-operation along the lines advocated by Raiffeissen could 
do a lot to improve the conditions of village society in 
India2?. In December 1900, a Committee comprising Nicholson, 
Dupernex, Holderness and Law met in Calcutta to examine the 
possibilities of establishing co-operative societies in India. 
After considering the avenues open for financing the ryots, 
the law Committee came to the conclusion that
village associations constituted as mutual-Credit 
Associations, somewhat on the lines and with the 
objects of Raiffeissen Mutual Credit Associations, 
would generally be the most useful instruments of 
rural credit;, since these or similar societies
26
NAI. Note by T.W. Holderness, Secretary to the Department 
of Revenue and Agriculture, dated 28 Aiigust 1900: Dept, of 
Revenue and Agriculture (Rev. Branch), A Procs., fro. 7/10, 
November 1900.
27NAI. Note by E.F.G. Law, Finance Member of the Viceroy's 
Executive Council, dated 26 September 1900: Dept, of Revenue 
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satisfy the several postulates of small, contin­
uous, village credit, while developing conditions, 
habits and qualities essential to rural stabilityand progress. 28
The financing of the proposed village societies was a ques­
tion which the Committee thought ought to be tackled on two 
fronts. On the one hand, every encouragement ought to be 
given to the 'well-to-do, influential and educated' urban 
classes to form banks which would keep the village societies 
supplied with money; on the other, the State should extend 
pecuniary assistance and advice on problems of organisation 
to the credit societies in the initial stages. Because of 
the differences in social and economic conditions between the 
ryotwari tracts of Maharashtra, the 'joint' villages of the 
North-Western Provinces, and the permanently settled estates 
of Bengal, it was impossible for the Central Government to 
set down the form which State encouragement could assume with 
advantage in different parts of the country. The Law 
Committee, therefore, focussed its attention on broad ques­
tions of principle, and left it to the Local Governments to 
decide how these principles were to be applied in their
territories29.
28
NAI. Resolution of the Law Committee dated 19 December 1900: 
Dept, of Revenue and Agriculture (Rev. Branch), A Procs. No. 
11/249 November 1901.
29
NAI. Circular letter to the various Provincial Governments
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Despite the enthusiasm which the prospect of a rural 
society revitalised through co-operation had aroused at 
Calcutta, the Bombay Government was doubtful whether it was 
at all possible to launch Village Banks in Maharashtra30.
Its scepticism stemmed from an appraisal of social and 
economic conditions in the Bombay territories. The atomisa­
tion of rural society resulting from the ryotwari system had 
weakened the ties of association among the ryots, and had 
made it difficult for them to co-operate with each other 
for a common objective. It had also reduced the power and 
the prestige of the natural leaders of village society. The 
problems arising out of individualism and the decay of social 
cohesion were reinforced by the poverty of the peasantry, 
and the economic cleavages which the pursuit of rational 
economic policies had introduced in the village community.
The question which the advocates of co-operation would have 
to ask themselves, the Survey Commissioner of Bombay pointed
by J. Fuller, Secretary to the Department of Revenue and 
Agriculture, dated 5 November 1901s Dept, of Revenue and 
Agriculture (Rev. Branch), A Procs. No. 1/10, November 1901.
30
NAI. J.W.P. Muir-Mackenzie, Secretary to the Bombay Gov­
ernment, to Government of India dated 24 May 1901s Dept, of 
Revenue and Agriculture (Rev. Branch), A Procs. No. 1/10, 
November 1901. Also see Letter from the Collector of 
Ahmednagar to the Commissioner of the Central Division dated 
25 March 1901 in ibid.
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out, was how the ryot could be freed of his burden of debt, 
and how he could rise from a state of virtual serfdom to the 
independent ownership of his ancestral lands31. The pro­
ponents of Raiffeissen societies had assumed that the ryot 
possessed a small reserve of surplus capital, and that his 
financial dealings with the vani were those of an unencum­
bered individual* Neither of these assumptions was true for 
Maharashtra. The majority of the ryots had no reserves of 
capital, and their poverty made them reckless in their deal­
ings with the moneylender, so that they were invariably 
encumbered with a very heavy burden of debt. It was diffi­
cult to see how Village Banks could be started in such a 
peasant community. And if they were launched with official 
backing, they could hardly be expected to break through the 
dominance which the vanis exercised over the cultivators.
The only group of cultivators which would benefit from 
Raiffeissen societies, the Survey Commissioner pointed out, 
was a small class of 'rich1 peasants, whose prosperity was a 
consequence of the economic policies pursued by the British 
Government, and whose affluence was ensured by the peaceful 
conditions of British rule. This small class of peasants,
31NAI. Survey Commissioner, Bombay to Bombay Government 
dated 2 April 1901s Dept, of Revenue and Agriculture (Rev. 
Branch), A Procs. No. 1/10, November 1901.
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the 'creme de la creme' of the cultivating community, alone 
had the capital to float credit associations; and it alone 
possessed the intelligence and the initiative required to 
administer them once they had been organised. Since the 
idea of 'joint' responsibility in the villages of 
Maharashtra had been expressly repudiated by the ryotwari 
system, it was difficult to see how the rich peasants could 
be persuaded to run credit associations in the true spirit 
of co-operation, and to accept responsibility for loans con­
tracted to assist their less fortunate fellow villagers. It 
was far more likely that the credit associations would 
refuse to accept any obligations towards the poor peasants, 
and that their financial dealings would be confined to the 
more prosperous ryots. All the support, financial and organ­
isational, which the State would extend to the Village Banks 
would consequently increase the prosperity of those ryots 
who were least in need of any assistance:
If distressed agriculturists [the Survey Commis­
sioner concluded] could be given a method of 
escaping from the usurer's hands, and village 
associations were started to prevent them from 
falling back, then Government would not only be 
justified but morally bound, to go to any length 
consistent with prudence in forming the associa­
tions, but it does not appear to be quite a proper 
use of public money to lend it to...(rich peasants) 
merely to enable them to obtain loans at a lower 
rate of interest than at present in the off chance 
that thrift and self-help may thereby be 
stimulated. It is even conceivable that the use
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of Government money may have the effect of dis­
couraging these virtues*32
However, the scepticism of the Survey Commissioner was 
not shared by officers who administered the more prosperous 
districts of Maharashtra, where the ryots’ burden of debt was 
not beyond redemption, and where a wider section of the 
peasants could form the base of the Village Banks« The 
villages around Poona, for instance, enjoyed the advantages 
of a flourishing urban market, and a good system of communi­
cations for the transport of agricultural surpluses; they 
could also depend upon schemes of irrigation which protected 
their crops from the vagaries of the weather. J« McNeill, 
the Collector of Poona, was impressed by the possibilities 
held out by Raiffeissen societies, and he believed that ’the 
Poona district could be a hopeful field for an experiment in 
the formation of agricultural banks on co-operative lines’33. 
The ryots of Poona district, McNeill observed, were burdened 
with debt like ryots all over the Deccan; but there were some 
villages with a significant number of prosperous cultivators 
who could be persuaded to start Village Banks. Of course,
32
Ibid.
33
NAI. J. McNeill, Collector of Poona, to Commissioner, 
Central Division, dated 26 March 1901: Dept, of Revenue and 
Agriculture (Rev. Branch), A Procs. No. 1/10, November 1901.
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the management and financing of such societies would present 
difficulties. But if the Raiffeissen model was stretched to 
admit in the village societies 'landowners of some standing, 
(and) rich ryots, vakils and the higher government servants', 
then the Village Banks would be greatly strengthened.
All these points were impressed upon McNeill in the 
course of discussions with the principal cultivators of 
Chakan, 'a large and prosperous village in the Khed taluka'. 
Once the objectives of co-operation were outlined before the 
ryots of Chakan, and they were apprised of the extent to 
which the State would assist them, they exhibited consider­
able enthusiasm for the scheme. They also assured McNeill 
that they could be trusted to be honest and punctual in their 
financial dealings with a credit association that belonged to 
the village collectively. However, the initiative for any 
scheme of improvement had rested for so long on individuals, 
and on institutions, outside the village that the selection 
of a panch (managing committee) would present difficulties; 
and the ryots 'doubted if a capable panch to manage the 
working of the Associations wolld be found in the village 
alone'34# But this was precisely where official guidance 
could be most effective, and provide the leadership which was
34Ibid.
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the movement had worked successfully for some time:
Official guidance [McNeill pointed out] is neces­
sary if village banks are to be widely instituted. 
Perhaps official guidance might be adequately sup­
plied by requiring that the Assistant Collector or 
the Mamlatadar should be members of the managing 
body of any village banking association assisted by 
Government capital.Their position as members of 
the managing body would enable them to examine the 
workings of the bank and to put a timely check on 
any irregularities...A further advantage...would 
be that they could initiate unpleasant measures 
against defaulters and relieve honest but weak 
members of the panch of the odium of such measures.
In the early stages of village banks neither the 
associates nor the managers might have the courage 
of their convictions, but it would not be unreason­
able to hope that a sense of responsibility and of 
mutual support will grow...35
Despite the optimism of McNeill, who believed in the 
regeneration of rural society through co-operation, and who 
looked upon the movement as a challenge to the British Gov­
ernment, and a test of its faith in a prosperous peasant 
society, the poverty of the Deccan ryot, and the disastrous 
impact of the legislation of reform on the traditional 
values and leaders of the village, combined to make most 
District Officers sceptical of the success of Raiffeissen 
banks. A.R. Bonus, the Collector of Nasik, spoke for such 
officials when he observed that the prospect of the Deccan
lacking in the village, and could be developed only after
35
Ibid.
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ryots attaining prosperity through association and self-help 
reminded him ’of those islanders who are said to have made a 
living by taking in one another’s washings...’36 The Bombay 
Government’s reply to the Calcutta Government on the 
question of co-operation was, therefore, couched in the 
language of despair rather than in the language of hope.
The crux of the issue hinged on the individualism and the 
acquisitiveness which had been deliberately fostered in rural 
society by the Utilitarian policy of reform. While these 
reforms had been carried out on the basis of European exper­
ience, it was seldom borne in mind that the Deccan ryot 
lacked the sophistication which enabled the European peasant 
to strive for individual gain without depriving himself of 
benefits which he could not obtain through individual effort. 
For instance, individualism had taken so deep a root in the 
villages of the Deccan that it was impossible to rely on 
repairs being done to embankments and irrigation channels for 
which the villagers were traditionally responsible. The 
social climate of Maharashtra had deteriorated to an extent 
where the cultivators of a village regarded themselves as 
rivals and antagonists rather than as partners in a joint
33
BA (Bombay State Archives). Letter from Collector of Nasik
to the Commissioner of the Central Division dated 24 December
1901: R.D., Vol. 22 of 1902.
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enterprise, 'The burden of the reports from all parts of 
the Presidency is that there is seldom or never found such a 
spirit among the rural communities as will make co-operative 
credit societies possible1, stated the Bombay Government^?.
It would take a long time before the benefits of co-operation 
could be explained to such peasants, and unless this was done, 
it was futile to expect the prosperous cultivators to 
interest themselves in the fate of the poor peasants*
Although British administrative officers were far more 
optimistic about the prospects of Raiffeissen societies in 
regions like the North-Western Provinces, where the land 
revenue system had preserved the collective quality of rural 
social organisation, the challenge posed by co-operation 
appeared to most of them to be far too formidable to be easily 
overcome. Even Sir Daniel Ibbetson, who piloted the bill 
which launched co-operation in India, confessed that he was 
fnot too sanguine1 about the success of Village Banks. 'The 
idea of co-operation for the purpose of mutual help...(was) 
familiar to the people of India...' Ibbetson pointed out.
1(But) the whole tendency of our rule has been to discourage 
such action...However, we are bound to give the experiment
37NAI. Letter to the Government of India dated 12 August
1902: Dept, of Revenue and Agriculture (Rev. Branch), A
Procs., No. 1/14, September 1903.
every encouragement and a fair trial**38 por belief in 
co-operation was an expression of confidence in the ryot’s 
capacity to rise above selfish considerations, and to improve 
through his personal efforts the moral and material state of 
rural society*
The Bill which sought to launch co-operation in India 
was therefore an act of faith in the peasant and his style 
of life* As the Government of India pointed out in a des­
patch to the Secretary of State for India, the principal 
object of the legislation was to encourage thrift and 
co-operation among ryots of ’limited means’ through the 
establishment of Raiffeissen societies39. Government was 
aware of the fact that urban societies organised along similar 
lines could help the poor artisans, or facilitate the flow of 
capital to the countryside* But its principal concern lay in 
the village; and its sympathies were for the poor peasant* 
Government was anxious to ensure that the facilities which it 
extended to the poor peasants were not exploited by the pros­
perous cultivators* For this reason rural societies had to
33-------- -
NAI* Minute by Sir Daniel Ibbetson dated 29 January 1902s 
Dept, of Revenue and Agriculture (Rev. Branch), A Procs* No. 
1/14, September 1903*
39NAI. Despatch to Secretary of State for India dated 3 
September 1903s Dept, of Revenue and Agriculture (Rev. Branch), 
A Procs., No. 1/14* September 1903.
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be organised on the principle of unlimited liability, since 
the obligations imposed by that principle would frighten 
away the rich peasants from the Village Banks,
In its emphasis on the prosperity of the village com­
munity rather than the individual cultivator, and in its 
concern for the poor as against the rich peasant, the Act 
sponsored by the Government of India sought to develop 
co-operation along the lines mapped out by Raiffeissen.
Thus in addition to the principle of unlimited liability, it 
was proposed that no dividends were to be paid out of the 
profits of a rural society, and the number of shares in a bank 
held by a single individual was to be limited, in order to 
prevent control over its activities from flowing into the 
hands of a rich vani, or a prosperous peasant. Besides, 
since the traditional leaders of rural society had been de­
prived of their positions of dominance under British rule, 
the Government refused to entrust the promotion of 
Raiffeissen societies to the initiative of the peasants. 
Instead, provision was made for the appointment of a 
Special Officer (the Registrar of Co-operative Societies) in 
each province who was expected to guide and control 
co-operative societies, particularly in the eaii y stages of 
development. Again, in view of the difficulty in creating 
confidence in the credit of the village banks from the very
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outset, pecuniary assistance to these banks was recognised 
as an essential part of the Government’s responsibility in 
launching the movement. In recommending financial assis­
tance the Government was aware of the danger of undermining 
the principles of thrift and self-help, but it preferred a 
calculated risk to the consequences of inaction, since it 
believed that its ’advances will have a value beyond their 
mere use as capital, since they will be an earnest of the 
intensity of the government’s interest in the movement, and 
will stimulate the interest and self-help which should be a 
condition precedent to this grant...’40
Implicit in the concern for rural prosperity and for 
rural social values were questions relating to the stability 
of British rule, and the maintenance of British authority 
over India. These questions formed the background to the 
debate on co-operation, and they influenced the attitude of 
the British administrators towards the movement. The 
Utilitarian attempt to base British rule on the prosperity of 
affluent peasants had proved abortive because of the imbalance 
which the ryotwari system of land-revenue had created in the 
distribution of power in the village, and the encouragement 
it had given to the pretensions of the vanis at the cost of
40
Ibid.
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the cultivators. The upsurge of 1875 revealed how dangerous 
a situation the individualism and the acquisitiveness en­
couraged by the advocates of reform had created in the vil­
lages of the Deccan, The most ominous feature of the dis­
turbances of 1875 (from the British standpoint) was the fno 
taxf campaign of the Poona Sarva.ianik Sabha in association 
with the traditional landed families. For the alliance 
between the westernised and the traditional elite exploited 
peasant discontent to threaten the very foundations of 
British authority in India. The prevention of a combination 
between the peasantry and the westernised elite was an im­
portant reason behind legislation like the Relief Act of 
1879y and the Co-operative Credit Societies Act of 1904, 
which sought to protect theinterests of the ryots, and to 
create the conditions for prosperity in rural society. 
Co-operation was not onlyithe thin edge of a wedge between 
the peasants and the urban elites who were aspiring for pos­
itions of leadership; it was also regarded as a measure 
that would oblige these elites either to prove their 
capacity for leadership through participation in a creative 
process, or to renounce their political ambitions. In the 
Bombay Council, for instance, F.S.P. Lely, the Commissioner 
of the Northern Division, turned upon the representatives 
of new Maharashtra to ask why a Raiffeissen had not risen
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from their ranks. To Lely it appeared that the westernised 
elite fhave failed in their duty to their country din this 
i~ts particular need. (For) to stir up the dreary deadness 
of a single village where most of the population hung upon 
the Government in bad tdlmes and in good times upon the 
sowcar. • .would be to do more service to their country, which
I know they love, than to make twenty speeches however elo­
quent and however convincing...'41 Curzon expressed a 
similar sentiment in the Imperial Legislative Council, when 
referring to the embarrassed praise which Gokhale had 
showered on the Government for taking the initiative in 
founding Village Banks, he voiced his 'pleasure to find 
today that we (i.e. the Government and its nationalist 
critics) are all so unanimous, and that in the contemplation 
of this measure the lion had lain down with the lamb142.
Co-operation and Social Structure in Maharashtra
But for J. McNeill, the first Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies in Bombay, the task of educating the ryots was
41Proceedings of the Bombay Councils (Bombay 1904), Vol. XL: 
Speech by F.S.P. Lely, Commissioner of the Northern Division, 
dated 21 April, 1902.
42
NAI. Papers Relating to Act X of 1904, Vol. I: Procs. of 
the Governor-General's Council dated 23 October 1903.
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far more important than that of hurling reproaches on the 
urban elites for their failure to anticipate Raiffeissen in 
India. McNeill could hardly have embarked upon his task in 
an optimistic frame of mind, because the poverty of the 
Deccan ryots, and the atomisation of rural society through 
the ryotwari system, led most administrative officers to 
look upon the prospects of co-operation in Maharashtra with 
deep pessimism. Yet several factors combined to make a 
qualified success of co-operation in Maharashtra. One 
reason behind this was the availability of urban capital 
which could be invested in agriculture once a suitable 
channel for its flow into the villages had been devised. 
Besides, urban castes amongst whom traditional ties and 
habits of association remained strong formed a receptive 
social base for co-operative societies in the cities. Atom­
isation and poverty in the villages were facts which succes­
sive Registrars had to learn to live with; and to gradually 
vanquish. But with patience and skill it was possible to 
organise the ryots into village societies which, with State 
patronage and support from urban capital, were able to do 
something to ameliorate conditions in rural society. Of 
course, as co-operation gained momentum the values and 
structure of society in Maharashtra imposed its logic on the 
movement; and principles more in keeping with the
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requirements of the ryot in the village, or the artisan in 
the city, were substituted for the ideals of 1non-acquisition1 
and 'Christian brotherhood* through which Nicholson and 
Dupernex had hoped to refashion rural society.
The first year which McNeill spent in propagating 
co-operation in the villages of the Deccan did not produce 
any spectacular results. But it prepared useful ground for 
the future, and convinced him that although rural society 
lacked men of initiative who could be trusted to run Village 
Banks on their own, habits of association and collective en­
deavour had not toally died out among the cultivators43. 
McNeill was agreeably surprised to find that the ryots were 
quick to grasp the advantages of co-operation, even though 
it rested on principles outside their social experience. In 
the absence of any indigenous leadership the ryots were wil­
ling to be guided and controlled by the Registrar, so long as 
they were able to decide the membership of the credit 
societies, and to grant or refuse loans to the cultivators. 
What struck McNeill as a particularly hopeful feature was the 
cheerful acceptance of the principle of unlimited liability
43Annual Report Relating To The Establishment Of Co-operative 
Credit Societies In The Bombay Presidency For 1905 by J. 
McNeill, Registrar of Co-operative Societies, dated 29 
September 1905* Henceforth referred to as Annual Report of 
Co-operative Societies.
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unlimited liability would prevent prosperous peasants from
participating in village associations, and would deny the
associations of the capital and leadership that was available
in the villages• But in
the villages which I have visited [McNeill pointed 
out] the ordinary agriculturist accepts unlimited 
liability as natural, I propose to register no 
rural society in which the liability is to be lim­
ited unless careful inquiry shows that it is im­
possible to organise a society on the basis of 
unlimited liability. Apart from the fact that 
societies with unlimited liability are more genuine­
ly co-operative, the committee are more likely to 
exercise care in granting loans and the whole body 
of members are more interested in preventing default,,.44
From the outset the credit associations which McNeill 
set up in the villages of the Deccan faced the problem of 
finding sufficient capital to satisfy the needs of the 
ryots. Since the village societies were meant to advance 
the interests of the poor peasants, their membership fee was 
deliberately kept very low, and the bulk of the capital was 
raised by taking fixed deposits from the prosperous culti­
vators of the village at an interest of 6+1/4 per cent. 
Deposits by individual cultivators ranged from Rs.5 toRs. 3 0 0;
by the ryots. He had been apprehensive that insistence on
44Annual Report Relating To The Establishment Of Co-operative 
Credit Societies In The Bombay Presidency For 1905 by J. 
McNeill, Registrar of Co-operative Societies, dated 29 
September 1905•
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and most societies were able to raise between Rs.500 to 
Rs.2,000 in this fashion. The capital thus raised was dis­
bursed in loans to needy and enterprising cultivators at an 
interest of 9+3/4 per cent, and the profits which the 
societies made through such transactoons were transferred to 
a reserve fund^S.
Though the growth of rural credit associations was pain­
stakingly slow until the organisation of * feeder1 societies 
in the towns opened a new source of capital to the Village 
Banks, the educative value of the movement was significant 
even when it was confined to a few prosperous villages. As 
G.V. Joglekar, the officiating Registrar in 1908, pointed 
out in an annual Report, to receive a transcript of 'Proceed­
ings in Committee1 from some remote society of ryots couched 
in terms like 'first resolution', or 'voted to the chair', or 
'carried unanimously', gave some indication of the changes 
that would transform rural society once the movement gained 
momentum:
Let us visit Hulkoti [ran Joglekar*s Report], just 
by Gadag, and see what its society can tell us.
We are met by the Patel, Mr Shiddangowda, and told 
he is the chairman. With him are several others, 
more or less leaders too; and with them is the 
schoolmaster, who, we are told, is the Society*s 
Secretary. We find that their capital stands at 
Rs.10,500, of which Rs.4*000...is entirely devoted
45
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to redemption of old debts...We find they are 
charging 9+3/8 per cent on loans to members, and 
giving 6+1/4 per cent on fixed deposits* We think 
at once of investing in the paying "deposits”, 
but are told that such a privilege is reserved as 
a rule for "members only!" What will they give 
then for a loan? They look at their books and 
find only five demands outstanding; just at 
present, for loans from members, they have Rs.175 
odd at hand in the Post Office, instalments to the 
amount of Rs.872 are due next month, so that alto­
gether they have no immediate need of our money.••
Again we are disappointed. But then, remember 
that we are dealing with one of the best...Rural 
Societies in the Presidency...We ask about their 
membership, and find there are 123 members. The 
liability is unlimited...and they are together 
more like a little family, a village within a 
village, ruled by a panch, then a Company estab­
lished by L a w . . . 46
However, the fbestf rural society in Maharashtra can 
hardly convey any adequate impression of the difficulties 
which confronted rural banks in the poorer villages. By 
1907* the Registrar had launched 48 rural credit associations. 
But the precarious margin which separated a majority of these 
societies from liquidation, and the ingenious methods which 
the ryots devised to obtain loans for their capital-starved 
holdings* reflected the extent to which the vanis still 
featured in the rural economy, and the grip of traditional 
values on the peasants. Because of the paucity of capital, 
and high rates of interest, it was far more difficult to 
launch credit societies in the central districts of
4§
Ibid.
Maharashtra than it was in the Northern, or in the Southern, 
districts* But even in the more prosperous tracts, the 
obstacles in the spread of the co-operative movement were 
formidable* Ryots frequently borrowed money from the vanis 
and deposited it in the Village Banks merely to establish 
their credit, and to create the good will necessary for 
raising a large loan* Besides, since it was impossible for 
the credit societies to accommodate the ryot whenever he 
required an advance, his dependence upon the vani was 
diminished, but was not wholly eliminated by the new credit 
institutions* Finally, the number of occasions on which 
a ryot returned a loan, only to be advanced a similar sum 
shortly afterwards, indicated that the cultivators who ran 
the Village Banks took a cavalier view of the ethics of 
co-operation, and of the virtues of thrift and prudence 
which the movement was meant to inculcate in the ryots4?.
The breakthrough for co-operation in Maharashtra came 
with the organisation of credit societies in the urban areas* 
Two factors made this breakthrough possible* First, the 
existence of sophisticated and cohesive castes, which were 
organised for collective action, and which took to acquisi­
tive co-operation on the lines advocated by Schulze-Delitsch
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with a minimum of persuasion. And secondly, the presence 
in Bombay of sowcars, who for reasons of self-interest and 
philanthropy, were anxious to invest their capital in agri­
culture .
The facility with which the institution of caste could 
be exploited for the promotion of co-operation was forced 
on the attention of the Bombay Government even before 1904* 
In Sholapur, for instance, lived a community of weavers, 
15*000 in all, who were reduced to destitution by a series 
of bad harvests in the 1890s, which made deep inroads into 
the purchasing power of the ryots of the surrounding 
villages on whom the weavers of Sholapur depended for 
custom. To alleviate their misery the Sholapur Municipality 
and a local philanthropist, Mr Veerchand Deepchand, combined 
to make a grant, of Rs.25*000. This grant was used by Mr 
T.J. Pitre, an enterprising municipal officer, to advance 
sums of money to the weavers at low rates of interest for 
the purchase of yarn and other raw material which they re­
quired for the production of cloth. Once their financial 
dependence upon the local moneylenders was eliminated, the 
Sholapur weavers, who had formerly paid high rates of 
interest and were obliged to se£l their products at low 
prices, began to thrive and prosper in a remarkable fashion. 
The success of his scheme encouraged Pitre to propose the
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institution of a 'Weaver’s Co-operative Society managed by 
the panch of the Sholapur Weavers for the benefit of their 
community under the benevolent supervision of the State'48.
Since the urban castes were aware of the advantages of 
association, and because most of them possessed a high level 
of sophistication, it was natural for the first urban 
co-operatives to be organised along caste lines. A pioneer­
ing caste co-operative in Bombay was the Shamrao Vithal 
Society of the Saraswat Brahmins, which was founded in 1907, 
and which built up a membership of 371> and accumulated 
capital assets worth at Rs.l4>000, in the brief space of 
two years. In a closely knit caste like the Saraswat 
Brahmins the Shamrao Vithal Society was able to do a lôt of 
constructive work, and with a scattered yet cohesive social 
group for a constituency, it was able to open branches in 
places like Kawwar, HUbli and Kumta immediately after its 
inception. 'There is no knowing into what corner of the 
Presidency or activities of life the Society may not pene­
trate, on discovering a constituent through whom to preach a 
practical lesson of co-operation', pointed out the Registrar
43---------
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in 190949* Nor did he see any harm in the growth of sec­
tarian societies, which exploited the bonds of caste for 
the promotion of co-operation* A particularly fruitful 
field of endeavour for the Registrars were urban castes like 
the weavers or the chamars, who formed a distinct profession­
al group. While such castes were as easy to organise as 
the Saraswat Brahmins, the benefits derived from organising 
them were far more substantial, since the advantages of 
co-operation could be made to impinge directly on their 
professional activity. Successive Registrars were not slow 
in grasping the opportunity which the institution of caste 
offered to them. In 1907* for instance, out of 30 urban 
societies in Bombay as many as 22 were caste societies 
embracing groups like the chamars, the weavers, the Sutars, 
the Khatiks and the Mahars.
Despite the insight they afford into the strength of 
caste ties and the structure of urban society, caste 
societies did not occupy the centre of the stage in the 
movement, and their strength in numbers can convey a dis­
torted impression of their relevance for co-operation as a 
whole* As emphasised earlier, while there was a considerable 
amount of urban capital seeking exploitation in agriculture,
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rural societies were starved of capital, and could not make 
any substantial progress so long as they depended solely 
upon the more prosperous ryots in the villages for their 
financial resources. Far more important than caste 
co-operatives, therefore, were associations called Central 
Unions, which set about to organise urban capital in order 
to finance rural societies. Immediately after his appoint­
ment as Registrar of Co-operative Societies in Bombay, 
McNeill met a group of Bombay sowcars headed by a philan­
thropic financier, Sir Vithaldas D. Thackersey, who were won 
over to the idea of co-operation, and launched a Central 
Union for helping Village Banks^O. Thackerseyfs Central 
Union proposed to raise capital through fixed deposits 
bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent. This capital 
was to be channelised to Village Banks through the Registrar, 
whose advice was to be sought on the solvency and the credit 
worthiness of the village associations. By 1909, five 
Central Unions had been launched in the Presidency, each one 
of them enjoying the patronage of a leading personality.
Thus in addition to Sir Vithaldas1 Central Union there were: 
the Broach District Society of Rao Bahadur Motilal Chunilal; 
the Dhulia Society of Mr K.N. Bhangaonkar; Mr Harlekarfs
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Southern Maratha Society of Dharwar; and finally, the Sural 
Credit Union, The Bombay Central Union of Sir Vithaldas 
was the most substantial of these societies. By 1909 it had 
loaned Rs,14,000 to eight village associations. More sig­
nificantly, it was negotiating the institution of a Central 
Bank with the Government^*,
For although the Central Unions were able to give con­
siderable assistance to village societies, they did not 
obviate the need for a more centralised credit institution 
that would attract all the urban capital awating exploita­
tion, and encourage the floating of credit societies in 
villages which did not possess capital of their own. In 
focussing attention on the need for such an institution, 
Vithaldas Samaldas, a leading banker of Bombay, pointed out 
as early as 1902 to the ’growing...class of capitalists’ who 
desired a higher return on their capital than what Govern­
ment securities had to offer, but who lacked the acumen to 
enter into business on their own^2# Samaldas’ scheme for an 
Agricultural Bank, which would draw its capital from the 
rich cultivator and the sowcar, failed to arouse any
51Annual Report of Co-operative Societies for 1909.
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enthusiasm in official circles when it was first proposed. 
But in 1908 he joined hands with Sir Vithaldas to sponsor a 
scheme for a Central Bank in Bombay53. This bank was to 
commence business with a share capital of Rs.S,OO,OOO; and 
with reserve powers to extend it to Rs.2s,oo,ooo. It would 
also issue debentures at 4 per cent which would be guaranteed 
by the State. Finally, the capital at the Bank's disposal 
waal to be used exclusively for making advances to village 
societies. 
While expounding his scheme before a Conference on 
Co-operation held in Bombay in December 1908, Sir Vithaldas 
observed that a guarantee on the debentures, and the adoption 
of commercial principles of management were vital to the 
success of the proposed Central Bank. The guarantee would 
inspire public confidence in the Bank until it had justified 
itself as a viable institution, and the adoption of commer-
cial principles of management would ensure the success of the 
project. Although the Vithaldas scheme leaned heavily on 
State assistance, and exploited the profit motive, it 
received strong support from the Bombay Government as a 
53 
BA. Vide 'Scheme for a Central Financing Society' pre-
sented by Sir Vithaldas Thackersey _and L. Samaldas at a 
Co-operative Conference held in B'ombay on 15-18 December 
1905: R.D., Vol. 69 of 1909. 
measure that would facilitate the spread of the co-operative 
movement54# But precisely the reverse view of the scheme was 
taken by the Supreme Government at Calcutta. Non-acquisition 
and thrift and prudence were values on which the Supreme 
Government set great store, and it found the proposal for a 
Central Bank offensive to all these principles. A guarantee, 
it pointed out, would foster dependence upon the State in­
stead of encouraging habits of independence; and a guarantee 
was all the more objectionable when it was meant to support 
a credit institution based on the profit motive. Besides, 
financial assistance to any urban bank was hardly necessary. 
For the Supreme Government was convinced that co-operation 
had come to stay in India, and that it had aroused that 
finterest in commercial and banking circles that it is 
quite possible that in the early future capital may be forth­
coming for its needs without the necessity of any Government 
guarantee... * 55
The objections raised by the Supreme Government to a 
guarantee for the proposed Central Bank were refuted by J. 
McNeill and C.S. Campbell, the two pioneering Registrars of
54 “
BA. Minute by Sir George Clerk, Governor of Bombay, dated
13 December 1908 and 10 March 1909: R.D., Vol. 60 of 1911.
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co-operative societies in Bombay, through arguments which 
illustrate how the objectives with which co-operation had been 
launched in India gradually gave way to the practical needs 
of the situation^. As Campbell pointed out, it was absurd 
to talk of the dangers of State interference when the entire 
movement owed its genesis to an act of legislature, and when 
it had been nourished by officers specially appointed to 
persuade the ryots to organise themselves in credit associa. 
tions. Equally pointless was the refusal to extend support 
to a Central Bank because it was based on the profit motive. 
While it was sure to prove fatal for urban societies, 
over-emphasis on non-acquisition and mutual assistance could 
prove disastrous even in the villages, for the ryots who 
managed Village Banks could thereby be persuaded into 
adopting too lenient an attitude towards defaulting members. 
But to hold the profit motive against an urban bank bordered 
on the ridiculous. It mattered little to what extent the 
Bank offended abstract principles; the point at issue was how 
much it would benefit co-operation, and what were the advan­
tages which the peasants would draw from it:
Turning from the abstract to the concrete [McNeill
observed], I could cite the case of Hulkoti Village
53---------
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Society•••The Society collected about Rs.2,600 
from members, borrowed Rs.2,000 from the Bombay 
Society organised by Sir Vithaldas and others*
After a little (more) experience was gained it 
borrowed Rs*4*000 (more) from the same source to 
liquidate various debts. It is now flourishing, 
possessed a considerable reserve, and has done 
much to familiarise the people of several talukas 
with the benefits, both moral and material of 
co-operation. Its borrowings*•.may be termed... 
unhealthy. But I do not think that the only 
result was to teach the people of the village to 
rely on official aid or Bombay philanthropy. On 
the contrary, the main lesson learnt was the ease 
with which ordinary villagers could combine to 
help themselves and manage their own businesses 
without reference to officials. They have profited 
both morally and materially, and they are only at 
the beginning of the lesson.57
With the support they received from the Bombay Government, 
Sir Vithaldas Thackersey and Lalubhai Samaldas launched the 
Bombay Central Co-operative Bank in 1911? with a share cap­
ital of Rs.7*00,000 subscribed by 911 sowcars. The organisa­
tion of the Central Bank was an important landmark in the 
development of co-operation in Bombay. Because of its abun­
dant capital resources, and the ease with which it could 
channelise credit to remote villages through a network of 
district and taluka organisations, village associations were 
no longer starved of capital, and they had only to come for­
ward with the necessary leadership and enterprise for things
57
Vide memo, by J* McNeill quoted in fn. 56
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to set moving. So drastically did the Bank alter the finan­
cial situation, that the Registrars had henceforth to be on 
guard against the dangers of facile credit, and to prevent 
the growth of societies which lacked any momentum of their 
own, and were not backed by thrifty and industrious cul­
tivators. So extensive, indeed, were the financial resources 
of the Central Bank that in addition to supporting village 
societies, it was able to sponsor schemes of debt redemption, 
and back the cultivation of cash crops in the Poona district* 
In short, with the institution of the Central Bank, 
co-operation in Maharashtra came into its own, and spread 
into the villages as fast as the enterprise of the ryot, and 
the purse of the sowcar, permitted it to do so5^#
But the principles which formed the basis of co-operation 
were a far cry from the non-acquisitive ethic, and the 
collective quality of social existence, through which 
Nicholson and Dupernex had hoped to regenerate rural society 
in India. The emphasis initially placed on Raiffeissen 
societies, and the importance attached to the absence of the 
profit motive, reveals that the movement started as a reaction 
against the individualism, the rationality, and the spirit of 
competition which had been inculcated in rural society by the
Annual Reports of Co-operative Societies for 1912 and 1913.
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legislation of reform. It is equally obvious that the 
proponents of co-operation aimed at restoring that balance 
of power in the village, and that dignity of the peasant’s 
style of life, which had been undermined by the reforms 
sponsored by administrators subscribing to Utilitarian 
views. But acquisition had become so important a con­
stituent of the social climate, and to such an extent had 
the ryot taken over to rational economic behaviour, that it 
was impossible to run credit associations solely on 
non-acquisitive lines.
The abandonment of non-acquisition as a guiding 
principle of rural co-operation led to consequences which 
had a powerful impact on economic cleavages within the 
village. In floating mutual aid societies in Germany, 
Raiffeissen had placed great stress on the organisation of 
the poor peasants, who comprised the most depressed social 
group in rural society, Raiffeissen societies were meant 
primarily for the poor peasants. The more prosperous 
peasants were discouraged from joining them, because if they 
did so, they could acquire control over the movement, and 
exploit it for their ends. In the Deccan, however, it was 
impossible to exclude the rich peasants from the movement, 
because the poor peasants were so utterly demoralised by 
poverty and debt that Village Banks could not be floated on
415
their resources and initiative alone. However, to include 
rich peasants in the credit societies was to yield to them 
a controlling interest in its activities. The control ex­
ercised by the Patel and the principal cultivators over the 
Hulkoti Society, of which we have had a glimpse earlier, was 
characteristic of credit societies throughout Maharashtra59# 
As a result, the Village Banks supported the rich peasants 
rather than the poor peasants, and a tendency was built into 
the structure of rural co-operation which defeated the objec­
tives of the movement in so far as they revolved around the 
moral and material salvation of the poor peasants.
But whatever be its effect on the distribution of 
economic power among rich and poor peasants in the village, 
co-operation reinforced the position of the cultivating com­
munity as a whole vis-a-vis the moneylenders. Before the 
British conquest, the ryot had procured capital from the 
urban sowcar through the village community, and since he 
confronted the sowcar with the authority of the village com­
munity behind him, the sowcar was unable to establish his 
dominance over him. By directing the flow of capital through
59Vide discussions in Poona with Dr Kakade of the Servants of 
India Society, and a rich peasant who was the Vice-President 
of the Hadapsar Credit Society, the first Village Bank to be 
founded in Poona district.
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the vani, instead of the village community, the ryotwari 
system robbed the peasant of the strength he derived from 
association with his fellow villagers. The creation of 
Village Banks partially restored the old order of things, 
since the ryot could once again borrow money from urban 
sources through an institution which protected him from the 
designs of the sowcar. The spread of co-operation, there­
fore, reinforced the position of the cultivator vis-a-vis 
the moneylender; though within the cultivating community 
co-operative societies served the interests of the more 
prosperous peasants and sharpened economic cleavages within 
rural society.
What direction did the ambitions of these prosperous 
peasants assume? And what was their relationship with the 
fnew Brahmins1 who coveted positions of leadership in 
Maharashtra?
To answer these questions we turn to the concluding 
chapters of this study.
CHAPTER VII
THE WHIG BRAHMINS
The consequences of the economic policy pursued by the 
Utilitarians in Maharashtra were in the main destructive 
rather than creative* The advocates of reform had attempted 
to create a climate of competition and individualism within 
the villages on the assumption that such a climate would 
encourage the ryots to improve their lot through hard work 
and rational endeavour* But the reformers merely succeeded 
in undermining the collective quality of rural society, and 
in heightening tension in the villages of the Deccan* This 
tension led to the agrarian disturbances of 1875 > which 
obliged the British administrators to abandon the twin 
principles of social atomism and rational action through 
which they had hoped to transform rural society* However, 
while the attempt to refashion rural life along individual­
istic and acquisitive lines proved abortive, the British 
Government was far more successful in the intellectual 
development which it tried to foster in Maharashtra, and the 
values which it sought to inculcate in the sophisticated
417
418
sections of the community. It is, indeed, in the growth of 
a rational and liberal sentiment in a section of the Brahmin 
community that we must look for the enduring impact of 
British rule on western India.
The New Brahmins of Maharashtra
To appreciate the changes effected in the intellectual 
climate of Maharashtra in the nineteenth century it is 
necessary to bear in mind the intellectual consensus which 
existed at the time of the British conquest. This consensus 
was a result of the influence exercised by advaita over elite 
castes like the Chitpavan Brahmins, and by its hold on the 
middle and lower castes through the bhakti orders which 
expressed the religious philosophy of Sankara in a simple 
poetry comprehensible to the peasants. The significance of 
the social consensus which linked the Brahmin and the kunbi 
to a common religious outlook was heightened by the policy 
adopted by Elphinstone of supporting institutions like the 
Hindu College and the dakshina. in the first instance for the 
transmission of traditional values, but with the ultimate 
purpose of introducing the Brahmin elite to the rational ethic 
and the liberal values of the West. The course mapped out by 
Elphinstone for the intellectual development of Maharashtra 
did not share the fate of his economic policy, and his
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programme of education for the Brahmin castes was faithfully 
carried out by the Utilitarians who assumed control of the 
Bombay Government after his departure in 1827* The result 
was the creation of a group of Whig Brahmins who combined a 
liberal and rational outlook with a concern for the tradi­
tional values which held together the classes and castes of 
Maharashtra through allegiance to a common corpus of 
religious ideas*
A commitment to Elphinstone’s views on education was in 
no way inconsistent with the periodic review, and the reform, 
of the institutions created by him as the instruments of his 
policy* His successors, therefore, kept a close watch on the 
progress of the Hindu College, and the distribution of the 
dakshina. When in 1834 J*H* Baber, the Principal Collector of 
Poona, turned his attention to the Hindu College, he dis­
covered that the institution had drifted far from the ideals 
for whose promotion it had been founded by Elphinstone*
Instead of providing a classical education in Sanskrit for 
young Brahmins of outstanding ability, the College had become 
a refuge for idlers and drones ’having the appearance of men
25 to 30 years old, to whom*,*it was never intended the allow­
ance should be continued’*. The apparent failure of the
Ï
BA (Bombay State Archives). J,H, Baber, Collector of Poona,
to Bombay Government dated 31 October 1834 5 G.D. (General
Department), Vol. 8/303 of 1836.
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institution raised several questions of fundamental import­
ance. The College had been founded by Elphinstone in order 
to impress upon the Hindu community the new Government's con­
cern for the religious traditions and the values to which the 
community was deeply attached. Elphinstone had also hoped 
that the College would train and encourage young men from 
established Brahmin families to enter into the service of the 
British Government. But neither of these expectations was 
realised. The College had provided only one candidate for 
the public service; and the courses of instruction it offered 
were so unattractive that not a single Brahmin family of 
repute had deigned to send any of its members to it. In view 
of these circumstances, Baber raised the question whether the 
College was serving any useful purpose at all, and whether it 
deserved any support from the Government.
Baber had presented so dismal a picture of the Hindu 
College that a Committee appointed in 1835 to investigate the 
institution, and having as its President a well known conserva­
tive like Thomas Williamson, the Commissioner of the Deccan, 
recommended the outright abolition of the College2. However, 
Robert Grant, the Governor of Bombay, refused to be pushed
2
BA. Report submitted by the Committee for the Reorganisa­
tion of the Hindu College to the Bombay Government dated 29
October 1835: G.D., Vol. 17/349 of I8 3 6.
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into taking so precipitate a step, even when it concerned an 
institution which, as he put it, ’preserves and cherishes the 
old Brahmanical interest, which is anti-British in all its 
tendencies*3# To abolish the Hindu College, Grant argued, 
just when the Bombay Government had established a school in 
Poona for imparting education through the medium of English 
would be highly offensive to the Brahmin community, even 
though the students of this school did not receive any 
financial assistance from the State, unlike the drones lead­
ing a parasitic existence at the Hindu College. Since polit­
ical considerations ruled out its abolition, the only solu­
tion open to Government was to modify the courses of instruc­
tion offered in the Hindu College, keeping in view its long 
term objectives.
However, political expediency was not the only reason 
which pointed to the need for continued State assistance for 
the Hindu College. It was left to the Reverend J. Stevenson, 
a Poona Missionary who was well versed in Sanskrit, to im­
press upon the Government the proper role of a Sanskrit 
College and the importance of some, if not all, of the
3
BA. Minute by Robert Grant, Governor of Bombay, dated
22 March 1835: G.D., Vol. 17/349 of I8 3 6.
disciplines which formed part of a classical education4. The 
existence of a parasitic student community, Stevenson argued, 
could be ascribed to the ineptitude of Narayan Shastri, who 
had succeeded Raghu Acharya Chintamun as the Mukhya Shastri 
(Principal) of the Hindu College in the late 1820s, rather 
than to any inherent defect in the institution, Sanskrit, 
he continued, was the classical source of all the languages 
of India, and its study was therefore essential for the 
development of the regional languages, and their transforma­
tion into media adequate for the transmission of rational and 
scientific ideas to the common people. As Stevenson put it, 
while ’English is necessary to furnish ideas to the native 
mind, the SANSKRIT is equally necessary to enable the learned 
in European science to diffuse their knowledge among the 
masses of the community1. But in putting forth a powerful 
plea for the retention of Sanskrit, Stevenson proposed 
drastic alterations in the disciplines taught at the Hindu 
College. Instead of any encouragement being given to meta­
physical speculation on the nature of the universe and the 
spiritual quality of man, he argued, emphasis ought to be 
placed entirely on the more practical fields of study. Among
4 BA. Report by Reverend J. Stevenson dated 28 November 1836 
G.D., Vol. 39/409 of 1837» Also see Memorandum by W.H. 
Wathen, Chief Secretary to the Bombay Government, dated 
December I8362 G.D., Vol. 39/409 of 1837.
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the 1 pernicious* disciplines taught at the Hindu College, 
Stevenson listed Advaita, Jyotish, Alankar, Nyaya and the 
Vedas. and he recommended the aboliton of the Chairs in these 
fields* Courses of instruction in disciplines like Mayukh 
(jurisprudence), Vyakaran (grammar), and the Dharamashastras 
could continue as before, since proficiency in these spheres 
could equip a young Brahmin for a useful career in life.
The reconstitution of the Hindu College along the lines 
advocated by Stevenson in I836 reflected the Bombay Govern­
ment’s determination to slowly undermine the hold of tradi­
tional values on the Brahmin intelligentsia, and to expose 
it to the influence of rational and liberal ideas. A similar 
objective inspired the changes effected in the 1830s in the 
distribution of the dakshina. an institution to which 
Elphinstone had extended his support for precisely the same 
reasons which prompted him to establish the Hindu College.
Of course, for the Hindu community in general, and the 
Brahmins in particular, the dakshina was far more important 
than the Hindu College, since it not only supported a large 
number* of impecunious Brahmins, but it also identified the 
State with the values and traditions to which the community 
was deeply attached.
Vhatever be its significance, when Baber turned his 
atten-ion to the distribution of the dakshina in 1834, he
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discovered that the institution was being thoroughly exploited 
by the Brahmin community^. In recommending candidates for 
the award of the dakshina, the Committee of Shastris appoint­
ed for this purpose by the Bombay Government was guided by 
Tcaprice1 rather than by the merit of the applicants. But 
apart from the corruption which apparently determined its 
distribution, the dakshina, Baber argued, hardly promoted any 
of the objectives which had encouraged Elphinstone to support 
it. Instead of training the minds of the rising generation of 
Brahmins f in habits of respect and attachment to the British 
Government1, it confirmed them in their allegiance to tradi­
tional values, and was instrumental in widening the gulf 
between the rulers and the ruled. Baber’s appraisal led the 
Bombay Government to appoint a Special Commission to investi­
gate the distribution of the dakshina, and to suggest ways and 
means for its reform. Through the implementation of the 
Commission’s recommendations the old Committee of Shastris, 
which had thoroughly discredited itself in official eyes 
through its corrupt practices was dismissed, and the rules 
for admission to the dakshina were made much more rigorous than 
before. The most important decision taken by the Bombay
5
BA. J.H. Baber, Collector of Poona, to Bombay Government
dated 8 November 1834: G.D., Vol. 6/301 of 1835*
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Government on the Commission’s suggestion concerned the im­
position of an interdict on the admission of new candidates 
to the dakshina after 1836^.
The reaction of the Brahmin community to a decision 
which affected its interests so adversely was sharp and 
instantaneous. For besides providing financial assistance 
to impecunious but scholarly Brahmins, the dakshina sym­
bolised the predominance of Brahmanical values over the com­
munity, and the acquiescence by the State in this predomi­
nance. The Brahmins therefore interpreted the decision to 
discontinue the dakshina as a challenge to their intellectual 
hegemony over Hindu society, and a bid to undermine the 
values and traditions of which they regarded themselves as 
the custodians. After debating the issue in their caste 
assemblies, in November I836 the Brahmins of Poona presented 
a petition to the Bombay Government. This petition was 
signed by 800 ’Shastris, Pandits and Puraniks etc.’ and it 
stated in forthright language the serious consequences likely 
to flow from the discontinuation of the dakshina grants? .
The study of the Vedas and the Shastras » the petition pointed
Z----------
BA. Report submitted by the Committee for the Reorganisa­
tion of the Dakshina dated 20 September I8 3 6: G.D., Vol. 
17/349 of 1836.
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BA. Petition by the Brahmins of Poona to the Bombay Gov­
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between the Hindu community and the values and traditions
which gave it moral cohesion, and fashioned its objectives
in the secular and spiritual worlds. In keeping with their
traditional role, the Brahmins of Maharashtra had taken upon
themselves this responsibility, and in return the State had
promised to maintain then, and to encourage them in their
labour, through the distribution of the dakshina. Such an
alliance between the political and the intellectual leaders
of the community had worked with the happiest of results in
the past, and had protected the interests of the Brahmins as
well as the secular authority. Elphinstone, the petition
argued, had recognised the benefits which accrued to the
State, and to the community, from the dakshina, and he had
therefore refrained from abolishing it. To do so now, the
Poona Brahmins stated in conclusion, would be to undermine
the moral foundations of Hindu society, and to sow the seed
for its political disintegration:
We therefore entreat [ran the petition] that the 
Sircar will take the whole of these circumstances 
into consideration, and make such arrangements as 
to cause all such balances as will have remained 
in hand, after the distribution of the ensuing 
Dakshina, on account of the absent Brahmins, to be 
distributed to all new candidates, who may be 
admitted after passing the usual examination.
This will be the means of disseminating the learn­
ing and the people will moreove be happy and it 
will greatly tend to the honour of the Government,
out, was necessary to sustain a creative relationship
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but should it be otherwise, both science and 
religion will be lost and ruined, and people will 
not act uprightly in their dealings, and every 
one will suffer extremely.8
However, the Bombay Government refused to be browbeaten 
into surrender by the spectre of moral anarchy and social 
disintegration raised by the Brahmin community. Its confi­
dence in its policies stemmed from the belief that the edu­
cation being given in institutions like the Poona English 
School (which was founded in 1832) would, in the course of 
time, give rise to a generation of Brahmins who would sympa­
thise with its political ideals and its social objectives.
The orthodox Brahmins who had petitioned against the decree 
prohibiting new individuals from presenting themselves as 
candidates for the dakshina were therefore told that the 
Government was unable to reconsider its decision^. It was, 
however, pointed out to them that the funds released through 
the interdict would ’continue to be made available to the 
general purposes of promoting education and rewarding acqui­
sitions of science*. The Government also committed itself to 
a de novo consideration of the problem after the number of 
dakshina receiving Brahmins had fallen sufficiently low.
3----------
Ibid.
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BA. Bombay Government to the Collector of Poona dated 19
January 1837: G.D., Vol. 15/385 of 1837.
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Since the Bombay Government had refused to acquiesce 
in the demands of the Poona Brahmins, the agitation against 
the discontinuation of the dakshina continued with unabated 
vigour, and even spread in widening circles to embrace the 
Brahmins of Satara, Wai, Pandharpur, Kurud, etc. Throughout 
the 1840s the authorities were made to feel the brunt of 
Brahmin disapproval through representations drawn along the 
lines of the Poona petition of 1836*0. But the Government 
did not retreat before this onslaught, since it was confident 
that the establishment of institutions like the English 
School was bound to exercise a liberalising influence over 
the Brahmin community. Nor was it disappointed in its expec­
tations, A series of representations received in 1850 from 
a group of Poona Brahmins, and from some students of the 
English School, spoke in clear terms of a cleavage in the 
Brahmin caste, and the emergence of a group of liberal 
Brahmins who had disowned the values and traditions of their 
forefathers, and who were anxious to exploit the opportunities 
open to them to secure positions of leadership within the 
community,
ÏÔ
BA. See Petition by the Brahmins of Poona, Wai, Satara, 
etc. dated 19 January 1 8 3 8s G.D., Vol. 9/526 of I84O. Also 
see Petition by 300 Brahmins of Poona to Bombay Government 
dated 2 November 1849: G.D., Vol. 26 of 1850,
The liberal Brahmins threw an open challenge to the old 
style shastris the moment sufficient arrears had accumulated 
from the annual dakshina subvention of Rs.30,000 to oblige 
the government to consider ways and means to usefully exploit 
the funds at its disposal. Their bid for power took the 
form of a representation to Viscount Falkland, the Governor 
of Bombay, which contained suggestions seeking to extend the 
scope of the dakshina beyond the promotion of studies in 
Sanskrit, and the assistance of old style shastris and 
pandits. The liberal Brahmins proposed the institution of
16 prizes, of the total value of Rs.1,000, in Sanskrit; and 
a similar number of awards, amounting to Rs.2,000, in 
Marathi and English. These prizes were to be awarded to 
individuals of any caste on the submission each year before a 
competent body 1 of an original useful composition in the 
Prakrit, or translation from some original works in the 
Sanskrit, English or any other language1**.
In stating the reasons which had encouraged them to 
propose alterations in the distribution of the dakshina. the 
liberal Brahmins defined their social vision and their 
political objectives with unmistakable clarity. Under the
n
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Bombay Government dated September 1849: G.D., Vol. 16 of 1849.
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Peshwas, they pointed out, support of Sanskrit and the pre­
tensions of the Brahmin caste could be justified on the 
basis of the prevailing intellectual climate, and the concept 
of political order from which the State drew its sanctions. 
But for the British Government to desist from introducing 
changes in the distribution of the dakshina would be a point­
less surrender to the forces of reaction. The ideals to 
which it subscribed were in no way related to the values of 
which the old style shastris regarded themselves as the cus­
todians; nor did it draw its sanctions from the traditions 
which the orthodox Brahmins cherished. On the other hand, 
with a little boldness and a little imagination the State 
could be instrumental in promoting the dissemination of 
knowledge which would widen the intellectual horizon of the 
community, and spread habits of thought and action that would 
promote progress and prosperity. It was incumbent on the 
British Government to adopt such policies both for altruistic 
reasons, and on grounds of equity. Its revenues were largely 
drawn from a tax on the peasant, and a policy which sub­
ordinated the kunbifs interests to the interest of the 
superior castes was morally reprehensible and politically 
inexpedient:
The present system of the distribution of the
Dukshunna Fund [the liberal Brahmins of Poona stated
in conclusion] has no tendency to promote learning
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among and extend its benefits to the great mass of 
the population. It is found (sic) on the old 
illiberal and barbarous prejudice of confining 
learning to the Brahmin Caste and locking it up in 
stores which the great mass of the people can never 
be able or hope to open...(The) present plan is 
calculated to civilise the nation in general and lay 
open for its benefit these stores of learning and 
wisdom...which have hitherto been inaccessible to 
the nation at large.
Another striking characteristic of the old system 
of the institution of the Duk&hiinna is the confine­
ment of its benefits to the caste of Brahmins...
The cultivator, the gardner (sic), the carpenter, 
the blacksmith, who are the most useful members of 
Society, and from whom the Dukshunna Fund is wrung, 
would not under the old system, share in its bene­
fits nor can be civilised by it...What the nation 
most wants is useful arts, science, and morals, and 
they shall find them not certainly in the dead 
Sanskrit, but in the animated English literature.
This essential reform must therefore be introduced 
and it cannot be commenced too soon.12
When the petition from the liberal Brahmins calling for 
an imaginative view of the dakshina was followed by a repre­
sentation, couched in identical language, from the 'students 
of Government English School and other English Schools in 
Poona**3, j .q # Lumsden, the Secretary to the Bombay Government, 
observed that the time had at long last come when the Govern­
ment could safely embark upon a policy of reform!4. The
12
Ibid.
13
BA. Petition by the Students of the Government English 
School dated 23 October 1849: G.D., Vol. 26 of 1850.
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BA. Memorandum by J.G. Lumsden, Secretary to the Bombay
Government, dated January 1850: G.D., Vol. 26 of 1850.
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Sanskrit, Lumsden argued, in no way committed the government
to prop the traditional order in Maharashtra, Elphinstone
had yielded to no one in his anxiety to introduce liberal
ideas among the Brahmins. But with his Burkean concern for
continuity in the processes of change, he had visualised the
westernisation of the Brahmin intelligentsia as a gradual
process. Since there existed a considerable group within the
Brahmin caste that was clamouring for a liberal education,
and a bold attitude towards the dakshina, it was clear that
a policy of reform could be adopted without any fear of social
disintegration. That reform would have to be undertaken sooner
or later, Lumsden argued, was inevitable. For to retain the
dakshina as it stood under the Peshwas was to deny the ideals
and objectives for whose fulfilment British rule had been
established over Maharashtra, Brahmanical values, with their
emphasis on stability and prescription and status, were
diametrically opposed to concepts like equality in the eyes
of the law, and economic progress and social mobility. To
submit to Brahmin ideals would prevent the British Government
from embarking upon any scheme of improvement or reforms
Are the recipients of the Duxxina [Lumsden asked] 
unable to comprehend that the system at work around 
them is directly at variance with the social system 
and the entire body of ethics which have formed the 
subjects of their studies and which they regard with 
a bigoted reverence? Or is it to be supposed that
support given by Elphinstone to the dakshina and the study of
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a single act of concession like the distribution of 
this Duxxina will conciliate the views of (those?) 
who receive it or render them less alive to the 
fact that the Government is pursuing a course which 
threatens eventually to deprive them of their 
cherished social supremacy?
If there be justice in the above remarks the course 
which it is proper to pursue will not require much 
consideration. Unless Government are deterred by 
the apprehension of adding to the dissatisfaction 
of this class who in the present day are rather sub­
jects for compassion than for admiration it should 
avoid all occasions of extending to them a direct 
and prominent support which places them in a false 
position equally in relation to ourselves and to the 
people.
What encouragement Government can afford should 
rather be given to those among them who have come 
out from their camp and who have been educated under 
the auspices of Government in ideas more consonant 
with "the progress of national education". The time 
has arrived when without concern for the result, 
Government can afford to give a direct and unequi­
vocal support to those men whose ideas it has helped 
to liberalise and whose minds it has endeavoured to 
advance beyond the prejudices of their nation and 
in so doing has placed them in the position of 
opponents to their own caste and to caste interests 
while they may unquestionably be regarded as more 
friendly and partial to ourselves.15
Since it recognised the contradiction between Brahmanical 
values and the political objectives of the British Government, 
and because it focussed attention on the liberal forces at 
work within the Brahmin community, the Lumsden memorandum was 
the signal for sweeping changes in the dakshina and in the 
Hindu College. No new candidates had been admitted to the
15
Ibid.
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dakshina after I8 3 6, and the amount of money distributed to 
the shastris and pandits by the Government was reduced from 
Rs.28,000 in 1839, to Rs.12,000 in 185716. In 1859 the 
dakshina fund was taken over by the Education Department, and 
a number of Fellowships were instituted, which were awarded 
to candidates, irrespective of caste, to enable them to 
receive a secular education in the schools and colleges of 
Bombay*?. The Hindu College had in the meanwhile been trans­
formed into an institution for imparting a modern and a scien­
tific, as opposed to a classical, education. Through reforms 
initiated in 1850, the College was thrown open to all castes, 
and its Sanskrit Professorships were substituted by four 
Chairs: the first in Vernacular, the second in English, the 
third in Marathi, and the fourth and last in the Sciences*^. 
Students seeking admission to the College were expected to 
possess a sound knowledge of the Vernacular. It was also 
obligatory for them to study Marathi, though Sanskrit was 
optional for candidates whose main interest centred on the 
English language, and vice versa. A second set of reforms
16
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introduced in 1856 heightened the importance of the Chairs of 
English and Science in the College, and stipulated that 'Sans­
krit students should be made to learn also the other branches 
of a useful general education taught in the College...
Finally, in 1864 the Hindu College was renamed the Deccan 
College, and thereafter played a key role in the intellectual 
life of Maharashtra through giving a liberal education to 
generations of young Brahmin students.
Despite the changes brought about in the intellectual 
climate of Maharashtra by a deliberate policy of westernisa­
tion, the radical Brahmins whom a liberal education, and the 
tacit support of the State, had encouraged to challenge the 
position of their orthodox caste-fellows were still in a 
minority. The weakness in numbers of the radical Brahmins is 
underscored by the fact that while the liberal petition seek­
ing changes in the dakshina was supported by only 22 Brahmins, 
the orthodox faction could persuade 500 shastris and pandits 
to endorse a counter-petition to the Bombay Government2 .^ 
However, while the orthodox Brahmins had the strength of 
numbers on their side, the winds of change that were blowing
19
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BA. Petition by 500 Brahmins of Poona, Satara, Wai etc.
dated 13 December 1849: J.D, (Judicial Department), Vol. 16
of 1849.
across Maharashtra hscl created a climate that was favourable 
to the aspirations of the ’new BrahminsT for the leadership 
of the community. The power of the orthodox shas tris, it 
should be borne in mind, did not rest exclusively on their 
religious role. For besides regulating the spiritual life 
of the individual, the shastris led the caste assemblies 
which acted as channels of communication between the caste 
members and the State, and protected the secular interests of 
the community. Now the shastris could initiate social action 
only when the State too subscribed to the values on which they 
based their positions of leadership, and shared their social 
ideals and political objectives. Since the British Government 
stood for social ideals and political objectives which were 
different, and in some vital respects antagonistic, to those 
of the traditional leaders of the community, the latter were 
unable to perform their political role adequately after the 
British conquest. The stage was thus set for the emergence of 
a new elite, and the development of a new style in politics.
The inability of the traditional elite to act to any 
purpose in the altered political climate engendered by 
British rule, and the consequent need for a new leadership, 
is brought into sharp focus by the riots which broke out in 
Surat in 1844* The Surat riots of 1844 were obviously con­
nected with the depressed economic conditions which prevailed 
in the city ever since its displacement by Bombay as the
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entrepot for the trade of western India in the opening decades 
of the nineteenth century2*. But the immediate cause of the 
anti-British uprising in Surat was a decree which raised the 
duty on salt to off-set the losses sustained by the public 
treasury through the abolitinn of transit duties on commercial 
goods. In raising the salt-tax the Government unwittingly 
imposed a new and heavy burden on broad sections of the com­
munity: on the cultivators, who were already staggering under 
the weight of an oppressive land-tax; on the Brahmins, who 
were living on the wreck of fortunes of better times, and 
whose main diet consisted of vegetables cured in salt; and on 
the poor fishing communities of the coast, which employed 
large quantities of salt in preserving the fish they caught. 
The increase in the duty on salt was particularly ill-conceiv- 
ed since the social groups it affected did not gain anything 
from the abolition of transit duties. Dr Gibson, a mission­
ary who was in close touch with native opinion in Surat, 
pointed out how the measure had confirmed the natives in 
their suspicion that the British Government would ultimately 
burden them with taxation just as arbitrary, and oppressive, 
as that levied by the Peshwas:
21
BA. Petition by 1180 Merchants of Surat to the Bombay
Government dated 24 April 1827: J.D., Vol. 20/146 of 1827.
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I have often conversed [Gibson observed] with 
Natives who were ready to twit me with the philan­
thropy of the British Government in giving up 
transit duties, and in substituting this tax which 
brought in a huge sum...It seems to me that one 
could not have hit on a measure better calculated 
to excite extreme discontent among the various 
classes who have suffered by our rule, and whose 
affection we have no opportunity of conciliating 
otherwise than by letting them alone. The differ­
ent classes are numerous - they are influential.22
As pointed out by Gibson, and subsequently underscored
by the riots, the intensity of feeling against the increase
in the duty on salt afforded an excellent opportunity to the
traditional leaders in Surat to acquaint the authorities
with public reaction to the measure. But to such an extent
was the traditional elite alienated from the centres of
power, that it was unable to act to any purpose in the
crisis precipitated by the British Government. In the
absence of any initiative from their traditional leaders,
the citizens of Surat expressed their opposition to the increase
in tax on salt through uncoordinated mass action. On the
30th of August 1844* an angry and excited tmobt of 30*000
marched to the adawlut in Surat, and demanded a cancellation
of the duty on salt from the British magistrate, Sir Robert
22
BA. Memorandum by Dr Gibson enclosed in letter from Sir 
R.K. Arbuthnot, Collector of Surat, to Bombay Government 
dated 31 August 1844: P* & S.D. (Political and Secret Depart­
ment), Vol. 92/1625 of 1844.
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Arbuthnot2^ • The march on the adawlut brings into sharp 
focus the ineffectiveness of the traditional leaders in a 
situation which they could have turned to their advantage; 
on the one hand, by asserting their leadership over the com­
munity, and on the other, by demonstrating to the British 
Government their proper role as channels of communication 
between the State and its subjects. The spontaniety of the 
Surat demonstration, and the extent to which the bewildered 
traditional leaders were compelled to adopt belligerent 
attitudes under pressure from their followers, is all too 
clear from an account of the riots by Sheikh Sharif, the 
foremost Muslim divine in the city:
In the hope of seeing you hereafter [Sheikh Sharif 
wrote to Arbuthnot] I beg now to repeat that since 
this morning, the whole men of this city have united 
and assembled at my house and urged me to proceed to 
the Sirdar (i.e., the British representative). But 
I have since morning till this time told them to have 
great patience and make no disturbance or tumult... 
and that those who have anything to say, should 
petition on the subject, and to agree to whatever 
a beneficient Government may desire, but in no way 
will they be satisfied. At length they have agreed 
to be satisfied in this manner: the Government to 
order...that an answer will be given to the petition 
in a few days and for the present, until a final 
order be given, that all the ryots shall remain in 
their own homes... 24
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That the dilemma which confronted the traditional elite 
was genuine rather than simulated is obvious from Arbuthnotfs 
description of Sheikh Sharif as fa very respectable and good 
man...whose followers are a discontented set...t25 But in 
the absence of any other channel of communication with the 
Tmobf on the streets, Arbuthnot was obliged to turn to tra­
ditional leaders like Sheikh Sharif, and the Mullah of the 
Borahs, and the Goswamijee Maharaj of the Hindus, for 
assistance in bringing the situation under control2^. However, 
because the traditional leaders were unable to adjust them­
selves to the changing style of politics in Maharashtra, the 
future lay with the liberal Brahmins, who were in a position 
to convey the sentiments of the people to the government, and 
at the same time shared the values of, and were inspired by 
the same ideals as, the British Government. Of course, the 
traditional leaders were fully aware of their growing impo­
tence, and of the changes which were undermining their pre­
dominance over the community. All this is clearly reflected 
in the retort of an embittered shastri of the old school to 
a liberal Brahmin who tried to win him over to the cause of 
reform: *We Shastris know that the tide is against us and it
25
BA. Letter from R.K. Arbuthnot to Bombay Government dated 
3 September 1844: P. & S.D., Vol. 92/1625 of I8 4 4.
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is no use opposing. You people should not consult us, but 
go your own way, and do the thing you think right; and we 
shall not come in your way. But if you ask us and want us 
to twist the shastras to your purpose and go with you, we 
must speak plainly and we must oppose...’^7
Who were these ’new Brahmins1 who were seeking to rob 
the traditional elite of their role as leaders of the com­
munity? What was their social vision and what were their 
political objectives? How wide was the gulf which separated 
them from the orthodox leaders, and how fundamental were the 
changes which they sought to bring about in Maharashtra?
Were they an alienated group, or did their enthusiasm for 
reform stop short of a rupture of their ties with the more 
conservative sections of the community?
These questions are best answered by sketching brief 
portraits of some representative new Brahmins of Maharashtra.
Gopal Hari Deshmukh, also known as the Lokhitwadi 
(Advocate of the People’s Welfare), was born in 1823 in a 
Chitpavan family which had served the Peshwas, and whose 
estates were confiscated by the British Government for their 
loyalty to the ancien regime. After completing his education
27
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in the Poona English School, the Lokhitwadi entered the judi­
cial service of the Bombay Government, and rose from a humble p 
position to be a judge in the Nasik District Court. Fie was a 
pioneer of Marathi journalism, in which capacity he applied him­
self to the task of spreading political education and propagating 
social reform in Maharashtra. The TSatapatren*, or the weekly 
letters which the Lokhitwadi contributed to a contemporary jour­
nal, are not the effusions of a sophisticated mind; nor do they 
reveal any deep insight into current problems and predicaments. 
But despite his limited vision, and his superficial acquaintance 
with western thought, the Lokhatwadi reached at a shrewd assess­
ment of the impact of British rule on Maharashtra. The British 
occupation, he pointed out, differed fundamentally from the Mus­
lim conquest. While the intellectual impact of Islam had been 
marginal, British rule had opened the eyes of the intelligentsia 
to a new and exciting range of social values and political ob­
jectives, and had convinced it of the advantages of representa­
tive government and popular democracy. Through promoting a 
change in the intellectual climate, the British Government had 
cleared the way for the political emancipation of the country. 
Once Maharashtrians had exorcized evils like the institution of 
caste and the low status of women, and reorganised their soci­
ety on a liberal and democratic basis, they would have no 
trouble in achieving political emancipation. Social change ra­
ther than political power formed the principal concern of the
Lokhitwadi, but like many a first generation new Brahmin, he
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did not look upon the political and the social as mutually 
exlusive, and he believed that liberalisation in the latter 
automatically assured progress in the former sphere2®.
Vishwanath Narayan Mandlik was born in 1823 in a dis­
tinguished Chitpavan family which was connected with the 
Peshwas by ties of kinship, and which had provided the former 
rulers with many a high officer of State29. Mandlik was en­
dowed with an intellectual stature and qualities of leader­
ship which would have assured him an outstanding political 
career anywhere. He received his education in Elphinstone 
College, Bombay, where he created a most favourable impres­
sion on his teachers, and after a brief spell of Government 
service embarked upon a legal career. But it was through his 
participation in public affairs, first in the Bombay Munici­
pality, then in the Provincial Legislative Council, and 
finally in the Imperial Legislative Council, that he made his 
mark upon the contemporary stage. A 'Whig' who saw no
IE-----------
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contradiction between the British ’connection1 and the in­
creasing participation of Indians in affairs of State, as a 
figure in public life Mandlik provided a striking contrast 
with the traditional leaders of the j_o hokum (sycophantic) 
school, from whose ranks the British Government all too 
frequently packed the legislatures. Yet his essentially 
conservative cast of mind, and his regard for traditional 
values, alienated him from the more impetuous Brahmins who 
had become impatient of the slow pace at which power was 
being transferred into their hands. The image Mandlik has 
left for posterity is that of an enlightened conservative who 
was outpaced by the rapid growth of radical sentiment among 
the second generation of new Brahmins; and although he started 
public life as a cautious liberal, towards the end of his 
career he was battling furiously and valiantly on behalf of 
orthodoxy to protect Hindu society from schemes of reform 
which, so he believed, would have undermined its cohesion by 
creating a wide gulf between its leading and its traditional 
elements^®*
A new Brahmin with a difference, because of his political 
interests, was Ganesh Vasudev Joshi, who was born in Satara 
in 1828, and who came to Poona in I848 in search for
444
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employment after having completed his preliminary schooling 
in the city of his birth. After a brief and unhappy spell 
of service in a Government department, Joshi applied himself 
to a legal career, and at the same time commenced taking an 
active interest in the politics of Poona. He was a founding 
member of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, and as its first 
secretary responsible (along with M.G. Ranade) for guiding 
its agitational activity, and shaping its political style. 
Like other Brahmins who subscribed to liberal values, Joshi 
was aware of the wide gulf that had come to separate the 
traditional leaders from the centres of political power, and 
in the Sarva.janik Sabha he saw fa mediatory body which may 
afford to the people facilities for knowing the real inten­
tions and objectives of the government...(and provide them 
with means) for securing their rights by presenting timely 
representations to Government of the circumstances in which 
they are placed*31. His search for a creative political role 
for the new Brahmin elite prompted Joshi to involve the 
Sabha in a series of agitations, from support to the ryots of 
the Deccan in their grievances against the Revenue and Survey 
Department which found expression in the disturbances of
31
Vide article entitled *Note on the Life and Work of G.V. 
Joshi* in unpublished source material available with BSCHFM.
1875 > to organised protests against the repressive press le­
gislation enacted by the government of Lord Lytton. None of 
these agitations was marked by any conspicuous success. But 
Joshi did not have any illusions about the strength of the 
forces that were ranged against him, within the community, 
and in the ranks of the administration. Besides, he regarded 
participation in agitational activity by the new elite not as 
a short cut to victory, but an experience which would streng­
then the moral fibre and sharpen the intellectual faculties 
of the new Brahmins for the political struggles that lay 
ahead. JoshiTs finest hour came in 1877, when he attended 
the Imperial Durbar as the representative of the Sarvajanik 
Sabha, and invoked an ’Indian Parliament’ of the princes and 
feudal chiefs who had assembled there to expound for their 
benefit the ideals and objectives of liberalism^2.
The most influential new Brahmin of his day was Vishnu 
Shastri Chiplunkar, who transformed Marathi into a language 
capable of expressing modern ideas, and who assumed the role 
of an iconoclast with an eye for humbug that was pitiless in 
its appraisals, and a vision that was bold in the ideals 
which it set before the community. Before he died a
32
See Source Material For A History Of The Freedom Movement 
In India. (l88S-lQ20). XI. (Bombay. p p .  1-10.
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premature death in 1881, Vishnu Shastri had made a profound 
impression on the young Brahmin intellectuals of his time, 
and in assessing the loss which Maharashtra had suffered 
through his demise a contemporary compared him to ’Voltaire 
(who) made everyone from Stockholm to Rome, and St. Peters­
burg to Lisbon, tremble in his shoes when he took up his 
pen...(So) did Shastribua make the Rao Sahebs, the Rao 
Behadurs, the Reverends and the Saraswatis squirm and squeak 
under his literary lash’33. While he accepted western values 
with far more discrimination than an intellectual with the 
limited vision of a Lokhitwadi, Vishnu ShastriTs sympathies 
lay with the advocates of change rather than with the old 
style shastris, and he looked with hope and optimism to a 
future in which Maharashtra would play a creative role after 
having purged itself of its social evils and regenerated it­
self politically. Such ideals found expression in the New 
English School, which Vishnu Shastri founded in 1880 together 
with a group of young Brahmins like Tilak, Agarkar and Apte 
who were destined to give intellectual and political leader­
ship to Maharashtra till well into the opening decades of the 
twentieth century.
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Ouoted in D.M. Limaye, The History of the Deccan Education 
Society, (Poona, 1935), p. 19.
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Despite the influence exercised by Vishnu Shastri 
Chiplunlcar on the intellectuals of his generation, new 
Brahmanism found its loftiest expression in Mahadev Govind 
Ranade, who was the most sophisticated thinker of his day.
Born in a poor Chitpavan family in I842, Ranade received his 
early schooling in Poona, and in 1859 proceeded to Elphinstone 
College in Bombay, which was then virtually moulding the mind 
of young Maharashtrians through enlightened and liberal educa­
tionalists like Green and Wordsworth. Although the lack of 
independent means obliged Ranade to enter into the service of 
the Bombay Government, he did not permit his official duties 
to restrict either his interests or his activities. Ranade’s 
interests encompassed the entire range of human activity, and 
once he had entered public life through the Poona Sarva.janik 
Sabha in the 1870s, he continued to play an active role in 
the affairs of the community till his death in 1901. But des­
pite the leadership he gave to the new Brahmins in politics 
and religion and social reform, Ranade compels our attention 
primarily for the insight which he possessed into the short­
comings of Hindu society, and the vision and catholicity with 
which he proposed solutions for their eradication. The intel­
lectual qualities which raised Ranade a head and shoulders
RanadeTs liberalism and his rational ethic
above his contemporaries restricted him as a man of action, 
and placed him at a distinct disadvantage in the rough and 
tumble of politics. A pessimistic cast of mind; an inability 
to compromise on questions of principle; and a lack of the 
qualities that make the successful demagogue combined with 
intellectual sophistication to circumscribe the influence of 
RanadeTs ideas, and to restrict the popularity of his leader­
ship^.
Apart from his mental make-up and education, Ranadefs 
social vision was shaped by his membership of an elite caste 
which shared its values with the lower and middle castes of 
Maharashtra, and which retained even after the lapse of half 
a century vivid memories of the dominant position it had en­
joyed under the Peshwas. The transfer of power in 1818 had 
shattered the hegemony of the Chitpavan Brahmins. But by 
virtue of their intellectual traditions, and the hold they 
had exercised over the bureaucracy before the British take-over, 
they remained even after 1818 the most influential indigenous 
group in Maharashtra, flocking in great numbers to the educa­
tional institutions opened by the British Government, and 
monopolising the junior ranks of the civil service. An
34
J. Kellock, Mahadev Govind Ranade, (Calcutta, 1926), Chap­
ters I and II, passim.
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examination of Table A demonstrates their predominance over 
the schools and colleges in the Bombay province, which pro­
vided the only means of access to the civil service, and to 
independent careers in professions like law^5. in the Deccan 
College in Poona, for instance, more than 97 per cent of the 
students were Brahmins, although the caste formed only four 
per cent of the total population of the Deccan. Small wonder 
then that British civilians viewed the preponderance of the 
Chitpavans with alarm, and apprehended the implications of 
their memories of past glory for the future of British rule 
in India:
Now the Chitpawun tribe [wrote Sir Richard Temple, 
the Governor of Bombay, to the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, 
in 1879] still stands in vigour and prosperity.
They are inspired with national sentiment and with 
an ambition bounded only with the limits of India 
itself...If you were to count heads among our best 
native employees all over the Deccan and the Concan, 
and even among our humble village accountants, you 
would be surprised to find what a hold this tribe 
of Chitpawuns has over the whole administrative 
machinery of the country. And this position is won 
over not by favour but by force of merit. For 
among prizemen and honours holders in the schools 
and graduates of the University the Chitpawuns are 
predominant... But nothing that we do now, by way of 
education, emolument, or advancement in the public 
service, at all satisfies the Chitpawuns. They will 
never be satisfied till they regain their ascendency 
in the country, as they had it in the last century.36
35
Vide Education Commission, Bombay. Vol. I: Report of the 
Bombay Provincial Committee,(Calcutta, 1884), p. 136.
36
Vide l7he Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 8 July 1962.
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The social background of a new Brahmin like Ranade 
deserves special emphasis because of the light it throws on 
his views, and the significance it bestows upon the ideals 
he set before the community. It would be futile to deny that 
RanadeTs views were to a considerable extent shaped by a con­
servative temper which prompted him to look upon politics as 
the art of the possible, and to reject the utopian and the 
vissionary for the concrete and the practical. But it is 
equally certain that the political ambitions which he enter­
tained as a member of the TChitpawun tribe’, and the spiritual 
outlook which he shared with the unsophisticated kunbi 
through allegiance to a common body of religious values, in­
culcated in him a concern for social consensus, and encourag­
ed him to reject progress achieved at the cost of social 
alienation.
RanadeTs concern for social consensus as a member of an 
elite caste which was closely integrated with the rest of the 
community was reinforced by the intellectual influences which 
shaped his views on politics and society. Like other new 
Brahmins of his generation, he read extensively of the works 
of Adam Smith, Burke, Bentham and the Mills; and like the 
rest of them, he was impressed by the place given by Burke to 
tradition in the life of the community, and the interpretation 
given by Mill to liberty, despite the sweeping reservations
voiced by the prophet of liberalism about societies which 
lacked political sophistication and a sound formal education. 
But it was the social theories of Herbert Spencer, to whom 
Ranade once referred as ’the greatest living philosopher of 
the age’37^ that made the most significant impact on his mind 
and inculcated in him a belief in evolution, and a vision of 
progress, which saw social or economic or politcal activity 
as intimately related rather than isolated fields of human en 
deavour. Ranade and the new Brahmins who chose to follow his 
lead are frequently referred to as liberals. This label is 
accurate only to the extent it distinguishes them from the 
old style shastris who were committed to traditional values, 
and from individuals who subscribed to activist theories of 
political action. But the new Brahmins of Ranadefs camp did 
not believe in the individualism which characterised English 
liberalism in the nineteenth century, and they did not pin 
their faith on social action based on the motivations of the 
individual rather than the group. Indeed, so far was Ranade 
from subscribing to laissez-faire ideas, that he held the 
economics of liberalism responsible for much of the poverty 
of India under British rule.
37
Quoted from a speech given by M.G. Ranade in the Prarthana 
Samaj: The Mahratta, 11 December 1887.
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Despite his comprehensive view of society, and despite 
his belief in progress as an all embracing rather than a 
fragmented quality, since the circumstances of India under 
British rule hinged on a relationship of political superor­
dination and subordination between two societies, Ranade was 
obliged to place an emphasis on political progress which did 
some violence to the ideas of Herbert Spencer. The need for 
such an emphasis became all the more pressing when a powerful 
group of conservative officials in the Government of India 
initiated a debate concerning political objectives, which (to 
Ranade) appeared to contradict the manifest principles of 
political progress, and to violate the basic assumptions that 
provided the moral sanctions for British rule over India. 
Admittedly, these officials had been provoked into action by 
the liberal policies of Lord Ripon, and by the Ilbert Bill in 
particular. But since Ranade looked upon the devolution of 
power initiated by Ripon as a process to which the British 
Government in India was irretrievably committed because of 
its basic political values, he regarded the conservative 
reaction to Riponfs policies as an attempt to give a novel 
and sinister interpretation to the relationship binding 
India to England.
The conservative case against the liberal policies of 
Ripon was best expressed by Sir Fitzjames Stephen, a
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Utilitarian who was influenced by the authoritarian doctrine 
of Hobbes, and whose experience as the Law Member of the 
Government of India from 1869 to 1872 reinforced his contempt 
for popular democracy and representative government, and for 
the shibboleths of TLiberty, Equality, and FraternityT . 
Stephen regarded Ripon’s attempt to promote progressive 
Indian participation in affairs of State as a step that 
would fatally undermine British authority in India; and he 
subjected the liberal vision of British rule over _ India to 
a scathing attack in an article which appeared in the Nine-
0
teenth Century in 1883, and which spelt out his view of TThe 
Foundations of the Government of India139. At the root of 
liberal pusillanimity and liberal blunders in India, Stephen 
argued, lay the confusion and feelings of guilt which over­
whelmed the heirs of John Stuart Mill when they found them­
selves upholding two different, and contradictory political 
ideals in India and England. The correct policy to be pur­
sued in a dependency which was at the same time an oriental 
polity became clear once the liberal principles of Mill were
38
See E. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford, 
1959), pp. 273-98. Also see J.F. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity, (London, 1874), for Stephenfs attack on John 
Stuart Mill.
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disavowed, and it was recognised that England was a 'belli­
gerent ’ civilisation in India, and that she could attain her 
political objectives there only by refusing to share power 
with any indigenous group. The Government of India, Stephen 
followed his argument, was
essentially absolute Government, founded not on con­
sent, but on conquest. It does not represent the 
native principles of Government, nor can it do so 
unless it represents heathenism and barbarism. It 
represents a ’belligerent civilisation’, and no 
anomoly can be so startling or so dangerous as its 
administration by men who, being at the head of a 
government founded on conquest, implying at every 
point the superiority of the conquering race, of 
their ideas, institutions, their opinions, and 
their principles, and having no justification for 
its existence except that superiority, shrink from 
the open, uncompromising, straightforward assertion 
of it, seek to apologise for their own position, and 
refuse, for whatever cause, to uphold and support it.40
Stephen was convinced that British rule over India was
based on principles which were different from, and opposed to
the sanctions of government in England. These principles
hinged on the assertion by the British Government in India of
absolute power. Stephen further argued that absolutism was a
legitimate form of government in itself, and not merely a
stage of transition to popular democracy, as was widely assum
ed by the liberals in India. In justifying British rule over
India, the liberals employed arguments which implied that the
40
Ibid.
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exercise of absolute power could be justified only as a 
temporary expedient to educate the peoples of India in the 
virtues of popular democracy, and the use of representative 
institutions. TI do not thinkT, Stephen pontificated, Tthat 
the permanent existence of such a government as ours in 
India need in itself be a bad thing; that we ought not to 
desire its permanence even if we can save it; and that the 
establishment of some kind of parliamentary system instead 
of it is an object which ought to be distinctly contemplated, 
and, as soon as it is practicable, carried out141.
For Ranade the authoritarian principles of Stephen were 
anathema, since they condemned India to permanent servitude, 
and deprived the British Government of any convincing moral 
argument justifying its presence in the country. Since 
Stephen1s principles were shared by influential civilians in 
India, and viewed with sympathy by powerful politicians in 
England, their enunciation held implications that Ranade was 
quick to recognise. To offset the influence exercised by 
StephenTs incisive attack on the liberal positions, he out­
lined his view of fThe True Foundations of British Rule in
41Ibid.
IndiaT42 an article which appeared in the April I884 issue 
of The Journal of the Poona Sarva.janik Sabha. This article 
embodied a cogent and sophisticated expression of the liberal 
conception of the objectives of British rule, and it set out 
with remarkable foresight the process by which political 
power was transferred into Indian hands.
At the very outset Ranade attacked Stephenfs doctrine 
of absolute power, and the Tpractical inferences1 Stephen 
drew from the application of this doctrine to the issues con­
fronting the British Government in India. It had been argued, 
Ranade observed, that since the British Government in India 
was founded on conquest, it should not hesitate to proclaim 
the superiority of the conquering race, and it ought not to 
limit its freedom of action by the opinions and ideals of its 
Indian subjects. Both the inferences drawn by Stephen were 
fallacious. If the culture of the ruling elite was superior 
to that of the subject race, then the dominant group could 
quite legitimately assert its superiority over the latter, 
whether it had acquired power through conquest, or through 
the consent of the governed. However, the superiority of the
42
M.G. Ranade, fThe True Foundations of the Government of 
India1, Quarterly Journal of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha (hence­
forth referred to as JPSS), April 1 8 9 4 . This article does 
not appear under RanadeTs name, but can be attributed to him 
on stylistic grounds.
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the sentiments, or even the prejudices, of the subject
people. Instead, it imposed on it the responsibility of
raising their cultural level. On his own part Ranade was
willing to admit the superiority of European civilisation in
certain branches of human activity, and he proclaimed his
willingness Tto receive, from our English rulers, the
benefits of the new civilisation*. But the reasons which
encouraged him to welcome the liberalising influence of
British rule also convinced him that British authority over
India could never be asolute or unquestioned:
(We)...have no objection [Ranade pointed out] to 
open and straight forward assertion of the superi­
ority of Englishmen over us, in so far as such 
assertion is necessary for the spread amongst us of 
the higher civilisation of which Englishmen are the 
representatives. But on the other side, we say 
such assertion should not be as uncompromising as 
Sir F. Stephen makes it - because it is essential 
to the spread of that civilisation that at many 
points it should proceed by way of compromise...^3
Ranadefs opposition to the conservative standpoint stem­
med from his disapproval of the authoritarian principles which 
Stephen applied to the British Government in India, and his 
dismay at Stephenfs denial of any creative role to the new 
Brahmins whom he represented. In focussing attention on the
ruling elite did not invest it with the right to disregard
43 Ibid.
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dangers of absolute government, Ranade leaned heavily on the 
familiar liberal indictment of authoritarianism. Stephen, 
he argued, had made a plea for absolute government on grounds 
of its ability to initiate reform with far greater efficiency 
than was possible for a government that was subject to the 
popular will. But was this supposition at all justified? 
Government, whether absolute or otherwise, was run by indi­
viduals who were fallible, and who had therefore to constantly 
appraise and modify their policies in the light of the 
responses of informed opinion, and the reactions of the en­
lightened sections of the community. For the British Govern­
ment in India, the new Brahmins constituted the one and only 
link with the native community. While the great bulk of the 
population was ignorant and apathetic, a small but significant 
minority had learnt to appreciate western values through the 
education it had received in the new schools and colleges, 
and as a result of the intellectual climate of the country 
under British rule. This minority was anxious to see repre­
sentative institutions work in India, and it sought to apply 
rational and liberal techniques to the social and economic 
development of the country. These new Brahmins could be taken 
into political partnership by the British Government in India 
with advantage both to the State and the community, and they 
would in course of time provide the social base for the
4 6 0
transfer of authority into Indian hands. Only by embarking
upon such a policy could British rule in India justify
itself, and successfully accomplish its civilising mission:
We dissent almost entirely [Ranade stated in con­
clusion] from the political principles which Mr 
Justice Stephen wishes to be prevailing in the gov­
ernment of this country. We consider these prin­
ciples to be erroneous and of evil tendency. Our 
general conclusion is, that while the shell and 
husk...which belong to the English constitution as 
it at present rests, may be and ought to be cast) 
aside, the real kernel of it is as suitable in this 
country, as in the soil where it has had such bene­
ficial growth. We agree, that even this essential 
portion of that constitution should not be intro­
duced all of a sudden. Let each successive step 
that is taken be justified by the event before 
further progress is attempted. But however slowly 
we may move, however cautiously and circumspectly 
we may look about us at every step that we take, 
let our progress be towards the goal which is indi­
cated by the constitution of the great kingdom with 
which we are now so closely associated as parts of 
the great empire in which the sun never sets...44
The debate in which Ranade participated as an antagonist 
of Sir Fitzjames Stephen, and the definition he gave to his 
political views, formed only one facet of his activities as 
a public figure. With his belief in the intimate interdepen­
dence between the political, the intellectual, the religious 
and the economic facets of a society, Ranade was convinced 
that it would be futile and dangerous to place an exaggerated
44 Ibid.
emphasis on the achievement of political objectives, to the 
exclusion of progress in other directions. To be meaningful 
and enduring, so he believed, progress had to embrace all the 
fields of social activity, and it had to proceed at a uniform 
pace in all the branches of human endeavour*
The insight which Ranade gained through his vision of 
progress as a comprehensive rather than a fragmented 
phenomenon, and the importance he attached to the intellec­
tual climate which prevailed in the community and shaped its 
values, are seen clearly in an article in which he spelt out 
fThe Exigencies of Progress in India145, The first pre­
requisite for progress, he pointed out, was a belief in 
progress on the part of the individuals who made up a 
community. For progress to be achieved, it had first to 
be desired. The revolution of rising expectations, and 
the growth of a widespread belief in the desirability of 
social mobility and economic growth, were the two most 
fundamental and significant changes in the climate of 
opinion in India under British rule. Prior to the British 
conquest, social values had imposed acquiescence in the 
status quo rather than an urge for improvement on the
45
M . G .  Ranade, TThe Exigencies of Progress in India’, JPSS, 
April 1893« This article again does not appear' under Ranade’s 
name, but can be attributed to him on stylistic grounds.
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Satisfied with an ancient civilisation [Ranade 
pointed out], we have never, in recent history, 
endeavoured to fall in line with modern progress; 
nor, but for our education, it is likely that even 
now we should cherish any new ideal. Our ruin is 
attributable to our national apathy, lethargy and 
torpor, the direct result of past isolation and 
foreign conquests. The active impediments to pro­
gress are the inquisitorial power of religion, and 
the overpowering influence of custom and tradition, 
which have associated the highest ideal of happi­
ness in our minds with inactivity and ease. While 
the western nations have striven to develop human 
energies and powers, and to secure a mastery over 
physical nature, we have stood before the world 
with folded hands, a picture of helplessness and 
despair, but in dutiful veneration of everything 
pertaining to the past, and yielding ourselves in 
placid contentment to the guidance of antiquated 
usages, and to rules of conduct which regulated 
social life before the dawn of modern civilisation.46
If a commitment to values which placed a premium on 
order and stability at the cost of progress had retarded the 
development of India, Ranade raised the question, how could 
the progress of the country be ensured? The most important 
attribute of a forward looking society was a rational 
approach to economic activity. Reduced to its bare essen­
tials, a progressive and modern community was one in which 
every person was constantly striving to improve his status 
through planned effort. In this quest for self-improvement 
there was no place for the irrational and the romantic; and 
even where these qualities were not wholly eliminated, they
individual:
46
Ibid.
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Science and rationality were the two basic props of modern 
society; and as seminal intellectual influence they played 
the same role in the contemporary world as faith and religion 
had played in the earlier stages of human history.
Since the key to social progress lay in rational action, 
and in the substitution of reason for superstition, and 
scientific values for religious prejudices, Ranadefs attempt 
to effect a religious revival was geared to the promotion of 
such changes in the social climate of Maharashtra. Alone 
among the new Brahmins of his generation, he discerned the 
implications of the rise of protestantism in Europe, and 
recognised the upsurge of creative energy that had reinvigo­
rated the West through the spread of the idea of individual 
responsibility to God, and of an ethic which promised 
spiritual fulfilment through dedication to a calling in the 
secular world. The spread of protestantism in Europe had 
prepared the ground for progress through creating a social 
and intellectual climate which undermined the mediaeval 
world. The bhakti saints of Maharashtra (Ranade believed) 
had attempted to stimulate similar changes, and they stood 
for ideals and objectives identical to those that had inspired 
the religious reformers of mediaeval Europe:
There is a curious parallel [Ranade pointed out]
between the history of the Reformation movement in
were subordinated to the achievement of practical ends.
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Western Europe, and the struggle represented by 
the lives and teachings and writings of these 
saints and prophets... The European reformers of the 
sixteenth century protested strongly against the 
authority claimed by the priests and clergy with 
the Roman bishop at their head...The reformation 
in western India had its counterpart in this res­
pect. Ancient authority and tradition had been 
petrified "there, not in an ambitious Bishop and 
his clergy, but in the monopoly of the Brahmin 
caste, and it was against the exclusive spirit of 
this caste domination that the saints and prophets 
struggled most manfully to protest. They asserted 
the dignity of the human soul as residing in it 
quite independently of the accidents of its birth 
and social r a n k . 47
Ranadefs critique of the bhakti movement is far more 
convincing as an exposition of the religious values which he 
sought to propagate in Maharashtra, than it is as an appraisal 
of the social objectives which inspired the leaders of the 
bhakti movement. In their attitude towards established 
religion, and towards spiritual privileges which were as 
arbitrary as they were devoid of any utility, the protestant 
reformers of Europe resembled the bhakti saints of 
Maharashtra. But the protestant emphasis on the worthiness 
of the secular life, and on the possibility of salvation 
through dedication to a calling in the secular world, were 
conspicuously absent in the teachings of the bhakti saints.
47M.G. Ranade, *The Saints and Prophets of Maharashtra’, in 
Rise of the Maratha Power, (Bombay, 1901 reprinted in 1961), 
pp. 66-7.
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The leaders of the bhakti movement were primarily interested 
in spreading the values of Hinduism, which had till then 
remained confined to the Brahmin castes,among the lower and 
middle castes through expressing them in a language and an 
idiom comprehensible to the common people. They sought to 
create a social consensus by directing the allegiance of 
the various castes to a common corpus of religious values. 
Whether Ranade (like many a reformer before him) deliberately 
misinterpreted the social objectives of the bhakti saints is 
difficult to say. What is unmistakable is his desire to 
create in Maharashtra the same intellectual climate which 
he believed had set European society on the path to economic 
prosperity and social progress.
Such were the values of the 1 Hindu Protestantism’48 
which Ranade preached from the platform of the Prarthana 
Samai, a religious society which he launched in association 
with new Brahmins like Dadoba Pandurang and R.G. Bhandarkar, 
to reconcile Hinduism to the spirit of progress, and to 
cleanse it of the irrationality that had presumably come to 
disfigure it over the period of time. While rejecting the 
religious philosophy of Sankara as a principle whose arid
43--------
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intellectual quality left the emotional roots of the 
individual untouched, Ranade acknowledged his debt to 
advaita through attributing the creation of the universe and 
the existence of man to a single and omnipotent God. ’There 
are not many Gods, nor a hierarchy of Gods, nor deified good 
and bad powers, nor principles of light and darkness, of 
matter and spirit, of Prakriti or Maya and Purusha. God is 
One and without a second and not many persons - not a triad, 
nor a duality of persons’49f he asserted in A Theist’s Con­
fession of Faith. Ranade saw this Being in the compassionate 
God of the bhakti saints, in whose praise Ekanatha and 
Namdeva and Tukarama had composed their abhangas, and who 
could be reached more readily through devotion than through 
intellectual inquiry.
Because of the evolutionary ideas which shaped his 
approach to social problems, and convinced him of the inevit­
ability of progress, in reinterpreting Hinduism Ranade saw 
himself rationalising forces that were spontaneously at work 
within Hindu society, rather than imposing alien values on 
it. Nor was such a view unjustified; for all around him he 
saw changes stemming from the interaction between the tradi­
tional society of Maharashtra and the values which the new
49
Quoted in Kellock, ojd. cit. , pp. 168-9.
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rulers interjected into the social climate. As early as 
1821 the Poona Brahmins had split into conflicting camps 
over the readmission into the community of a caste-fellow 
called Ganghadhar Dixit Phadke who had defied custom by 
residing in Bombay for a short interval. The conservative 
and liberal factions within the Brahmin community had 
clashed even more violently when Shivprasad Seshadri, a con­
vert to Christianity, had indicated a desire to be readmitted 
into the Brahmanical fold. In I84O, barely two decades after 
the British conquest, a society was launched by a group of 
Brahmins along masonic principles to propagate the abolition 
of caste. A more important landmark in the spread of western 
and liberal values was the founding in 1848 by young Brahmin 
students of a Literary and Scientific Society which served as 
a forum for the discussion and dissemination of radical ideas 
Members of this society were prominently associated with 
social reform, and tried to promote the emancipation of women 
Encouraged by their initial success in liberalising the in­
stitution of caste, and in providing for the education of 
women, the liberal camp launched in the 1870s an attack on 
that great bastion of Hindu orthodoxy, the interdict on the 
remarriage of widows. While the habits of thought the 
liberals encountered in their attempt to promote the 
remarriage of widows were far too deeply entrenched to be
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shaken by a single assault, Vishnu Shastri Pandit, the 
leader of the radical Brahmins, had the satisfaction of 
debating the issue publicly with Shri Sankaracharya, the 
spiritual head of the Advaitists; and even though the Hindu 
pontiff decreed the marriage of widows to be against the 
letter and the spirit of the shastras, his participation in 
the debate indicated how strongly the winds of change were 
blowing across the land, and it reflected the concern of the 
orthodox community over the rapidly changing intellectual 
climate of Maharashtra^.
Yet Ranade did not permit his belief in social evolu­
tion to blind him to the need for organised action, or to 
convert him to the view that the forces at work within Hindu 
society would spontaneously ensure its development along the 
right lines. He dismissed the conviction of some new Brahmins 
in the spontaniety of social change as being compounded in 
equal parts of ’apathy and intellectual sophistry’; and he 
argued that the inevitability of change stemmed from the 
active assertion of their will, and the propagation of their
50
N.G. Chandavarkar, ’The Forces at Work (Within Hindu 
Society)’, in Times of India, (Bombay), 8 December 1887«
Also see M.G. Ranade’s speech before the Prarthana Sama.j re­
printed in The Mahratta, 11 September 1887* For a brief 
review of social reform movement in Maharashtra see speech 
by N.G. Chandavarkar before the Bombay Provincial Social 
Conference in 1901 reproduced in his Speeches and Writings 
etc., pp. 92-6.
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views, by the liberal sections of the community. It was im­
portant for the liberals to actively promote change along 
desirable channels, and there was no assurance that this 
would come about spontaneously. The doctrine of a liberal 
elite in the role of a social catalyst was enunciated with 
great clarity by one of Ranade’s closest followers in the 
field of social reform:
Though a state of transition [stated N.G.
Chandavarkar] such as that through which our Hindu 
society is passing is inevitable under the present 
conditions...we should not delude ourselves with 
the belief that a period of mere scepticism... 
without any inward impetus or conviction must nec­
essarily and unconditionally give way to a better 
period in the long run. When a society is being 
disintegrated...no hope of a better integration of 
it can be held unless there are found even in the 
midst of the forces that disintegrate it "organic 
filaments" or forces which promise to bring the dis­
turbed elements together, and reunite the different 
and dispersing elements of society on a better and 
higher principle of life. It is in the formation of 
those "organic filaments" that the work and value of 
the social reformer lies; while the forces around us 
are slowly loosening our faith in the old..., the 
social reformer has to bring those very forces to 
his aid and show the way to the formation of a new 
faith, a new ideal, and a new bond, which shall 
enable society to enter into a higher and richer form 
of life, instead of being disorganised.51
Equally vital to enduring social progress (as the notion 
of a leading elite) was RanadeTs view of reform as a process
51
From N.G. ChandavarkarTs speech on Social Reform delivered 
on 28 November 1896: Writings and Speeches etc., pp. 62-3.
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which altered traditional values and institutions slowly and 
gradually^2. Both his conservative cast of mind, and his 
belief in social theories which set a premium on evolution, 
as opposed to revolution, led him to the view that the ad­
vocates of reform in a hurry only succeeded in harming the 
course of progress, and the community which they set out to 
serve. Ranade fully realised the obstacles in the path of 
slow and cautious reform. But to assume a contrary course 
of action, he argued, could well prove disastrous. The 
reformer had to Taccept the teachings of the evolutionary 
doctrine...,because they teach that growth is structural and 
organic, and must take slow effect in all parts of the 
organism...J° The supreme illusion, Ranade pointed out, was 
the belief that the reformer had to write on a clean slate. 
Nothing could be further from the truth; for his work was to 
,complete the half-written sentence..., (and) to produce the 
ideal out of the actual, and by the help of the actual*. As 
it happened, for the reformer in Hindu society the task of 
maintaining links with tradition presented no serious diffi­
culty. Hinduism had shown remarkable flexibility in the past,
J2
From M*G. Ranadefs speech on Social Evolution before the 
Indian Social Conference of 1892: Miscellaneous Writings of 
the Justice M.G. Ranade, (Bombay, l$95)j PP* 114-21.
53
Ibid., p. 118.
and there was no reason to believe that Hindu society had 
lost the ability to adapt itself to changing circumstances^# 
It was possible for the liberal Hindu to draw his sanctions 
from the best traditions of the past, and to adjust the 
relationship of the present with the past in a spirit of 
true catholicity. It was also possible for him to hold in 
high regard the essence of the shastras, though he might on 
occasion violate the letter of the sacred texts. Such was 
the spirit which inspired Ranade to range himself with 
B.M. Malabari in the great debate between orthodoxy and 
liberalism which the Parsi reformer initiated in 1886 through 
his Notes on Infant Marriage and Enforced Widowhood. A 
similar logic impelled him to seek in the shastras and the 
sacred texts support for the measures of reform proposed by 
Malabari^5 .
RanadeTs desire to modernise Maharashtra without disrupt­
ing the consensus which held the various castes together in 
allegiance to a common corpus of values provides the key to 
his social ideals and his political objectives. He was
54
From M.G. Ranade’s Speech on ’The Past History of Social 
Reform1 before the Indian Social Conference of 1894J 
Writings of Ranade etc., pp. 133-42.
55M.G. Ranade, ’The Sutras and Smriti dicta on the Age of 
Hindu Marriage’, in JPSS, April 1891.
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aware of the fact that the bhakti movement had mitigated 
social tensions in Maharashtra to such an extent that 
’caste exclusiveness finds no place in the religious sphere 
of life, and is relegated solely to the social concerns of 
men, and even there its restrictiveness is much relaxed, 
as any one can judge who compares (the caste feelings of) 
the Brahmans of South India...with the comparative indiffer­
ence shown in such matters in the Deccan portion of 
M a h a r a s h t r a 6. This realisation prompted him to reject the 
politics of extremism, and to oppose religious movements like 
the Brahma Samaj, whose members alienated themselves from the 
community because of their radical views on religious and 
social reform^, The social consensus which linked the 
Brahmin to the kunbi, and which Ranade was above all things 
anxious to preserve, impressed itself forcibly even on a 
visitor like the Russian Indologist I.P. Minayeff, who 
travelled extensively in India in the 1880s, and who was 
struck by the unique quality of the intellectual climate in 
Poona and Bombay. Minayeff noticed how the radical Brahmin
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student of the Deccan College fadmire(d) Spencer and at the 
same time is devoted to spiritualism*; and how in any discus­
sion on the state of society and the nature of politics with 
the Brahmin intellectual, the problems of the kunbi occupied 
a prominence which they rarely did elsewhere^
Both in politics and in social reform Ranade sought to 
modernise Maharashtra without disrupting the social cohesion, 
and undermining the intellectual consensus, which linked 
classes and castes together in a close relationship.
Ranade*s policies did not reflect any explicit concern for 
the maintenance of Brahmin predominance; nor did they 
reserve for the Brahmin castes a dominant role in society. 
Notions of caste exclusiveness, and caste superiority, and 
caste monopolisation of social roles had no place in RanadeTs 
vision of the future. But because he wanted to lead 
Maharashtra into the age of rationality and progress without 
destroying the existing cohesion, and since the Brahmins 
occupied a position of superiority, the changes which Ranade 
advocated would have left (for some time at any rate) the 
predominance of the Brahmin castes unaffected. Any attempt to 
artificially undermine this predominance would have struck
58
I.P. Minayeff, Travels in and Diaries of India and Burma, 
(trans. by S. Bhattacharya*J^ (Calcutta ?), pp. 49, 52-3.
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Ranade as morally reprehensible and incompatible with 
orderly progress. Thus when in I884 the Bombay Government 
attempted to raise the intellectual and educational level of 
the lower and middle castes by reserving scholarships for 
them in the various schools and colleges, the Sarva.janik 
Sabha launched a bitter campaign under RanadeTs aegis 
against what i^ as characterised as an act of discrimination 
against the Brahmin community^.
However, since the notions of progress and rationality 
propagated by Ranade challenged the traditional values of 
Hinduism, and the beliefs which sustained the institution 
of caste, they were bound to undermine the social and intel­
lectual preponderance of the Brahmin castes. The implica­
tions of Ranadefs ideas were clear to the old style shastris 
and pandits, whose grip over positions of power was even 
otherwise being undermined by the changing quality of the 
political scene. The orthodox Brahmins therefore opposed 
RanadeTs social ideals and political objectives as subversive 
of the traditional order, and of Brahmin supremacy over the 
community. Their reaction to the liberal doctrine was
59
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expressed in political action like the deputation of Poona 
shastris headed by Rama Shastri Apte, which apprised Sir 
James Fergusson, the Governor of Bombay, of the strong dis­
approval with which they would view state interference in the 
social and religious life of the Hindu community along the 
lines suggested by the advocates of reform. 1 According to 
the Hindu shastras marriage was a religious institution regu­
lated by strict rules and injunctions...*, Rama Shastri told 
Fergusson, f(and no) good government has yet interfered with 
our religious laws and customs...f^0
Because of the opposition of the traditional leaders 
of the brahmin community, and because of the long range im­
plications of the changes he advocated in Hindu society, 
Ranade*s programme of reform did not commend him to the 
majority of the Brahmins of Maharashtra. Despite the 
catholicity of their vision, the insight they possessed into 
contemporary society, and the rationality of their programme 
of social and political reform, new Brahmins like Ranade 
formed only a small section of that Brahmin community whose 
dominance over Hindu society remained unshaken till the clos­
ing decades of the nineteenth century. Yet the tragedy of 
the new Brahmins did not lie in their failure to influence
60
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the Brahmin rank and file. Their tragedy lay in their in­
ability to win over to their side the middle and lower 
castes of Hindu society. The Sarva.janik Sabha*s attempt in 
the 1870s to lead rural discontent against the Bombay Govern­
ment remains an isolated bid on the part of the new Brahmins 
to win peasant support for their policies. But apart from 
the ’no-taxT campaign which preceded the riots of 1875* the 
new Brahmins were unable to make any impression on the kunbis 
whose cause they espoused with such integrity and skill.
The new Brahmins1 failure to establish political rapport 
with the peasants was a result of the changes which took 
place in the distribution of power in the villages of the 
Deccan in the nineteenth century. We turn next to a con­
sideration of these changes and to an assessment of their 
political implications.
CHAPTER VIII 
CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN MAHARASHTRA - 1918
Since the political and economic life of Maharashtra in 
1818 was shaped by the character of rural society, and 
because the Deccan retained its predominantly rural com­
plexion in the nineteenth century, the social climate of the 
villages continued to exercise a decisive influence over the 
region in 1918, In view of the predominantly rural influ­
ences which shaped the political life of Maharashtra, the 
Chitpavan elite which had dominated the region at the time of 
the British conquest, and which continued to dominate it 
during the course of the nineteenth century, found its posi­
tion being undermined by the emergence of the rich peasants 
in the opening decades of the twentieth century. The rise of 
these rich peasants was a result of policies that sought to 
transform Maharashtra from a traditional to a modern society, 
and put her on the path to progress and prosperity.
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To appreciate the changes which took place in rural 
society during the nineteenth century, it is necessary to re­
capitulate the social organisation which prevailed in the 
villages of the Deccan in 1818, and the institutions which 
linked the rural communities to the seat of government in 
Poona,
The village of 1818 was a self-sufficient and virtually 
isolated social unit. The cultivators within the village 
were divided into two social groups on the basis of the 
tenure on which they held their land. First the meerasdars, 
who were the descendants of the first settlers of the 
village, and whose superior status was reflected in their 
social prerogatives rather than in their wealth. The 
meerasdars of a village made up the executive council which 
managed the affairs of the village community under the leader­
ship of the patel or the headman. In contrast to the 
meerasdars, the uprees were temporary settlers who rented and 
tilled the cultivable waste, or the deserted holdings, of the 
village. The uprees did not possess a voice in the village 
council. The distinction between the uprees and the
1
The entire sub-section is based on the preceding chapters, 
and has not therefore been documented.
Social Change in the Villages of the Deccan*
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meerasdars hinged on social status rather than on differences 
in incomes; and it found expression in contrasting styles of 
life. Because of the collective responsibility of the cul­
tivators for the land-tax of the village, and the manner in 
which this tax was distributed among individual cultivators, 
both the meerasdars and uprees lived at the level of subsis­
tence, and there were no glaring inequalities of wealth in 
the village.
The patel was the most important individual in the 
village. His power stemmed from his traditional authority as 
the head of the most senior founding family of the village, 
and from his appointment by the State as the headman of the 
village. The combination of the roles of the traditional 
leader of the village, and its official headman, formed the 
basis of the patelfs unique authority and prestige. Because 
his freedom of action was not hampered by any legal and 
rational restraints, the patel could represent the interests 
of the State and the village community without involving him­
self in a conflict of loyalties. Between the village commun­
ity and the Poona Government stood the mamlatdars, who assess­
ed and collected the land-tax for the State, and the deshmukhs, 
or the traditional landlords, who acted as alternative chan­
nels of communication between the kunbis and the State. A 
balance of power between the mamlatdars and the deshmukhs was
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necessary for the smooth working of the administration, and 
this balance was dependent upon the effective exercise of 
his authority by the Peshwa who controlled supreme power in 
Poona.
The cohesion and identity of the village community was 
reflected in the assessment of its fiscal obligations to the 
State through consultations between the patel, who represented 
the interests of the village, the mamlatdar, who spoke on 
behalf of the State, and the deshmukh, who mediated between 
the patel and the mamlatdar, and played a vital role in the 
determination of a reasonable land-tax. The cohesion of the 
village was also reflected in its relations with the sowcar 
or urban financier. The patel was often unable to collect 
the land-tax he had contracted to pay to the mamlatdar. When 
confronted with such a situation he turned to the sowcar for 
assistance, and pledged the credit of the village community 
in return for a loan which enabled him to honour his obliga­
tions. The financial dealings of the patel, representing the 
village community, and the sowcar are to be distinguished 
from relations between the kunbis and the village vani. The 
vani, who lived in the village and was subject to its judi­
cial and executive authority, doled out small sums of money 
to the cultivators in their individual capacity in times of 
distress. The sowcar, on the other hand, lived outside the
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village, and dealt only with the patel. He was far too 
powerful an individual to be controlled by the village com­
munity. Indeed, through the loans he advanced to the patels, 
the sowcar very often gained access to the entire agricultural 
surplus of the village, and only his caste values prevented 
him from acquiring a more intimate control over the economy 
of the village community.
Before 1818 the villages of the Deccan were therefore 
organised along collective lines, with the community rather 
than the individual cultivator conducting their relations, 
both with the mamlatdar who represented the authority of the 
State, and the sowcar through whom urban credit flowed to the 
village. Besides, relations between the village community 
and the State, on the one hand, and between different social 
groups within the village, on the other, were conducted on 
traditional rather than on legal and rational lines. The 
powers and responsibilities of a patel or a mamlatdar, for 
instance, were not precisely defined: and the pitch of the 
land-tax was determined on the basis of past realisations, 
rather than on abstract economic principles. As a result, 
the village was characterised by a collective and co-operative 
rather than an individualistic and competitive social envi­
ronment. Further, distinctions within the village found ex­
pression in different social styles rather than in glaring
inequalities in incomes. Practically all the peasants lived 
at the level of subsistence, and the only outstanding figure 
in the village was the patel, who provided leadership to the 
village community, and resolved its day-to-day administrative 
problems.
For the Utilitarian administrators who were entrusted 
with the government of the Deccan after 1818, both the collec­
tive form of social organisation which prevailed in the vil­
lage, and the absence of a legal and rational basis for 
relations between the kunbis and the State, were anathema.
As against the inertia and lack of mobility which character­
ised Maharashtra under the Peshwas, the Utilitarians were 
interested in promoting social progress and economic growth.
To achieve these objectives they embarked upon a programme 
of reform which looked upon the ryot instead of the organised 
community for creative social action, and which attempted to 
determine relations between the peasant and the State on the 
basis of the scientific laws of political economy.
The ryotwari system of land-revenue was the hub of the 
Utilitarian programme of reform in the Deccan. Through de­
fining the kunbifs fiscal obligations in a legal contract 
between him and the State, the ryotwari system set aside the 
authority of the village community in revenue affairs. It 
simultaneously determined the land-tax on the basis of
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scientific principles in preference to the riva.j or customary 
realisations under the Marathas. Behind the institution of 
the ryotwari system lay the belief that once the peasant was 
rid of his obligations to the village community, and his fis­
cal burden regulated on a rational basis, he would be well 
set on the path to progress and prosperity. Through stimu­
lating economic growth, and promoting the rise of an affluent 
peasantry, the ryotwari system sought to create a social 
class whose loyalty would be firmly anchored to the new 
order in Maharashtra.
The ryotwari system held revolutionary implications for 
rural society. First and foremost, it removed the distinc­
tion between the meerasdars and the ugrees, and reduced all 
cultivators to an identical status. But its significant con­
sequences lay elsewhere. The most important bond between the 
peasants of a village was the collective responsibility they 
bore for the payment of the land-tax. Once this responsibil­
ity was no longer enforced, the cohesion of the village com­
munity was undermined in a most significant fashion. Simul­
taneously, the Patelfs leadership over the village community 
became a thing of the past, since he no longer determined the 
burden of tax on the village in consultations with the 
mamlatdar, and because his powers and obligations were defined 
by a code of regulations which emphasised his legal authority
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at the cost of his traditional ties, and alienated him from 
the village. Besides diminishing the status of the patel, 
the creation of a rational administration reduced the im­
portance of the deshmukhs and other leaders of rural society, 
whose authority had stemmed from the non-existence of an 
organised bureaucracy under the Peshwas.
Apart from undermining the village community and the 
traditional leadership in rural society, the ryotwari system 
altered the economic links between the city and the village, 
and effected a redistribution of social power in rural 
society. So long as the cultivators had shared joint 
responsibility for the land-tax on the village, any deficit 
in the collection of this tax was met by a loan contracted 
by the village community from the sowcars. But once collec­
tive responsibility for the land-tax was no longer enforced, 
the village community ceased to have any dealings with the 
sowcar. Under the new system the sowcar used the vani in the 
village as an agent for advancing loans to the cultivators, 
who were now expected to look after their affairs. As a 
result of this change, the vani’s role gained considerably in 
significance; and because of the links which he developed with 
his caste-fellows outside the village, the vani became a 
powerful figure in the rural community. The creation of a 
judiciary on laissez-faire principles, which favoured the
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vanis against the kunbis, served to heighten the dominance 
acquired by the vanis through the institution of the 
ryotwari system.
The social consequences flowing out of the ryotwari 
system belied the expectations of the advocates of reform.
The Utilitarian administrators had introduced reforms on the 
assumption that a competitive social environment and a 
rational policy of taxation would stimulate agricultural 
productivity and encourage the rise of an affluent peasantry. 
This actually happened to a limited extent. But the emergence 
of a small class of rich peasants was completely overshadowed 
by the growing dominance of the vanis over village society.
So acute was the tension generated by this social change, 
that in 1875 the Deccan was convulsed by class and caste war­
fare between the cultivators and the moneylenders.
The Deccan riots of 18 75 highlighted the failure of 
Utilitarian reform. Based on a consuming belief in the 
virtues of individualism, the ryotwari system was all too 
successful in undermining the collective institutions which 
had flourished in the villages of the Deccan before 1818.
But the decay of these institutions benefited the vani instead 
of the cultivator. When the authority of the patel over the 
village declined, dominance passed over into the hands of the 
vani rather than the peasant. The resulting crisis obliged
the British administrators to abandon their doctrinaire 
belief in individualism and rationality. The Relief Act of 
1879? for instance, was an attempt to modify the legal system 
in order to buttress the declining position of the kunbis, 
and it violated a fundamental principle of 1 aissez^-faire in 
throwing the weight of the State in favour of the cultivators. 
When the reform of the legal system proved inadequate, the 
British Government took the initiative in organising 
co-operative societies in the villages; in the first instance 
to provide the kunbis with cheap credit; next to undermine 
the power of the vanis; and finally to stimulate growth and 
prosperity in rural society on a co-operative instead of a 
competitive basis.
The Relief Act and the Village Banks instituted with of­
ficial support were meant to assist the peasants as a whole 
in raising agricultural productivity and in improving their 
standard of living. But both these measures proved to be 
discriminatory in the benefits they showered on the cultivators. 
The Relief Act, for instance, destroyed the credit of the poor 
peasants and made the vanis reluctant to help them in times of 
distress, since its provisions made the recovery of loans 
very difficult. But while the poor peasants fared badly 
under the Relief Act, the more substantial cultivators still 
commanded enough goodwill to raise loans whenever they needed
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them, and they were also able to exploit the Act to restrain 
the vanis. Similarly, co-operation furthered the interests 
of the more affluent sections of the rural community. The 
poor peasants possessed neither the capital nor the intelli­
gence to run co-operative societies, with the result that 
these societies were financed and run by the more substantial 
peasants, for the benefit of their class, rather than for the 
benefit of the cultivating community as a whole.
The measures enacted to curb the power of the vanis con­
sequently vested social and economic dominance over the vil­
lages of the Deccan in a class of rich peasants who owed their 
prosperity to the economic policy pursued by the British Gov­
ernment .
Anti-Brahmanism and the Rise of the Rich Peasants
The growth of a class of rich peasants by the opening 
decades of the twentieth century held serious implications 
for politics in Maharashtra. If Elphinstonefs programme of 
educational reform had been carried out in its entirety, and 
a network of schools disseminating liberal and rational values 
among the cultivators had been created along with the Hindu 
College, then the ideals of new Brahmins like Ranade would 
possibly have acquired considerable popularity in rural soci­
ety. But since popular education came to be dominated by
advocates of the diffusion theory, who entrusted the educa­
tion of the masses to a westernised Brahmin elite, the 
values of the kunbis did not change under British rule. 
Peasants brought up in a traditional climate acquiesced 
readily in the institution of caste, and in the absence of 
opportunities for raising their standard of living. The ex­
tent of their subservience to caste values is indicated in 
their refusal to attack Brahmin moneylenders (of whom there 
were a goodly number) in 1875? despite the fact that Brahmin 
moneylenders were just as grasping in their dealings with the 
peasants as were moneylenders from other castes2.
But even before 1875 a small but articulate non-Brahmin 
elite was trying to instill among the kunbis an awareness of 
their fallen state, and encouraging them to reject the insti­
tution; of caste. Conspicuous among this elite was Jyotiba 
Phule, who was born in 1827 in a mali (a kunbi sub-caste) 
family, and whom the non-Brahmins of Maharashtra even today 
revere as their Mahatma^. Phule was endowed with a forceful 
personality rather than with a sophisticated cast of mind.
2
Report of the Deccan Riots Commissiont (Bombay, 1876), 
para. 76.
3
Based on a biographical note on Jyotiba Phule available 
with the Bombay State Committee for the History of the Free­
dom Movement in India (henceforth referred to as BSCHFM).
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He received a narrow education in a missionary school, and 
this contact with the missionaries was instrumental in shap­
ing his attitude to the Brahmins, and in impressing upon him 
the need for improvement in the moral and material condition 
of the non-Brahmin castes. Phule first tried to achieve this 
objective through opening schools for children from the lower 
castes. But when his efforts to educate his caste-fellows 
failed to make any significant impact, he embarked upon a 
programme of political activity, creating in the Satya Shodak 
Sama.j (Association for the Propagation of Truth) a counter­
poise to the new Brahmin dominated Sarva.janik Sabha, and 
spelling out in polemical tracts like Gulamgiri (slavery) the 
extent and the iniquity of Brahmin dominance over Hindu 
society.
PhuleTs Gulamgiri, which appeared in 1873> not only 
focussed attention on Brahmin exploitation in contemporary 
Maharashtra, but it also created a mythology from which 
anti-Brahmanism all over India subsequently drew its inspira­
tion. The Brahmins, Phule argued, were not the original in­
habitants of India. They were an Aryan people who had in a 
period of remote antiquity been attracted to the country by 
its wealth and fertility, and had subjugated the original 
inhabitants, referring to them subsequently in terms of op- 
probium as the shudras (the insignificant). The sanguine
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sacred place in the folk memory of the Aryan people; and 
this memory found expression in legends like the one concern­
ing the annihilation of the Kshtriya race by the Aryan-Brahmin 
leader, Parashuram. To perpetuate their dominance over the 
country, the conquering Aryans had
devised that weird system of mythology, the institu-j 
tion of caste, and the code of cruel and inhuman 
laws, to which we can find no parallel amongst 
other nations. They founded a system of priest­
craft so galling in its tendency and operation, the 
like of which we can hardly find anywhere since the 
times of the Druids. The institution of caste, 
which has been the main object of their laws, had 
existence among them originally,...The highest 
rights, the highest privileges and gifts, and every­
thing that could make the life of the Brahmin easy 
...were inculcated and enjoined, whereas the shudras 
and the atishudras were regarded with supreme con­
tempt, and the meanest rights of humanity were 
denied to t h e m . 4
In the emotive rhetoric of Gulamgiri, the history of 
India after the Aryan conquest revolved around a continuous 
struggle for power between the Brahmins and the non-Brahmins. 
Though the dominance of Kshtriya dynasties like the house of 
Shivaji indicated that the non-Brahmins had frequently held 
their own in the contest, the intellectual hold which the 
Brahmins possessed over the community through the monopolisa­
tion of the priestly function assured them of a privileged
conflicts associated with the Aryan invasion of India held a
From translation of Gulamgiri available with BSCHFM.
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position which they did not hesitate to exploit for their 
selfish ends. But whenever their intellectual predominance 
was reinforced by the acquisition of political power, and 
this vas precisely what had happened under the Peshwas, then 
the non-Brahmin position became completely intolerable, and 
a gross tyranny was imposed on the non-Brahmin community.
Since Phule identified the rule of the Peshwas with 
Brahmanical tyranny, he looked upon the events of 1818 with 
approval, and regarded the British conquest of Maharashtra 
as an act of deliverance for the lower and middle castes from 
the Brahmin yoke, He was also deeply impressed by the 
Christian values and the humanitarian ideals which inspired 
the new rulers of Maharashtra; and he singled out for special 
praise the egalitarian spirit which moved them to equate the 
bigoted Brahmin with the lowly shudra, and to accord them an 
equality of status in the eyes of the law. But, Phule argued, 
although the British Government was inspired by the noblest 
of ideals, it had inadvertently supported policies which had 
strengthened the Brahmin hold over the community. Public 
service and the liberal professions, particularly the former, 
were the two avenues to advancement open to the people under 
British rule. Access to these avenues was to be had through 
the schools and colleges set up under British aegis. Because 
of their belief in the diffusion theory of education, British
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institutions in the hope that the favoured individuals who
graduated through them would take upon themselves the task of
educating the masses. Such an assumption, however, took no
account of the caste values of the Brahmins. Instead of
directing their energy to raising the intellectual level of
the lower castes, the Brahmins had exploited the situation to
monopolise the public service and the liberal professions.
The position of the shudras under British rule was therefore
worse than ever before:
The Brahmin deceives the shudra [Phule pointed out] 
not only in his capacity of the priest, but does so 
in a variety of other ways...In the most insignifi­
cant village, as in the largest town, the Brahman 
is all in all; the be all and end all of the ryot.
He is the master, the ruler, The Patil of a village, 
the real head, is in fact a nonentity. The kulkarni, 
the hereditary Brahman village accountant...moulds 
the Patil according to his wishes. He is the tem­
poral and spiritual advisor of the ryots, the sawkar 
in his necessities, and the general referee in all 
matters...If we go up higher, to the court of a 
mamlatdar, we find the same thing. The first an­
xiety of a mamlatdar is to get around him, if not 
his own relations, his castemen to fill the various 
vacancies under him...If a shudra repairs to his 
court, the treatment which he receives is akin to 
what the meanest reptile receives...If we go up 
higher still..., the same system is followed in a 
greater or smaller scale. The higher European of­
ficers generally view men and things through Brahman 
spectacles, and hence the deplorable ignorance they 
exhibit in forming a correct estimate of t h e m . 5
administrators had concentrated all their efforts on these
5
Ibid
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Because an ill-conceived though well intentioned educa­
tional policy had reinforced Brahmin preponderance over the 
community, Phule believed that the liberation of the 
non-Brahmins from the Brahmin yoke was possible only through 
drastic changes in the attitude of the British Government to­
wards popular education. The State in India, he pointed out 
before the Education Commission of 1884> drew the bulk of its 
revenues from a tax paid by the ryots. It was, therefore, 
legitimate to demand that it should focus its attention on 
the education of the rural masses rather than the Brahmin 
castes, who constituted a small intellectual elite. This 
could be done most effectively by making primary education 
compulsory in the villages, and by giving a practical orien­
tation to the instruction given in the primary schools. At 
the same time, since secondary schools and colleges were 
equally important for the balanced intellectual development 
of the community, it would be wrong for the State to withdraw 
the support it had hitherto extended to such institutions.
But to prevent them from being monopolised by the Brahmins, 
it was necessary to encourage the lower castes to join them 
in increasing numbers through special incentives. fThe 
shudras are the life and the sinews of the country’, Phule 
told the Education Commission, 1 and it is to them alone, and 
not to the Brahmins, that the Government must look to tide
over the difficulties, financial as well as political. If 
the hearts and the minds of the shudras are happy and con­
tented, the British Government need have no fear for their 
loyalty in the future.’
The Orthodox New Brahmins
Though Phule’s anti-Brahmin crusade failed to make any 
immediate impact on the kunbis of Maharashtra, the signifi­
cance of his ideas was not lost on the Brahmin community.
The old style shastris and the majority of the Brahmins of 
Maharashtra were opposed even to the whiggish ideas of a new 
Brahmin like Ranade, since they saw in any attempt to promote 
rationality and progress the decay of their hegemony over 
Hindu society. But while Ranade’s proposals were characteris­
ed by restraint, and he looked to a gradual change in the 
values and structure of Hindu society, Phule aimed at un­
leashing a social revolution through a frontal attack on 
Brahmanical dominance and the institution of caste. Phule, 
therefore, presented a far more serious threat to the estab­
lished order than Ranade.
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Vide Evidence by Jyotiba Phule before the Education Com­
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On being confronted with the non-Brahmins who advocated 
revolution, and the new Brahmins who preached reform, the 
Brahmin community of Maharashtra at first turned to its 
traditional leaders. So far as the traditional leaders 
were concerned, they concentrated their fire on reformers 
within the Brahmin community, rather than on revolutionaries 
outside the Brahmin pale. The impassioned debate on the 
secular implications of advaita between Narayan Vishnu Bapat, 
the President of the liberal Hindu Union Club, and Bhima 
Acharya Zhalkikar, a shastri who held the chair of Sanskrit 
at the Elphinstone College, during the Hemantotsava (spring 
festival) lectures of 1886, illustrates the orthodox bid to 
stiffle heresy before it had a chance to influence the 
Brahmin rank and file, and convert it to a new religious and 
secular outlook?. In tracing the evolution of the advaitic 
weltgeist, Bapat made a strong plea for active participation 
by the individual in the secular life; and he debunked other 
worldly interpretations of Sankara’s philosophy as reflecting 
the political subservience of Hindu society. Bapat’s inter­
pretation was disputed by Bhima Acharya Zhalkikar, who held 
that ’the advait philosophy was sought only by those who were 
convinced of the transient nature of the universe, and the
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common herd of people generally were allured by objects 
which influence the p a s s i o n s ...’  ^ Yet the traditionalists 
were not always on the defensive, nor did they hesitate to 
adopt the new style in politics in order to secure their ob­
jectives. This is indicated by the Madhav Bagh meeting held 
in Bombay in September 1886, when a crowd of 10,000 from the 
leading Hindu castes congregated to draw up a petition 
against the reforms proposed in Hindu marriage by Malabari 
with the support of individuals like R a n a d e 9. It is also re­
flected in the creation of bodies like the Sanatama Pharma 
Parishad (the Association for Preserving the Orthodox Relig­
ion), which enjoyed the patronage and support of Shri 
Sankaracharya, the pontiff of the Saivites, and Pandit 
Gattulalji Sharma, a leading Vaishnavite intellectual; and 
which sought to revitalise orthodox Hinduism through the 
active co-operation of the heads of the various castes and 
communities^ •
But Zhalkikar ShastriTs defence of advaita against the 
liberal onslaught was as futile as the traditionalist bid to 
reinvigorate Hinduism through the creation of bodies like the
8
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9
The Mahratta dated 5 September and 12 September 1886.
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Sanatama Pharma Parishad. For the basic weakness of the tra­
ditional elite lay in the intellectual, gulf which separated 
it from the new rulers of the land. This gulf made it impos­
sible for the orthodox Brahmin leaders to give effective 
leadership to the community in its secular concerns. How­
ever, if the old style shastris were unable to perform their 
secular role with any measure of adequacy under the altered 
conditions of British rule, precisely the reverse was true of 
those new Brahmins who saw no contradiction between the 
achievement of progress and the traditional structure of 
Hindu society; and who looked forward to an era of progress 
and prosperity in which the traditional values, and the tradi­
tional patterns of social dominance, would remain unaltered. 
The exponent of such a standpoint among the first generation 
of new Brahmins was Vishnu Shastri Chiplunkar. For despite 
his vitriolic attacks on the pillars of Hindu orthodoxy, and 
despite his belief in the desirability, as distinct from the 
inevitability, of social change, Vishnu Shastri did not sub­
scribe to the views of a Ranade or a Lokhitwadi» and he was 
opposed to radical changes in the intellectual quality and 
the social structure of Hindu society.
The most forceful advocate of orthodoxy among the new 
Brahmins was Bal Ganghadhar Tilak, who combined a belief in 
advaita with a commitment to the spirit of progress, and who
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tried to reconcile the institution of caste with the modern­
isation of Hindu society. In his vision of society as a dy­
namic as opposed to a static organism, and in his belief in 
economic progress along the lines of western society, Tilak 
stood for values and objectives which were opposed to the 
traditional outlook. But unlike the liberal new Brahmins, 
he would not allow that there was any incompatibility between 
the traditional structure of Hindu society and its economic 
development, on the one hand, and political emancipation, on 
the other. In putting forth his views on ’The Hindu Caste 
from an Industrial Point of View’ before the Bombay State 
Industrial Conference of 1892, Tilak launched a scathing at­
tack on those who ’held that any amelioration of the indus­
trial classes of this land is impossible without a religious 
revival, or at any rate without a complete annihilation of 
the caste system, which they have been brought up to regard 
as the prime source of all evil in Hindu society...’^  Ex­
plaining the evolution of caste as a consequence of the in­
creasing complexity of the productive process, and the con­
sequent division of functions in society, Tilak heaped ridi­
cule on the idea that distinctions of caste implied
TT
B.G. Tilak, ’The Hindu Caste from an Industrial Point of 
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differences in status and social rank. Caste, he pointed
out, was *a secular institution among the members of the
Aryan race, for the propagation of hereditary institutions,
and for purpose of mutual help and co-operation*. Like the
guilds of mediaeval Europe, caste had formerly played a vital
role in the secular life of the community. Caste panchayats
had regulated the affairs of Hindu society through enforcing
norms of social behaviour and through upholding values which
were essential for the social order. Could caste serve a
similar function in the industrialised community of the
future? Tilak asked the question:
I think [he stated in answer to his question] there 
can be no two opinions on this point...The free com­
petition of foreign countries has well nigh threat­
ened the very existence of many industrial classes 
in the land, and the ignorance of the latter leaves 
them completely helpless in such a crisis... Under 
these circumstances... our industrial classes badly 
want an organisation which will protect them from 
total ruin. The organisation of caste already pre­
vails among them, and its history shows that it 
has saved them from similar crises in ancient 
times...If we prudently attempt to build on the 
existing foundations there is every hope that the 
organisation of caste might again become a living 
force, and under the altered circumstances of the 
country protect the working classes in the same way 
as it did in ancient times...-*-2
Despite his allegiance to traditional institutions Tilak 
recognised the need, and inevitability, of social change. Where
12
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he differed from liberal new Brahmins was in his belief that 
the political community existed distinct from the social com­
munity; and that it could progress independently of the 
latter. Since he distinguished the social from the political, 
Tilak believed that the advocates of social reform would only 
succeed in delaying the achievement of those political ob­
jectives on whose attainment all new Brahmins were agreed.
The occasion for spelling out these differences came in 1895> 
when Tilak’s followers prevented the Indian Social Conference, 
a body organised by Ranade to promote social reform in the 
country, from holding its session jointly with the Indian 
National Congress^^. In defending the stand taken by his 
followers, Tilak disputed RanadeTs picture of social progress 
as a process catalysed by a westernised elite; and he stress­
ed the desirability of spontaneous change, which would carry 
along with it all the sections of the community, and prevent 
the alienation of its liberal and progressive from its con­
servative elements. Hindu society, Tilak argued, was divided 
into castes and communities which existed at different levels 
of social development and intellectual sophistication. To 
raise the banner of social reform was to transform these 
castes and communities into antagonistic social groups, and
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to sharpen the cleavages which divided them from one another. 
But in the political sphere the spirit of nationalism was all 
pervasive, and the demand for devolution of power would unite 
instead of dividing the people.
Although he opposed the social programme of the liberal 
Brahmins on grounds of expediency, Tilak cheerfully accepted 
the inevitability of change. His differences with the liberal 
camp were not really fundamental. Indeed, in searching the 
classical texts of Hinduism for a definition of the individ­
ual’s role in the secular affairs of the community, he came 
to a position very similar to the one advocated by Narayan 
Vishnu Bapat, the President of the Hindu Union Club, during 
the Iiemantotsava controversy of l886-*4# As Tilak pointed out 
in the Gita Rahasya (Secret of the Gita), the distinction 
between the sacred and the profane worlds made by a tradi­
tionalist like Bhima Acharyz Zhalkikar was based on an 
erroneous reading of the religious texts:
The conclusion I have come to [Tilak pointed out] 
is that the Gita advocates the performance of action 
in this world even after the actor has achieved the 
highest union with the Supreme Deity by Gnyana 
(knowledge) or Bhakti (devotion). This action must 
be done to keep the world going by the right path 
of evolution which the Creator has destined the
14
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world to follow.. .This I hold is the lesson of the 
Gita...Gnyanayoga (the path of knowledge) there is, 
yes. Bhaktiyoga (the path of devotion) there is, 
yes. Who says not? But they are both subservient 
to the Karmayoga (the path of action) prescribed in 
the Gita.^5
In spite of his differences with the traditionalists on 
the meaning of the classical texts, and on questions of social 
change, Tilakfs views gained considerable popularity in the 
Brahmin community. If the choice for the Brahmins had rested 
between the old style shastris and Tilak, their response to 
his ideas might well have been hostile. But the political 
climate of British rule had undermined the power of the tra­
ditional elite to such an extent that the only practical al­
ternative to Tilak’s lead was acquiescence in the views of 
liberal new Brahmins like Ranade. Between Ranade and Tilak 
the Brahmin community had little hesitation in making its 
choice. Ranade openly acknowledged the superiority of western 
political ideals and social values; Tilak stood for the re­
vitalisation of Hinduism. Ranade wanted to introduce a new 
ethic in Hindu religion; Tilak regarded any such attempt as 
completely superfluous. Finally, and we touch here on the 
most significant difference between the two, Ranade regarded
15
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caste as incompatible with progress and rationality; Tilak, 
on the other hand, looked upon it as an institution that 
would protect the individual from the moral anarchy, and the 
social atomisation, that were the inevitable concomitants of 
modernisation.
Tilakfs attitude to caste and the traditional structure 
of Hindu society persuaded the Brahmin community to extend 
its support to him. The Brahmins of Maharashtra believed 
that so long as the institution of caste remained intact, and 
to the extent the values of Hindu orthodoxy claimed the 
allegiance of the people, their predominance would stand un­
shaken. They were equally convinced that the breakdown of 
caste values would spell the end of their dominance. 
Brahmanical opposition to Ranade was, therefore, only to be 
expected. In recommending the substitution of belief in 
traditional values by rationality, and in advocating a 
gradual change in the social structure of Hindu society, 
Ranade outlined a programme of action which was bound to 
undermine the positions of power which the Brahmins had won 
for themselves under British rule. However, the Brahmins 
refused to embark upon a suicidal course, and they preferred 
to follow the lead of Tilak, who proposed to leave their 
supremacy unchallenged.
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But the very reasons which endeared Tilak to the 
Brahmin community alienated him from the non-Brahmin castes, 
since orthodox Hinduism had condemned these castes to perma­
nent servitude. So strong were the ties of caste in 
Maharashtra, and so powerful the intellectual consensus which 
linked the kunbis to the Brahmins, that there was no immed­
iate opposition to the ideals or the pretensions of the 
orthodox new Brahmins. But the growth of a non-Brahmin elite 
nursed in the values of a Phule, and the rise of a rich 
peasantry anxious to find for itself a place in the sun, in­
troduced a new note of disquiet in the politics of 
Maharashtra. The non-Brahmin elite saw in the devolution of 
power which lay ahead both an opportunity, and a challenge, 
for the rich peasants whom it claimed to represent. If 
Brahmin supremacy remained unchallenged, it argued, and the 
Brahmin castes acquired control over the machinery of govern­
ment and politics, then the transfer of power into Indian 
hands would result in caste tyranny and caste oppression of 
an unparalleled intensity. However, through an active asser­
tion of the rights and prerogatives assured to them under 
British rule, and through an exploitation of the democratic 
process, the kunbis could secure for themselves a fair share
The Brahmin non-Brahmin Conflict
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of political power. In what measure they would be able to 
do so would depend upon their intellectual sophistication, 
and the extent to which they were able to exploit the oppor­
tunities thrown open to them under British rule.
Such were the arguments which Phule presented before 
the kunbis of Maharashtra through a dedicated cadre of polit­
ical workers whom he had enrolled in the Satya Shodak Sama.j. 
The activities of little known Sama.j agitators like Narayan 
Pensai, whom we find addressing a meeting of kunbis in the 
village of Kowli in Amraoti district in 1901; or Dharmaji 
Ramaji, who travelled through the villages of the Deccan, 
distributing pamphlets which told the ryots ’how we have all 
fallen victims to the religious tyranny of the Brahman*, and 
exhorted them to rise against this tyranny, gradually created 
among the peasants a desire for equality of status with the 
elite castes-®-^.
Yet it would be a mistake to attribute the ferment among 
the peasants of Maharashtra solely to the agitational activity 
of the Satya Shodak Sama.j. The kunbi awakening was part of a 
wider process which affected all the castes and classes of 
Maharashtra. Behind this awakening lay the growing belief 
that progress and prosperity and social mobility were
16
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desirable and attainable; that the lower and middle castes 
could improve their status through hard work and rational 
endeavour; and that the key to self-advancement lay in educa­
tion, and in the pursuit of careers in the public service or 
the liberal professions, which had for so long been monopol­
ised by the Brahmin castes. Consider, for instance, the 
advice given to his caste-fellows by the President of TThe 
Third Educational and Social Conference of the Reddies of 
Bombay Province* in 1910. Welcoming the growth of a new 
caste consciousness among the Reddies, fwith a view to uplift 
ourselves socially and to devise means for the spread of edu­
cation amongst usf, the President exhorted his castemen to 
pursue the path of loyalty to the British Government, demand­
ing in return for this loyalty special facilities for educa­
tion and recruitment in the public service. ’1t is very easy 
to scoff at office seeking,’ the President stated, ’but in 
the particular circumstances in which we are situated, the 
bestowal of office would, apart from the good it directly 
does to the recipient, give hope and infuse energy into 
other members of the community and make them strive their 
utmost, not only to get themselves educated, but to spread 
education among their clansmen.’!?
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The intellectual climate of Maharashtra under British 
aegis undermined the values which had formerly reconciled the 
lower and middle castes to an inferior social status; and the 
imminent devolution of power combined with this change to 
unleash a profound conflict between the different castes and 
classes, since to be outmanoeuvred in the jockeying for posi­
tions of influence and authority which lay ahead meant total 
insignificance for a social group. So far as the rural 
classes were concerned, however, their desire for power was 
reinforced by the emergence of a rich peasantry through the 
economic policies pursued by the British Government. Having 
accumulated wealth through the opportunities thrown open to 
them under British rule, the rich peasants sought for them­
selves a position in keeping with their newly acquired 
economic status. Their ambition was the driving force behind 
the anti-Brahmin movement which sought to wrest social and 
political control from the Brahmins. Witness the representa­
tion made by the Deccan Ryots* Association in 1918 for sep­
arate electorates for the agricultural classes in the new 
legislatures that were to come into existence under dyarchy. 
While the Ryots* Association claimed to represent all the 
peasants, its social base is obvious from the demand that the
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rural vote be limited to rich peasants *who paid Rs .48 or 
more as land revenue’^ .
The ryots* demand for separate electorates in 1918 
represents a high water mark in the tension between the 
Brahmin and the non-Brahmin castes of Maharashtra. Behind 
this demand lay two factors: the growth of a rich peasantry 
anxious to transform its economic gains into political power; 
and the conflict unleashed between the different castes and 
classes through the interjection of popular democracy into 
their midst. However, the social consensus which character­
ised Maharashtra prevented the tension arising through the 
introduction of representative institutions from creating 
any deep cleavages in the community. That this consensus had 
not been undermined under British rule was largely due to the 
conservative social vision of Elphinstone, and the cautious 
liberalism of Ranade, the two most creative influences to im­
pinge upon Maharashtra in the nineteenth century. The per­
sistence of a consensus despite the stresses and strains of 
modernisation set the pattern for the development of 
Maharashtra in the twentieth century. It also determined the 
moderation of the anti-Brahmin movement in the region before
18
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and after 1947; and the ultimate success with which the dom­
inant rural caste of kunbis was able to forge a creative 
political alliance with social groups like the Brahmins, on 
the one hand, and the Mahars, on the other. Maharashtra 
stands unique in India in her political stability; and in the 
absence of the frustrating tensions which characterise rela­
tions between classes and castes in other parts of the 
country. Her stability is an eloquent tribute to the relig­
ious reformers who shaped her destiny during the time of 
troubles under the shadow of Islam; and to the patriots and 
administrators who handled with such consummate skill and 
far-sighted vision the heritage bequeathed to them by the 
Saints and Prophets of Maharashtra.
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CHAPTER XX
RETROSPECT
Between the downfall of Baji Rao Peshwa in 1818, and the 
rich peasants’ demand for an appropriate political status in 
the reformed constitution of 1918, there intervened a century 
of social and political change in Maharashtra. I have 
attempted to focus attention on the implications and the 
quality of this transformation, and to trace its connection 
with the social ideals and the political objectives which 
inspired the new rulers of Maharashtra, and shaped their 
administrative policy. My attempt to look up social and 
political change in Maharashtra during the nineteenth cen­
tury as a consequence of the interaction between the social 
organisation which prevailed in 1818, and the policies of the 
new rulers, involved a search for the answers to a series of 
questions: What were the factors of conflict and consensus 
in Maharashtra before the British conquest? What were the 
values which sustained the community and shaped its spiritual 
and secular outlook? How did the new rulers look upon this 
society? To what extent did they agree with its moral
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suppositions? and in what respect did they desire to modify 
these suppositions? Were there any conflicts of opinion 
within the British administration? If so, how were these 
c onflicts resolved? How did the policies of the British Gov­
ernment affect the structure of Maharashtrian society? What 
were the new conflicts and cleavages it created in the com­
munity? How did it proceed to heal these cleavages? Did 
British rule bring about any change in social values, and 
in the complexion of the dominant social groups? And 
finally, what were the characteristics of the new society 
which emerged out of a century of innovation and reform?
The two striking features of Maharashtra in 1818 were 
the social consensus which tied class and caste in a close 
intellectual relationship; and the extent to which the 
Brahmins in general, and the Chitpavans in particular, dom­
inated the rest of the community. The consensus between the 
high and low castes stemmed from the bhakti movement which 
expressed the Brahmanical values of advaita in a folk litera­
ture of great simplicity and emotive power, and thereby 
gained the allegiance of social groups which were not directly 
influenced by the great tradition of Hinduism. The bhakti 
upsurge bound the lowly kunbi and the bigoted Brahmin in a 
close bond of religious values, mitigating the tensions which 
characterised the relationship between these social groups in
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regions such as Tamil Nad where Brahmanical values and popu­
lar religion were based on different, and even conflicting 
systems of religious philosophy. However, while the consen­
sus between the high and low castes was deliberately fostered 
by the Saints and Prophets of Maharashtra in order to meet 
the challenge of Islam, the extent of Brahmanical dominance 
over the community flowed from the purely fortuitous seizure 
of power by the Chitpavans in the person of their 
caste-fellow, Balaji Vishwanath. As an elite which monopol­
ised the function of priesthood, and looked upon itself as 
the guardian of the traditions of Hindu society, the Brahmin 
caste enjoyed a unique position throughout the country. But 
by seizing political power in Maharashtra, the Chitpavan 
Brahmins reinforced their dominance over the rest of the 
community. Since the Peshwas, in addition, created a land­
owning aristocracy from members of their caste in order to 
buttress their position, the Chitpavans enjoyed a position of 
unparalleled ascendency over Maharashtra before the events of 
1818 transferred authority into the hands of the British Gov­
ernment •
The institution of caste and the consensus linking the 
kunbi with the Brahmin were both intimately connected with 
the lack of progress and mobility in Maharashtra before the 
British conquest. But while there was little change in the
512
over all values and structure of society before 1818, it 
would be wrong to assume that the relative position of the 
castes and classes within the community was not capable of 
any alteration. Conflict between one social group and 
another was a normal feature of the social system, and the 
displacement of one caste by another in a position of domin­
ance was a frequent occurrence. The eclipse of the fkshtriyaT 
house of Shivaji by the Brahmin Peshwas, and the long stand­
ing feud between the Brahmin castes and the Kayasth Prabhus, 
bear witness to this. But since these conflicts rested on 
moral presuppositions revolving around the institutions of a 
traditional polity, the antagonism between the different 
social groups reinforced, instead of weakening, the values of 
Hinduism, and it contributed to the stability and cohesion of 
Maharashtrian society.
Underlying the lack of progress and mobility in 
Maharashtra before 1818 lay a collective pattern of social 
organisation which encouraged co-operation and mutual assis­
tance between individuals, and which stiffled that spirit of 
competition which forms the basis of progress and mobility.
In the urban world, caste organisations imposed a rigorous 
code of social behaviour on the individual, and shaped his 
relations, on the one hand with the political authorities, and 
on the other with his caste fellows. Rural society was
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similarly controlled by institutions like the village com­
munity and the iatha t which were interposed between the 
kunbi and the State. The role of the village community in 
shielding the peasant from the arbitrary exercise of politi­
cal authority, and in regulating the ryotTs fiscal obliga­
tions to the State, is well known to students of Indian 
history. But it has been overlooked that caste organisations 
played a similar role in urban society. The distribution of 
the dakshina by the leaders of the Brahmin community; and the 
undertaking by the artisan and commercial castes to pay a 
collective mohturfa to the State, which was then distributed 
amongst individual caste members, focusses attention on the 
secular functions of caste organisations. The point to be 
emphasised about these urban and rural institutions is the 
premium they put on stability as against progress; and the 
extent to which they discouraged attempts at self-improvement. 
Both the village community and the urban castes distributed 
the tax they had contracted to pay to the State amongst their 
members with reference to an individual’s ability to contri­
bute to the collective obligations, rather than as a fixed 
proportion of his gross income. As a result, the peasant and 
the urban craftsman were unable to accumulate the capital 
necessary for sustained economic growth.
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The notions of social equity which prevailed in 
Maharashtra before 181.8 approved of a system of taxation 
which was based on a collective pattern of social organisa­
tion, and which reduced inequalities in incomes to a mini­
mum. This was particularly true of rural society, where ac­
cumulations of capital were rare, and where differences in 
status found expression in social styles rather than in stan­
dards of living. Both the weight of the tax on land, and the 
manner in which the village communities distributed it amongst 
their members, reduced the majority of the peasants to a 
level of bare subsistence, and precluded the possibility of 
striking inequalities in incomes. The absence of sharp 
economic cleavages reinforced the consensus stemming from the 
bhakti orders that linked the entire community in a texture 
of common religious values. These two factors interacted with 
and reinforced one another, and they were responsible for the 
cohesion and stability which characterised society in 
Maharashtra before the British conquest.
The conservative administrators who were entrusted with 
the pacification of Maharashtra after 1818 faced a task beset 
with serious difficulties. This was so because of their 
social vision, and the values which inspired their
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administrative policy. The conservatism of Elphinstone, who 
represented an influential school of British administrators 
in the Deccan, did not lead him to an indiscriminate defence 
of the status quo, since he regarded innovation and reform as 
an inevitable and even necessary part of the social process. 
But he also subscribed to the view that to be meaningful and 
effective, reform had to premise itself on the enduring moral 
suppositions of a community, and to establish a creative rela­
tionship between the past which it was seeking to undo, and 
the future which it was attempting to create. Natural as 
opposed to artificial innovation, Elphinstone believed, was 
based on the principle of continuity in the processes of 
change; and he regarded progress as an affirmation and ful­
filment of the ideals and objectives which formed the moral 
basis of a community.
The Deccan presented a dilemma to Elphinstone because of 
his views on social change; and on the intimate relationship 
between the moral suppositions of a polity, and its social 
and political institutions. The caste organisation of soci­
ety, which institutionalised inequalities in spiritual and 
secular status; a bureaucracy which was not subject to legal 
and rational restraints; and an economic order which 
achieved stability and cohesion at the cost of progress, were 
all morally repugnant to Elphinstone, and opposed to the
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values which he cherished. Yet he could hardly initiate the 
changes which he considered desirable and essential without 
doing violence to the principle of ’natural1 innovation, and 
without forcing the pace of orderly progress.
To avoid creating any tension between the Brahmins and 
the British Government, Elphinstone extended his support to 
the dakshina and the Hindu College, in the first instance for 
the support of traditional values, but with the ultimate 
objective of winning over the Brahmin elite to the liberal 
and rational ideals of the West. The intellectual develop­
ment which Elphinstone envisaged for Maharashtra stemmed from 
his conservative vision of social progress, and his compre­
hension of the role of Brahmins in Hindu society. He was 
convinced that any attempt to disregard their position as the 
intellectual leaders of the community would alienate them 
from the British Government, and reinforce their attachment 
to traditional values in a gesture of defiance to the alien 
rulers of the land. On the other hand, once their position 
was recognised, it was possible for the Brahmin castes to be 
won over to western values, and to support the social ideals 
and the political objectives of the British Government. Such 
a transformation would put an end to the dominance of Brahmins 
which weighed so heavily on the lower and middle castes, and 
stood as an insurmountable obstacle in the way of progress.
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But since the initiative for the change would come from 
westernised Brahmins who had rejected traditional Hinduism, 
it would not breed any antagonism, either between the State 
and the intellectual leaders of the community, or between 
these leaders and their followers.
Though the response of the Brahmin castes to a policy 
of gradualism differed in some respects from the reaction 
anticipated by Elphinstone, his success in winning over a 
section of the caste to western values without raising any 
serious problems of alienation, and without undermining the 
consensus which had characterised Maharashtra under the old 
order, was quite remarkable. But if Elphinstone achieved 
considerable success in the intellectual sphere, the reverse 
was true of his attempt to remould the Maratha bureaucracy, 
and reform the Maratha land revenue system, in tune with the 
requirements and the objectives of a modern State. The use 
of traditional institutions for modernising Maharashtra was 
in fact impossible. For it involved their exploitation for 
objectives that were not only different but were contradic­
tory to the purposes for whose realisation they had been 
created. The Maratha State stood for prescriptive status and 
social stability; in its place Elphinstone wanted to create a 
polity resting on economic progress and social mobility. 
Between the two, and between the institutions necessary to 
secure their objectives, there was little in common.
The futility of ElphinstoneTs attempt to use traditional 
institutions for the creation of a modern State is highlighted 
in his failure to preserve the status of the deshmukh and the 
patel, who had maintained the Peshwafs peace, and who played 
an important part in the collection of land revenue. The 
unique position enjoyed by these officers stemmed from the 
traditional dominance which they exercised over rural society, 
and the de jure recognition of this dominance by the Maratha 
State. In an administration devoid of legal restraints, the 
patel and the deshmukh were successful in acting simultan­
eously as spokesmen for the peasants and the State, and in 
reconciling the interests of the political authority with 
those of the village communities. But the moment Elphinstone 
drew up a code of Regulations which transformed the patels and 
deshmukhs into the instruments of a rational bureaucracy, he 
undermined their traditional ties with the peasants, and 
alienated them from the communities which had formerly 
accepted their leadership. The creation of a rational admin­
istration weakened the authority of the traditional leaders 
of village society, and in combination with other changes (of 
which more later), it created the conditions for the rise of 
a new dominant group in rural Maharashtra.
Elphinstone attempted to achieve the impossible, and 
failed. But the radical administrators who succeeded him
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deliberately set about to substitute the collective quality 
of rural society by an individualistic and competitive en­
vironment in the hope of setting Maharashtra on the path to 
progress and prosperity. Besides his concern for continuity 
in the processes of change, a conservative like Elphinstone 
looked upon society as an organism embracing conflicting 
social groups in a state of equilibrium whose wanton destruc­
tion would result in moral anarchy and social disintegration. 
For the Utilitarians who succeeded him, however, prescription 
and status held no significance whatsoever; and they regarded 
collective institutions like the village community and the 
;i at ha as obstacles in the way of progress. Under their 
aegis, therefore, a system of land revenue in which the .jatha 
and the village community played an important part had to 
give way to the ryotwari system, which revolved around a 
direct contractual relationship between the individual ryot 
and the State without the interposition of any intermedia­
ries. The Utilitarians simultaneously replaced the egalita­
rian basis on which the land-tax had formerly been computed 
by a rational criterion which favoured the accumulation of 
capital by the more affluent peasants, and sought to promote 
economic growth in rural society.
The ryotwari system of land revenue was the lynch-pin of 
the Age of Reform in Maharashtra. Its advocates sought to
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liberate the peasants from their obligations to the ,j at ha and 
the village community, since they believed that these obliga­
tions prevented the peasants from seeking individual gain, 
and discouraged them from making the effort necessary to im­
prove their economic conditions. The proponents of reform 
looked forward to the growth of a class of rich peasants 
whose emergence would put an end to the climate of stagnation 
in rural society. In contrast to the Maratha system of land 
revenue, which fell heavily on the more prosperous peasants, 
the ryotwari system taxed rich and poor peasants on a uniform 
basis, thereby seeking to create a dominant rural class whose 
accumulations of capital, and desire for acquisition, would* 
form the basis for a steady improvement in agricultural 
productivity. The Utilitarians justified their revenue 
policy on both theoretical and practical grounds. The laws 
of political economy (as embodied in the Ricardian notion of 
rent) demonstrated that it was equitable that rich peasants, 
who owned fertile land, should enjoy higher returns than poor 
peasants, whose fields were of a poor quality. Expediency 
supported a similar course of action, since by protecting the 
interests of the rich peasants the Government would secure 
the loyalty of a class whose dominance over rural society 
would ensure the stability of British rule over Maharashtra.
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The presuppositions underlying the policy of Utilitarian 
reform were only partly justified by the consequences of the 
ryotwari system of land revenue, and the legal and rational 
administration, which formed the basis of the new order in 
Maharashtra. Barely half a century after the British con­
quest, , the village communities which had till 1818 defied 
the ravages of time, and the free-wheeling Maratha bureau­
cracy (a no less formidable opponent), stood fragmented into 
antagonistic functional groups, and were divested of much of 
their former cohesion and vitality. True, the growth of a 
small class of rich peasants, whose desire for acquisition 
and ostentatious style of life created the illusion of 
all round improvement in rural society, appeared to vindicate 
the policy of the Utilitarian reformers. But the benefits 
flowing to the community from the emergence of this class 
were completely over-shadowed by the disadvantages arising out 
of the diminution in the authority of the Patels and the 
deshmukhs, who had sustained the village community, and had 
infused it with the vitality, self-sufficiency and ability to 
look after its affairs that were its most important attributes.
The disastrous consequences of a land revenue policy 
based on the twin principles of rationality and individualism 
are seen at their clearest in the decline of the traditional 
leaders of village society. The situation was further
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aggravated through the seizure of social power in the 
villages by sowcars and vanis whose caste values prevented 
them from participating in agricultural production, and who 
preferred a parasitical role in the rural economy. Even 
before the British take-over, the vanis had occupied an im­
portant position in rural society, and had advanced capital 
to the ryots to enable them to carry out their agricultural 
operations, and to pay their taxes to the State. But despite 
the important role they played in the rural economy, the 
moneylenders were not a dominant social group, because of the 
strength and cohesion of the ryots organised into communities, 
and due to the nature of the Maratha judicial system, which 
favoured the kunbis as against the vanis. With the atomisa­
tion of the village community through the ryotwari system, 
and the establishment of a judiciary based on laissez-faire 
principles, the position was reversed. The ryot now confront­
ed the vani as an individual rather than as a member of an 
organised community; while a judiciary which inadvertently 
favoured the pretensions of the vani served to heighten his 
social impotence. All this led to a drastic redistribution 
of power in rural society, with the vani replacing the patel 
and the deshmukh as the dominant element in the village.
The transfer of dominance from the kunbis to the vanis 
created a serious tension in the villages of the Deccan, and
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it undermined the cohesion which had formerly held the 
village community together. The peasants conveyed their 
social frustration, and their resentment of the dominance of 
the vanis, to the British Government through representations 
which protested against the iniquity of the new Courts of 
Law, and denounced the oppression of the vanis. But British 
administrators were far too committed to Utilitarian prin­
ciples and laissez-faire values, to adopt any new course of 
policy. Commitment to abstract ideas did not obscure the 
vision of District Officers whose intimate knowledge of rural 
society, and the tensions breeding within it, made them 
sceptical of a rational economic policy and a bureaucratic 
system of administration. But the attempt of such officers 
to support the ryots through administrative and judicial re­
forms proved abortive because of the doctrinaire views which 
prevailed in the seats of authority remote from the villages.
As a result of the build-up of tension within the vil­
la ges, the Deccan went ablaze in 1875 y when a frustrated and 
enraged peasantry suddenly rose against the moneylenders to 
divest them of the title deeds and mortgage bonds in which 
it saw the principal instruments of oppression. The antag­
onism between the kunbis and the vanis was not the only 
factor behind the Deccan Riots of 1875. An economic depres­
sion which followed the all too brief stimulus given to the
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agrarian economy by the American Civil War: a series of 
ill-timed, and inefficiently executed, revenue surveys which 
raised the burden of tax on the poor cultivators: the 
propaganda conducted by the traditional leaders of village 
society, and reinforced by the agitation launched by a new 
elite (of which more later) seeking to establish itself in 
the affections of the peasantry, all contributed to heighten 
the tension which erupted in 1875- But the involvement of 
the kunbis and vanis in the Deccan Riots, to the exclusion of 
other social groups in the village, makes it clear that these 
factors merely served to highlight what was the most irrecon­
cilable antagonism in rural society.
The Deccan Riots of 1875 revealed the bankruptcy of the 
Utilitarian programme of reform. They simultaneously under­
mined the faith of the advocates of reform in the efficacy 
of their social vision. Admittedly, policies based on 
rationality and individualism had undermined the stagnation 
which had characterised rural society before 18.18, and had 
stimulated the rise of a small class of rich peasants. But 
the Utilitarians had hardly bargained for the growth of a 
powerful vani class which exploited the peasantry without 
contributing anything to agricultural production. Instead of
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creating the conditions for stability and progress, the pro­
ponents of reform had on their hands a rural society frag­
mented into antagonistic social groups, and incapable of mak­
ing any sustained effort to raise agricultural production.
The social and economic consequences of Utilitarian reform 
were disturbing in themselves; but its political implications 
were even more disquieting. The class of rich peasants which 
had grown up since 1818 was far too insignificant a social 
group to provide a firm base for British rule over Maharashtra. 
Rural society was dominated instead by the vanis and sowcars. 
But their dominance bred antagonism instead of order; and it 
created conditions which could (vice 1875) precipitate a 
violent conflict, not only between the peasants and the vanis, 
but also between the peasants and the political authority 
which the kunbis blamed for the growth of an oppressive vani 
class.
After the upsurge of 1875 the British Government, there­
fore, sought to foster the interests of those ryots for whom 
the decay of the village community, a rational economic 
policy, and the growth of a bureaucratic administration had 
only brought forth exploitation at the hands of the vanis and 
the sowcars. The propagation of new notions of progress and 
change about this time by Maine and West provided British 
administrators with a new insight into Hindu society, and
helped them understand the reasons why the Utilitarian pro­
gramme of reform had failed so disastrously. According to 
Maine, social evolution was a phenomenon embracing the orderly 
progress of a community from one epoch to another, each epoch 
being characterised by a unique set of social and political 
institutions. Because of his evolutionary view of progress, 
Maine looked upon the Utilitarian bid to transform Hindu 
society from a community based on prescription and collectiv­
ism to one resting on individualism and rationality as an 
attempt doomed to failure. Utilitarian notions of law and 
government were relevant only to the advanced communities of 
the West. Their application to a retarded community was 
bound to create new antagonisms and new tensions in Hindu 
society•
Maine’s belief in the intimate connection between the 
maturity of a society, and the nature of its social and 
political institutions, reinforced the political argument 
for the extension of support to the ryots of the Deccan, and 
encouraged the Bombay Government to reform the legal system 
in order to curb the growing power of the vanis. The notion 
of freedom of Contract, for instance, was central to the 
Utilitarian view of a progressive community, and it formed 
the basis of the Courts of Law instituted after 1818. How­
ever, administrators who took their cue from Maine looked
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upon this principle as apposite only to the advanced com­
munities of the West, The application of freedom of Contract 
to Hindu society, which was based on prescription, could only 
result in chaos and confusion. Since this prognosis was vin­
dicated by the events of 1875? the Bombay Government accepted 
the remedy advocated by the Maine school for the rural prob­
lem, and placed a partial interdict on the freedom of land 
transfers through the Deccan Agriculturists* Relief Act of 
18 79> which attempted to throw the weight of the law in 
favour of the cultivators as opposed to the moneylenders.
But the Relief Act of 1879 was based on a limited view 
of the rural situation, and it overlooked the problems of 
rural finance which lay at the root of the kunbi’s troubles. 
While it is true that a legal system based on laissez-faire 
principles supported the ambitions of the vanis, the fact 
remained that the vanis played an important role in rural 
society by providing the ryots with credit for financing 
their agricultural operations. Through imposing a partial 
interdict on the transfer of land, the Relief Act deprived 
the cultivators of the only possession which made it worth 
while for the vanis to advance them money. It therefore 
interfered with that flow of credit from the moneylender to 
the cultivator which was essential for the prosperity of 
rural society. Ironically enough, the Relief Act curtailed
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the credit of the poor peasants to a far greater extent than 
the credit of the rich peasants, since the goodwill of the 
latter was dependent upon their general prosperity, and they 
could even after 1879 persuade the vanis to advance them 
money. Despite the legal protection which it afforded to the 
peasants, the Relief Act therefore failed to improve the con­
dition of the poor peasants for whose benefit it had been 
primarily enacted.
The failure of the Relief Act to improve rural condi­
tions turned the attention of the British Government to the 
problems of rural finance, and to the quality of social en­
vironment in village society likely to maximise production. 
Practically all British administrators conceded that the 
kunbi had to be protected from legal exploitation by the 
vanis; but it was equally obvious that a measure which ensur­
ed this would not suffice by itself. In fact, legislative 
enactments (like the Relief Act) which struck indiscriminately 
at the moneylenders created more problems than they solved, 
since in supporting the kunbi they tended to drain the 
sources of capital on which he was dependent for the cultiva­
tion of his fields. For conservative officials like Nicholson 
and Dupernex the rural problem was far more complex than the 
Maine school had led itself to believe, since it impinged, on 
the one hand, on the decay of the village community, and on
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the other, on the spread of the acquisitive spirit which had 
been deliberately encouraged by the Utilitarian reformers. 
Under Maratha rule the sowcar had lent money to the village 
community instead of individual ryots, and the strength of 
this institution had prevented the moneylender from embarking 
upon a career of exploitation. Since the ryotwari system 
obliged the cultivator to borrow money directly from the vani, 
the latter was now in a position to establish his dominance 
over the former. The acquisitiveness fostered by the Utili­
tarians added to the gravity of the situation, since it dis­
couraged the cultivators from helping each other in times of 
distress, and weakened the spirit of mutual assistance which 
had formerly flourished in rural society.
To break through this vicious circle Nicholson and 
Dupernex recommended the adoption of co-operation along the 
lines of the Raiffeissen movement in Germany. The organisa­
tion of the peasants in co-operative societies, they argued, 
would not only restore the flow of credit to the kunbis, but 
it would revive the corporate spirit and encourage that sub­
ordination of individual gain to collective prosperity which 
had characterised the village community before the Utilita­
rian deluge. As a member of a credit association the ryot 
would strengthen his position vis-a-vis the vanis; and he 
would at the same time proclaim his preference for the
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principle of association to that of acquisition. A success­
ful co-operative movement would revive the values of 
non-acquisition which had flourished in the villages of the 
Deccan before 1818, and it would create a prosperous society 
of peasants basing their progress on mutual assistance rather 
than on competition* However, the advocates of co-operation 
based their expectations on a mistaken notion of the extent 
to which individualism had taken hold of rural society, and 
the degree to which rational considerations of gain determin­
ed the behaviour of the peasants. The credit societies estab­
lished with official assistance came to be dominated in a very 
short space of time by the more affluent peasants in the 
villages, who utilised their funds for their personal gain, 
rather than for the benefit of the rural community as a whole. 
Like the Relief Act, therefore, co-operation reduced the 
power of the vanis by opening a new source of credit for the 
ryots, and by giving them the strength which comes from organ­
isation. But also like the Relief Act, the opportunities 
which it offered reinforced the position of the affluent 
peasants, rather than of the peasant community as a whole.
By the opening decades of the twentieth century, therefore, 
rural society in the Deccan was dominated by a class of rich 
peasants who owed their prosperity to the economic policies 
pursued by the British Government. These rich peasants
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played a vital role in the political life of the community.
No less significant than the growth of the rich peasants 
was the emergence of the new Brahmins who gradually displaced 
the old style shastris and pandits as the intellectual 
leaders of the community, and who usurped the secular role 
that had given the traditional elite a position of unique 
importance in the affairs of Hindu society. Partly because 
of the consensus which characterised Maharashtra before 1818, 
and partly due to Elphinstonefs policy of educational reform, 
which stemmed from a deep insight into the intellectual 
quality of Hindu society, the rise of the new Brahmins was 
not accompanied by any crisis comparable to the agrarian dis­
turbances of 1875» Elphinstone had acted on the assumption 
that the recognition of the intellectual predominance of the 
Brahmins over the rest of the community, and the gradual 
introduction of rational disciplines in the schools and 
colleges where they were educated, would create a class of 
liberal Brahmins who would share the social ideals and the 
political objectives of the British Government, and who would 
play a creative role in bridging the gulf between the State 
and the Hindu community. His vision was vindicated when 
barely three decades after the British conquest, the Brahmin
community had split into liberal and orthodox factions, of 
which the former looked up to the British Government for 
support, and sought to transform Maharashtra into a progres­
sive society resting on the twin principles of social equal­
ity and popular democracy.
While new Brahmins like Ranade were cast in an intellec­
tual mould fashioned by Elphinstone, it does not follow that 
their rise to positions of leadership did not present the 
British Government with problems of authority and order, or 
that their dominance was not challenged by any social group 
from within Hindu society. Since they looked upon themselves 
as the heirs of the Chitpavan elite which had ruled over 
Maharashtra before 1818, and because they subscribed to the 
same values which inspired the new rulers of Maharastra, the 
new Brahmins expected the British Government to sympathise 
with their aspirations, and to transfer political authority 
into their hands as they increased in numbers and strengthen­
ed their hold over the rest of the community. Elphinstone, 
to do him credit, had anticipated such a development; and had 
held that the emergence of a liberal elite dedicated to pro­
gress, and believing in the virtues of representative govern­
ment, would spell the fulfilment and the end of British rule 
over India. But his views were the reverse of popular with 
a majority of British civilians in India, and conservative
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politicians in England, who subscribed to the authoritarian 
ideas expressed by Fitzjames Stephen. Though they were 
products of the English enlightenment, and firmly committed 
to liberal values, the new Brahmins therefore clashed with 
the British Government on the question of devolution of 
power, until the latter substituted the authoritarianism of 
a Fitzjames Stephen for the liberalism of an Elphinstone.
But opposition to the new Brahmins did not only come 
from authoritarian civilians and politicians. Since the con­
cepts of social equality and popular democracy which they 
promoted tended to undermine the institution of caste, and 
destroy Brahmanical supremacy, the Brahmin community looked 
upon their programme of social action with considerable hos­
tility. Given the choice, the Brahmins of Maharashtra would 
have preferred to follow their traditional leaders, who re­
jected progress and change, and clung to values which assured 
the supremacy of the Brahmin caste. But the inability of the 
traditional leaders to perform their secular role with any 
measure of adequacy in the political climate generated under 
British aegis compelled the Brahmin community to turn to a 
group of new Brahmins who reconciled progress with Brahmanical 
supremacy, and who saw no contradiction between popular democ­
racy and the institution of caste. The ’orthodox* new 
Brahmins shared the political objectives of the liberal new
Brahmins. But unlike the latter, they refused to countenance 
social action designed to destroy the traditional structure 
of Hindu society. Since they did not attack Brahmanical 
supremacy, and because they believed that political emancipa­
tion could be achieved without social reform, the orthodox 
new Brahmins enjoyed a popularity in the Brahmin community 
which was denied to their liberal antagonists.
The objectives of the orthodox new Brahmins set them in 
opposition to the non-Brahmin elites, who looked upon Brahmin 
supremacy as the greatest obstacle in the progress of Hindu 
society, and who apprehended the transfer of political 
authority into the hands of the Brahmin community. But while 
a liberal education had destroyed the faith of the 
non-Brahmin elites in the institution of caste, the majority 
of the non-Brahmins, of whom the kunbis comprised the single 
biggest group, were far too attached to caste values to take 
any serious notice of what they preached. PhuleTs fulmina­
tions against the joshis and kulkarnis « for instance, made 
little immediate impact, because during the agrarian dis­
turbances of 1875 the kunbis refrained from attacking the 
Brahmin moneylenders, of whom there were a considerable 
number. The consideration shown by the peasants in 1875 to 
the Brahmin moneylenders is clear proof of their attachment 
to caste values, and their cheerful acceptance of their
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prescriptive status. However, those peasants who had grown 
into a rich and dominant class by the opening decades of the 
twentieth century refused to acquiesce in their traditional 
status, and sought to transform their wealth into political 
power. Their search for a place in the sun found expression 
in the non-Brahmin movement of Maharastra. But the intellec­
tual and religious ties between the Brahmins and kunbis 
prevented this movement from acquiring the virulence it 
assumed in other regions (e.g., Tamil Nad). Consensus, 
rather than conflict, dominated political life in Maharashtra, 
and contributed to a political stability and co-operation 
between castes and classes which stands unique in India.
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(iii) Commerce Department Proceedings from 1871 to 1914
(iv) Legislative Department Proceedings from 1818 to 1914
(v) Survey of India from 1818 to 1914
2. Bombay State Archives:
The following series of records were consulted at the 
Bombay State Archives for the years 1818 to 1914«
(i) Proceedings of the Revenue Department
(ii) Proceedings of the Judicial Department
(iii) Proceedings of the Education Department
(iv) Proceedings of the Secret and Political Department
(v) Proceedings of the Public Works Department
(vi) Proceedings of the Ecclesiastical Department
3. Peshwafs Daftar, Poona:
The administrative and judicial records available at the 
Peshwa’s Daftar under the heading ’The Deccan Commission­
er’s Files ’ .
B. PRIVATE PAPERS
1. The private papers of G.K. Gokhale which I was permitted 
to see by the courtesy of Shri D.V. Ambekar of the 
Servants of India Society, Poona.
2. The private papers of Sir F.J. Stephen of which a micro­
film copy is available with the National Archives of 
India, New Delhi.
3. The private papers of Lord Minto of which a microfilm is 
available with the National Archives of India, New Delhi.
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C, PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
1. Selections of Papers from the Records at the East India 
House, Relating to Revenue, Police and Civil and Criminal 
Justice, Under the Company’s Government in India, Vol.
IV, (London, 1828).
2. Papers Relating to Act X of 1904 (Co-operative Credit 
Societies Act), 2 Vols.
3. Selections From Papers on Indebtedness and Land Transfers, 
4 Vols.
4. Papers Relating to the Deccan Agriculturists1 Relief Act 
of 3.879) 2 Vols. Selections From the Records of the Gov­
ernment of India, Home Department, No. 342.
5. F.A. Nicholson, Report Regarding the Possibility of In­
troducing Land and Agricultural Banks Into the Madras 
Presidency, 2 Vols. (Madras, 1895).
6. Report of the Education Commission of 1884? (Calcutta,
1885).
7. Census of India, 1931? Vol. VIII, Part I, Bombay Presi­
dency: General Report (Bombay, 1933) by A.H. Dracup and
H.J* Sorbey.
8. H. Sharp, Selections from Educational Records, Part I, 
1789-1859, (Calcutta, 1920).
D. PUBLICATIONS OF THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT
1. Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. 
4: Report on the Village Communities of the Deccan by 
R.N. Goodine.
2. Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, New 
Series, No. 39: Concealment of the Revenue Records of the 
former Government by Hereditary District Officers.
3. Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, New 
Series, No. 47: Papers Relating to the Deccan Agricultur­
ists’ Relief Act of 1879«
4 . Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, New 
Series, No. 151: Report by Col. J. Francis on the taluka 
of Indapur.
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5. Report of the Committee on the Riots in Poona and 
Ahmednagar, 1875 : (Bombay, 1876), 2 Vols.
6. District Gazeteers of the Bombay Presidency.
7. R.V. Parulekar, Selections from the Education Records of 
the Bombay Government, 4 Vols.
8. G .W.  Forrest, Selections from Letters, Despatches, and 
other State Papers in the Bombay Secretariat: Maratha 
Series, Vol. I, Part III, (Bombay, I 8 8 5 ) .
9. Reports of the Registrars of Co-operative Societies 
from 1905 to 1921.
10. Selections from the Records of the Peshwafs Daftar, 42 
Vols.
11. Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in 
India (Published by the Bombay State Committee):
(i) Vol. I, 1818-1885, (Bombay, 1957)
(ii) Vol. II, 1885-1920, (Bombay, 1958)
E .  PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS
1. House of Commons Vol. 62 of 1887. Correspondence Regard­
ing Agricultural Banks in India.
F . CONTEMPORARY WORKS
1. II. Dupernex, People’s Banks for Northern India, (?).
2. G.W. Forrest, Selections from the Minutes and other Offi­
cial Writings of Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of 
Bombay, (London, 1 8 8 4 ) .
3. G.V. Joshi, Writings and Speeches of the Honourable Rao 
Bahadur G.V. Joshi, (Poona, 1912).
4 . Sir Henry Maine, Lectures in the Early History of Insti­
tutions, (London, 1893)»
5. B.M. Malabari, Notes on Infant Marriage and Enforced 
Widowhood, (Bombay, 188 4).
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6. N.V. Mandlik, Writings and Speeches of the late Honour­
able Vishwanath Narayan Mandlik, (Bombay, 1896).
7. IfP. Minayeff, Travels in and Diaries of India and Burma, 
(trans. by S. Bhattacharya), (Calcutta, ?).
8. M.G. Ranade, (i) Essays in Indian Economics: A Collec­
tion of Essays and Speeches (Bombay,
1895).(ii) Rise of the Maratha Power (Bombay,
1 9 0 0 ) .
(iii) Religious and Social Reform: A Collec­
tion of Essays and Speeches, (Bombay, 
1902) .
(iv) The Miscellaneous Writings of Justice 
M.G. Ranade, (Bombay, 1915).
9. A. Steele, Summary of the Laws and Customs of the Hindoo 
Castes Within the Dekhun Provinces Subject to the Presi­
dency of Bombay, (Bombay, 1827).
10. J.F,. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, (London,
1874).
11. B.G. Tilak, (i) Srimad Bhagavadgita Rahasya, (trans.
by B.S. Suthankar), 2 Vols., (Poona, 
1935).
(ii) His Writings and Speeches (Madras, n.d.).
(iii) Speeches of Bal Ganghadhar Tilak,
(Fyzabad, 1 9 1 3).
G. NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS
1. The Times of India.
2. The Mahratta.
3. The Sudharak.
4 . The Pioneer.
5. Digest of Native Newspapers for Bombay.
1. The Quarterly Journal of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha.
2. The Industrial Quarterly Review of Western India.
3. The Bombay Co-operative Quarterly.
4 . Transactions of the Literary Society of Bombay, 3 Vois., 
1820-23.
5. The Nineteenth Century.
6. The Journal of Asian Studies.
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7. Contemporary Studies in History and Society.
8. The Calcutta Review.
9. The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review.
10. Journal of the Bombay Royal Asiatic Society.
11. The Artha-Vigyana.
Ii. THESES
1. D.K. Garde, Social and Political Thought of the Saints of 
Maharashtra, Thesis submitted to the University of 
Allahabad for the degree of Doctor of Literature, 1956.
2. M. Patterson, A Preliminary Study of the non-Brahmin 
Problem in Maharashtra, M.A. Thesis at the University of 
Pennsylvania, 1952.
I. SECONDARY WORKS
1. D.V. Athalye, The Life of Lokmanya Tilak, (Poona, 1929).
2. J.E. Abbott, The Poet Saints of Maharashtra, 12 Vols., 
(Poona, 1926-41).
3 . K. Ballhatchet, Social Policy and Social Change in West­
ern India, 1817-30, (London, 1957).
4 . R.G. Bhandarkar, A Note on the Age of Remarriage and its 
Consummation According to Hindu Religious Law, (Poona, 
1891).
5. G.C. Bhate, History of Modern Marathi Literature, 1800- 
1938, (Poona, 1939).
6. H. Bhattacharya. The Cultural History of India, 4 Vols., 
(Calcutta, 1956).
7. G.L. Chandavarkar, A Wrestling Soul: Story of the Life of 
Sir Narayan Chandavarkar, (Bombay, 1956).
8. The Speeches and Writings of Sir Narayan G. Chandavarkar, 
(Bombay, 1911).
9. R.D. Choksey, (i) The Aftermath, (Bombay, 1950).
(ii) Economic History of the Bombay Deccan, 
(Poona, 1956).
(iii) The Last Phase, (Bombay, 1948).
(iv) Selections from the Deccan Commis­
sioner’s Files, (Poona, 1945).
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10. T.E. Colebrooke, Life of Honourable Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, 2 Vols., (London, I 8 8 4 ) .
11. W.S. Defaming, Ramdas and the Ramdasis, (Calcutta, 1928).
12. R.E. Enthoven, The Tribes and Castes of Bombay, 3 Vols., 
(Bombay, 1921).
13. R. Gopal, Lokmanya Tilak: A Biography, (Bombay, 1956).
1 4. J. Grant-Duff, A History of the Marathas, (Oxford, 1921).
15. D.G. Karve, Ranade: Prophet of Liberated India,
16. I. Karve, Hindu Society: An Interpretation, (Poona, 1961)
17. J, Kellock, Mahadev Govind Ranade: Patriot and Social 
Servant, (Calcutta, 1926).
18. N.C. Kelkar, Life and Times of Lokmanya Tilak, (trans. by 
D ♦V , Divekar), (Madras, 1928).
19. P.M. Limaye, The History of the Deccan Education Society, 
(Poona, 1935).
20. A.C. Lyall, Asiatic Studies: Religious and Social, 2 Vols 
(London, 1907).
21. J. Martineau, The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle 
Frere, 2 Vols., (London, 1893).
22. J. Muccann, Six Radical Thinkers, (London, 1903).
23. Memorandum from the Samyakta Maharashtra Committee to the 
States Reorganisation Committee.
24* A. Roger, The Land-Revenue System of Bombay, 2 Vols., 
(London, 18 9 2)•
25. G.S. Sardesai, (i) New History of the Marathas, 3 Vols.,
(Bombay, 1946-48).
(ii) The Main Currents of Maratha History, 
(Bombay, 1849).
26. E. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, (Oxford, 
1953).
27. B.H. Tahmankar, Lokmanya Tilak, (London, 1956).
28. H.W# Wolff, Co-operation in India, (London, 1925).
